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Using the ecosystem concept as his starting point, the author examines the 
complex relationship between premodern armed forces and their environ-
ment at three levels: landscapes, living beings, and diseases. The study focuses 
on Europe’s Meuse Region, well-known among historians of war as a battle-
ground between France and Germany. By analyzing soldiers’ long-term inter-
actions with nature, this book engages with current debates about the eco-
logical impact of the military, and provides new impetus for contemporary 
armed forces to make greater effort to reduce their environmental footprint.
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INTRODUCTION
at a hiLL named Sint­Pietersberg, just outside Maastricht, around the year 1780 
labourers digging out limestone found the skull of a large creature resembling a whale 
or giant crocodile. It belonged to an animal that measured fifteen to seventeen metres in 
length. This remarkable specimen, the “Grand Animal de Maastricht,” had reached such 
fame by 1794 that the Commissaires des Sciences et des Arts present with the Army of 
the Sambre and Meuse, which had invaded the Austrian Netherlands to spread the ideas 
of the French Revolution, ordered soldiers to search and confiscate it from its right­
ful owner. They located the skull on November 8, 1794, only four days after the sur­
render of the Dutch garrison of Maastricht.1 It was brought to the newly established 
Muséum national d’histoire naturelle in Paris, where in 1808 the zoo logist George 
Cuvier (1769–1832) identified it as an extinct species of lizard.2
The history of this skull is a well­known event in the history of science, but its semi­
nal nature is somewhat overstated. Dr. Johann Leonhard Hoffmann (1710–1782), direc­
tor of the military hospital of Maastricht, had already come into the possession of similar 
fossils around 1770, and made his observations known through correspondence with 
other scientists.3 It was not until 1829, however, that the mysterious animal was defini­
tively identified: the English geo logist Gideon A. Mantell named it mosasaurus hoffmanni 
in honour of the man who made it famous. “Mosasaurus” literally means “lizard of the 
Meuse.”4 The discovery of these fossils is a landmark in the history of science because 
mosasaurus hoffmanni was one of the first extinct species ever identified. The fact that a 
species could die out implied that the world as it was known in the eighteenth or early 
nineteenth century was different to the one God created. It therefore challenged the gen­
erally accepted worldview at the time and paved the way for the evolutionary theory of 
Charles Darwin.5
The area around Maastricht, and the Sint­Pietersberg in particular, is well known 
for its layers of limestone, which have continued to provide large quantities of fossils 
until this very day. Military men had a key role in the discovery of the mosasaur genus, 
because this landscape had both eco logical and strategic value. Officers of both the 
Dutch and French army expressed considerable interest in the underground network of 
the Sint­Pietersberg because a besieging army might use it to assault the fort, built on 
this hill in 1702, from below (see figure 1). During the siege of 1794 Dutch and French 
1 Lacour, La République naturaliste, 73–80; 105–30; Rompen, “Mosasaurus Hoffmanni,” 37–40; 
van Schaik, De Sint-Pietersberg, 383.
2 Cuvier, “Sur le grand animal fossile.”
3 Faujas de Saint­Fond, Histoire naturelle, 59–67, 215–30; Rompen, “Mosasaurus Hoffmanni,” 37–63; 
van Regteren Altena, “Achttiende­eeuwse verzamelaars”; van Regteren Altena, “Nieuwe gegevens.”
4 Rompen, “Mosasaurus Hoffmanni,” 77–80.
5 Rudwick, Bursting the Limits of Time, 68–70.
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soldiers actually placed explosives in the quarries to attack their adversaries’ positions.6 
The close connection between military and scientific exploration is also reflected in the 
oldest publications dedicated to the Sint­Pietersberg, which were all written by soldiers 
or scientists attached to the military.7
The term “mosasaurs” serves as a suitable metaphor for the following analysis, not 
only for the specific historical circumstances that led to the identification of this genus, 
but also because it suffers from the same stereotyping as armed forces. Mosasaurs, sea 
lizards who lived during the Late Cretaceous Era (101 to 66 million years ago), are com­
monly portrayed as destructive monsters. While this particular species, mosasaurus 
hoffmanni, was in fact a huge and fearsome predator, it is only one member among a 
genus of over forty species, which had an important and complex role in the function­
ing of eco logical systems in which they lived. While the largest mosasaurs ate almost 
everything smaller than themselves, others specialized in eating molluscs, sea urchins, 
gastropods (snails and slugs), or squid. Different species therefore occupied different 
eco logical niches.8 In the same way, there is no doubt that armies can adopt the shape of 
6 Notermans, Fort Sint-Pieter, 23–25; van Schaik, De Sint-Pietersberg, 380–88; van Regteren Altena, 
“Achttiende­eeuwse verzamelaars,” 107.
7 Bory de Saint­Vincent, Description; Faujas de Saint­Fond, Natuurlijke historie, vii–viii; Mathieu, 
“Notice sur les orgues géo logiques.”
8 Schulp, “On Maastricht Mosasaurs,” 99–111.
Figure 1. Map of the Sint­Pietersberg and Fort Sint­Pieter, late eighteenth century 
(Faujas de Saint­Fond, Natuurlijke historie).
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large destructive forces of tens of thousands of armed persons who destroy everything 
in their wake, but as with the mosasauridae genus, this is only one aspect of a multifac­
eted being.
This book considers interactions between armed forces and their surroundings 
from a long­term perspective, more specifically the region of the Meuse river (or Maas 
in Dutch and German) in the period from 1250 to 1850 as the river flows from northern 
France through modern­day Belgium and the Netherlands into the North Sea at Rot­
terdam. It argues that armies’ conscious and concerted protection and conservation of 
ecosystems predates the rise of environmentalism by several centuries, and that this 
supposedly modern behaviour is just one element in a complex web of interconnections 
between armed forces and eco logical systems. In fact, the eco logical impacts of armies, 
past or present, can only be understood when one distinguishes between long­ and 
short­term effects.
Studying the reciprocal impacts between armies and ecosystems means analyzing 
exchanges between ecosystems in general and one of their specific components. In more 
practical terms this means highlighting interventions by armed forces, while acknowl­
edging that many factors, natural as well as cultural, contributed to actual eco logical 
results. As this book argues that historical armed forces had a significant impact on eco­
logical systems, it needs to demonstrate that a certain eco logical consequence would not 
have occurred, if armies had not intervened.
By drawing attention to armed forces’ historical role in the preservation of ecosys­
tems, this book contributes to current debates about the eco logical impact, the “envi­
ronmental footprint,” of military forces. These discussions date back to the 1960s and 
particularly the Second Indochina or Vietnam War (1955–1975), which saw the massive 
use of pesticides (the infamous Agent Orange). This fuelled an increasingly powerful 
peace movement, and also prompted some of the first academic studies on the eco­
logical effects of warfare. Arthur H. Westing, a bio logist who saw active service in the U.S. 
army, played a pioneering role in this regard. He was one of the first researchers to study 
environmental destruction in wartime and the need to devise measures to prevent, or at 
least reduce, these effects.9
By the late 1980s and early 1990s environmental organizations went a step further 
and criticized armed forces’ role in large­scale pollution and environmental degrada­
tion in both war and peace. The continuous connection of such critics with the peace 
movement is made clear by a small German edited volume from 1988, which is titled 
Natur ohne Frieden, “Nature without Peace.” The cover page depicts a tank riding down 
a tree with a peace dove flying over it.10 Conservationists were also quick to make com­
parisons with historical examples. Gerd Schuster, editor of the journal Natur, argued 
that “a mentality of medi eval mercenaries governs at least the higher echelons of the 
(West) German Army.” Another journalist equated that same army with “medi eval rob­
9 Westing, Warfare in a Fragile World.
10 Achilles, ed., Natur ohne Frieden; Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment”; Skrotzky, 
Guerres; van Mourik, van Teijlingen, and Vertegaal, De natuur onder vuur.
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ber barons.”11 The presumed similarity to medi eval mercenaries is of particular interest 
within the context of this study because it reveals that the stereotyping of the Middle 
Ages is both explicit and implicit. The modern German word for mercenary (Soldner) is 
also the medi eval German word for soldier.
It is unclear to what extent the sheer horror of being called “medi eval” contributed 
to a change in attitudes, but military organizations have put substantial effort into pre­
senting a different image to the general public from the 1980s onwards. Most military 
forces, national or international (nato), now have a specific webpage dedicated to pre­
senting an image of an organization for which environmental conservation is a major 
concern. Such websites invariably refer to military domains which have increasingly 
been turned into nature reserves during the last decades, or at least receive special 
protection because of their biodiversity value. In recent years they have facilitated the 
comeback of wolves in Western Europe.12 There is also an increasing awareness among 
conservationists of the eco logical value of former militarized landscapes as unique envi­
ronments. Abandoned bunkers from the World Wars have become home to bat colonies, 
and the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea constitutes a rare paradise 
for endangered species. The Indian army has special “Environmental Task Forces” to 
carry out afforestation and irrigation projects, particularly near the frontiers with Paki­
stan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, while the armed forces of countries such as South Africa 
and Botswana can claim that they actively protect wildlife against poachers. In recent 
years soldiers have also become increasingly involved in the protection of the Amazo­
nian rainforest.13
The ways that the historic past is used within these important, but also very complex, 
debates, is striking. A clear tendency exists, though, to either ignore historical examples 
of the close entanglement between armies and eco logical systems altogether or refer 
to them in a simplistic manner (“mercenaries,” “robber barons”). This is based on two 
more or less contradictory assumptions. The first supposition is that due to techno­
logical “backwardness,” historical armies were not able to influence their environments 
in a cognisant and meaningful way and are thus not relevant to current debates. The 
second assumption is that armed forces have always been destructive, even though their 
potential impact on eco logical systems did increase with techno logical developments. In 
both instances, however, protective or non­destructive behaviour is presented as some­
thing “new,” as an accomplishment of environmentalism, environmental organizations, 
and modern military forces.
11 “Allzu deutlich war nämlich geworden, dass zumindest in höheren Riegen der Bonner 
Verteidigungsarmee, eine Art mittelalterliche Söldnermentalität herrschte.” Lange, “Raus aus den 
Kartoffel,” 209; Schuster, “Täuschen und Tarnen,” 14.
12 Brunel, Les missions militaires; de Wolf and Fautsch, “Les sites militaires”; Gilissen, Missie natuur. 
For a critical discussion of military forces’ rhetoric, see Coates et al., “Militarized Landscapes”; 
Woodward, “Khaki Conservation”; Woodward, Military Geo graphies, 85–103.
13 Adeney Thomas, “The Exquisite Corpses”; Boosten, Jansen, and Borkent, Beplantingen; Brunel, 
Les missions militaires, 71–72; Havlick, “Disarming Nature”; Henk, “Biodiversity and the Military”; 
Sabo, ed., Tanks and Thyme.
 introduction 5
Historians have certainly picked up on these themes and made their own contri­
bution to these debates: in the last decade several mono graphs have been published 
on the environmental consequences, mostly devastation, of the American Civil War, the 
World Wars and the Cold War.14 A growing number of works are also concerned with 
the impacts of disease or weather and climate on the conduct of warfare.15 These analy­
ses have favoured rapprochement between military and environmental history, and it 
is perhaps even possible to speak about a “green turn” in military history. Still, envi­
ronmental studies relating to warfare before “modernity,” before the industrialization 
of warfare in the nineteenth century remain quite rare. The works of J. R. McNeill and 
Richard P. Tucker need especially to be mentioned here.16 Other scholars, from the field 
of history as well as archaeo logy and literature, have also contributed significantly to the 
study of army–ecosystem interactions even though they do not link themselves explic­
itly to debates about the “environmental footprint” of modern military forces.17
In premodern Europe, however, there were no strict dividing lines between armed 
forces and general society. This book therefore considers armies or armed forces as tem­
porary or permanent social groups characterized by the fact that their members carry 
weapons, whose main purpose is the management of organized and collective conflicts 
in which the use of—potentially—lethal violence is the essential element: war.18 Such 
a definition might seem unproductively wide. It emphasizes that function, rather than 
a debatable numerical minimum or political legitimacy, is an army’s key characteristic. 
Even setting a minimum limit for the concept of army is counterproductive in light of the 
relative growth in army size during the period 1250–1850.19
Furthermore, such a characterization avoids the assumption that warfare inevitably 
revolves around battles and sieges or that armies can only be raised by “states.” Many 
armed forces had a very short lifespan, especially before the late seventeenth and early 
14 Bader, Wald und Krieg; Best, “The Historical Evolution”; Brady, War Upon the Land; Brauer, War 
and Nature; Closmann, ed., War and the Environment; Coates et al., “Militarized Landscapes”; Corvol 
and Amat, eds., Forêt et guerre; Hupy, “The Environmental Footprint”; Masson­Loodts, Paysages 
en bataille; McNeill and Unger, eds., Environmental Histories; Meyerson, Nature’s Army; Muscolino, 
The Eco logy; Pearson, Mobilizing Nature; Russell, War and Nature; Shively Meier, Nature’s Civil War; 
Tucker and Russell, eds., Natural Enemy, Natural Ally.
15 Degroot, “‘Never Such Weather Known in These Seas’”; Degroot, The Frigid Golden Age, 154–95; 
McGready, “Contested Grounds”; Winters, ed., Battling the Elements; Zhang et al., “Climatic Change, 
Wars, and Dynastic Cycles.”
16 Agoston, “Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet”; Bankoff, “Wood for War”; 
Garnier, “Les ressources naturelles”; Gordon, “War, the Military, and the Environment”; Hughes, 
Environmental Problems, 150–62; Mayor, Bio logical and Chemical Warfare; McNeill, “Forests and 
Warfare in World History”; McNeill, Mosquito Empires; Tucker, “The Impact of Warfare.” See also the 
special issue “Environments of War” of the Hungarian Historical Review 7:3 (2018).
17 Childs, The Military Use of Land; Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture; Hevia, Animal Labor and 
Colonial Warfare; Hill and Wileman, Landscapes of War; Pluskowski, The Archaeo logy, 294–326; 
Trautmann, Elephants and Kings; Withers, “The Eco logy.”
18 This characterization adopts Alexander Moseley and Keith F. Otterbein’s definitions of warfare: 
Moseley, A Philosophy, 14–16; Otterbein, How War Began, 9–10.
19 A useful overview is provided in Lynn, “The Evolution.”
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eighteenth century. They were assembled for a particular purpose and disbanded after­
wards. Even so, marching, standing guard, maintaining fortifications, and simply stay­
ing healthy by securing access to food and shelter were far more pressing issues on a 
daily basis than preparing for combat. If an army actually engaged the enemy it was 
most likely in the context of skirmishes, incursions, and sudden assaults, rather than 
major battles or sieges. The relative importance commanders attributed to such actions 
changed over time, and so did the termino logy: from the medi eval chevauchée or Reise 
to seventeenth­century partisan warfare, and eighteenth­ or nineteenth­century “little 
war” (petite guerre, Kleinkrieg, guerrilla). Still, from the perspective of army–ecosystem 
interactions these aspects of warfare remain among the most significant.20
The people who actually make up an army will be referred to as “army members.” 
While it might seem more logical to opt for terms such as “soldier” or “military,” this 
would also mean that the specific meaning of these terms in historical sources is 
ignored. “Army members” is in fact much closer to the termino logy the sources them­
selves adopt (“men of war,” “men of arms,” “armed people,” “army people”).21 The term 
soldier, of medi eval origin (soudener, soudoier, Soldener), derives from Latin solidarius, 
which is literally “someone who receives a solidus,” a golden coin of the Late Roman 
Empire, or “paid man” in a more general sense. It refers to combatants who receive mon­
etary compensation for their services.22 When the term soldier appears in this study, it 
is always with this specific meaning.23 In a similar way, the term “military,” derives from 
Latin miles, militaris, and indicates matters relating to war or armies in general (as in 
military history). It only became the preferred term to refer to a specific kind of army, 
characterized by uniforms, a strict hierarchy, and clear distinctions from the general 
population (“citizens”) during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. When this 
study uses the term military it is in the general sense, unless stated otherwise.24
Armies included, and still include, a considerable number of persons in their ranks 
who cannot be referred to as “soldiers,” and to a lesser extent “military.” These could be 
wagoners, servants, pioneers, medical personnel, combatants’ partners and children, 
and so forth. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century commanders and govern­
20 Lomas, “Raids and Raiding”; Parker, The Army of Flanders, 12–13; Picaud­Monnerat, La petite 
guerre; Rogers, Soldiers’ Lives, 237–53; Satterfield, Princes, Posts and Partisans; Verbruggen, 
“Military Service.”
21 “Gens de guerre,” “Kriegsvolk,” “legervolk,” “gewapenden,” “Reisiger,” “gens d’armes,” “mannen 
van wapenen.” The terms gens d’armes and mannen van wapenen could also refer to a dominant 
group within armies (men­at­arms) or even a social group identifiable by its martial qualities 
(squires). In medi eval Latin miles (plural milites) generally referred to knights specifically rather 
than combatants in general: Lind, “Genesis of the Civilian,” 52–53.
22 The word soldier spread from French (soldat) to Dutch (soldaat) around the late sixteenth 
century, and to German (Soldat) in the early seventeenth century. Schulten, Contribution, 104–5.
23 Contemporaries mainly distinguished soldiers according to their function or geo graphical 
background. The use of the word mercenary remained rather limited until the late eighteenth 
or nineteenth century. DeVries, “Medi eval Mercenaries”; Govaerts, “‘Fire­Eaters,’” 9; Percy, Mer-
cenaries, 68–90; Sikora, “Söldner.”
24 Bardin, Dictionnaire, 12:3640–41; Lind, “Genesis of the Civilian,” 59–64.
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ments put considerable effort into turning armies into military organizations. These 
processes entailed that the aforementioned individuals either adopted a more offi­
cial presence (for instance, the militarizing of transport services and administration) 
or were excluded from army contexts (such as women and children).25 In recent years 
scholars have started to question this close association again, by referring to the rise of 
private security companies and the blurring of distinctions between military and police 
forces in the fight against terrorism.26
Establishing a clear definition of the second cornerstone of this book, the eco logical 
system or ecosystem, is no less problematic. The concept conventionally refers to all of 
the organisms, meaning plants, animals, fungi, and microorganisms that live in a partic­
ular habitat (a community or multiple communities), along with their immediate physi­
cal and chemical environment. Living and non­living elements constantly interact with 
each other through flows of energy and matter (such as food chains). In theory, the term 
ecosystem cannot be limited to a certain spatial or temporal level. The Meuse River itself 
is an ecosystem, but so is a forest or a lake. Some might argue that the whole globe is one 
huge ecosystem.27
This very lack of spatial and temporal limitations makes the term both thought­pro­
voking and problematic. The concept of an eco logical system was originally developed 
in the early twentieth century; the term was coined in 1935, on the basis of lakes. A lake 
is a closed system that can be reasonably well defined in spatial terms. In most cases, 
and the Meuse Region is a good example of this, it is very difficult to pinpoint where one 
ecosystem ends and another begins. The fact that “everything is connected to everything 
else” does not help either. Many scholars therefore prefer to examine a single aspect or 
level within ecosystems, such as the non­living environment (landscapes), living beings 
(biotic communities) or even pathogens (organisms or materials that cause disease), 
and individual species.28
In order to approach the subject in a systematic way these same distinctions will 
be adopted. The first two chapters, frontiers and fortifications, represent the landscape 
level or the non­living environment, comprising soil structure, hydro graphy, and land 
use. Landscapes are considered here as eco logical milieux that are created through the 
mutual engagement of environment and people. A landscape is simultaneously a mate­
rial reality and a cultural construct.29 The next two chapters, disturbances and policing, 
25 Cardoza, Intrepid Women, 166–228; Mayer, Belonging to the Army; Tachon, Enfants du troupe, 
225–40.
26 Woodward, “Military Landscapes,” 51–52.
27 Park and Allaby, Dictionary, 135; Chapman and Reiss, Eco logy, 187; Willis, “The Ecosystem,” 270.
28 Golley, A History; Raffaelli and Frid, “The Evolution”; Willis, “The Ecosystem.”
29 Many different definitions of “landscape” exist, depending on one’s field of study. In eco logy 
for instance, landscapes can also be studied as units consisting of multiple ecosystems or ecotopes 
(the smallest homogeneous mapable units of land). This description focuses on the socio­cultural 
dimensions of the word landscape to emphasize the close entanglement of “nature” and “culture.” 
Förster, et al., “Towards Mutual Understanding”; Ingegnoli, Landscape Bionomics, 3–9, Jones, “The 
Elusive Reality of Landscape,” 232–34.
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Map 1. Geo graphical overview of the Meuse Region 
(© Jop Mijwaard, Softmap kartografie).
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are concerned with living beings or fauna and flora (humans, animals, and plants). The 
final level comprises only one chapter, army health, and examines pathogens, or dis­
ease and disease prevention. These distinctions are not absolute, but should be seen 
as a shift in emphasis, as no single aspect of the ecosystem concept can be studied in 
isolation. Such a methodo logy also fits into the traditional geo graphical understanding 
of a region as multiple landscapes that share similar characteristics. The Meuse Region 
is composed of several distinct landscapes that are nevertheless related because they 
are part of the same river basin, and these landscapes in turn comprise diverse kinds of 
living beings and pathogens.30
Despite the ambiguity of “ecosystem” as a concept, it still provides a suitable frame­
work to think about the natural world in a way that more traditional notions, such as 
“nature” and “environment,” do not allow. It does not assume for instance that humans 
are fundamentally different from the world that surrounds them. Its rising popularity 
from the 1970s onwards originates to a large extent in its adoption by environmentalist 
movements.31 What is important for this study is that it permits the organizing of com­
plex interactions between armies and their surroundings in a manner that is meaning­
ful to military and environmental historians, or to historians and researchers of other 
disciplines.32 The concept of ecosystem provides a sound theoretical basis, while the 
actual chapters concern themselves with one of the three levels encompassed by the 
ecosystem concept: landscapes, biotic communities, and pathogens.
Now we have established working definitions of the two corner­stones of this book, 
it is time to say something about its geo graphical framework: the Meuse Region or the 
basin of the Meuse River, meaning the river itself and its tributaries.33 The Meuse River 
measures about 925 kilometres or nearly six hundred miles, ranges from Pouilly­en­
Bassigny on the plateau of Langres (in Lorraine), at an elevation of 409 metres, down 
to the North Sea, and is part of a basin that stretches over thirty­four thousand square 
kilometres (see map 1). Because it is mainly fed by rainwater, the Meuse’s behaviour can 
be quite unpredictable, a characteristic of considerable importance for army–ecosys­
tem interactions. Today it is officially referred to as the Meuse from Meuse­en­Bassigny 
30 Baker, Geo graphy and History, 109–29.
31 Chapman and Reiss, Eco logy, 92–93; Park and Allaby, Dictionary, 144, 287; Radkau, Natur und 
Macht, 29–32; Wiegleb, “A Few Theses,” 104–7; Worster, “History as Natural History.”
32 Some researchers have adopted the concept of “hybrid systems” to bridge the traditional divide 
between “nature” and “culture.” This analysis agrees with the general idea of hybrid systems, but 
does not adopt the termino logy, because it might lead to unnecessary confusion. If one accepts that 
the term ecoystem in itself emphasizes connections between living and non­living beings, including 
humans, there is no need for yet another term. Human perceptions of their environment can easily 
be examined as a factor of importance regarding interactions within ecosystems. Hoffman, An 
Environmental History, 5–20.
33 The most important tributaries of the Meuse are, from source to estuary: Saônelle, Mouzon, 
Vair, Chiers, Bar, Sormonne, Semois, Viroin, Hermeton, Lesse, Molignée, Bocq, Houyoux, Sambre, 
Mehaigne, Hoyoux, Ourthe, Berwinne, Voer/Fouron, Geer/Jeker, Geul, Geleenbeek, Rur/Roer, Neer, 
Swalm, Niers, Raam, and Dieze.
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onwards. The initial watercourse is simply known as “the Brook” (le Ruisseau).34 The 
Meuse Region is relatively sparsely populated, especially if compared to the neighbour­
ing Scheldt basin in Flanders, and the most important settlements lie directly on the 
Meuse River itself. Note that on map 1 the Meuse estuary reflects the situation around 
1250 in order to draw attention to the processes of land reclamation that have occurred 
during the medi eval and early modern period.
The choice for a geo graphical approach, inspired by Fernand Braudel’s famous 
mono graph on the Mediterranean, serves as an alternative to the traditional emphasis 
on political entities, and more particularly nation states. This is not to say that the con­
cept of “region” is unproblematic. Its role in geo graphy is similar to that of “period” in 
history. It refers to a set of lands that share some specific characteristics, but its exact 
size and limits can diverge widely depending on the subject, and researchers’ individual 
preferences. The Meuse Region from an economic or political point of view does not 
necessarily correspond to this geo graphical framework. The importance of the Meuse 
as a political boundary for the Kingdom of France, for instance, far extends these geo­
graphical limits.35
The basin of the Meuse as a subject of study is valuable because it provides a geo­
graphical framework that is relevant for both military and environmental history. If 
historians refer to the Southern Netherlands as the “battlefield” or “cockpit” of Western 
Europe, then the Meuse valley certainly is a highway to that battlefield. Rivers were cru­
cial to military movement, especially before the invention of railways, for several reasons: 
they considerably facilitated the transportation of heavy equipment and supplies, pro­
vided relatively clean (running) water and served as a defensive line. It is hardly surpris­
ing therefore that the Meuse Region assumed considerable strategic importance from at 
least the Late Roman Empire to the World Wars (with the struggle for Verdun in 1916 
and the battle of the Bulge in 1944 as the best­known examples). The role of the Meuse 
is in this sense quite similar to that of other major rivers, such as the Rhine and Danube.36
A comparison of the Meuse and Rhine is of particular interest here because of their 
proximity. Some geo graphers might even argue that the Meuse River is a tributary of the 
Rhine. While the symbolic value of the Rhine as a boundary between France on the one 
hand and Germany on the other is well known, this perception is a relatively recent phe­
nomenon. In the broader historical context of this study the Meuse Region has been far 
more important as a boundary marker between the kingdom of France on the one hand 
and the Holy Roman Empire, dominated by the Habsburgs, on the other. The linguis­
tic and political variety of the Meuse Region is also more considerable than that of the 
Rhine, especially if the former’s smaller geo graphical dimension is taken into account. In 
this way, this study transgresses different historio graphies organized by nation states.
34 Breuer, Die Maas; Guillery, La Meuse; Loicq, Les noms, 253–56; Suttor, La Meuse; Vereerstraeten, 
“Le bassin.”
35 Baker, Geo graphy and History, 156–63, 182–93.
36 Agoston, “Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet”; Babinger, “Die Donau als 
Schicksalstrom des Osmanenreich”; Schmid, “The Environmental History of Rivers”; Suttor, 
“L’espace fluvial”; Suttor, La Meuse.
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Diversity within the Meuse Region is indeed essential to this analysis. Being part 
of a geo graphical belt that stretches from northern France and the Low Countries to 
the western part of Germany and northern Italy, and being well known for incorporat­
ing some of the most densely populated areas in Europe, the Meuse Region stands out 
because relatively sparsely populated regions dominate it. The riverbanks of the Meuse 
River are very fertile and so are a handful of other areas, characterized by fertile loam 
or clay soil, such as Hesbaye. If the Meuse Region is considered as a whole, however, the 
most common landscapes are mountainous forests (Woëvre, Argonne, Ardennes, Eifel) 
and peat or heath lands (Hohes Venn, Peel, or the Campine, also known in Dutch as the 
Kempen). Many armed forces have been drawn to the Meuse Region because of its stra­
tegic importance, but most of them preferred to remain in the fertile parts, especially the 
river valley of the Meuse itself.
The soil characteristics of the Meuse Region are also important when it comes to 
construction materials. Some settlements, especially in the southern and middle parts 
of the basin, had access to relatively large quantities of wood, while inhabitants of the 
lands near the Meuse estuary started to run out of suitable construction wood as early 
as the High (or Central) Middle Ages. The local presence or absence of raw materials, 
such as wood, coal, or stone, had a substantial impact on trade patterns along the Meuse 
River, because river transport was mainly limited to such high­volume, low­value goods. 
The valley of the Meuse from Givet to Maastricht is well known for its layers of lime­
stone, which come very close to the surface. Because of the presence of calcium car­
bonate these landscapes contain unique vegetation that only grows on calcareous soils. 
Many sites, including the aforementioned Sint­Pietersberg, have now received special 
protection because of the rare species that live there (notably herbs, flowers, butterflies, 
and bats). This might seem to be a consequence of their inherent geo graphical features, 
but some of the most valuable ecosystems are actually man­made (the grasslands and 
quarries). The dominance of limestone as a building material is of major consequence 
for the ways fortifications in the Meuse Region interact with ecosystems at large, espe­
cially in a long­term perspective.37
Our chrono logical limits, 1250–1850, reflect the general emphasis on a long­term 
perspective. These parameters do not constitute absolute boundaries, but serve, in the 
same way as the geo graphical scope, as an alternative framework. They transgress tra­
ditional chrono logical divisions and bring the importance of the Central Middle Ages 
as a transformative period in European history to the fore. As will be argued below, the 
Central Middle Ages were characterized by a series of changes—environmental, social, 
economic, cultural, military, and more—that constitute a background or framework that 
remains dominant until it was replaced by another series of changes during the nine­
teenth century. The main turning point is around the year one thousand, or the years 
1000–1300 more generally, rather than the fifth or fifteenth century. This is not to argue 
that the 1250–1850 period did not experience significant changes, only that many his­
torians privilege such transformations above forms of continuity with the Middle Ages. 
37 Breuer, Die Maas, 54–76; Rousseau, “La Meuse,” 99–121; Suttor, La Meuse.
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The object is to open up research perspectives, rather than to replace one determinism 
with another.
Landscapes that are considered archetypical for specific areas in the Meuse Region, 
or even as “natural” landscapes, such as the ponds of Woëvre, the heathlands of the 
Hohes Venn or the Dutch coastline, were to a large degree created during the Middle 
Ages. Pro­environmental organizations put much effort into recreating or maintaining 
such eco logical milieux because they encompass species that can be found nowhere 
else. Paradoxically this often involves cutting down the very forests and trees that for 
many people represent true “nature.” People may be aware that these landscapes have 
become much scarcer or even disappeared because of changes in land use, particularly 
during the last hundred and seventy years. Few of them realize, however, that they are to 
a large extent recreating medi eval landscapes.38
These older landscapes both originated in and brought about changes in agricultural 
practices (e.g., the three­field system) that supported significant demo graphic growth 
during the Central Middle Ages. The extent of this growth is reflected in the fact that 
most of the settlements that currently exist in the Meuse Region can trace their history 
back to precisely this period. The great majority of cities today had already obtained 
municipal charters granting them rights during the Middle Ages. It is noteworthy that 
the few exceptions to this general pattern often have a military origin (such as Charleroi 
or Leopoldsburg). Of no less importance is that these settlements built specific stone 
structures—fortresses (“castles”), urban walls, and churches—which retained a major 
military role until the eighteenth or nineteenth century. This same period also saw the 
development of an ideo logy centred on the “Three Orders” (i.e., those who pray, those 
who fight, those who work), even if the reality could be rather more complex. The asso­
ciation of nobility with knighthood is of particular importance for subsequent chapters. 
Finally, the development of a money economy also encouraged the renewed spread of 
paid military service (soldiers) for the first time since the Late Roman Empire.39
The political fragmentation of the Meuse Region came about during this period as 
well, notably as a result of the disintegration of the Duchy of Lorraine (Lotharingia) into 
a multitude of relatively small principalities. The original division, between Upper and 
Lower Lorraine from the second half of the tenth century, was quickly followed in the 
eleventh century by a further series of separations, as local aristocrats consolidated 
their power.40 By 1250 the following principalities had emerged: the duchies of Lor­
raine, Brabant, and Limburg, the bishoprics of Verdun, Liège, and Toul, and the counties 
of Bar, Champagne, Rethel, Chiny, Luxemburg, Hainaut, Namur, Loon, Jülich, Guelders, 
38 Barends, et al., eds., Het Nederlandse landschap; Girardot, Le droit et la terre, 1:239–48; Nienhuis, 
Rhine-Meuse Delta, 49–79; Noël, Quatre Siècles; TeBrake, Medi eval Frontier, 190–220; Webb, “The 
Traditional Management.”
39 Bartlett, The Making of Europe; Burgers and Damen, “Feudal Obligation or Paid Service,” 
785–86, 789–90; Dejongh and Thoen, “Arable Productivity”; Hoffmann, An Environmental History, 
119–54; Hoppenbrouwers, “Town and Country”; Krieger, “Obligatory Military Service”; Napran, 
“Mercenaries and Paid Men”; Pounds, “Population and Settlement”; van Bavel, The Invisible Hand, 
145–69.
40 Alberts, Overzicht; MacLean, “Shadow Kingdom”; Milis, “Counts, Cities, and Clerics.”
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Map 2. Political over­
view of the Meuse 
Region in 1250  
(© Jop Mijwaard, 
Softmap kartografie).
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Map 3. Political over­
view of the Meuse 
Region in 1789 
(© Jop Mijwaard, 
Softmap kartografie).
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and Holland. Furthermore, there were several more or less independent lordships, prin­
cipalities, and cities, such as Commercy (from the Germanic marka; march), Stavelot­
Malmédy, and Aachen (see map 2).41
Despite numerous attempts at unification, the Meuse Region remained highly frag­
mented from a political point of view. In 1789, on the eve of the French Revolution, the 
borders of the kingdom of France already closely resembled the current situation, while 
the northern half of the river basin was still divided among various rulers as well as the 
Dutch Republic (see map 3). Ecclesiastical territories, such as the Prince–Bishopric of 
Liège, were a major factor of continuity because their survival did not depend on the 
fortunes of one family. French expansion from 1792 onwards briefly united the entire 
Meuse Region, but new splits followed in 1814–1815 (with the division of the north­
ern half of the basin between the Kingdoms of the Netherlands and Prussia) and in 
1830–1839 (with the secession of Belgium and Luxembourg).
In this way, this book emphasizes the importance of a “peripheral” region that has 
received far less attention in historical studies of the late medi eval and early modern 
Low Countries than neighbouring “core” regions (Flanders, and the more densely popu­
lated parts of Holland and Brabant). This is partially the result of the relative availability 
of source material, but the fact that the history of this region does not fit well into tradi­
tional narratives of the rise of the Burgundian/Habsburg composite state or the Dutch 
Republic certainly plays a role as well.
The claim that frameworks established during the Central Middle Ages lost most of 
their significance only in the nineteenth century can best be illustrated with two exam­
ples: gunpowder weapons and the so­called Columbian exchange. Military historians tra­
ditionally attribute great importance to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because of 
the effects of gunpowder weapons on fortifications’ architecture. While such devices did 
become relatively more efficient during those centuries, these same scholars often neglect 
to emphasize that gunpowder had already spread to Europe during the thirteenth centu­
ry.42 The oldest written reference to a gunpowder weapon in the Meuse Region comes 
from the 1346 city accounts of Aachen: an iron gun that shot arrows.43 It took almost 
three centuries (thirteenth to sixteenth centuries) before gunpowder weapons trans­
formed the way (new) stone fortifications were constructed. Another century would pass 
before the need to carry gunpowder weapons caused a divergence between warships and 
other types of vessels. As far as battlefields are concerned, gunpowder weapons did not 
end the continued prevalence of melee weapons before the nineteenth century.44
In a similar way, overseas travellers brought all kinds of new plants to the Meuse 
Region from the sixteenth century onwards, but very few of them spread beyond (bot­
41 The boundaries of the counties of Champagne and Rethel as well as other components of the 
kingdom of France are not illustrated because they did not constitute frontiers, as defined in this 
study. For the same reason the lordships of Breda and Briey have been given the same colour as 
respectively the duchy of Brabant and the county of Bar.
42 Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 41–45; Partington, A History.
43 “busa ferrea ad sagittandum tonitrum”: see Laurent, Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 182.
44 For a general overview see McNeill, The Pursuit of Power.
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anic) gardens. The cultivation of tobacco, for instance, became quite common during 
the seventeenth century, but this plant requires a relatively intensive garden­like cul­
tivation. The same applies to the potato, which was only widely adopted at the end of 
the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The number of neophytes, 
plants that were introduced after 1500 and could survive independently of human aid, 
was negligible before major changes in transportation during the nineteenth century, 
especially if compared to the large number of archaeophytes; plants that were intro­
duced and established themselves before the Columbian exchange (e.g., good king 
henry, wormwood, common snapdragon). It is often very difficult to distinguish these 
from actual “native” plants.45 A comparison of animal introductions is also revealing: 
archaeozoo logical research and fiscal accounts indicate that turkeys (“Indian peafowl”) 
lived in a handful of prestigious lordships during the sixteenth century (such as the 
castles of Breda, Eindhoven, and Pietersheim), but this handful of animals seem barely 
relevant in light of the medi eval introductions of the rabbit and domesticated carp (see 
chap. 5).46
The fundamentals of army–ecosystem interactions were only transformed during 
the nineteenth century. Some of these changes were techno logical: railways (1830s), 
ironclad warships (1860s), the general adoption of breech loaders (1840–1870), the 
machine gun (1860s), the construction of detached fortifications made of concrete and 
steel rather than stone and wood, and barbed wire (1870–1890). It is also during the 
nineteenth century that the first large­scale attempts were made to channel the Meuse 
River itself.47 Others were of a more social nature, such as the militarizing of armies 
and the adoption of personal military service (see chap. 4). Major developments in the 
iron industry and coalmines altered landscapes in the middle of the Meuse basin, from 
Charleroi to Liège. It is also at this time that agricultural practices lost their medi eval 
roots, with the last elements of medi eval practices disappearing one by one (such as the 
end of common land and small­scale ownership).48
The need for wider chrono logical limits is imperative given the “Military Revolution” 
paradigm, which became the subject of major debates in the 1990s, but still looms large 
within the field of military history. Research on military revolution(s) largely ignored 
the environmental aspects of armed forces, and emphasized the difference between 
medi eval and early modern warfare.49 This book studies continuity and change across a 
45 Preston, Pearman, and Hall, “Archaeophytes”; Schroeder, “Zur Klassifizierung”; Zeven et al., De 
introductie.
46 Coenegrachts and van de Konijnenburg, “De kasteelsite van Oud­Rekem,” 64–65; de Jong, 
“Huisdieren, jachtwild, vissen en weekdieren,” 222–23; Lauwerier and Zeiler, “Wishful Thinking”; 
Marchal, Inventaire, 174; Nagels, Kerklaan, and van Kaam, Kasteel van Breda, 16, 52.
47 This applies to the Meuse River as a whole. Human interventions at the most local level, notably 
dike building, altered the course of the Meuse significantly and repeatedly during the Middle Ages 
and Early Modern period (see also chaps. 1 and 2). Breuer, Die Maas, 95–123; Guillery, La Meuse; 
McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, chap. seven.
48 Dejongh and Thoen, “Arable Productivity”; Lebrun et al., Essai sur la révolution industrielle; 
Parmentier, Pays de Charleroi.
49 Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate.
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period during which several of these transformative changes supposedly took place, and 
in a region which Geoffrey Parker identified as part of a core zone in which his “Military 
Revolution” first came about.50
Making interactions between armies and eco logical systems the subject of this argu­
ment means bringing different rates of historical time to the fore again and provide an 
alternative framework for understanding military change during the longue durée.51 
Because of the general emphasis on long­term impacts political events and individual 
rulers occupy a far less prominent place in this analysis than in most works concerned 
with military history. The book rather assesses the eco logical aspects of state formation, 
as well as the agency of common soldiers, their families, animals, plants, and the Meuse 
River itself; actors that historians have often neglected or taken for granted.
Studying the reciprocal impacts of armies and ecosystems in a timeframe of six hun­
dred years and a multilingual context creates evident challenges. The continuous stra­
tegic importance of the Meuse Region has also had the unfortunate result that warfare 
related damage caused a considerable loss of archival material. In 1940, for instance, 
most of the medi eval and early modern archives kept in Mons and Mézières went up 
in flames.52 Chrono logical and geo graphical differences are an integral part of the argu­
ment, and will be given due attention, but constantly referring to distinctions within 
the basin of the Meuse even when this is of limited relevance to the argument would 
have turned this study into a work the size of Braudel’s magnum opus. The text instead 
focuses on a select number of examples, which can thus be properly contextualized. Fur­
ther references are provided in the footnotes to avoid the impression that one example 
represents the whole Meuse Region.
The main argument, which is that armies’ conscious and concerted protection and 
conservation of ecosystems long predates the rise of modern environmentalism, and 
that this supposedly modern behaviour is just one element in a complex web of inter­
connections between armies and eco logical systems, will be demonstrated through five 
chapters: frontiers, fortifications, disturbances, policing, and army health. These themes 
represent the three levels encompassed within the ecosystem concept and, as argued 
before, constitute a more practical framework than ecosystem. The chapters follow logi­
cally as the analysis starts with the largest eco logical level and follows up with lower 
levels. At the same time, they all refer to and need each other as a basis.
The first two chapters, frontiers and fortifications, represent the landscape level. 
The chapter about frontiers connects the eco logical impacts of military domains, which 
constitute such an important part of current military forces’ discourse, to much older 
practices of security against external threats. It examines how significant military train­
ing practices were within larger processes of frontier management, and whether medi­
eval perceptions of frontiers continued to influence armies’ actions in later centuries. 
The next chapter, fortifications, analyzes the current emphasis on abandoned defences 
50 Parker, The Military Revolution, xvi­xvii.
51 Braudel, La Méditerranée, 13–14 (préface); Kinser, “Annaliste Paradigm”; Latham, “Warfare 
Transformed.”
52 Collin, Guide, 31, 71–72.
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as safe havens for endangered plants and animals. Ruined buildings overgrown with 
plants might fit well a romantic idea of nature, but say little about to what extent pres­
ent biodiversity levels are based on historical management practices. Discussions about 
former fortifications as cultural heritage or eco logical sites would benefit from a more 
thorough understanding of the eco logical value of these structures when armed forces 
still managed them.
The third and fourth chapters, on disturbances and policing, examine biotic com­
munities, or fauna and flora. They embody two seemingly antagonistic influences: 
damage and protection, both of which figure prominently in recent debates about the 
“environmental footprint” of military forces. The chapter about disturbances investi­
gates whether the most obvious or spectacular devastations, such as sieges or other 
large­scale interventions, were also the most meaningful in a long­term perspective. 
Warfare obviously involved the killing of humans, animals, and plants, but one should 
keep in mind that ecosystems consist of transfers of energy. Theoretically, for every spe­
cies negatively affected, there could be another taking advantage. Furthermore, armed 
forces might have exerted lesser­known impacts that were far more destructive in the 
long run. The policing chapter places the current depiction of modern military forces as 
“nature’s army” in a broader historical context. Soldiers have a vital role in the protec­
tion of endangered animals such as elephants or rhinos, but this behaviour might not be 
as progressive, or modern, as is often claimed. These are conflicts over control of natural 
resources, and the socio­economic value that they represent. Given that armies act as 
agents of both order and disorder, the use of armed force could very well have become a 
necessity because of soldiers’ own actions.
The fifth chapter, on army health, focuses on the lowest level within the ecosystem 
concept: pathogens. Histories of military medicine traditionally construct a narrative 
of gradual progress, from medi eval armies as epidemic hazards, over early modern 
attempts to impose basic hygiene, to the spread of modern medical theories in the nine­
teenth century. The last chapter questions this teleo logical paradigm by drawing atten­
tion to prophylactic health measures, or disease prevention, rather than the well­known 
emphasis on hospitals, surgeons, and wound treatment. It also considers historical 
examples of bio logical warfare, or deliberate attempts to spread disease, a major ethi­
cal problem that eventually started the debate on the eco logical impacts of the military.
Drawing these together, the conclusion returns to the book’s main argument, and 
emphasizes the significant role of historical armed forces in the protection and conser­
vation of eco logical systems. It also determines the main characteristics of army–ecosys­
tem interactions in the Meuse Region from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century, and 
makes some final remarks about the relevance of these findings for current eco logical 







In 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner presented his seminal essay titled “The Significance 
of the Frontier in American History,” a theory that has had an enormous impact on the 
perception of the United States’ environmental history. Crucial to Turner’s reasoning is 
the association of the word frontier with the advance of civilization, as opposed to “wil­
derness,” or uncontrolled nature.1 The popularity of this thesis lingers on to this very 
day, even though environmental historians such as William Cronon have demonstrated 
convincingly that no so such thing as a primeval wilderness existed when immigrants of 
European descent settled on the continent and increasingly moved westwards.2
Many different definitions of the term “frontier” exist, but all acknowledge that it 
essentially refers to a boundary, a dividing line of some kind. Scholars have identified 
political–military as well as cultural, ideo logical, or eco logical frontiers, depending on 
their respective perspectives. These definitions are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
but can cause unnecessary confusion if the word frontier is used as a simple synonym 
for related words (such as borderland or border). This is especially so since historical 
sources also employ a variety of terms to describe boundaries (limits, confines, poles), 
the different connotations of which are often difficult to grasp. Language differences 
make matters even worse. The word frontière in modern French has not the same 
meaning as frontier in English, for instance, because during the early modern period it 
became a common term to refer to political boundaries, regardless of their military or 
eco logical significance.3
The following chapter uses the original medi eval meaning of the word frontier as its 
starting point, and defines it as a military boundary, a dividing line between “the self” 
and “the other,” where the other is perceived as particularly threatening to the extent 
that warfare becomes a distinct possibility. The English word frontier derives from the 
French frontière, which in its turn originates in the Latin frons, a front(line) of an army 
or a house. It therefore implies a notion of linearity. The word frontière can be traced 
back to the early fourteenth century, while its use in Spanish and Italian is even older 
(twelfth and thirteenth centuries respectively).4 It was not the only medi eval term to 
refer to military–political boundaries, however, and contemporaries often used it along­
1 The essay was published in 1921 as the first chapter of Turner’s book: The Frontier in American 
History.
2 Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness.”
3 Berend, “Medi evalists”; Gouguenheim, “Les frontières”; Febvre, “Frontière: le mot et la notion”; 
Janeczek, “Frontiers and Borderlands”; Rankin and Schofield, The Troubled Historio graphy.
4 Berend, “Medi evalists,” 66; Febvre, “Frontière: le mot et la notion.”
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side words such as “limits,” “marches,” and “poles.”5 Henry VI of England, for instance, 
declared his intention in January 1427 to overcome the last French centres of resistance, 
strongholds, on the left bank of the Meuse River, located in Champagne, Thierache, 
Rethel […], and their marches et frontieres.6
The mentioning of strongholds is hardly a coincidence, for fortifications constitute 
an indispensable aspect of the ways frontiers were actually managed or defended. In 
the interest of clarity, this part of the argument analyzes frontiers in a general way, and 
leaves the specific eco logical impacts of fortifications to the next chapter. Both frontiers 
and fortifications can be considered as “militarized landscapes,” a term coined by Peter 
Coates and his research group to describe landscapes modified by modern military 
organizations.7 Given the emphasis on premodern warfare and the complexity of the 
ecosystem concept, this study describes a militarized landscape as an eco logical milieu 
in which interactions between armed forces and its physical features have become so 
encompassing that they can be considered as a defining characteristic. Militarized land­
scapes are prepared in a direct or indirect way for coping with the possibility of orga­
nized violence by armies, but they do not have to be actually engaged in armed conflict. 
Frontiers for instance can be studied as militarized landscapes because the risk of attack 
necessitates a more or less permanent military presence.
Because of its close association with enemy threats the concept of frontier is also 
closely connected to the construction of territories and ultimately to processes of state 
formation. Any study of the territory concept has to take its history of violence and war­
fare into account, for the very word territory relates to the military concept of terrain 
and Latin terrere, “to frighten.” This analysis adopts the interpretation of “territory” 
developed by Michel Foucault and Stuart Elden, which is that control over land or space 
(“territory”) and people (“populations”) is intrinsically linked. In this way, it connects 
the chapters of frontiers and policing to each another as two different aspects of terri­
tory formation.8
The object of the following chapter is to use the historical development of frontiers 
as militarized landscapes in the Meuse Region to explain the origin of military domains, 
which constitute a core element in current debates about military forces’ “environmen­
tal footprint.” It seeks to establish whether the idea of a frontier as a frontline against wil­
derness, or uncontrolled nature, has a medi eval origin, and to what extent these medi­
eval perceptions had a role in the establishment of the military training areas that still 
exist today. This chapter thus lays the basis for the argument that there is little modern 
or progressive about the ways current military forces interact with eco logical systems.
There is a general consensus that during the Middle Ages and the early modern 
period boundaries became more defined and tended to encompass larger entities. 
Whereas in the Central Middle Ages many areas in the Meuse Region were characterized 
5 Ellis, Defending English Ground, 65; Genicot, “Ligne et zone,” 31; Gouguenheim, “Les frontières,” 
54–56; Lieberman, The Medi eval March of Wales, 11–12.
6 Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, 203.
7 Coates et al., “Militarized Landscapes,” 465–91; Pearson, “Militarized Landscapes,” 115–26.
8 Elden, “Land, Terrain, Territory,” 801–7; Elden, “How Should We Do the History of Territory.”
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by a multitude of jurisdictions and enclaves, some as small as individual villages or even 
hamlets, the nineteenth century is well known for the dominance of “nation states” with 
large and clearly demarcated borders or frontiers. Given that boundaries were initially 
drawn between fairly small entities and tended to become larger over time, it comes as 
no surprise that boundary markers first developed at the local level became central ele­
ments in processes of state formation. The brooks, ditches, hedges, isolated trees, and 
boundary stones that marked the limits between villages were eventually replaced by 
“natural frontiers,” the mountains, rivers, and forests that, in an ideal situation, sepa­
rated (nation) states. The fifth line of the German national anthem states that Germany 
should extend Von der Maas bis an die Memel (“from the Meuse to the Neman”).9
A basic awareness of agricultural developments in medi eval Europe is necessary to 
understand these processes. The Central Middle Ages saw the appearance of nucleated 
villages, concentrated around a parish church and, in some cases, a noble house (“cas­
tle”; see chap. 2). This development corresponds with agricultural systems, or “agroeco­
systems” if one wants to stress the close entanglement of humans and eco logical sys­
tems, that distinguish between an intensively cultivated “infield” and extensively used 
“outfield.” This infield is generally located near the village itself and consists of com­
monly managed agricultural lands that are fertilized regularly by the village flock, which 
explains the German name Dungland. The outfield by contrast is composed of areas that 
are cultivated more irregularly or possibly not at all. In such a context, it is only to be 
expected that boundaries between settlements are drawn in their extensive outfields 
and that the need to clearly demarcate them is a result from local conflicts. Moreover, 
the description of outfields and common land as Wildland or terres sauvages strongly 
suggests that the connection in Western Europe between general boundaries and wil­
derness originates in medi eval agricultural practices.10
The relevance of these changes for the historical development of frontiers can be 
demonstrated by referring to another medi eval term: the march. Marches were specially 
designated jurisdictions located on the limits of the Carolingian empire (for instance, 
Brittany, Spain, Saxony), headed by a margrave whose main responsibility was to deal 
with potential enemy attacks. Marches were in effect the frontiers of the Carolingian 
Empire. The oldest occurrences of the term march, from the sixth century, did not refer to 
political boundaries, but to the uncultivated land between two properties, “wilderness.” 
In some German­speaking regions it was even synonymous with the term Wald (wood­
land). The notions of frontier and wilderness were thus closely connected to each other.11
A charter from 1301 regarding the castellany of Couvin, located at the frontier of the 
Prince­Bishopric of Liège with the County of Hainaut, clearly shows the close associa­
tion between military organization and agricultural practices. According to the coun­
cillors of Couvin the inhabitants of the castellany, the town itself, and its surrounding 
9 Belissa, “La question des frontières naturelles”; Genicot, “Ligne et zone”; Girard d’Albissin. 
Genèse de la frontière franco-belge; Suttor, “Le rôle d’un fleuve.”
10 Genicot, L’économie rurale, 4:88–102; Hoffmann, An Environmental History, 156–65; Hoppen­
brouwers, “Territorialiteit en landsheerlijkheid”; Wealer, “Une identité paysagère,” 73.
11 Lieberman, The Medi eval March, 11–12.
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villages, constituted one “banner,” had the same war cry and alarm, and had access to 
the common pasture, woodlands, and waterways.12 The word banner, a flag that orga­
nizes armed forces into specific units, derived from bannus/bannum, the royal right to 
command, forbid, or punish. It could also, as in this example, refer to a territorial unit 
in which the inhabitants fought under the same banner and shared control over natural 
resources. The town of Geldern even designated in 1571 its Landwehr, earthen embank­
ments with hedges planted on top of them, which demarcated the city’s territory, as 
a bantuin. The area included within the ban is thus denoted as a garden. In Venlo, the 
toponym bantuin has survived until this very day.13
The description of specific territories as “garden” enclosures is of particular interest 
because it reinforces the aforementioned perception of frontiers as wilderness.14 Gar­
dens figure after all as symbols of human mastery of the natural world. Calling one’s 
12 Bormans, Cartulaire de la commune de Couvin, 21.
13 Geldern, Stadtarchiv, A, no. G9, Stadtrechnung, fol. 250v (1571) (transcript by Rien van den 
Brand, http://www.scriptoriumempeje.nl); Berens, Territoriale Entwicklung & Grenzbildung, 140; 
Hanssen, Inventaris, 481.
14 On the importance of perceptions in geopolitics see Black, Geopolitics.
Figure 2. The Leo Belgicus prevents Spanish pigs from entering the “Garden of Holland,” 
late sixteenth century. Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum (RM, RP–P–OB–77.682).
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own territory a garden means emphasizing the civilized or cultivated nature of one’s 
own lands versus the wilderness that lay beyond. The medi eval Dutch word for garden, 
tuyn, in particular refers to a fence or an enclosed space.15 Late medi eval accounts from 
Heusden, Geldern, Grave, and Venlo use the word as a verb to describe the making of a 
fence with planks, branches, and thorn bushes.16 The use of the garden concept is not 
just a play on words: wartime areas perceived as lying outside one’s own “garden” were 
far more likely to experience the full extent of armed forces’ destructive force, which 
contributed to the spread of actual wilderness (see chap. 3).17
The symbolic depiction of a territory as a garden relates to the late medi eval cult of 
Our Lady, in which Mary was commonly portrayed within an enclosed garden, which 
represented the Garden of Eden.18 This garden imaginary rose to particular prominence 
in the medi eval County of Holland. The accounts kept by the count’s administration 
indicate that in the fourteenth century his army actually went to battle with a banner 
depicting a fence, and Willem van Oostervant, later known as Willem VI of Holland 
(1404–1417), founded a new chivalric order in 1387: the Order of the Garden (Orde 
van de Tuin).19 The County of Hainaut, united with Holland through a personal union, 
also used the term jardinet (“little garden”) to describe its territory in the 1390s. The 
diminutive might have been adopted to distinguish it from the Jardin de France, which 
denoted the I�le de France.20
This emphasis on the medi eval origin of the garden termino logy puts better­known 
early modern characterizations into perspective. The French engineer de Vauban’s 
description of France as a “square field” (pré carré) protected by a mixture of fortresses 
and “natural frontiers,” for instance, has its origin in these medi eval ways of frontier 
perception.21 The same applies to the famous “Garden of Holland” (Hollandsche Tuyn), 
which will be forever associated with the Eighty Years War (1568–1648). An etching 
related to this conflict, dating to the late sixteenth century is of particular interest here 
(see figure 2). It portrays a lion defending his “garden,” a fence, against Spanish pigs. The 
rendering of Spanish forces as pigs not only reinforces the notion of an enclosed garden, 
15 Middelnederlandsch Woordenboek, “Tuun” (http://gtb.inl.nl); Rudd, Greenery, 165–70.
16 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 217, fols. 6v, 7r, 15r, 26r, 94r, 146v, 151r, 152r, 257r, 
258r, 267v, 268r, and 277v (transcript by Rien van den Brand); Bondam, “Oudste stadsrekening,” 
109–110; de Groot, De stadsrekeningen, 1384 fol. 5; 1385 fols. 7, 8, 39; 1386 fol. 7; 1387 fols. 24, 
26, 28; 1388 fols. 9, 15, 26; 1397 fols. 8–9; 1399a fol. 8; 1402 fols. 9, 20; 1404 fol. 24; 1405 fol. 14; 
1406 fol. 8; 1407 fol. 15; 1408 fol. 10; 1409 fols. 10–12, 14; 1412 fol. 41; 1415 fol. 28; Kuppers, “De 
stadsrekeningen,” 9, 11, 20, 22, 34, 48, 60, 61, 69–72, 83, 92–93, 105, 158, 220, 235, 296.
17 Kroener, Les routes, 84, 95–96, 100, 112–13.
18 Miwa, “The Hortus Conclusus,” 2–4, 7–11, 54–55, 76–79, 86–87, 128–31; van Winter, “De 
Hollandse Tuin,” 59–64, 102–3.
19 van Tol, “De Orde van de Hollandse Tuin”; van Winter, “De Hollandse Tuin,” 31–59.
20 Dauphant, Le Royaume des quatre rivières, 211; Flammang and Van Eeckenrode, “Le jardinet de 
Hainaut,” 45–49; de Planhol and Claval, An Historical Geo graphy, 104.
21 Bitterling, L’Invention du pré carré.
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but might also refer to the forced conversion of Jews and Muslims.22 The anonymous 
artist has also given the sea a very prominent place, as an obstacle that the pigs had to 
cross. The apparent paradox of the wilderness–garden termino logy, an aspect of fron­
tiers that will be referred to again later, is indeed that the very defence of a “garden,” a 
territory, against wilderness, could also be based on wilderness elements. It is precisely 
this military perception of frontier landscapes that we will now examine.
Studying the ways armed forces perceived, and ultimately managed, frontiers might 
seem to be relatively straightforward. The political–military importance of these areas 
after all ensured a relatively strong interest on the part of rulers and/or states. It is in 
fact well known that peripheral areas, and frontiers in particular, were generally charted 
before a political entity’s core regions.23 The oldest maps from the Meuse Region, made 
with a military purpose in mind, date to the fifteenth century at least. Charles the Bold, 
Duke of Burgundy, paid painters in the 1460s, during his conflicts with the Prince­Bish­
opric of Liège, to make two maps: one of the frontier between the Duchy of Limburg and 
22 van Winter, “De Hollandse Tuin,” 82–87.
23 Dalché, “Les usages militaires”; Dauphant, Le Royaume des quatre rivières, 182–88; Desbrière, 
Cartes et mémoires, 5, 15–18, 22–25, 125–26; Hale, “Warfare and Carto graphy.”
Figure 3. Itinerary from Luxemburg to Paris, 1544 (Brussels, KBR, MS 22089). Reproduced 
with permission of the Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique/Koninklijke Bibliotheek van België.
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the Prince­Bishopric, and an itinerary, a road map, that connects les pays de par deça 
(“the lands over here” or the Burgundian possessions in the Low Countries) with les 
pays de par dela (“the lands over there” or the Duchy of Burgundy and Franche­Comté).24
The maps themselves do not seem to have been preserved, but it is possible to get 
an idea of what they might have looked like from a sixteenth­century map, now kept in 
the Royal Library in Brussels (see figure 3). This map, dating to 1544, depicts an itiner­
ary from Luxemburg to Paris. It has to be read from the corner on the lower right to 
the one on the upper left. It was probably made in preparation for an actual invasion of 
France, given that Habsburg troops were actively fighting French forces at that time. The 
text on top says “Map from Luxemburg to Paris, to know the country so you will learn, 
1544” (Caerte van Lutsenborch tot Parijs, om die contreij te weten soo wordijs hier wijs, 
1544). While this map evidently used different conventions from military maps from 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it does show a clear emphasis on waterways and 
woodlands. These natural elements are depicted in a very schematic way, but it is still 
possible to identify the Meuse and Ardennes on the foreground.
Waterways and woodlands are in fact a prominent feature of all military maps, which 
were never meant to be realistic depictions of landscapes but guides to commanders on 
how to take advantage of them and avoid potential pitfalls. The eighteenth­century Fer­
raris map of the Southern Netherlands, named after the Habsburg engineer, the count 
de Ferraris (see figure 8), might appear to be more accurate than this medi eval­looking 
map from 1544, but it still does not depict economic activities that were considered 
irrelevant for military commanders. In order to properly understand the assumptions 
and perceptions on which these maps are based, they have to be read in juxtaposition 
with the original written explanations that accompanied them, or with military hand­
books. These sources confirm that military commanders saw woodlands and waterways 
as potentially dangerous environments, as obstacles to military movement, but also as 
potential aids to defence, as sources of fuel, and transportation routes.25
A far more important question than issues of accuracy or completeness is whether 
these maps actually reflect the perceptions of army members in general. Only a handful 
of higher­ranking officers and engineers had access to them. The information encom­
passed in these maps was not public; it constituted a carefully guarded secret.26 While 
it is very unlikely that the average combatant was familiar with military maps, he still 
shared the same feelings towards woodlands, waterways, and other kinds of “wilder­
ness” and expressed these sentiments in various kinds of tales and stories. John M. Col­
lins actually made a connection between military perceptions of woodlands and fairy 
tales in his military geo graphy handbook, as both depict woodlands as “dangerous.” He 
24 Paviot, “Les cartes et leur utilisation,” 209–10, 213.
25 Brussels, KBR, Cartes et plans, MS IV 5.567: Carte de Ferraris; de la Fitte, Mémoire militaire; 
Desbrière, Cartes et mémoires, 32–33, 37–39, 41, 113; Despy, “Les opérations,” 287–90; Graatsma, 
“Limburg 1802–1807”; Lemoine­Isabeau, La Carto graphie, 141–43, 321–44.
26 Printed maps for instance were far less detailed than their manu script versions. 
Lemoine­Isabeau, Les militaires, 67–72; Lemoine­Isabeau, La carto graphie, 52–56; Schäfer, 
“‘Krygsvernuftelingen’,” 239–45.
28 chapter 1
intended this just as a joke, and failed to see that the connection between tales or sagas 
and armed forces is very real. 27 The average storyteller in premodern Europe was far 
more likely to be an adult male than the stereotypical “Mother Goose” character. The 
essential feature of a good narrator, aside from being able to speak fluently, was experi­
ence of travel. Soldiers and sailors therefore constituted a substantial group among such 
storytellers. The Brothers Grimm for instance paid J. F. Krause, a pensioned non­com­
missioned officer of the Saxon cavalry, because he was a famous storyteller, to obtain 
some typical soldiers’ tales.28
The roots of these stories lay, at least partially, in the Middle Ages, and more specifi­
cally in chivalric romance (see figure 4). The tale of “Les Quatre Fils Aymon” or Renaud 
de Montauban and the horse Bayard, for example, can be dated to the twelfth century, 
and describes events that supposedly took place in the Ardennes during the reign of 
Charlemagne. It had a major role in contributing to the perception of the Ardennes as 
an impassable wilderness, and was still told in Lorraine during the eighteenth and nine­
teenth century with minor adaptions; the four knights had simply become soldiers.29 
27 Collins, Military Geo graphy, 41.
28 Bahro, “Afgedankte soldaten”; Fink, “The Fairy Tales”; Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant, 71–73, 108–24.
29 Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant, 221–36; Lejeune, “L’Ardenne,” 69–72.
Figure 4. A knight errant enters a forest full of exotic animals, miniature from a Lancelot–
Grail manu script made in Tournai or Hainaut, mid­fourteenth century (Paris, BnF, MS 
français 122: Lancelot Graal, Piérart dou Tielt (atelier), 1344–45, fol. 180r).
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In a medi eval context the actual narration was typically left to minstrels or heralds rather 
than combatants, but these storytellers also had a strong connection to warfare. Heralds 
accompanied armies on campaign to record events and identify noble participants. The 
herald Gelre for instance, the author of one of the most famous armorial books in medi­
eval Europe, wrote a series of poems in which he praised the chivalric deeds of knights 
from the lands of the Meuse and Rhine.30 Minstrels on the other hand had to raise the 
morale of the troops. The blacksmiths’ guild of Liège, one of the most powerful associa­
tions in the city, enlisted two minstrels for life in 1403 to accompany them on military 
campaigns and processions.31
The Rymkronyk of Jan van Helen (“Heelu”), written in 1288–1290, which narrates 
the duke of Brabant’s victory in the battle of Wörringen (1288) and the actions that 
led up to it, is another good example. It recites real events that happened relatively 
recently and is therefore not a fictional tale in the same way as the Romance d’Arthur 
or Lancelot’s quest to find the Grail, but still draws on the same stereotypes. It claims 
in effect that when Duke Jan I of Brabant advanced through the Ardennes in the winter 
of 1286–1287 to besiege the fortified church of Sprimont, he rode through the “wildest 
lands of the German Empire.”32 The poet also added a very practical element, however, 
one that can also be found in later military descriptions: the Ardennes were considered 
inhospitable because invading forces found it difficult to procure sufficient amounts 
of food there (they were full of snow, and consisted of forests, mountains, and rocks). 
The duke, anticipating these problems, ordered his men to carry provisions with them 
on packhorses. The supposed impassability of the Ardennes, or indeed any other huge 
stretches of wilderness, was therefore connected to logistical issues.33
The Duke of Brabant’s response to these supply problems deserves further scru­
tiny. It demonstrates that fast moving mounted forces were able to overcome most of 
the risks posed by these barren environments. Areas of wilderness certainly had their 
share of armed forces passing through. One just has to distinguish between huge invad­
ing forces and smaller armies with local bases to fall back on. Only the first category was 
relatively rare, at least when compared with more fertile lands, such as along the banks 
of the Meuse. The nobility of the lands between the Meuse and Rhine enjoyed a particu­
lar warlike reputation during the Central and Late Middle Ages, mainly because of their 
willingness to serve for pay or booty when an opportunity presented itself.34
30 De Boer, Faber, and van Gent, eds., De rekeningen, 1393–1396, lxi–lxii; van Anrooij, Spiegel van 
ridderschap; Verbij­Schillings, Beeldvorming, 224–32, 238–44.
31 de Chauvelays, “Les armées,” 174, 176, 179, 206; Fairon, Chartes, 132–33; Mora­Dieu, “Les cor­
porations,” 200.
32 Jan van Helen uses the term Oesselinc or Oesseninc for the Ardennes, which might also be a 
reference to its wilderness character (woest). Goossens, De geografie, 10; Sleiderink, De stem van de 
meester, 87–97; van Helen, Rymkronyk, 100, 130–32.
33 Arnold, Negotiating the Landscape, 155–62, 216–18; Deniéport, ed., “Routes de terre et d’eau”; 
De Rabutin, Commentaires, 1:260–66; d’Haynin, Mémoires, 1:164 and 2:84–85; Kroener, Les routes, 
59, 100; Muller, “Histoire militaire”; Vallée and Pariset, eds., Carnet, 7, 13, 217, 218, 229; Vilain, 
Mémoires militaires, 131.
34 Govaerts, “From Knight Errants to Disloyal Soldiers.”
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The main difference between these two kinds of forces can be demonstrated by 
taking the French invasion of the northern Meuse Region, in 1388, as an example. 
This expedition was directed against Guelders and Jülich and had to pass through the 
Ardennes, Hohes Venn, and Eifel. Despite the assembly of numerous wagons for this 
purpose, the chronicler Jean Froissart claims the army column measured no less than 
forty­five kilometres in length, logistical preparations would prove to be utterly inad­
equate in the face of difficult terrain, hostile inhabitants, adverse weather (incessant 
rains), and the cold climate. The size of this invasion force quickly became a liability 
rather than an asset: no fewer than three thousand labourers had to clear the roads 
between Virton and Neufchâteau in the Duchy of Luxemburg.35 The famous French poet 
Eustache Deschamps served in this army, and later commented on his experiences in 
several ballads. One explictly warns against the dangers of a winter campaign, another 
complains about the money and horse he lost. The French army eventually accom­
plished its goal, the duke of Guelders and the count of Jülich signed a peace treaty, but 
the campaign was hardly the glorious victory the soldiers had expected. Many French 
noblemen were taken prisoner by their German counterparts, who were not hampered 
by these same environmental constraints, possibly because they knew the local ter­
rain, and wore lighter armour.36
Given the predominance of large stretches of wilderness in the Meuse basin, such as 
the Campine/Kempen, Peel, Hohes Venn, Eifel, Ardennes, Woëvre, and Argonne, the use 
of the Meuse River as a symbolic frontier between the kingdom of France and the Holy 
Roman Empire might seem to be self evident. It should be stressed therefore that while 
the eco logical characteristics of the Meuse Region have a significant role in explaining 
the political history of these lands, there is nothing predestined about the use of the 
Meuse as a frontier marker. This particular use, which has consequences to this very 
day, as the current basin of the Meuse River is divided among five states, is an accidental 
outcome of centuries of historical developments, in which political, economic, cultural, 
and military impacts were at least as important as eco logical ones.37
During the Early Middle Ages the Meuse Region was in fact not a frontier at all. It 
constituted the core of the Carolingian Empire. The Carolingian dynasty came origi­
nally from the middle part of the Meuse basin, more precisely from Hesbaye, the fertile 
lands to the north of Liège. Names such as Pepin of Landen and Pepin of Herstal are very 
revealing in this regard. Charlemagne also established his empire’s capital in Aachen. 
This does not diminish that contemporaries already perceived the Ardennes as a wilder­
ness. The main point is that in the Early Middle Ages an area such as the Ardennes could 
become the core of an empire despite its apparent wilderness character. Charlemagne 
35 Froissart, Chroniques, 13:196–98; Laurent and Quicke, L’Accession, 220–53; Moulin and Pauly, 
Die Rechnungsbücher, 1:38–42.
36 Deschamps, Oeuvres, 1:123–24, 3:24–26, 5:121–22; Laurent and Quicke, L’Accession, 220–53; Le 
Bouvier, Le livre, 113.
37 On the use of woodlands as frontier markers see Bechmann, Trees and Man, 259–62; Dubois 
and Renard, “Forêts et frontières,” 29–34; Higounet, “Les grandes haies forestières.”
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liked to hunt in the Ardennes and might actually have killed some of the last aurochs 
living in Western Europe.38
The wilderness aspects of large areas of the Meuse Region became relevant in the 
specific context of the division of the Carolingian Empire. It is hardly a coincidence that 
the two major agreements that settled disputes over this inheritance came about in 
the Meuse Region: the treaties of Verdun (843) and Meerssen (870). It is particularly 
as a result of the latter treaty that most of the Meuse Region, which had become part 
of Lothair I’s Empire, was incorporated into the eastern half of Charlemagne’s former 
imperium.39 The Meuse only served as a limit between what later became the kingdom 
of France and the Holy Roman Empire in Champagne and the Argonne. Further north 
the Scheldt replaced it as the official dividing line. Even in these southern areas, the 
importance of the Meuse River can be called into question. A list of testimonies, assem­
bled in 1288 on request of emperor Rudolf of Habsburg (1273–1291), regarding the 
exact limits of the Empire in the Argonne, demonstrate that not the Meuse, but a small 
river, the Biesme, a tributary of the Aisne, served as the actual boundary marker.40
The gathering of these testimonies reflects the emperor’s growing discomfort with 
French expansion towards the east. It is precisely in the late thirteenth century that the 
kings of France incorporated the Meuse River into a discourse that presented their king­
dom as delineated by four rivers (the Meuse, the Saône, the Rhône and the Scheldt). 
The year 1301 was a crucial turning point, for Count Henry III of Bar (1291–1302), 
whose county lay on both banks of the Meuse River, had to acknowledge Philip the Fair 
(1285–1314) as his overlord for “Bar non­mouvant,” more or less the part of his county 
located on the left (western) river bank. This made him a fiefholder of both king and 
emperor, whereas until this point the entire principality had been part of the Empire. In 
other words, the Meuse River became a dividing line because of European politics in the 
Central Middle Ages. This still did not turn the river into a real frontier, however, since 
the County of Bar still occupied both riverbanks. The Meuse only served as a frontline in 
the 1420s, when troops loyal to Henry VI (King of France, 1422–1453) occupied almost 
the entire kingdom of France north of the Loire River. Partisans of Charles VII (King of 
France, 1422–1461) only held out in a handful of fortresses east of the Meuse River: in 
other words, in the Holy Roman Empire. It is in this specific context that Jeanne d’Arc, 
born in Domrémy, on the left bank of the Meuse River, rose to prominence.41
The example of the County of Bar refers to a fundamental aspect of the distinctions 
between the Meuse’s symbolic and practical value as a frontier marker. During the Mid­
dle Ages, the ways in which the various principalities that actually composed “France” 
and the “Holy Roman Empire” interacted with each other and drew boundaries were 
often more important than perceived boundaries between these larger entities. Most 
38 Arnold, Negotiating the Landscape; Müller­Kehlen, Die Ardennen, 109–10; Rousseau, “La 
Meuse,” 49–64; Suttor, La Meuse, 221–37.
39 Pettiau, “Un espace frontalier”; Suttor, La Meuse, 231–37.
40 Aimond, Les relations, 54–69; Havet, La Frontière d’Empire dans l’Argonne, 22, 26–27, 37. See 
also Kraemer, “Une carte choro graphique,” 219–24.
41 Dauphant, Le Royaume des quatre rivières, 121–22; Toureille, Robert de Sarrebrück, 78–86.
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of these smaller principalities straddled both riverbanks (see map 2). The Meuse River 
only served as a frontier along rather small stretches of its course: in 1250 between 
Namur and Luxemburg near Poilvache, between Namur and Liège from Andenne until 
Huy, and between Loon and Brabant on the one hand and Guelders on the other around 
Stokkem and Maaseik and Oss and Cuijk. In some of these areas copper boundary poles 
were put in the Meuse during the Late Middle Ages. Processes of political amalgamation 
reduced its role as a dividing line even further (see map 3). Today, it only serves as a 
border between the Dutch and Belgian provinces of Limburg (see map 1).42
The limited role of the Meuse as a frontier marker can be explained by drawing 
attention to its economic importance. The river was one of the main transport routes 
in Western Europe since at least Late Antiquity, especially for large volume goods such 
as wood, metal, or stone. Such traffic inevitably led to attempts to control trade net­
works and extract income (for instance, tolls). Military transportation also had to rely 
on rivers because moving artillery or large quantities of food and ammunition over 
land was a very laborious task. The detailed accounts of the fifteenth­century Burgun­
dian administration make it clear that the transportation of the heaviest guns, which 
could easily weigh two tons, necessitated the use of specially reinforced wagons drawn 
by over thirty horses. Their ammunition, specially extracted stone or cast iron balls, 
had to be carried along in wagons that also required more horses than usual: a wagon 
carrying twelve bullets needed nine horses instead of the usual three or four. Charles 
the Bold had to mobilize almost three thousand horses to transport his artillery (one 
hundred and twelve guns) and associated material during the 1473 campaign against 
Guelders.43 
There were in effect many drawbacks to land transport: it was slow and cumber­
some, and the horses and wagoners needed to be fed and paid. When the dukes of Bur­
gundy assembled their armies they did so preferably near waterways: Mézières in 1465, 
Namur in 1466, and Maastricht in 1473. Transporting artillery over water does require, 
however, that a commander controls both riverbanks, or at the very least that his boats 
do not have to pass through hostile territory. Artillery became more standardized from 
the sixteenth century onwards and consequently easier to handle, but during this entire 
research­period sieges required relatively large amounts of heavy artillery (e.g., twenty­
four pounder guns, howitzers, and mortars instead of twelve or six pounders), which 
had to be specifically brought up for that purpose.44 Dutch military treatises from the 
early seventeenth century indicate that the transportation of sixty­seven tons of ammu­
nition required either one hundred thirty five wagons or five boats. It is indeed revealing 
that a plan of the French engineer Filley to block an Allied advance towards Dinant in 
42 Dauphant, Le Royaume des quatre rivières, 127–28; Panhuysen, “De politieke verhoudingen”; 
Suttor, “Le rôle d’un fleuve,” 361–64.
43 Decuyper, “De Bourgondische artillerie,” 218–27; Douglas Smith and DeVries, The Artillery, 
48–49, 112, 351–52, 208–9; Sommé, “L’Artillerie”; Suttor, La Meuse, 444–46.
44 Decuyper, “De Bourgondische artillerie,” 221–27; Harari, “Strategy and Supply”; Marchal, 
Inventaire, 135; Naulet, L’Artillerie, 186–212.
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1695 by constructing a dam in the Meuse was never executed because it also made a 
French counterattack towards Namur impossible.45
The use of the Meuse River for transporting troops and their horses was far less 
important, because marching over land was faster and easier. The militias of cities 
located next to the Meuse made frequent use of river transport, but the actual num­
ber of troops could be as low as a dozen.46 The accounts of Venlo from 1412 specify, 
for instance, that it paid for the transportation of about fifty men on two baardsen to 
Batenburg, a fortress located between Lith and Grave. A baardse was a relatively shallow 
and small ship, which made it ideal for navigating rivers as well as carrying out military 
expeditions on the North Sea. In the medi eval County of Holland the use of ships, cogs 
as well as baardsen, during military campaigns was so conventional that the number of 
people that each settlement had to supply was measured in oars (similar arrangements 
existed in Scandinavia and Scotland).47
River transport remained a distinct possibility well into the early modern period as 
long as the navigability of the Meuse itself allowed it.48 A temporary drop in the water 
level, or conversely, a sudden flood, made it impossible for boats to pass through. Even 
in the best of circumstances the river could only be navigated from Commercy onwards. 
Commercial traffic was only possible between Sedan to the North Sea. The Freiherr von 
Natzmer (1654–1739), a former officer of the Dutch army, remembered in his mem­
oirs how the low water level of the Meuse significantly complicated their retreat from 
Maastricht in 1676, since the sick and wounded, as well as the cannons, could not be 
transported by water.49 The construction of new forts at Stevensweert (near Maaseik) 
and Navagne (near Visé) by the Habsburg government in respectively 1633 and 1634 
also attempted to secure traffic over the Meuse after the Dutch conquest of Maastricht.50
Throughout these six centuries many rulers tried to reunite the entire Meuse Region, 
and several of them could claim to have been temporarily successful. Any of these actions 
could, potentially, have led to the unification of the region under one political entity. 
Charles the Bold (1467–1477), for example, made major efforts to restore Lothair’s for­
mer empire (855–869) and effectively controlled almost the entire northern half of the 
Meuse Region by the early 1470s. He died at the battle of Nancy while fighting for control 
over the southern half. Charles V (1506–1555) again united a considerable part of the 
region, by occupying the Duchy of Guelders, but the Dutch Revolt caused a renewed sepa­
ration. The armies of Louis XIV (1643–1715) seized large stretches of the Meuse basin, 
even taking Maastricht in 1673, yet eventually had to abandon many of their conquests. 
45 Muller, “Les gués”; Wijn, Het krijgswezen, 388.
46 Burgers and Dijkhof, eds., De oudste stadsrekeningen, 23, 43–44, 65, 71; Suttor, La Meuse, 
463–64; Waale, De Arkelse oorlog, 118; van Helen, Rymkronyk, 116.
47 de Groot, De stadsrekeningen, 1405 fols. 14–16, 1407 fols. 18, 22, 1412 fols. 18, 44; Fritze and 
Krause, Seekriege, 57–58: Jansen and Hoppenbrouwers, “Heervaart in Holland.”
48 Helmich, Journaal, 230, 232; Kroener, Les routes, 92–93; Suttor, La Meuse, 464–65.
49 von Adlersfels­Ballestrem, ed., Memoiren, 24–25.
50 Sangers and Simons, Geschiedenis, 82–83; van Hoof and Ramakers, “De militair­strategische 
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Napoleon I (1804–1814) ruled over the entire Meuse Region after the incorporation of the 
kingdom of Holland into the French Empire (1810) until his abdication caused renewed 
divisions. The Meuse Region might have been percieved as a symbolic frontier since the 
Early Middle Ages, but it only became a real one as a result of specific political events.
Managing Frontiers
Armed forces’ perception of frontier landscapes was to a large degree based on the gar­
den–wilderness dichotomy, which reflects the basic fact that armies operating in the 
Meuse Region came from societies that depended on agriculture for their survival. This 
agrarian origin also had a major influence on the ways armed forces actually operated 
in frontier landscapes. Let us first analyze the core of frontier strategies: concentrated 
defence (strongholds) versus drawn­out linear fortifications. Both options had their 
value and limitations. The choice for one or the other can therefore be used to gain 
insight into the nature of the perceived threat, the “other” standing on the opposite side 
of the frontier.
Fortresses control their surrounding territory, not only through their strategic loca­
tion, but also by operating as a seat of government. A classic example is the city of ’s­Her­
togenbosch, founded at the end of the twelfth century in what was originally a forested 
area (the name literally means the Duke’s Forest). This city functioned as the centre of 
the northern part of the duchy of Brabant; the Meierij of ’s­Hertogenbosch. When the 
Dutch captured the city in 1629 they could therefore lay claim to the entire district. It 
was also a key stronghold in the defence of the Meuse River, first for the dukes of Bra­
bant and later for the Dutch Republic.51
The city of ’s­Hertogenbosch was only one of many new towns founded in the Cen­
tral Middle Ages with strategic considerations in mind. Rulers throughout the Meuse 
Region granted charters of liberties and urban rights for similar purposes to settlements 
as Geertruidenberg, Nieuwstad, Stokkem, Montmédy­Haut, and Marville. Villagers typi­
cally received such privileges in the expectation that they would defend a ruler’s for­
tress or to consolidate the frontier more generally.52 The main difference between these 
medi eval towns and their sixteenth­ and seventeenth­century counterparts (Mariem­
bourg, Rocroi, Philippeville, Willemstad, Stevensweert, Charleroi, and Longwy) is that 
armies, and more particularly soldiers, often had an active role in the latter’s construc­
tion, a reflection of processes of state formation. Another noteworthy characteristic 
is the concentration of these early modern defences around the Meuse River where it 
enters the inhospitable landscapes of Marche­en­Famenne and the Ardennes. This part 
of the Meuse Region became especially important as a corridor within the context of the 
Habsburg–Valois rivalry in the 1540s and 1550s.53
51 De Cauwer, Tranen van bloed, 143, 261–63; Deprez, “La politique castrale.”
52 Aarts and Hermans, “Castle Building,” 17–18; Berens, Territoriale Entwicklung & Grenzbildung, 
125, 137; Reichert, Landesherrschaft, 2:585, 2:609–10, 2:615; Yante, “Franchises, paysages et 
environnement,” 134.
53 Gaber, “Marville et l’espace frontalier”; Hasquin, Une mutation, le “Pays de Charleroi”, 18–23, 
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While these fortresses did control strategic access points, they were still unable to 
defend a “frontline” on their own. Only in exceptional cases were rival strongholds built 
so close to each other that one might speak of a true frontier in the sense of a frontline. 
The best example is the long­standing rivalry between Bouvignes and Dinant with the 
destruction of Dinant by Burgundian forces (1466) as a notorious climax. The town of 
Bouvignes, in the County of Namur, was founded in the twelfth century as a counter­
part to Dinant, in the Prince­Bishopric of Liège, on the opposite (left) bank of the Meuse 
River. Copper boundary poles were put into the river to demarcate their respective ter­
ritories, and by 1465 the cities’ respective fortifications had been expanded to such an 
extent that gunners could actually target their adversary’s defences.54
The example of Bergeijk, in the Campine/Kempen on the Brabant–Loon frontier, on 
the other hand, might be more typical for most frontiers within the Meuse Region. Of 
particular interest is a charter from 1415, written down in the context of a local bound­
ary dispute. Such disagreements invariably involved witness testimonies of the oldest 
members of a village. In this charter villagers of Pelt (Overpelt and Neerpelt) declared 
that several decades earlier, possibly in 1334, an official of the count of Loon wanted 
to burn neighbouring Bergeijk in retaliation for a Brabant attack on the count’s town 
of Beringen. The villagers managed to convince him not to do so by pointing out that 
the count also owned twelve manors in the district. Apparently, a fixed boundary had 
not yet been established in the heathlands of the Brabant–Loon frontier. The inhabit­
ants of Bergeijk again narrowly avoided a raid in 1388, when they persuaded the duke 
of Guelders that their lands depended on both Brabant and Liège. That very same year 
the councillors of Theux wrote down an agreement between the inhabitants of the lord­
ship of Franchimont in the Prince­Bishopric of Liège, and those of the Duchy of Limburg. 
It stated that livestock could graze on the common land from sunrise to sundown and 
that, if one of the principalities was involved in an armed conflict, villagers could pasture 
their animals on the lands of the other side.55
The aformentioned charters demonstrate that medi eval principalities were assem­
blies of lands over which a ruler could claim some right (notably taxation or justice). 
Power was not exerted uniformly across the whole territory.56 Over time general bound­
aries did of course become more clearly defined, but it is illuminating that even in the 
late eighteenth century, when the Ferraris map was drawn, major issues regarding the 
exact location of the borders between the Austrian Netherlands and the Prince­Bishop­
ric of Liège still remained unsolved. The gunners who made this map went to consider­
able trouble to denote enclaves and contested boundaries.57
The awareness that premodern frontiers could assume the shape of both zones and 
actual frontlines is crucial for understanding how armed forces interacted with frontier 
251–53; Sangers and Simons, Er ligt een eiland in de Maas, 82–83, 244–51; van den Eynde, “La 
fonction militaire”; van Nispen, Willemstad, 25–33.
54 Borgnet, Bouvignes; Bormans, Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., Cartulaire de Dinant, 2:103–10.
55 Bormans, “Chambre des Finances,” 20–21; Vangheluwe, “Bergeijk,” 309–24.
56 Chouquer, Traité d’archéogéo graphie, 23–38; Genicot, “Ligne et zone”; Noordzij, Gelre, chapters 3–4.
57 Brussels, KBR, Cartes et plans, MS IV 5.567: Carte de Ferraris.
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landscapes. Many armies, especially up to the early eighteenth century, simply intended 
to raid and devastate, or otherwise extract income from enemy lands (contributions), 
rather than to occupy territory. Revealing in this regard is a treaty from 1707, signed 
by representatives of the French king and the Dutch Republic. The French government 
agreed to pay contributions and not to raid the land of Cleves, and in return the Dutch 
would not invade the lands to the west of the Meuse River with a force of fewer than 
four thousand men. In other words, in 1707 a force of four thousand men was accepted 
as a dividing line between an army bent on establishing contributions and one able to 
occupy territory.58
When the French engineer de Vauban devised his famous “iron belt” (frontière de 
fer) in the late seventeenth century, two lines of fortresses along the frontiers of Louis 
XIV’s kingdom, he left a gap between the Meuse River on the one hand and the Moselle 
and the Rhine on the other. In this area it was assumed that the Ardennes, a “natural 
frontier,” constituted an adequate barrier. As the treaty from 1707 demonstrates, this 
defence system deterred only large invasion forces, not fast­moving bands of mounted 
raiders. From 1644 to 1748 the French monarchy thus had to construct special defen­
sive lines on the Meuse and Semois rivers to cope with this threat.59
These linear defences deserve closer attention because they show the difficulty of 
using the Meuse, or any other river, as an obstacle. The French government connected 
major strongholds (Mézières, Sedan, Mouzon, and Stenay) to each other through the 
58 Desbrière, Chronique critique, 128–31, 136.
59 Desbrière, Chronique critique; Parker, The Army of Flanders, 11; Satterfield, Princes, Posts and 
Partisans, 86–88.
Figure 5. Detail of a map depicting fords in the Meuse River from Saint­Mihiel to Revin, 1640 (Paris,  
BnF, Cartes et plans, GE BB–246 (IX, 128–129 Partie du cours de la Meuse avec les guez sur icelle)).
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garrisoning of medi eval fortresses along the Meuse, and the creation of new watchtow­
ers and earthen embankments (redoubts) near fording places. Soldiers of the royal 
army concentrated in the former points of defence, while guarding the latter linear 
defences became the responsibility of thousands of armed peasants, drawn from the 
lands between the Meuse and Aisne. The costs of this defence were manifold: it drained 
manpower from the regular army, removed peasants from their work, and consumed 
massive amounts of timber. A surviving report from 1710 indicates that the construc­
tion of a single redoubt required one hundred and twenty­eight fascines (bundles of 
branches) and two hundred and fifty pallisades. Yet these lines rarely succeed in keeping 
well­organized raiders at bay.60
The character of the Meuse River itself lay at the heart of the difficulties: depending 
on the season multiple fords could appear or disappear, and each had to be fortified (see 
figure 5). This unpredictable behaviour also lowered the life expectancy of earthen forti­
fications considerably: the seasonal flooding of the Meuse ensured that if these redoubts 
were not properly maintained they became completely unusable in a few years due to 
erosion. Yet worst of all was that despite these defensive efforts enemy forces crossed 
the Meuse River anyhow, either because armed peasants could do little to oppose them, 
or because they found other ways to get across, by using boats or swimming. The French 
government responded to these issues by establishing a different defensive line, on the 
Semois, a tributary of the Meuse, and by increasing the number of guards. M. de Lagrange, 
lieutenant de roi in Rocroi, even ordered the cutting of wood alongside the main road 
from Sedan to Bouillon in 1701 so that enemy troops could be spotted more easily.61
The problems faced by French generals were hardly unique, as every effort to defend 
the Meuse River faced the same difficulties: ’s­Hertogenbosch depended on temporary 
fortifications (blokhuizen) and patrolling by boat to fend off attacks from Guelders in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth century, and Imperial troops constructed earthen redoubts to 
defend themselves against Belgian rebels on the west bank of the Meuse in 1789–1790. 
Such defensive efforts could be hampered by harsh winters, when invading forces could 
simply walk over the frozen Meuse, as well as dry summer months (see figure 30).62 The 
Duke of Alba’s attempt to keep William of Orange on the east bank of the Meuse River in 
1568 famously failed when the prince’s army found a ford in the Meuse between Stok­
kem and Obbicht on the night of October 5 to 6. Credit for this operation probably has to 
go to Karel van Bronckhorst, lord of Obbicht, who fought with the rebel army. In order 
to prevent surprises such as this, Michel de Warisoul, castellan of Samson, sent a report 
in September 1568 to the count of Berlaymont, stadtholder of Namur, listing all possible 
60 Desbrière, Chronique critique; Desbrière, “Le bois,” 243–47, 249.
61 Desbrière, Chronique critique, 21–22, 29, 34, 44, 90–91, 110, 117, 227; Richer, Abrégé chrono-
logique, 220–94.
62 Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 44; de Clercq, “Jean­Baptiste De Bouge,” 207–52; Deloffre, 
“Guerres et brigandages,” 352, 391; De Stavelot, Chronique, 101–2; Sabron, De oorlog, 2:125, 2:126, 
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von Adlersfels­Ballestrem, ed., Memoiren, 89; Waale, De Arkelse oorlog, 126.
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crossing points between Dinant and Huy, including suitability for cavalry, infantry, and 
wagons. There were no fewer than thirty­one.63
This concern with potential routes in the Meuse River is representative for a more 
general friction between road networks and the conservation of wilderness. Frontiers 
were landscapes characterized by the threat of a potential enemy attack. The stan­
dard response to an invasion was blocking the invader’s road of advance. Depending 
on local landscape features this could entail the obstruction of routes with cut down 
trees (abatis) and ditches, the destruction of bridges, and the obstruction of river traffic 
with stakes or palisades. In 1422, for instance, the forester of Hainaut’s lieutenant led 
his wardens and an unspecified number of labourers into the Forêt de Mormal to block 
roads with cut down trees and destroy bridges so that enemy troops would not be able 
to pass through. They needed thirteen days to complete this task.64 Contemporaries 
thus not only perceived wilderness as dangerous because of its inherent nature, but also 
because these landscapes were far more likely to serve as hostile environments during 
armed conflicts.
Such needs could outweigh economic ones, creating certain tensions. In 1488, during 
the siege of the castle of Namur, which was built adjacent to the confluence of the Sam­
bre and Meuse, the besiegers blocked traffic on both rivers by putting chains between 
the pillars of an existing bridge over the Meuse, constructing a temporary wooden 
bridge over the Sambre, and placing a large floating barrel on the Meuse near one the 
artillery towers in the city wall. The creation of two separate barriers across the Meuse 
was necessary to close off the river before and after its junction with the Sambre (see 
figure 8).65 The city of Maastricht (from the Roman “Mosa Trajectum” or bridge over the 
Meuse/Maas) likewise assumed considerable strategic importance because of its loca­
tion on a major Roman road, connecting Bavay to Co logne, and its control over one of the 
few stone bridges over the river. Maastricht retained its military value from the fourth 
century ce, when the Roman army built a fort there, until its demilitarization in 1868.
Most roads in the Meuse Region, as elsewhere in Western Europe, were tracks lead­
ing from one settlement to the next. A 1632 handbook for the maréchal des logis, the 
officer in charge of billeting troops, depicts a variety of local road networks.66 The state 
of such paths, filled with mud piles and holes, and rarely designed to accommodate 
any movements beyond local traffic, obviously left much to be desired.67 Officers of the 
63 Brouwers, “Les gués”; de Graaf, Oorlog, 243; Sangers and Simons, Geschiedenis, 67.
64 Delcourte Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 320, 342. See also Becquet, “Montaigle,” 108–9; 
Burgers, “De steden van Holland,” 277; de Robaulx de Soumoy, “Recherches,” 184–85; de Stavelot, 
Chronique, 365.
65 Borgnet, “Troubles,” 35, 45–50.
66 De Solemne, La charge du mareschal des logis; Duyck, Journaal, 3:395; Mourroux, “Stenay, ville 
militaire,” 50–51; Parker, The Army of Flanders, 72–74; Richer, Abrégé chrono logique, 183; van Hoof 
and Ramakers, “De militair­strategische betekenis.”
67 Brunner, ed., Reise des P. Reginbald Möhner, 54, 101–2; d’Haynin, Mémoires, 1:139, 1:216; 
Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 3:268; Felsenhart, “L’invasion,” 306, 311; Hagendorf, Tagebuch, 
62; Lidec, ed., “Routes de terre et d’eau,” 50–54; Vallée and Pariset, eds., Carnet, 108, 122; van 
Werveke, Die Erwerbung, 38.
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bishop of Liège’s army, for example, complained in April 1756 about soldiers losing their 
shoes in the mud when chasing vagrants in the Campine/Kempen (see chap. 4). They 
explicitly stated that the roads were impracticable for a military unit.68
Given that building high­quality paved roads rarely became a viable option before 
the eighteenth century, relatively few solutions were available to solve these problems. 
Accounts from the village of Chatelineau, near Charleroi, show that during the sev­
enteenth century the villagers regularly procured hundreds of fascines to lay on local 
tracks.69 In several of these instances, it is clear that these efforts were, directly or indi­
rectly, stimulated by armed forces passing through. The main alternatives to not improv­
ing the tracks would be that the soldiers stayed longer in the area or were diverted from 
the tracks and trampled agricultural land in the process. Many legal acts or court records 
of war­related damage speak of armies cutting down hedges and damaging agricultural 
fields when passing through.70
While armed forces complained regularly about the state of the road network, they 
also contributed to road degradation themselves. In 1665, for example, a new regional 
road connecting Liège and Sedan (le Chemin Neuf) was finished. This road had consider­
able economic value because it did not have to pass through the Spanish Netherlands. 
It thus allowed traders to avoid potential conflicts between the French and Habsburg 
monarchies, economic or otherwise. But French forces also took advantage of this new 
route to invade the Meuse valley in 1667–1668, and effectively rendered the road unus­
able until repairs could be carried out.71
Armies ultimately responded to the constraints on movement posed by land roads 
as well as rivers, such as the Meuse, by constructing canals (and later railways as well). 
Canals provided a relatively easy, and economical, way of transportation, just as rivers 
did, but their straight outline and constant water level made them much more reliable in 
terms of navigation. Of no less importance is that these same characteristics also made 
them much easier to defend. What we see here is a combination of military and eco­
nomic goals, or at least the assumption that military and economic objectives can be 
complementary, in a way that resembles military concern with horse supply (see chap. 
4). The Fossa Eugeniana (1626–1633) and the Canal du Nord (1806–1810) for example, 
both of which were never finished, aimed to divert traffic from the Meuse and Rhine 
Basins, and therefore the Northern Netherlands, towards the Scheldt Basin (favour­
ing Antwerp). Yet at the same time these canals constituted a military defence line, a 
potential frontier. This is especially obvious in the Fossa Eugeniana because intermedi­
ate forts were built to defend this canal, and soldiers had an active role in its construc­
tion. The Zuid­Willemsvaart (built in 1822–1826), on the other hand, ran parallel to the 
68 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. no. 2974: Petition April 10, 1756.
69 Kaisin, Annales historiques de la commune de Chatelineau, 125, 127, 154, 345.
70 Caffiaux, Essai sur le régime, 272–73; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 3:283; Driessen, 
Emundt van Oeteren, 347, 702; Illaire et al., eds., Les cahiers de doléances, 210; Jacob, Bruyères, 181; 
Lambert, “Des témoins,” 195; Laurent and Quicke, L’Accession, 229; Mertens, “Bank van Pelt,” 23; 
Sabron, De oorlog, 2:25; van Heiningen, Tussen Maas en Waal, 282–87.
71 Harsin, “Etudes sur l’histoire économique,” 89–95. See also Mengels, Chronyk, 45–46.
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Meuse River and created a relatively swift and reliable transportation route between the 
strongholds of ’s­Hertogenbosch and Maastricht.72
Such waterways might seem the perfect alternative for the relatively unpredictable 
Meuse River, but they created problems of their own. Canals drain water from surround­
ing areas, especially the rivers they are connected with, and in this way make the latter 
even more difficult to navigate. In 1460, for example, the citizens of ’s­Hertogenbosch 
dug a canal near the fortress of Nederhemert, on the frontier of Brabant and Guelders, 
between two arms of the Meuse River. Creating this new watercourse isolated the afore­
mentioned fortress, a fief of the duke of Guelders, but it also served to avoid Heusden’s 
toll stations. The town council of Heusden continued to protest that it made the Meuse 
impassable in inquests of 1494 and 1514. Communities obviously wanted to convince 
their ruler that the tax burden should be reduced, but that does not mean that the griev­
ances put forward in such documents were unfounded.73
The complaints of the council of Heusden can be seen as emblematic for environ­
mental problems near the Meuse estuary. Both Rotterdam and Dordrecht in the Middle 
Ages had almost direct access to the sea. By the sixteenth century processes of land 
reclamation and the silting up of significant parts of the Meuse had made this contact 
increasingly problematic. Defence of the sea, “the most important frontier of the repub­
lic,” rested mainly on warships, but it was precisely these ships that found it increasingly 
difficult to navigate the Meuse estuary.74 Such problems were not just the result of eco­
logical processes; they were aggravated by an increasing divergence between warships 
and other vessels during the seventeenth century. The pressing need to carry more 
guns, symbolized by the adoption of so­called ships of the line, necessitated the creation 
of larger vessels.75 The Admiralty of the Meuse, tasked with defending the Meuse estu­
ary, therefore had to turn the small town of Den Briel into its main harbour, which was 
connected by the “Brielse Maas” to the main or Old Meuse in 1607. By 1650 even this 
forward post had to be replaced by new docks in Willemstad and Hellevoetsluis.76
Armies valued wilderness because it served as a barrier, but at the same time its 
very naturalness made movements, especially counterattacks or offensive strategies, 
problematic. Rather than adopting an entirely defensive attitude towards frontiers, or 
abandoning wilderness as protective elements, armed forces ultimately came to their 
own unique solutions to solve the tension between road networks and wilderness, 
72 Plans to connect the Oise to the Sambre or the Meuse to the Moselle were never executed, 
however. Blanchard, Les ingénieurs, 453–54; de la Fitte, Mémoire militaire, 101–8; Desbrière, Cartes 
et mémoires, 45; Filarski, Kanalen, 117–20, 296–97; Guillery, La Meuse, 6–7; Harsin, “Les projets”; 
Martin, “Maastricht,” 115–21, 177–84; Pistor and Smeets, Die Fossa Eugeniana; Rowlands, “Moving 
Mars,” 492–507; van der Woud, Het lege land, 108–30, 490–91.
73 Enqueste ende informatie (1494), 196; Informacie up de staet faculteyt ende gelegentheyt, 433; 
Hoeckx et al., eds., Kroniek van Molius, 118–19.
74 Krayenhoff van de Leur, Militair-historische schetsen, 89–92. de Jong, “Staat van oorlog”, 65; 
Denessen, “Twee havenuitdiepings­projecten; van Hoof, “De kustverdediging.”
75 Bruijn, Varend verleden, 81–84, 92, 95–97, 102–3, 184–85, 216.
76 Don and Voorne­Putten, 58–59, 67–74; Filarski, Kanalen, 52–54; 80–81; van Mastrigt, 
Willemstad prinsheerlijk, 48–53, 91–92, 101–4.
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movement, and blockades: they created their own artificial “wilderness.” The most 
famous example of such an attempt is the Hollandic (or Dutch) Water Line.
The term Hollandic Water Line refers to a series of inundations intended to safe­
guard the core of the Dutch Republic, the County of Holland, if an attacker managed 
to invade the country. In effect it gave new meaning to the image of the Hollandsche 
Tuyn. Its basic conception originated in the desperate year 1672, when French and Mün­
ster troops overran large parts of the republic. It was only later that Dutch engineers 
developed a more complicated system of sluices and access dikes that allowed com­
manders to inundate specific areas and defend a handful of access points. The essential 
aspect of this Hollandic Water Line, or Lines, for one should distinguish between the 
Old (1672–1795) and New Hollandic Water Line (1815–1956), was therefore that large 
stretches of land had to be prepared for a potential inundation but were not flooded 
permanently. Their long­term eco logical significance, which continues to this very day, 
lays in the preservation of large wetlands or marshes that would otherwise have been 
drained and turned into agricultural fields, rather than the handful of years the lands 
were actually flooded.77
The French government by contrast adopted its own equivalent of the Hollandic 
Water Line, based on the preservation of woodlands near frontiers. This policy devel­
oped only gradually. The marquis de Langeron, a French general, left an account of 
an inspection tour along the French frontiers in 1773–1774, meant as an educational 
opportunity for his young son, on how to follow in his father’s footsteps. When he 
passed near the Forêt de Mormal he remarked that it is a good thing that the count de 
Nicolaï�, marshal of France, prevented the grand maître des eaux et forets from construct­
ing a major road through these woodlands. It would have facilitated an enemy invasion.78
In 1776 the king of France passed an official regulation, which gave military engi­
neers far­reaching powers to prevent anyone from creating new routes in frontier 
zones, which included the entire French­controlled part of the Meuse Region, without 
the approval of a special commission (la Commission mixte des travaux publics), domi­
nated by military engineers. Given that any significant clearing of woodlands created a 
potential invasion route, the French military had a primordial role in the preservation of 
forest belts alongside France’s borders, which are clearly observable even today. These 
landscapes, symbols of European “wilderness,” are the result of a deliberate policy based 
on military perceptions of frontiers that date back to the Middle Ages at the very least.79
Up till this point we have considered frontier landscapes in terms of access, and more 
particularly defence against a potential enemy attack. Armies’ interactions with fron­
tier landscapes also included a set of impacts, however, that were not directly related 
to defensive needs, and might occasionally even run contrary to them. These will be 
referred to as “garrison services” because of their vital role in sustaining a military pres­
77 Bevaart, Nederlandse defensie, 71–76; 96–101; Caminada­Voorham, Loevestein, 109–11, 
126–28; Ridderbos, Kleine atlas, 80–87; Will, Sterk water, 29–63.
78 Vallée, “Le journal,” 168–69.
79 Ordonnance Corps du Génie (1776), 30–31, 43; Dubois, “Les forêts”; Reitel, “Le rôle de l’armée,” 
143–48.
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ence. The French engineer de Vauban speaks of a place forte’s need for dépendances.80 In 
order to study the relationship between these services and actual defensive needs, let us 
first examine the case of the fortress of Montfort, for which source material is relatively 
abundant. Besides a series of accounts, the oldest of which date back to 1294–1295, a map 
drawn by order of the Habsburg government has been preserved, which gives an excep­
tional depiction of the landscape there in the early seventeenth century (see figure 6).81
Henry of Guelders, bishop of Liège (1247–1274), founded the imposing fortress of 
Montfort on the right, or eastern, bank of the Meuse, close to Maaseik, in the 1260s. It 
quickly became a key fortress in the defence of the County of Guelders’ southern fron­
tier, because of its function as a seat of government. The lordship of Montfort is a classic 
example of what English medi evalists have recently called “lordly” or “elite” landscapes: 
lands filled with symbolic elements of power.82 Several brooks in the area were chan­
nelled towards this fortress to create huge fishponds, and the lordship also contained 
several forests, the most important of which was the Echterwald, located on the Guel­
ders–Jülich frontier between the towns of Echt and Vucht. Landscape elements such as 
80 Mourroux, “Stenay, ville militaire,” 48.
81 Coenen, “Kasteel Montfort”; Meihuizen, De rekening.
82 Creighton, “Castle Studies,” 5–17; Creighton, Designs Upon the Land; Liddiard, Castles, 97–121.
Figure 6. Map of the lordship of Montfort (detail), drawn by the engineer Philippe Taisne in 
1625 (Brussels, ARA, Cartes et plans manuscrits, no. 73, Carte topo graphique et figurative de 
la terre, la seigneurie et château de Montfort, avec les villages de sa dépendance, dressée, en vertu 
d’ordres de la Chambre des Comptes de Ruremonde, par l’ingénieur Philippe Taisne, en 1625). 
Reproduced with permission of the Algemeen Rijksarchief / Archives générales du royaume.
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ponds or woodlands can be considered as status claims since access to game and fresh­
water fish was a social privilege. It was also a rather uneconomic way of land use. The 
owner of such lands showed that his socio­economic base was so secure that he could 
afford to use his lands for display rather than agriculture.83
It has become common practice to use this concept of elite landscapes to question or 
at least downplay the military role of medi eval fortresses (or “castles”; see further in chap. 
2), but the example of Montfort demonstrates that this is an oversimplification. There is 
no reason why a landscape feature such as a fishpond, which had obvious prestige value, 
could not have had a defensive role as well. In the case of Montfort, the fishponds were 
so extensive that a direct attack on the east side of the fortress became impossible. The 
chronicler Jean de Stavelot also wrote that in 1436 urban militias from the Prince­Bish­
opric of Liège first had to drain the ponds next to the fortress of Bossenove, near Rocroi, 
before they could assault it. This task took no fewer than three days.84
By the early seventeenth century, when the engineer Tassin drew a map of the lord­
ship, the landscape had changed markedly in many respects, a situation also reflected in 
inspection reports. The Echterwald was at this point the only major woodland remain­
ing in the area; the others had become simple heathlands. Several of the ponds became 
dry during the summer months, at which time the local population used them for pas­
ture. Overexploitation was a major cause of the degradation of this elite landscape, but 
it cannot be seen in isolation from fifteenth­ and sixteenth­century political events: the 
fortress no longer served as a ruler’s residence, subjects of the Count of Jülich diverted 
one of the brooks supplying the ponds with water, and the lordship had suffered repeat­
edly during invasions. The impoverishment that resulted from these wars forced stew­
ards to use lands in a more productive way. The deathblow to the last vestiges of the 
original lordly landscape came in 1650–1653, when soldiers stationed in the fortress 
dug a canal that drained the last remaining ponds.85
The slow growth of the lordship’s permanent military presence might have had an 
essential role in bringing about these landscape changes. The oldest surviving accounts 
of the duchy, from 1294–1295, indicate that the “high bailiff” tasked with defending this 
fortress had at his disposal five knights doing guard duty because of feudal obligations, 
two gatekeepers, two sentinels, five watchmen, a crossbow maker and his son. A “gar­
rison” of sixteen grown men and a child in times of war might seem wholly inadequate, 
but it is very much in line with the ways most fortresses were managed up to the late 
sixteenth century (see chap. 4). If an actual threat was imminent the garrison could eas­
ily be augmented to a hundred men and more. A garrison of about eighty soldiers was 
only established around 1578, and later expanded to about two hundred.86
83 Coenen, “Een kasteel”; Coenen, “Kasteel Montfort”; Gentenaar and Hupperetz, “Personeel en 
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These soldiers actively contributed to the overexploitation of natural resources by 
fishing in the moats, digging peat, and probably hunting as well. This behaviour was 
quite similar to that of their medi eval predecessors, the main issue being that they were 
far more numerous.87 Archaeozoo logical research of animal remains in Franchimont, a 
fortress located in the Prince­Bishopric of Liège with a similar strategic role, suggests 
that game, especially red deer and wild boar, constituted a significant part of its occu­
pants’ diet in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. According to the bishop’s 
regulations from 1503 the household of the castellan residing here should include three 
horsemen (the castellan himself, his page, and a groom), four infantrymen, a gatekeeper, 
two sentinels, and two servants (male or female).88
The appearance of large permanent garrisons in most parts of the Meuse Region 
from the late sixteenth century onwards therefore contributed to changes in frontier 
landscapes, as military governors, invariably members of prominent noble families, 
incorporated these same elements of lordship in the landscapes that they had to 
defend. A court record from 1660 Namur indicates for instance that the Prince of Chi­
may, governor of the city, had his own hunting park (garenne) in the forest of Hasti­
moulin. A local chronicle from ’s­Hertogenbosch likewise mentioned in the year 1697 
that the governor’s hunters killed a deer and a wolf.89 This reveals that the governor 
employed gamekeepers to manage his hunting grounds, and that wolf and deer had 
become so rare in the area that their killing became noteworthy. Soldiers’ fondness of 
hunting could in effect cause considerable damage and friction, with citizens as well as 
governors, because they rarely respected hunting regulations or private property (see 
chap. 3).90
Complaints about soldiers taking firewood from woodlands near their garrison 
should be read in a similar light. Providing garrison members with fuel, often coal or 
peat rather than wood, was the responsibility of the inhabitants in whose houses they 
lodged, the urban council, or the state, but these mechanisms often proved insufficient. 
Furthermore, the upkeep or expansion of fortifications and military material, notably 
gun emplacements, required substantial amounts of wood. Military garrisons would 
make sure they had access to nearby woodlands.91 In one case this even meant appro­
priating their actual management. During the Central and Late Middle Ages the Ravens­
bosch near Valkenburg was the main forest within this prestigious lordship. From the 
sixteenth century onwards it also became a major supplier of wood for the garrison of 
Maastricht. Records kept by the chief engineer demonstrate that he bought trees (oak, 
ash, field elm) to plant in this forest in 1750, in the aftermath of the reoccupation of 
Maastricht by Dutch forces, and had a major role in the establishment of new regula­
tions for the forest’s management in 1765. He also had a say in the appointment of new 
87 Arnold, German Knighthood, 85; Wadge, Archery, 114–15.
88 Den Dooven, “Les émoluments,” 98–99; Gautier, Hoffsummer and Vanguestaine, “Faune,” 75–88.
89 Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 3:268; van Bavel et al., De kroniek, 414–15.
90 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079, November 1, November 20, 1716; March 17, May 
1, 1717; Verbois, Rekem, 296; Verschure, Overleven, 199.
91 Illaire et al., eds., Les cahiers de doléances, 129, 158, 167, 209, 474, 524.
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forest wardens. It is indeed significant that in the early nineteenth century, when Dutch 
soldiers no longer had access to nearby woodlands, the garrison planted coppice wood 
in the outworks to secure their wood supply.92
Besides wood and game, garrisons also needed access to pasture for their hors­
es.93 Because of the sheer volume of forage consumed, cavalry forces typically stayed 
in regions with ample access to grasslands. The French government stationed a dispro­
portionate part of its cavalry forces in the Meuse basin from the seventeenth century 
onwards because the river valley provided extensive pastures for their horses. In 1789 
ten of the sixty­one French cavalry regiments had garrisons in the Meuse Region. Fron­
tier cities and towns for their part were quite content to receive them because they could 
sell their hay to the military and use the horses’ manure to fertilize their fields. The town 
of Rocroi went so far as to build new barracks and stables at its own initiative in 1721. 94
 Still, the intensive use of the Meuse and Sambre valleys by French cavalry units 
might have had other unintended results. Military consumption of hay and pasture 
removed a powerful incentive for local peasants to drain these areas and turn them 
into agricultural lands, thereby slowing down population growth in these areas. A 1693 
plan to drain the meadows of the Sambre valley in order to use these fertile lands as 
agricultural fields was never executed because it would have prevented mounted regi­
ments from garrisoning or even assembling in this area.95 In sum, military management 
of frontier landscapes produced significant eco logical results because it contrasted with 
agricultural or economic needs.
Military Training
After examining how armed forces perceived and managed frontiers in a general way, 
let us turn to one specific aspect of frontier management: military training. This par­
ticular feature of army–ecosystem interactions at landscape level deserves to be exam­
ined separately because it plays a key role in claims that today’s military forces have 
become protectors of nature. It also draws attention to a neglected feature of military 
history, for few authors have devoted serious attention to how medi eval and early mod­
ern armies practised military manoeuvres in peacetime; that is, beyond commenting 
on the adoption of “drill.”96 Military training is defined here as any activity that aims 
to prepare someone, or a group of people, for warfare. Since this study is specifically 
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concerned with frontier landscapes, the main emphasis will be on weapon handling and 
unit manoeuvres.
Frontiers are an obvious place for military training, because relatively few people 
lived there, armed forces were already present in these areas, and the chance that actual 
fighting would take place was relatively high. Military training can also be initiated to 
intimidate an antagonist, or to show off an alliance, in a way not dissimilar to joint U.S.–
South Korean military exercises in recent years. It reinforces the perception of frontiers 
as a “frontline” by sustaining and intensifying alleged distinctions between the “self” 
and the “other,” differences which could later justify the breaking of taboos during actual 
armed conflicts (notably killing other human beings).
Because large sections of a population could be called upon to serve in an armed 
capacity, military training became incorporated in other activities. In the Middle Ages 
in particular preparation for war often assumed the form of “games” or “sports.”97 The 
Rule of the Order of the Templars (1128–1129), which served as a model for other mili­
tary orders as well, specfied that a member of order could engage in target practice, 
but was not allowed to wager any objects of value. He could also participate in buhurts, 
informal mounted combats in which the participants were often not in armour, but only 
if the commander was present. The Templars were a monastic order of fighting men. 
Military training was thus an important part of their lives, but the leisurely elements 
normally attached to it were not acceptable and forcefully removed or restricted. The 
rules regarding hunting confirm this impression. There is no doubt that hunting and 
warfare are directly linked to each other, and that hunting skills can be quite useful in 
warfare (the killing of other living beings, arms handling, riding, tracking, acting as a 
group, and so forth), but there was a world of difference between falconry and killing 
dangerous animals. Members of the Templar Order were therefore only allowed to hunt 
lions or accompany hunting expeditions when a Christian might be endangered. Hunt­
ing for pleasure, especially falconry, was strictly forbidden. Brothers of the Teutonic 
Order could likewise hunt large carnivores such as the wolf, bear, lynx, and lion, but 
were forbidden to use dogs. They could also shoot birds as target practice.98
The development of formal military training during the early modern period might 
have put further pressure on the close association of hunting with preparation for war. 
The prince de Ligne, a member of the oldest and most prominent noble families in Hain­
aut, and a general in Habsburg service, criticized existing practices in 1780 when he 
wrote that “you do not tell a recruit: I will make you a hunter, you have to take him from 
the woods.” In the late eighteenth century “hunter” (Jäger, jager, chasseur) had become 
a general name for a particular kind of unit, “light troops” that typically wore green 
uniforms and might be armed with hunting rifles, but were apparently not necessarily 
composed of men with extensive hunting experience. A handful of units did establish 
97 Contamine, La guerre, 362–63; Kleinschmidt, Tyrocinium Militare, 27–29; Mehl, Les jeux, 
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Trophies; Manning, Hunters and Poachers, chap. 2.
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a strong connection with forestry departments, but for these specialist units replacing 
wartime losses was a major problem (see chap. 4).99
The connection between hunting and woodlands, mountains, or wilderness is hardly 
a coincidence. It demonstrates that the ambiguous perception of frontiers as both wil­
derness and garden barriers is omnipresent in military training practices as well. Prepa­
ration for war, especially arms handling, is a very disruptive activity. The choice for par­
ticular practice areas close to or within frontiers is therefore closely related to the ways 
armies cooperated with society at large. They could opt for sparsely populated lands 
(wilderness), or close off their exercise fields from local inhabitants (gardens).
Studying military training in a historical context can be problematic, because arms 
handling is a skill that large parts of the general population were expected to master. 
The available sources are therefore biased towards more large­scale and notable mili­
tary exercises, many of which included significant performance elements. The main 
issue from an eco logical perspective is how important such events actually were in the 
long­term evolution of frontier landscapes. Their effects might be quite similar to that of 
actual battles, except that killing one’s adversary was not the primary goal.
The oldest medi eval tournaments, in the late eleventh and twelfth century, were 
indeed very hard to distinguish from real combat: they included fighters on horseback 
and on foot and there were very few rules. The well­known Chronicon Hanoniense of 
Gislebert of Mons (ca. 1150–1225) makes it clear that many of these early tournaments 
were held in the Meuse Region, and more specifically on the frontiers of its numerous 
principalities (such as Trazignies or Maastricht). David Crouch has rightly argued that 
the northern part of France, and the Southern Netherlands, including most of the Meuse 
Region, played a key role in the tournament’s early history.100 Even in the thirteenth cen­
tury, when tournaments became more “urban” in character, they were still held in fron­
tier areas (such as Andenne or Geertruidenberg).101
Tournaments were organized on or near frontiers because of their political signfi­
cance, but also took the presence of major roads, and the eco logy of frontier landscapes 
into account. A horse’s hoof exerts a force more than six times greater than a human heel 
on a level surface.102 One can imagine the effects of a few hours of martial play with hun­
dreds of horse hooves moving about on carefully tended agricultural fields. It is for good 
reason that many tournaments were held after the harvest was brought in, or even bet­
ter, on land of relatively low value. The tournament of Chauvency (1280), arguably one 
of the most famous tournaments of the entire Middle Ages, was held in the river valley 
of the Chiers, between the town of Montmédy and the fortress of Chauvency, according 
to the verses of Jacques Bretel (1285). Such open grasslands were the most convenient 
99 de Ligne, Fantaisies militaires, 110.
100 Crouch, Tournament, 27–29, 49–50, 124–25; Neumeyer, Vom Kriegshandwerk zum Ritterlichen 
Theater, 36–57.
101 de Behault de Dornon “Un tournoi à Mons,” 386–91; La chronique de Gislebert de Mons, ed. 
Vanderkindere, 95, 101–2; Janse, “Toernooicultuur,” 153; Poncelet, “La guerre,” 277.
102 Liddle and Chitty, “The Nutrient­Budget of Horse Tracks.”
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place to organize a tournament; they were not enclosed and served simply as pasture 
and for hay production (see figure 7).103
By the fourteenth century the tournament proper, the melee or the charging of two 
groups of knights at each other, had all but been surpassed by the individual joust. Most 
tournaments were now held within towns, and group combat subsisted as only one part 
in a series of competitions. This should not be taken to mean, as has often been claimed, 
that tournaments lost their military relevance altogether. When Charles V (Emperor 
1519–1556, Lord of the Netherlands 1506–1555) came to the Low Countries in 1549 
to present his son, Philip II (1555–1598), as his successor, there were both huge pub­
lic activities, such as a mock battle outside Brussels, and still large­scale but more pri­
vate forms of spectacle, such as the storming of a “castle of love” in the hunting park of 
Mariemont (Hainaut), where eight knights disguised as “savages” held four noble ladies 
prisoner.
The latter performance, which involved at least several hundred soldiers, is particu­
larly revealing because the young prince is portrayed as an ideal successor surrounded 
by noblemen from all over the Habsburg Empire in the context of a controlled space, a 
hunting park and gardens, which just happen to serve as symbols for the unity of one’s 
own territory. It should also be stressed that while all this might seem more like the­
103 Bretel, Le Tournoi de Chauvency, 106–8; Neumeyer, Vom Kriegshandwerk zum Ritterlichen 
Theater, 289–333.
Figure 7. Medi eval tournament held in the open fields between two fortresses, Hainaut, early fourteenth 
century (Paris, BnF, MS français 122: Lancelot Graal, Piérart dou Tielt (atelier), 1344–45, fol. 80v).
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atre than military training, the front of this castle, described as a bastillon104 in a fiscal 
account recording the tournament’s expenses, was composed of bricks, and the actual 
assault involved a range of manoeuvres, including livestock raiding, an attack on a con­
voy, and live firing at the bastillon. The besieging army included cavalry, infantry, artil­
lery, pioneers, and at least one engineer. Three hundred and seventy­six infantrymen 
were drawn from the frontier with France to participate in this event. There were no 
human fatalities, but at least one horse died as result of a lance thrust, a nobleman suf­
fered burns because his beard and clothing caught fire, and several others fell from the 
castle’s walls during the attack. It can be very difficult to distinguish theatrical elements 
from practical military needs, and the question remains to what extent contemporaries 
actually made such distinctions.105
The tournament of 1549 establishes a useful link between medi eval tournaments 
on the one hand and early modern military training exercices on the other. Despite the 
supposedly “revolutionary” character represented by the adoption of drill in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth century, particularly in the Dutch army, there is rela­
tively little evidence for how armies practised unit manoeuvres. A new kind of military 
handbook made its appearance in this period, one that stressed the importance of drill 
and provided numerous illustrations to accompany the text, but it is quite unclear to 
what extent such manuals represent actual practice. David Parrott and Erik Swart have 
stressed the informal character of contemporary military training, based more on expe­
rience than formal drill.106 A notarial act from 1652 Rotterdam, concerning a soldier who 
refused to follow orders, mentions that the unit to which this man belonged exercised 
outside the walls, the same spaces Habsburg and French forces utilized for their military 
reviews.107 It is useful to note that open fields or heathlands regularly served as back­
ground for target practice as well, even though permanent shooting ranges existed from 
at least the fourteenth century. The citizens of ’s­Hertogenbosch, for instance, dragged 
a newly cast gun to the heath and marshes outside the city in 1545 in order to test it, 
according to the city’s accounts.108
The connection between military exercises and city walls, the city’s “frontiers,” 
was mirrored at a much larger scale by the establishment of major training camps on 
state frontiers from the late seventeenth century onwards. The establishment of these 
camps should be seen in the context of a significant growth in the size of armies in the 
period from 1660 to 1760, which made it necessary to practise manoeuvring with big­
ger forces. Surviving reports and plans demonstrate the intention of training soldiers 
104 A small bastille, meaning a blokhuis or bulwark (see chap. 2).
105 Bragard, Dictionnaire, 52–53, 249; Buchon, ed., Oeuvres complètes de Pierre de Bourdeille, 
1:302–4; Frieder, Chivalry and the Perfect Prince, 135–58, 183; Marquet and Glotz, eds., Une relation, 
57–62; Wellens, “Un compte.”
106 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, 38–48; Swart, “De mythe van Maurits en de moderniteit.”
107 Rotterdam, SAR, ONA, inv. no. 452, no. 44 October 1, 1652; Boonen, “Maaseiker soldeniers 
en huurlingen,” 11; Callot, Les Grandes Miseres et les Mal-heurs de la guerre, depiction of a military 
review; von Adlersfels­Ballestrem, ed., Memoiren, 11, 21.
108 van Zuijlen, Inventaris, 2:626.
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in camping and foraging as well as military manoeuvres in the strict sense of the word 
(including mock battles, sieges, and bridge building). Camps were typically pitched in 
grasslands or heathlands, but with access to running water.109 The French army thus 
established training grounds next to the Sambre, near the village of Aymeries, in 1727, 
1732, 1753, 1754, and 1755.110 As surviving maps indicate, these areas were sparsely 
populated, and therefore easy to rent or appropriate, and provided the necessary wide­
open spaces. The soldiers even had to flatten the prospective sites so that no obstacle 
impeded manoeuvres. Yet all this made these encampments more vulnerable to sus­
tained rain showers and the resultant flooding. The Dutch training camp in Oosterhout, 
organized in the heathlands near Breda in 1732, had to relocate twice because of inces­
sant rain and the flooding of the campsite, and was eventually broken up prematurely.111
Because campsites were chosen for their strategic locations, it comes as no surprise 
that some of them were held near or on actual battlefields. When Walloon regiments 
of the Imperial army performed the manoeuvres prescribed by their new drillbook, 
in 1767, 1768 and 1770, they did so near Jemappes, the same common lands, used as 
pasture, where they were defeated by a French republican army in 1792. While the 
eco logical effects of one encampment or battle would be ephemeral, the focus on spe­
cific areas could lead to long­term effects.112 This was especially so if camping involved 
major landscape changes. Dutch officers of the military academy in Breda for example 
referred to some artificial hills near the city as the “English Mountains” at the end of 
the nineteenth century. They thought British troops had constructed them during the 
1793–1795 campaigns against France, while they were actually remains of Dutch prac­
tice camps from 1769 and 1776. These hills served as huge butts to prevent any cannon 
balls from flying off the range. The published testimony of a corporal of the English foot­
guards confirms that the British army was not responsible for the hills’ construction, but 
that its members were well aware of their military origin. It is worth noting that both 
Dutch and British soldiers contributed to the lowering of the groundwater level by dig­
ging wells in these heathlands, where water was relatively scarce.113
While such notable events involving relatively large numbers of combatants were 
closely connected to frontiers, due to their very transient character they provide little 
evidence of long­term eco logical consequences. Less prominent military activities, how­
ever, also produced lasting effects, because they occurred repeatedly on the same piece 
of land. As far as the Meuse Region is concerned, the appearance of permanent train­
ing grounds can be traced back to the creation of brotherhoods or guilds of crossbow­
men from the thirteenth century onwards. These were later supplemented by archers, 
109 Ordonnance Corps du Génie, 43–44; Chagniot, “Les camps”; Pierrot, “L’arrondissement de 
Montmédy sous la Révolution,” 18–20; van Nimwegen, De Republiek, 111–14.
110 Paris, BnF, Département Arsenal, MS 6452 (456); MS 6452 (457); MS6452 (458B,1); MS 6452 
(458B,3); MS 6453 (461); MS 6453 (462); Département cartes et plans, GE D–16345.
111 Nauwkeurig dag-verhaal van ’t campement bij Oosterhout, 3, 21, 23; van Seters, “Het 
Campement bij Oosterhout anno 1732,” 140. See also Duyck, Journaal, 3:485.
112 Gosseries, “Souvenirs militaires de Mons,” 239–43.
113 Brown, An Impartial journal, 187–89; de Bas, “De Kalix Berna of Kalbergen.”
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(hand)gunners, and swordsmen’s guilds. The oldest surviving such charter dates back 
to 1266 Namur and was granted by Guy of Dampierre, Count of Flanders and Margrave 
of Namur (1253/1263–1305/1298). Because these men trained regularly, at least once 
every two weeks, they were considered a military elite; they had a major role in the 
maintenance of law and order, were always the first choice for military expeditions, and 
served as permanent guards on city walls during conflicts.114
From an eco logical viewpoint, it is important to note that only a relatively small part 
of the adult male population engaged in these exercises, in contrast to late medi eval 
England, where every adult male was supposed to own a bow and arrows and practise 
regularly. The terrains allocated to these associations tend therefore to be described 
as enclosed spaces (courtils) or gardens115, while in England target practice usually 
took place on common land and frequently led to the massive destruction of gardens 
(enclosures).116 Such shooting ranges, which could contain fruit­bearing trees and vines, 
were often located just inside or outside the city walls (“frontiers”), mostly in dry moats, 
especially if these ditches had lost their original function due to the expansion of the 
fortifications. In the fifteenth century one of the companies of crossbowmen in Dinant, 
according to the town’s cartulary, practised shooting at the foot of the walls, the other in 
part of the dry moat.117 Shooting guilds lost most of their military importance over time, 
and were disbanded in most garrison towns as early as the late sixteenth century, as 
central governments considered them unwanted competition for regular military units.118
The relative decline of these militias corresponded with a more general shift towards 
paid troops, “soldiers.” As mentioned earlier, it is unclear where these men trained, and 
whether they occupied a specific terrain for such purposes, before the eighteenth cen­
tury. The garrison orders of Namur are one of the few sources to provide good, detailed 
information. They indicate that the infantry, artillery, and cavalry more or less had their 
own drill grounds in 1759–1761. The cavalry exercised in the open fields outside the 
Porte de Jambes (near the like­named village, to the southeast of the city), the artillery 
next to the Meuse, outside the Porte Saint­Nicolas, and the infantry mostly outside the 
Porte Bulet (see figure 8). This does not mean that access to suitable grounds was easy. 
The garrison had to pass review in April 1761 outside the Porte Saint­Nicolas instead of 
Porte de Jambes, for example, because of obstruction by the city council. The governor 
complained to that same body in 1771 and 1772 that owners of the training fields near 
Jambes not only sowed them, but that one man even turned his lands into a garden (that 
114 Borgnet, Histoire, 4–6, 14, 26–27, 43–44; Devillers, “Notice historique sur la milice 
communale”; Thewissen, De gezworen schutterijen.
115 Tongeren, SAT, Resoluties, inv. no. 1, fol. 21r.; Borgnet, Histoire, 9, 16–17, 26–27, 43, 45, 48; 
Bormans, “Extraits des cris du péron,” 209; de Groot, De stadsrekeningen, 1399a f. 23; Devillers, 
“Notice historique sur la milice communale,” 178–79; Gaier­Lhoest, L’évolution topo graphique, 42, 
44; Mora­Dieu, “Les corporations,” 208; Rizzo, “La prévôté de Marville,” 13; Thewissen, De gezworen 
schutterijen, 183–91; van der Eerden­Vonk, Raadsverdragen, 379, 397.
116 Gunn, “Archery Practice,” 53–57, 63.
117 Bormans, Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., Cartulaire de Dinant, 2:52–54, 2:58–60, 3:206–7.
118 Denys, Police et sécurité, 118–30; Thewissen, De gezworen schutterijen, 251–56.
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Figure 8. Depiction of 
Namur and its immediate 
surroundings, map of 
the Count de Ferraris, 
1777 (Brussels, KBR, 
Cartes et plans, MS IV 
5.567: Carte de Ferraris, 
fol. 116). Reproduced 
with permission of the 




is, he enclosed it). Apparently, the sowing had been allowed earlier only as a special 
favour.119
The governor’s opposition to the enclosure of fields was reminiscent of an earlier 
conflict, in 1749, shortly after the Dutch garrison reoccupied the city. The governor 
wanted to establish training grounds large enough to accommodate the entire garrison, 
and demanded access to the Plaine de Salsinnes, to the west of the city, near the castle, 
which in his view were common lands and therefore suitable for military training. He 
also argued that the garrison already used them for military exercises before Namur 
had been lost to the French in 1745. Internal correspondence reveals that Dutch officers 
preferred to use this plain to prevent citizens from constructing earthen embankments 
with hedges or dig ditches, which facilitated an attack on the castle. The governor got 
his way and a training field was established, but it remained the property of individual 
citizens. The aforementioned references to the garrison orders of 1761 prove that the 
Dutch army eventually did lose access to these grounds and that such conflicts over land 
use were not solved for the long­term.120
The garrison of Maastricht meanwhile experienced similar problems. In 1790 it 
reached an agreement with a citizen named J. M. Theelen, who leased the right to cut 
the grass on the fortifications, to use fields next to the walls for training purposes. The 
soldiers could train there before the harvest, from February until the first half of May, 
for five years. Yet the contract also specified that cavalry units could not enter. The lease­
holder was evidently well aware that this resulted in far more extensive compaction of 
the soil. In order to provide their cavalry with suitable space for manoeuvres, the gar­
rison appropriated about six hectares of land in Amby, a village to the east of Maastricht, 
that very same year. This land, known as the Geuselderenbroek, consisted of a significant 
part of the village’s common land as well as some meadows owned by major landown­
ers. Its extensiveness also made it suitable for advanced manoeuvres with all infantry 
regiments together. Detailed fiscal accounts have been preserved, which demonstrate 
that, since charging on marshy ground is very difficult for cavalry units, soldiers turned 
them into suitable training fields by flattening the soil and digging drainage canals. The 
only concessions made to the villagers consisted of allowing them to pollard the trees on 
the edges of the field, and pass through with their wagons or carts, but only outside the 
drill season, and all tracks had to be levelled afterwards.121
During the eighteenth and especially nineteenth century military forces increas­
ingly began to feel the need for larger areas where they could practise on a permanent 
basis without causing conflicts or, conversely, without being disturbed. These camps 
119 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079, Orders March 23, 1714, August 5, 1715, 
September 10, September 11, 1716; inv. no. 2081, Orders April 24, May 16, 1741; inv. no. 2087, 
Orders May 9, May 22, May 23, May 25, May 26, 1759; May 20, May 23, 1760, April 24, May 26, May 
27, May 28, 1761; inv. no. 2088, Orders June 16, September 14, 1771, September 25, September 28, 
September 29, December 13, 1772; May 25, May 26, September 20, 1773; May 23, May 24, May 25, 
June 22, September 30, 1774.
120 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2598: Plaine de Salsinnes.
121 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, 2074: Garnizoensorders Maastricht, Geuselderenbroek.
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also served changing military needs, notably an increased emphasis on target practice 
and more diverse kinds of terrain on which to manoeuvre. The Napoleonic garrison of 
Maastricht, for example, reoccupied the Geuselderenbroek. In marked contrast to their 
predecessors, they also used it for target practice in 1808, which in turn prompted an 
immediate complaint by the city’s mayor to the prefect. The new Netherlands govern­
ment subsequently established several large training grounds on heathlands in the 
1820s.122 The Belgian army followed suit and founded the camp of Beverlo in 1835. This 
has proven to be one of the most long­lasting training grounds in the Meuse Region. 
The camp’s location, in the middle of desert­like heaths and drift sands of the Camp­
ine/Kempen, gained considerable strategic importance in the aftermath of the Ten Days’ 
Campaign (1831), as it controls a major road leading from Eindhoven to Hasselt. It was 
originally made near the garrison of Diest, but transferred to this desolate wilderness 
because the lands were inexpensive (see figure 9).123
Parts of the camp, now military domains, have received protection in the 1990s 
because of their value for endangered flora and fauna, mostly species that depend on 
122 Maastricht, RHCL, Frans Archief, inv. no. 710: letter of August 1, 1808; Biemans, August 
von Bonstetten, 87, 129, 203; Teunisse, Onderdaan in Oranje’s oorlog, 71, 72–74, 94, 102–3, 119, 
121–23, 125, 127; van der Heijden and Sanders, eds., De levensloop, 78.
123 “Notice sur l’armée néerlandaise,” 94–95; Delameillieure, “Het kamp van Beverlo,” 51–60; 
Roymans, Beex, and Roymans, “Some Napoleonic­Style Army Camps”; Weuts, Honderdvijftig jaar 
kamp van Beverlo, 10–11; Wanty, Le Milieu militaire belge, 61–64.
Figure 9. Cavalry patrol in the dunes and drift sands near  
the Camp of Beverlo, early twentieth century (postcard).
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heathlands and drift sands for survival. The eco logical value of these military domains is 
therefore similar to that of other training areas in Western Europe: they preserve land­
scapes that have become very rare elsewhere due to changes in agricultural practices. 
The Belgian army’s disruptive activities—the trampling of the soil, earlier by horses 
and now by mechanized vehicles, and the burning of vegetation as result of live fir­
ing—more or less ensure that this desert­like landscape does not turn into woodlands. 
These domains’ garden­like character (they are not freely accessible and often enclosed) 
makes them a safe haven for endangered species as well.124 While the military deserves 
credit for this protection, they also made a significant contribution to the disappearance 
of these same heathlands and drift sands. The Belgian army after all used the labour 
force of a penal company, the only unit to be stationed permanently in the camp, to turn 
one hundred and forty hectares of heathland into gardens (a quarter of the total), grass­
lands (an eighth), woodlands (one half), and plant nurseries (an eighth) in 1847–1849.125
These changes were initially very practical responses to the challenges posed by this 
landscape: the lack of cover made soldiers’ tents and huts very vulnerable to the wind, 
there was very little or no running water, and food for man and horse alike had to be 
imported from elsewhere. Soldiers thus planted pine trees to strengthen the soil and 
shield their encampment from the wind, dug wells, and used their own horses’ manure 
for the fertilization of these lands. By the 1850s, a new canal and a railway made the 
camp more accessible. Such landscape changes considerably raised the status of the 
army, for it made itself useful in peacetime by turning the wilderness of the Campine/
Kempen into valuable land. But none of the more ambitious programs, such as a horse­
breeding project, were ever put into practice. Perhaps its most enduring influence is the 
town of Leopoldsburg (Bourg­Léopold), created in 1835 because so­called camp follow­
ers were not allowed to live in the actual camp; a stringent reminder that the military–
civilian divide had now become the norm.126
Conclusion
Military domains, rather than being a symbol of progressive behaviour, are actually the 
isolated remains of what were once far more encompassing and diverse strategies of 
frontier management. Armies in the Meuse Region contributed to landscape variety 
on frontiers from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century because their actions were 
well integrated into the fabric of societies in the past, even though they often opposed 
economic needs. Military concerns helped preserve some of the last remaining stretches 
of wilderness from agricultural expansion, as they were efficient barriers against an 
enemy attack.
Developments within armies themselves—a relative increase in scale, and stand­
ing forces, combined with modifications in agriculture, notably enclosure movements—
124 Sterckx and De Blust, Heide in de vuurlinie, 16–18, 90–99.
125 Brion, “L’armée”; Delameillieure, “Het kamp van Beverlo,” 61–72.
126 Brion, “L’armée”; Delameillieure, “Het kamp van Beverlo,” 64, 70; Eenens, Ontginning; Wanty, 
Le Milieu militaire belge, 91–94.
 frontiers 57
stimulated the appropriation or acquisition of permanent training grounds from the 
eighteenth century onwards. These areas laid the basis for current military domains. 
They are considered eco logically valuable because the military’s disruptive activities 
preserve landscapes that have disappeared elsewhere, such as heathlands and drift 
sands, while also providing a refuge for endangered species. Given that such military 
domains are to a greater or lesser extent closed off from the general public, one might 
say that they have preserved a wilderness by turning it into a huge garden. But com­
paring these last refuges with the large stretches of wilderness preserved by historical 




Defences and Their Basic Maintenance
Apart from frontiers, another kind of militarized landscape plays a significant role in 
debates about the eco logical effects of warfare and military forces. The Meuse Region 
abounds with abandoned fortifications, from prehistoric and Roman times to the Second 
World War. Every year thousands of bats seek out bunkers, forts, and ruins for hiber­
nation, because of the constant low temperatures and high humidity. Many have also 
become sanctuaries for rare species of wall vegetation and lichens, or serve as city parks 
(such as Namur, Liège, Jülich). A handful of former fortifications have even been turned 
into nature reserves to protect the rare species that dwell there. The Bossche Fronten 
in Maastricht for instance provides a home for one of the northernmost populations of 
wall lizards (Podarcis muralis) in Europe, not to mention many rare flowers, herbs, and 
lepidoptera (butterflies and moths).1
The aim here, as with the previous chapter, is not to question the value of such struc­
tures for current eco logical conservation, but to expose some of the underlying assump­
tions. Very few, if any, serious attempts have been made so far to assess to what extent 
the biodiversity of former fortifications is based on or relates to their management 
when armed forces still controlled them.2 Old walls overgrown with various plants or a 
ruin covered with moss and/or lichens fit well into a romantic idea of nature reclaiming 
its rightful place, and support a general belief that eco logical conservation and peace are 
intrinsically linked to each other. It also creates a dichotomy between those who want 
to preserve the structures’ heritage and those who primarily seek to maintain their eco­
logical value. The city of Namur for example suffered disputes on the issue whether the 
trees standing on the former castle should be removed because their roots could dam­
age historical edifices.3
This chapter studies the eco logical impacts of these varied types of fortifications 
when they still had military value and were maintained with this function in mind. 
It thus considers fortifications as militarized landscapes in order to establish a link 
between the historical management of defensive edifices, and their current eco logical 
state. The main aim is to consider whether armed forces had a significant role in bring­
1 Brandes, “Burgruinen”; Brandes, “Flora und Vegetation”; Harbusch, Engel, and Pir, Die Fleder-
mäuse Luxemburgs, 10, 26–34, 74, 90, 136; Maassen and Vennix, De groene vestingmuren; Pelzer 
and Kerz, Der Jülicher Brückenkopf; Thoen, “Bouillon”; Weeda, “Maastricht,” 258–67.
2 See especially Boosten, Jansen, and Borkent, Beplantingen; Cremers, Kaaij, and Steenbergen, 
Bolwerken, 121–47; Jordan, “Grün in Festungen”; Neumann, Festungsbaukunst, 368–76.
3 Boosten, Jansen, and Borkent, Beplantingen, 108–11; Bragard et al., Namur, la citadelle 
hollandaise, 140–42.
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ing about and preserving landscape elements that are now considered valuable for eco­
logical conservation, and to what extent they preserved these structures in a manner 
currently recommended by environmental organizations. If this were the case, then this 
chapter lays the second keystone for the argument that armed forces did preserve eco­
systems centuries before the rise of environmentalism.
Most historical analyses of fortifications only examine them from the perspective of 
military architecture, or their relationship to general society, and devote little attention 
to the eco logical aspects of such structures. The field of castle studies is an exception, 
for it has seen an increasing number of studies since the year 2000 that aspire to go 
beyond the traditional image of “strongholds,” and analyze castles as central elements 
within larger “noble” or “elite” landscapes. Such novel approaches are invaluable in 
understanding interactions between armed forces and ecosystems. The meaning of the 
term “castle” (castrum, castellum) in medi eval sources is in fact quite ambiguous. Often 
they simply refer to noble “houses.” Recent emphasis on a castle’s basic function as a 
residence is especially important since it has led to a better understanding of landscape 
elements that figure as symbols for lordship (woodlands, ponds, gardens, and suchlike). 
Still, arguing that most castles had no military function, or at least that this function was 
subordinate at best, as Robert Liddiard has done, might be equally missing the point.4
The poem “Le Jugement dou roy de Behaigne,” for example, was written in the 1330s 
by Guillaume de Machaut, secretary of Johann von Luxemburg, King of Bohemia and 
Count of Luxemburg (1310/1313–1346). It gives an exceptional description of the 
house (“castle”) of Durbuy on the Luxemburg–Liège frontier, and describes it as being 
located on a rocky mount in the middle of a valley, surrounded by a river (the Ourthe). 
There were orchards filled with birds whose song echoed through the valley, a spring, a 
fountain, and broad and long meadows above the riverbanks with many kinds of herbs 
and grasses. The protagonists (a knight and a lady) had never seen a place so beautiful, 
so noble, and so easy to defend. Even the kings or France or Germany could not take it. 
The poet also specified that the house was located far enough from the surrounding hills 
so that no crossbow or siege weapon could reach it. The castle’s aesthetic and military 
qualities were thus complementary rather than conflicting.5
It is worth noting that while this poem certainly gives an idealized image, it is still 
based on the site’s actual geo graphical features. Any missile fired from the hills would 
have to cover at least three hundred metres to reach the fortress. This is indeed out­
side crossbow range. A trebuchet might still be able to target the fortress, but only by 
throwing smaller stones, which could only inflict limited damage.6 Furthermore, Count 
Johann of Luxemburg did make efforts to make his house more secure, for in 1325 he 
asked papal permission to demolish a chapel that impeded its defence, and rebuild it on 
another location.7
4 Coulson, Castles; Creighton, “Castle Studies”; Liddiard, Castles, 70–96, 151–52.
5 Machaut, Oeuvres, ed. Hoepffner, 1:109–111 (vv. 1379–1431).
6 Purton, The Medi eval Military Engineer, 174–76.
7 Fayen, ed., Lettres, 1:592–93; Vannérus and Grob, eds., Dénombrements, 551, 559.
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Given that distinctions between armies and general society were not drawn very 
rigidly before the eighteenth or nineteenth century, it is only natural that many fortifi­
cations had multiple functions and were well integrated into people’s daily lives. Every 
inaccessible place, including caves, quarries, woodlands, and marshes, could of course 
become a refuge in times of insecurity. This does not automatically turn it into a “forti­
fication.” Churches for instance had an important refuge function, but one can only con­
sider them as fortifications if they incorporated features such as arrow or gun slits, and 
battlements with or without murder holes (machicoulis).8 A fortification will therefore 
be defined in this study as a material reinforcement or barrier constructed or adapted 
to strengthen a place against attack. It is therefore invariably man­made to some extent, 
for even rivers, hedges, or woodlands need to be modified to military needs in order to 
become defensible.
In this context the question against whom people were trying to defend oneself 
becomes of major importance. One of the reasons why many types of fortifications have 
been left largely unexamined until now is that scholars assume that a certain scale is a 
prerequisite before we employ the terms “warfare” or “armies.” If one does not accept 
that huge armed forces with the latest siege equipment were the only threat, then the 
military function of less elaborate defensive structures is much harder to ignore. Such 
an approach also has the advantage of contradicting the simplistic, but widespread, idea 
that rural areas are essentially undefended, or “flat” (plat pays, platteland).9
The safety provided by fortifications often went beyond warfare and armies, as attested 
by an example from a late medi eval fiscal account. In 1495 the high bailiff of ’s­Herto­
genbosch sent members of the city’s shooting guilds to the village of Liessel, between 
Eindhoven and Venlo, to bring a notorious highwayman, who had been taken prisoner 
by the villagers at their landweer, to him.10 Landweren or Landwehren, earthen embank­
ments with hedges planted on top of them, which could be several kilometres long, had an 
important role in maintaining safety in the countryside, because they restricted the move­
ments of both people and animals, and forced them to use guarded routes.
It is indeed significant that the term Landwehr or landweer originally referred to the 
duty of a population to defend the land if called upon. Given this origin, the word chiefly 
appears in sources from German­speaking lands, as well as the Northern Netherlands. 
It is possible that such defences were more elaborate in those areas, but one can find 
similar structures throughout the Meuse Region. They are just not called Landwehren.11 
When the chronicler Jean de Stavelot wrote that horsemen from Maastricht rode up to 
the hedges of Heure le Romain in the late fourteenth century to draw out the defenders, 
8 Genicot, ed., Les Tours, 122–26, 131–42; Pagnotta, Les églises fortifiées, 116–28.
9 Gaier, “La fonction.” See also Gold and Revill, “Landscapes of Defence.”
10 Brussels, ARA, 1107 Rekeningen Hoogschout ’s­Hertogenbosch, inv. no. 12996, 080.1.2.12 
(transcript Henk Beijers Archiefcollectie); Kraus, Die Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 426. See also 
Contamine, “Scènes de chasse,” 238.
11 Brokamp, “Landweren,” 1:13–26, 1:30, 1:38–57, 2:104; Engels, “Die Instandsetzung”; Gaier, 
“La fonction,” 767–68; Huyskens, “Stadtbefestigung,” 183–88; Kneppe, ed., Landwehren; Ulrix and 
Paquay, Zuidlimburgsche plaatsnamen, 8, 20, 26–31, 41–44, 47, 56, 58–59, 66, 86–87, 91.
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he meant that they approached the barriers that defined the spatial limits of the village. 
The settlement might have been fortified with ditches and earthen embankments in the 
same way as a city wall.12 Hedges, with or without ditches, are one of the most ubiquitous, 
but also most neglected, object of study as fortifications. Similar defences can be found 
in many parts of Europe, in Sub­Saharan Africa, the Yucatan, and Southeast Asia. Caesar 
already mentioned their use by the Nervii, probably in the Scheldt basin, in the first cen­
tury bce. It is an agricultural technique that could easily be converted to warfare.13
Many hedges would have been composed of common hawthorn (Crataegus mono-
gyna), which is still used in the Meuse Region today. Alternatives could include black­
thorn, seabuckthorn, and non­thorn bearing trees or shrubs such as beech, oak, and 
hazel, depending on the hedge’s primary function. Woodlands acting as barriers in fron­
tier landscapes could also be called “hedges” for instance (such as the Haies d’Avesnes). 
A hawthorn hedge is the most difficult to get through, but its wood is an unsuitable 
source of either fuel or timber. The “laying” of a hedge, a general term to describe tech­
niques to cut and intertwine branches in such a way that the hedge becomes an impass­
able wall, was likewise a common way to turn a hedge into a more formidable defence, 
but it made it a far less productive supplier of wood. Some hedges were not even com­
posed of living plants: the use of wooden poles with willow branches woven between 
them was a common alternative.14
The late medi eval accounts of cities like Geldern, Grave, and Venlo suggest that many 
structures were actually combinations of living hedges and fences, as they mention the 
use of wooden poles, planks, willow branches, and thorns.15 Given that it takes several 
years before a newly planted hedge becomes a real obstacle, and that it is always pos­
sible that gaps appear because individual plants die, it was common practice to com­
bine living with non­living materials. Once a hedge has matured, however, it is far easier 
to maintain than fences or palisades.16 A small town like Bree for example, located in 
the Campine/Kempen, planted three thousand eight hundred thorn bushes and twelve 
12 De Stavelot, Chronique, 114.
13 Caesar, Gallic Wars, Book 2, chapters 17–26; Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare, 92; Palka, 
“Ancient Maya Defensive Barricades,” 428; Seignobos, “Pre­Colonial Plant Systems.”
14 Brokamp, “Landweren,” 1:46–48; Capelle, “Landwehrbau,” 26–28; de Groot, De stadsrekeningen, 
1385 fol. 6; 1386 fol. 7; 1387 fols. 5, 8; Duceppe­Lamarre, Chasse et pâturage, 240–41; Kraus, Die 
Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 155; Kuppers, “De stadsrekeningen,” 105, 134, 220; Vera, Grazing Eco-
logy, 159–62; Weerth, “Westfälische Landwehren,” 160–61.
15 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 217, fols. 7r, 94r, 217r, 258r, 267r, 277v; inv. no. 
218, fols. 173v, 175v; de Groot, De stadsrekeningen, 1384 fol. 5; 1385 fols. 7, 8, 39; 1386 fol. 7; 1387 
fols. 24, 26, 28; 1388 fols. 9, 15, 26; 1394 fols. 9–10; 1396 fol. 16; 1397 fols. 8–9; 1399a fol. 8; 1400 
fol. 6; 1402 fols. 9, 20; 1404 fol. 24; 1405 fol. 14; 1406 fol. 8; 1407 fol. 15; 1408 fol. 10; 1409 fols. 
10–12, 14; 1412 fol. 41; 1415 fol. 28; Kuppers, “De stadsrekeningen,” 8–11, 20–22, 35, 48–49, 61, 
83, 124.
16 Bragard, “Soldats et jardiniers,” 95–96; Bragard et al., Namur et ses enceintes, 42; de Groot, De 
stadsrekeningen, 1377 fol. 6; 1400 fol. 7; 1408 fol. 9; Marchal, Inventaire, 155; Moreau, Bolwerk der 
Nederlanden, 128; Pagnotta, Les églises fortifiées, 21–23; Rizzo, “La prévôté de Marville,” 28; van 
Nispen, Willemstad, 36.
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willows on the slope next to its moat in 1507–1508. This corresponds closely with the 
known length of its walls; about twelve hundred and twenty­nine metres.17
It is precisely this maintenance argument, aside from the resistance to artillery fire, 
which led famous engineers such as Daniel Specklin (1536–1589), Sébastien Le Prestre 
de Vauban (1633–1707), and Henri­Alexis Brialmont (1821–1903), to recommend their 
planting. Thorn bushes in particular performed a similar function to barbed wire, and 
it is illuminating that the demise of hedges, first in military contexts (late nineteenth 
century), then in agriculture (mostly after the Second World War) corresponds closely 
to the latter’s adoption.18 Jean d’Haynin, a nobleman from Hainaut, obtained first­hand 
experience of hedges’ defensive value during the Burgundian invasions of the Prince­
Bishopric of Liège in 1466–1468, and later wrote down a description of these encoun­
ters in his memoirs. According to this exceptional witness account the hedges were 
17 Maes, De geschiedenis van Bree, 2, 21.
18 Belonje, “Beplantingen,” 91–94; Boosten, Jansen, and Borkent, Beplantingen, 36–39; Brialmont, 
Etudes sur la défense, 1:167, 1:325; de Vauban, Traité, 26–27; Jordan, “Grün in Festungen,” 101–2; 
Netz, Barbed Wire, 23–31, 56–63; Speckle, Architectura, 27r, 31r, 108v, 109r.
Figure 10. A knight errant encounters a hedge made of shrubs and spiked 
heads, miniature from a Lancelot-Grail manu script made in Verdun or Metz, 
late thirteenth century (Paris, BnF, MS français, 344: Roman arthurien, fol. 388r).
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eventually overcome, but only after the soldiers dismounted, and they had great diffi­
culty getting through (once they even had to use ladders). Hedges seem to have been 
especially valuable as anti­cavalry obstacles in open landscapes, such as Hesbaye, but 
d’Haynin also mentions that the villagers of Loverval, near Charleroi, turned their wood­
lands into more effective barriers by constructing hedges (les bois estoie hayes).19
It is possible that events similar to those described by Jean d’Haynin found their way 
into literary works as well, for tales of medi eval romance are enduring testimonies to 
the efficacy of these hedges (see figure 10). In the famous Roman de la Rose, from the 
second half of the thirteenth century, the narrator fell in love with a rose that grew in 
an enclosed garden protected by a thorn hedge, and later had to rescue her from the 
fortress where she was held prisoner. It served as a major inspiration for the Roman de 
Perceforest, probably written in the County of Hainaut in the early fourteenth century. 
This remarkable story tells of the deeds of a knight errant who also had to pass through 
thorns and dense woodlands to reach his beloved. It is one of the oldest written versions 
of the fairy tale later known as “Sleeping Beauty.”20
Hedges are one of the most important, but not the only, type of fortification that is 
often overlooked because it does not fit well into the traditional military–civilian dichot­
omy. Many churches in the Meuse Region were also fortified, a logical consequence of 
their role as ultimate refuge.21 Relatively large numbers of such fortified churches have 
been preserved in the southern half of the Meuse Region, but they existed elsewhere as 
well. The city accounts of Grave record, for instance, that its citizens besieged the church 
of Herpen in 1463. Some churches had defensive value that went beyond mere local 
defence, as in 1408, when John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy (1404–1419), insisted 
during the peace settlement with Liège that the walls of all fortified churchyards located 
next to the Sambre had to be demolished, which is difficult to understand if they were 
mere refuges for the villagers.22
The use of fortified mills, and forges, is even more poorly understood than that 
of fortified churches. Mills were a prime target for raiders because they had a crucial 
socio­economic function, represented wealth, and their supply of water or wind energy 
made them stand apart of the rest of a settlement. In 1397, for example, Willem I Duke 
of Guelders and Jülich (1377/1393–1402), attempted to destroy a windmill built on 
top of a bulwark outside the gates of ’s­Hertogenbosch, but retreated when one of his 
knights was shot down. To save face he then burned a windmill that stood unprotected 
outside one of the other gates.23 Forges were vulnerable because of their role in arms 
19 Haynin, Mémoires, 1:138–39, 1:161, 1:223, 1:225, 1:226, 1:233, 1:235–37. See also Froissart, 
Chroniques, 3:35–36.
20 Bryant, ed., Perceforest; Horgan, The Romance of the Rose.
21 Genicot, Les églises mosanes, 276–303; Girardot, “Les forteresses,” 7, 17–29, 38–44; Harrison, 
Castles of God; Pagnotta, Les églises fortifiées; Rousseau, “Tours domaniales”; Rousseau, “A propos 
de la recherche de la sécurité”; van Helen, Rymkronyk, 130; Wright, Knights and Peasants, 102–15.
22 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 218, fol. 135v (transcript Rien van den Brand, 
http://www.scriptoriumempeje.nl); Chevalier, “Les ‘attres’ fortifiés,” 37–41.
23 van Boendale, Brabantsche yeesten, 2:341 (book 6, vv. 9907–9929).
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production, and their need for running water. Fortifying both mills and forges could thus 
become a valid option in times of insecurity. The most conspicuous are two of the larg­
est forges in the Meuse Region, those of Nouzon, near Charleville, and Ster (Vaux­sous­
Chèvremont near Liège), which accommodated small garrisons in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century.24 Perhaps the most striking case is the so­called “Tomp,” a fifteenth­
century windmill in the north of the Prince­Bishopric of Liège (at Achel). This structure 
was studied as a noble tower for decades, simply because it included obvious defensive 
features (gun slits, a hedge/fence, and a ditch).25
Noble houses (“castles”) certainly constitute one of the most archetypical fortifi­
cations, but here similar confusion exists. First of all, relatively few such noble houses 
resemble the classical castle as traditionally depicted. Jacques de Hemricourt, a noble­
man from Liège, wrote in the late fourteenth century a history of the famous feud 
between two of the most powerful noble families in the Prince­Bishopric: the War of 
d’Awans and de Waroux (1297–1335).26 In this book he makes a distinction between 
three types of noble houses: a fortress (forteresse), a tower (tour), and a simple house 
(plat maison). The first corresponded closely to the stereotypical medi eval stronghold, 
while the others refer to simpler structures. It is in fact unclear whether a plat maison 
could be considered as a fortification at all.27
Still, even the smaller types of noble house, which were also the most common, 
had some defensive worth. The Dutch/German word for a manor house with a tower, 
a blokhuis, is the same term used to describe temporary fortifications built from the 
thirteenth to the mid­sixteenth century during armed conflicts to either block access 
to a besieged city or fortress, or control traffic on a major river such as the Meuse.28 A 
fourteenth­century book of fiefs from the County of Loon, for example, mentions in 1367 
unam assisiam, cum una turri dicta vulgariter blockehuys, located near the village of Mil­
len, close to Maastricht. It is likely that when the Count of Loon agreed to participate in 
the siege of Gripekoven, near Roermond, in 1354, and provide thirty men­at­arms and 
thirty crossbowmen as garrisons for two blokhuizen, that these structures were closely 
modelled on such noble houses.29 The major difference being that they were typically 
made of wood rather than stone. Fiscal accounts suggest that their defences included 
ditches, fences, and gabions. At least one sixteenth­century blokhuis also comprised 
a drawbridge. They might have ressembled both the bastilles of the Hundred Years 
24 Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 59–60; Barbe, Laverdine, and Parizel, Moulins, 16–17; 
Bertrand, “La forge”; Desbrière, Chronique critique, 118–19; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 
4:172; Gaier, “La fonction,” 766; Gaier, Art et organisation, 243, 250; Hansotte, “L’industrie 
métallurgique dans la vallée de la Vesdre,” 183; Langlet, “La forge fortifiée”; Marchal, Inventaire, 
167; Matthieu, “Construction d’un fort avancé”; Rizzo, “La prévôté de Marville,” 28.
25 Claassen, Van mottoren tot kasteel, 27–34; Doperé and Ubregts, De donjon, 130.
26 de Hemricourt, Traité.
27 Coulson, Castles, 42–63; Genicot, ed., Les tours, 31–38.
28 Girardot, “Les forteresses,” 29–38; Laurent, Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 291; Waale, De Arkelse 
oorlog, 129.
29 de Borman, Le livre, 55–56; Ennen, Quellen, 394–95.
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War, and bastions (bulwarks, bol-
werken ,  boulevards) built to 
defend gateways in the Late Mid­
dle Ages (the word blokhuis was 
often used interchangeably with 
bolwerk).30
These blokhuizen played a 
similar role to the motte­and­bai­
ley castles made during military 
campaigns in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, and the earthen 
forts (sconces, schansen, Schan-
zen, or redoubts) constructed 
from the late sixteenth century 
onwards.31 All these fortifications 
have in common that they can be 
built relatively quickly, and that 
their construction mainly requires 
the presence of large numbers of 
semi­ or unskilled labourers. Alp­
ert of Metz records for example 
that in the early eleventh cen­
tury Count Wichmann of Vreden 
ordered local peasants to make 
a motte­and­bailey castle on an 
island in a lake, which was located 
about two hundred paces from the 
Meuse River itself. This refers to 
the village of Boxmeer, which lies 
next to a dead arm of the Meuse, and a Roman road connecting Nijmegen with Cuijk. 
Wichmann’s fortification was taken and demolished shortly after its construction, but 
the location retained major strategic value. A blokhuis situated at Boxmeer was besieged 
in 1284 by the count of Holland, and again in 1365 by the duke of Brabant, because its 
owners exacted toll from merchants travelling along the Meuse. Habsburg forces par­
tially demolished a castle built on this same location in 1572 and 1590.32
30 Douglas Smith and DeVries, The Artillery, 341; Hanssen, Inventaris, 24–26; van Zuijlen, 
Inventaris, 1:xi­xii, 1:91, 1:94, 1:97, 1:261, 1:279, 1:441, 1:497, 1:507, 1:513, 1:523, 1:557; Waale, 
De Arkelse oorlog, 185–90.
31 Creighton, and Wright, The Anarchy, 51–73; Raynaud, ““Défenses annexes”; Rogers, Soldiers’ 
Lives, 95.
32 Alpertus Mettensis, De diversitate temporum, 710–11; Aarts, “‘Montferland’ en de 
consequenties,” 34–37; Bachrach, “Civilians and Militia”; Burgers and Dijkhof, eds., De oudste 
stadsrekeningen, lxxviii, 30–31; van Helen, Rymkronyk, 108.
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Broadening our definition of the range of structures that functioned as fortifications 
is only the first step. In order to come to a better understanding of army–ecosystem 
interactions at a landscape level, we need to consider them as elements in larger defence 
systems rather than as isolated points of resistance. Creating systems or networks of 
defence, that is organizing communication and cooperation between the defenders 
of individual fortifications, adds to the strength of the whole. In ideal circumstances 
defence systems ensure that the entire landscape works against the enemy. Given that 
the establishment of such defence systems is well known for early modern and nine­
teenth­century states (such as the Hollandic Water Line or Vauban’s pré carré) this 
chapter emphasizes their functioning in the absence of permanent armed forces.33
33 See also Strickland, “Securing the North.”
Figure 11. Madonna and chancellor Rolin, early fifteenth century (detail). Painting by Jan 
van Eyck. Paris, Musée du Louvre; reproduced by Directmedia Publishing GmbH). Note the 
peafowl in the foreground, whose presence in castle contexts is also attested archaeo logically.
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From the eleventh century onwards the most important, most elaborate fortifica­
tions, the very core of defence systems, were invariably made of stone. Stone stood as 
the preferred building material because of its durability and resistance to the two most 
common assault techniques: setting fire and breaking down obstacles with an axe.34 Fire 
in particular presented a very serious threat: fiscal accounts from castellans and urban 
councils demonstrate that the roofs of towers and gates in major fortresses, such as 
Valkenburg, and prominent cities, such as Maastricht, were made of straw until well into 
the fifteenth or sixteenth century.35
The Meuse Region itself was a well­known centre of stone production. The Meuse 
valley from Givet to Maastricht more specifically had a good reputation for the qual­
ity of its limestone, and it was transported along the Meuse. A few isolated shipments 
ended up as far as Utrecht and Frisia. River cobbles, silex, schists, or sandstone provided 
the main alternatives, sandstone being especially common in the Eifel and Ardennes. 
Because land transport was so expensive such natural stone constituted only a relatively 
small part of building materials, bricks being the main component of most stone struc­
tures. However, since bricks were generally made from local materials, many of these 
can be considered calcerous as well. Fortresses located on rocky hilltops, such as Poil­
vache or Valkenburg were simply built or expanded by broadening the moat.36
The background of a well­known fifteenth­century painting, “Madonna of Chancel­
lor Rolin,” shows various stone fortifications (fortresses, city walls, a fortified bridge) 
scattered throughout a landscape, which is centred on a major river (see figure 11). It is 
possible that the artist, Jan van Eyck, who came probably from Maaseik, had his native 
region in mind when he created this work of art. Jean Lejeune has identified the stone 
bridge as the Pont des Arches of Liège. This bridge, fortified by a massive gateway, existed 
from the eleventh century until its destruction by massive flooding of the Meuse in 1409. 
It protected the city’s core from the district on the right riverbank, Outre­Meuse, which 
lacked city walls until the thirteenth century.37
The landscape created by Jan van Eyck is more or less fictional, as one of the city’s 
towers is based on the Dom Tower in Utrecht, but actual defences in the Meuse Region 
might still have looked quite similar to it. The paintings of the brothers van Eyck are 
indeed famous for their realism and detail. This depiction of a river valley is signifi­
cant, because it shows that fortifications have to be considered as part of larger defence 
systems rather than as individual structures. A similar emphasis on landscape control 
34 Raynaud, A la Hache!, 346–49.
35 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 217, fol. 17v; Informacie up de staet faculteyt ende 
gelegentheyt, 464; de Groot, De stadsrekeningen, 1385 f. 21, 1388 f. 8, 1398 f.10, 1403 f.12, 1407 
f. 17; Genicot, ed., Les Tours, 92–94; Kappelhof, “De heren en drossaarden,” 24–25; Marwede, Die 
Befestigung, 36–38; Moreau, Bolwerk der Nederlanden, 95–96; Uitterhoeve, Burg Rode, 14.
36 Coenen, “Een kasteel,” 61, 66; Doperé, “Steengroeven,” 102–10; Genicot, ed., Les Tours, 78–82; 
Marwede, Die Befestigung, 17–21; Moreau, Bolwerk der Nederlanden; Mourroux, “Stenay, ville 
militaire,” 44; Olson, “Medi eval Stone Production,” 189–208; Rhoen, Aachen, 124–31; Roosens, 
“Habsburgse defensiepolitiek,” 262–63, 346; Silvertant, Valckenborgh, 87–89, 95–107.
37 Henaux, “Note sur le pont des Arches.”; Lejeune, Les Van Eyck, 127–31, 154–55; Snyder, “Jan 
van Eyck.”
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existed in the small city­state of Aachen, where the watchtowers in the Landwehr stood 
in direct visual contact with the towers of the city walls. The inclusion of visual control, 
reminiscent of the original meaning of the term landscape (land­scape: a view, or scen­
ery of a collection of lands), is necessary to understand individual fortifications as parts 
of networks, not to be seen in isolation from other ways of communication.38
Once a threat was identified and located mobilization of defending forces generally 
occurred through sound.39 Horns, drums, and gunshots could all raise the alarm, but 
none of these instruments could rival the importance of the bancloque or stormklok, 
kept in the bell tower of a parish church, belfry, or fortress, to assemble the ban’s popu­
lation in case of alarm (some villages did not have a bancloque, but instead sounded all 
church bells at the same time). When this bell called all able­bodied adult males had to 
assemble and prepare to either defend the settlement, pursue criminals, or put out a 
fire. This bell was also the heaviest and largest one because its sound needed to carry 
across the entire territory of the ban (its “soundscape”). The reach of the bancloque cor­
responded to the limits of the ban’s jurisdiction.40
Organizing systems of defence was rarely such a straightforward process, however. 
Authority over Maastricht for instance was shared between the duke of Brabant and 
the bishop of Liège, and to make matters even more complicated the city’s hinterland 
included several imperial immediacies, lordships that were held directly in fief from the 
emperor. When Maastricht became involved in a conflict between Brabant and Jülich–
Guelders in 1396, the city council made known to several lords in the area (those of 
Kortessem, Stein, Elsloo, Rekem, Neerharen, Born, Pietersheim, and Mopertingen) that 
if any raiders passed through their lordships, they had to sound the bells and pursue 
them, or the city would recompense itself double for the damage done by confiscating 
their goods or those of their subjects, and taking them prisoner. The lords in question 
were fiefholders of the duke, and some might have been citizens of Maastricht, but theo­
retically the city had no authority to command them.41
This order, while threatening, was not an isolated incident, for both cities and rul­
ers did their best to convince more or less independent lords or village communities to 
cooperate with them and join their defence system. A classic example are agreements 
between a particular nobleman on the one hand, and a ruler or city on the other, which 
stipulated that the former would provide armed service when required, or that the lat­
ter could treat his fortress as an “open house,” meaning that they had access to it during 
38 Huyskens, “Stadtbefestigung,” 186. See also Bertrand, “Les trois tours,” 1–7, 16–18; Guénoun, 
“Deux edifices,” 83, 85.
39 Desbrière, Chronique critique, 31; Sabron, De oorlog, 2:32–33, 2:xv; Unger and Bezemer, Oudste 
stadsrekeningen, 50; van Mastrigt, Willemstad prinsheerlijk, 79, 158–59; van de Venne, Het beleg, 20.
40 Becquet, “Montaigle,” 123–24; Berens, Territoriale Entwicklung & Grenzbildung, 140; Jacobs, 
Justitie en politie, 161; Kaisin, Annales historiques de la commune de Chatelineau, 94; Sartelet, La 
principauté, 67.
41 van der Eerden­Vonk, Raadsverdragen, 218–19. See also Coun, “Een Middelnederlandse rol” 
and Koreman, De stadsrekening, 98, 108–9, 116, 118, 120.
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armed conflicts.42 Yet such contracts invariably included caveats that a nobleman could 
not be forced to fight against a ruler to whom he owned fealty, a consideration of par­
ticular importance in the politically fragmented Meuse Region.43
At the other end of the spectrum, cooperation between the different elements that 
constitute a premodern territory could not be taken for granted. The numerous mes­
sages that rulers, cities, and individual lords sent to one another in wartime, payments 
for which appear regularly in accounts, certainly give a perception of regular coopera­
tion and communication, but defence primarily remained a local matter.44 The town of 
Tongres (Tongeren in Dutch) for instance refused the bishop’s soldiers entry in Decem­
ber 1566, and only acceded to its ruler’s demands after extended negotiations, during 
which he promised to pay for their upkeep.45
While cities and noblemen had good reasons to fear loss of autonomy and status, it 
was the mass of lowly peasants that paid the heaviest price. The duke of Bar instituted a 
policy of traire à forteresse in the mid­fourteenth century, meaning that the rural popu­
lation had to seek refuge in fortresses with their movable belongings in case of attack. 
This reinforced their dependency on local lords and undermined the relative increase 
in status and autonomy they had gained during the preceding period. In exchange for 
protection during a period of insecurity, the Hundred Years War, they were forced to 
perform labour duties typically associated with serfs: maintenance work on a ruler’s 
fortress, notably cleaning the moat, and delivering certain supplies, such as wood, free 
of charge. Some also had to perform guard duty. The significant development is thus 
that obligations that had previously been bought off now had to be performed physically 
again, or were now being imposed for the first time.46
In 1402 the villagers of Vaux­la­Grande started a lawsuit against Amé de Sarrebruck, 
lord of Commercy, because he forced them to perform guard duty in his fortress. The vil­
lagers argued that Commercy was not part of the kingdom of France, that the road was 
long and led through woodland (the village lies about fifteen kilometres southwest of 
the town), and that they had their own fortified church. Their opponent responded that 
Commercy was an important city on the frontier, and that its security was in the king’s 
interest. Furthermore, the villagers were not allowed to turn their church into a fortress, 
it could only serve as a refuge during a raid.47
The southern half of the Meuse Region was hardly unique in this (re)imposition of 
labour duties. The Habsburgs and the bishops of Liège similarly ordered peasants to 
42 Girardot, “Les forteresses,” 44–55; Laurent and Quicke, L’Accession, 382; Noordzij, Gelre, 143–45.
43 Burgers and Damen, “Feudal Obligation or Paid Service,” 788.
44 Deloffre, “Guerres et brigandages”; Dinstühler, ed., Die Jülicher Landrentmeister-Rechnung, 
60–75; Gentenaar and Hupperetz, “Personeel en werkzaamheden,” 187, 210–13; Roosens, 
“Habsburgse defensiepolitiek,” 94–100; Ward, “Holland,” 185–89.
45 Tongeren, SAT, Resoluties, inv. no. 2, fols. 262, 264v.
46 Bar­le­Duc, ADM, B 1879, fol. 131r; 1907, fols. 2–3; Coulson, Castles, 285–90; Girardot, “Les 
forteresses,” 9–16; Girardot, Le droit et la terre, 2 :474–78; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 
1:96, 1:178, 1:261; Villa­Sébline Nicole, La sénéchaussée, 190, 192.
47 Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, 21–23.
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help expand or maintain the fortifications of nearby fortresses and cities during the 
fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. The temptation to use them as a cheap 
source of manual labour simply proved too great.48 A notarial act from Maaseik from 
1697 lists the complaints of villagers from Haelen, Buggenum, Neer, Heythuysen, and 
Ophoven, who all had to provide manpower to defend the castle of Horne (the seat of 
this small county). Most villages had to supply guards, except for Ophoven, which was 
located at considerable distance and instead had to clean the castle’s moat and ponds 
once a year. Apparently, they now had to obey a new castellan who demanded six guards 
instead of four, made them stay day and night instead of soley acting as night watchmen, 
and tripled the fine for disobedience. Moreover, the guards now had to bring their own 
firewood, and often had to perform chores, such as helping with the harvest, with just 
one man standing guard.49
Such misuse of military obligations encouraged rural populations to maintain or 
expand their own defences, especially fortified churches, which gave them stronger 
leverage to refuse newly imposed obligations, but also weakened the organization of 
defence systems. It is precisely because of its unpopularity that arrested vagrants or 
beggers were increasingly forced to construct or maintain fortifications from the mid­
sixteenth century onwards (see chap. 4). It also reveals the difficulty of organizing and 
sustaining defence systems in the absence of permanent armed forces.
The imposition of labour duties reflects a fundamental but often overlooked prob­
lem: that of maintenance. Every man­made structure will eventually disintegrate due to 
a combination of factors: decay of organic materials, impact of weather and climate, and 
processes of eco logical succession. Eco logical succession refers to phases of vegetation 
growth, which follow each other after a disturbance, in this case the building of a for­
tification, until a climax point is reached. In Western Europe this climax stage consists 
typically of oak­beech forests. If a stone wall is not maintained, soil will start to accumu­
late on the wall’s surface, and in cracks and fissures. This in turn allows different kinds 
of plants to establish themselves, first grasses and herbs, then woody plants. Their root 
system adds to the destabilizing of the wall until only ruins remain. Moats filled with 
stagnant water likewise become shallower over time due to the accumulation of soil and 
the growth of plants such as reeds.50
The results of archaeobotanical research carried out in the former fortress of Lom­
prez (Duchy of Luxemburg) are very informative in this regard. We know from the 
48 Arnhem, GA, Hertogelijk Archief, inv. no. 1580, fol. 11r; Bodard, ed., Receuil des ordonnances 
du Duché de Bouillon, 30, 44, 53–54, 82, 85, 87–88; Cuppens, “Opoeteren,” 327–30; de Waha, 
“Château et village,” 423–26; Driessen, Emundt van Oeteren, 653–54; Gillessen, ed., Die ältesten 
Kellnereirechnungen, 98; Habets, “Costumen,” 167–70; Hasquin, Une mutation, le “Pays de Charleroi”, 
231; Hoppenbrouwers, “Een middeleeuwse samenleving,” 16, 590–91; Kaisin, Annales historiques 
de la commune de Chatelineau, 92, 113, 199; Lefebvre, “Bastogne,” 338–39; Roosens, “De invloed 
van de vestingbouw”; Van den Brand, “Spaanse vestingbouwwerkzaamheden,” 82–83; von Below, 
“Die Leistungen.”
49 Hasselt, RAH, Notaris Claessens 1663–1702 (microfilm no. 1462274, item 5) fol. 616: act June 
16, 1697.
50 Peeters et al., Sloten, 51–55; Segal, Eco logical Notes, 46–47, 67–75.
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chronicler Jean de Stavelot that this house was burned down and abandoned in 1445. 
Only twelve men defended it. Pollen research now reveals that the banks of the moat 
originally, in the fourteenth century, supported relatively little vegetation, and that vines 
and fruit­bearing trees (common walnut and hop) grew close to the moat, presumably 
in a garden. Over time, aquatic plants, such as meadowsweet (Filipendula ulmaria), gave 
way to weeds such as redschank (Polygonum persicaria), which means that the moat 
turned into land. This process occurred gradually at first, and then accelerated, possibly 
in tandem with the abandonment of nearby agricultural fields and the use of the moat as 
a watering trough and for disposing waste.51 These results can be compared to a study 
of plant seeds in the castle of Eindhoven from the sixteenth and early seventeenth centu­
ries. This analysis suggests that the moat was quite shallow and polluted by waste from 
butchering and faeces. Historical sources confirm that when the castle was attacked in 
1604 the moat was only 1.26 metres deep and constituted no obstacle to the attackers’ 
assault ladders.52
Medi eval fiscal accounts are filled with references to the construction or mainte­
nance of fortifications, but this does not necessarily prove that defences were well pre­
served. Many fortifications were so extensive, with city walls measuring several kilome­
tres or more in length, that there was always work to be done. The accounts of Venlo note 
for instance that master Harman Wegge and his attendants needed 137 days to clean 
the city’s moats in 1411. This hardly indicates regular maintenance. The city council 
did call upon its citizens to clean the moats in 1409, a war year, but this might not have 
been enough, or the work was not done properly. Cutting a plant above water level was 
after all not sufficient; it had to be pulled out entirely. Accounts from Maastricht, from 
1399–1400, specify that the city bought a hook as well as a scythe to remove grass from 
the moats.53 The cleaning of the moats of Mons was apparently noteworthy enough in 
1523, also a war year, for Antoine de Lusy to include it in his chronicle. He explicitly said 
that the work came at great cost to the city, but that they also profited from it, because 
they could sell the grass. The 1581 accounts of the castellany of Longwy mention that 
seventy­two villagers had to remove trees and bushes from the fortress’s moat.54
It is indeed revealing for the haphazard character of the preservation of fortifica­
tions that authorities might have not proceded with it if not for external events. Every 
fortification built next to the Meuse or its main tributaries ran the risk of being flooded 
after which repairs needed carried out, if only to prevent worse disasters in the future. 
In most cases, however, an imminent enemy threat provided the most convincing rea­
son for spending money on fortifications.55 The accounts from Venlo reveal that in 1388, 
51 de Stavelot, Chronique, 555; Heim, “Wellin/Lomprez.”
52 Luijten, “Zaden en vruchten,” 240–44. See also Gillessen, ed., Die ältesten Kellnereirechnungen, 
98, 109, 111; Moreau, Bolwerk der Nederlanden, 58, 63–64, 215; Thomas, “Hygiène,” 269–70.
53 de Groot, De stadsrekeningen, 1388 fol. 15; 1409 fol. 15; 1411 fol. 16; Koreman, De 
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54 Bar­le­Duc, ADM, B 1936, fol. LXIXv; de Lusy, Le journal, 218.
55 Bodart, Société et espace urbains, 123; Boonen, “De Maaseiker wallen,” 52, 58; Driessen, 
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when a French army attempted to invade, the Count of Jülich sent four knights to inspect 
the defences.56 The cutting of wood in the Landwehr that defended the frontier between 
the Duchy of Limburg against attacks from the Prince­Bishopric of Liège had always 
been a punishable offence, but in 1468, when Duke Charles the Bold was at war with 
Liège, an offender risked capital punishment and the confiscation of his possessions, 
instead of a heavy fine of six Rhenish florins.57
Enemy threats thus ensured that military needs came to dominate structures that 
normally served multiple purposes. The town of Grave, for example, leased several of 
its towers and gates to private citizens in the fifteenth century. A 1452 contract, copied 
into the urban accounts, specified that a widow and her son could rent the tower and 
associated land located next to their own house on condition that they constructed a 
slate roof. The town reserved the right to take full control over the tower again in case of 
war.58 In an agreement from 1480 the city council of Maastricht similarly let a section of 
the city wall of Wijck, the part of the city that lay on the eastern riverbank, for four years 
to a citizen, who could fish in the moat, and pollard the willows.59 These willows served 
as sources of wood, and their roots stabilized the soil. The fact that some towers were 
named after individual guilds (such as the Lakenmakerstoren in Tongres/Tongeren) 
suggests that in some cases the latter were responsible for maintenance or defence of 
specific stretches of the city wall.60
Private citizens also owned gardens or fields next to the walls and made posterns to 
allowed them to go in and out the city without having to pass through one of the main 
gates. It goes without saying that such entrances had to be filled up with solid masonry if 
there was any threat of an attack.61 This in turn created different problems. A municipal 
act from Namur, dating to 1430, when troops from Liège invaded the county, indicates 
Huguenin, Chroniques, 539–540; Lhoist­Colmon and Gabriel, “La colline,” 25, 28; Liégeois, “Compte 
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des régistres,” 11:270; Koreman, De stadsrekening, 148, 154–55, 157, 164; Kuppers, “De 
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that waste kept piling up alongside three houses on the city wall, because the nearby 
postern had been closed.62 A surviving copy of a 1396 charter kept in the archives of the 
bailiwick of Alden Biesen demonstrates that the city council of Maastricht went a step 
further and granted the Teutonic Order custody over one of the city gates, located within 
the gardens of the bailiwick. This privilege still applied in 1784 when the chief engineer 
of Maastricht ordered his assistants to investigate how a sortie, a small gate, in the com­
mandery’s orchard could be secured without violating the institution’s rights.63
Responsibility for the upkeep of fortifications lay with bodies or individuals who, at 
least theoretically, were concerned with the common good. This involved the upholding 
of law and order, as well as socio­economic concerns and public health. It is unlikely that 
urban councils, castellans, or high bailiffs would have given priority to military matters 
above all others unless a specific threat gave them a good reason to do so.64 The use of 
fortifications for other functions besides warfare can be considered as a practical way to 
ensure basic maintenance. It also means that a considerable part of maintenance work 
does not appear in fiscal accounts. Gateways and towers typically became living spaces 
for gatekeepers, gunners, or watchmen, and served as storage places for gunpowder 
and prisons. Some were even used to store archives (such as a tower in Namur castle). 
Because urban councils kept fish in the moats or allowed the construction of water mills 
some citizens had an incentive to clean and deepen the ditches.65 A thirteenth­century 
charter from Liège shows that the city council leased part of the moat to a private citizen 
on condition that he made sure it remained at least two metres wide.66
This ambiguity is mirrored in the contested presence of animals in or near the for­
tifications. The accounts of Rotterdam from the year 1426–1427, for example, include 
a payment for the making of a fence to prevent livestock walking on the walls.67 This 
suggests that a considerable part of the city’s fortifications was still composed of earth, 
and that citizens did not respect official regulations against the pasture of animals. Still, 
when Albrecht Dürer published his fortification treatise in 1527, he also suggested 
that moats could serve as animal parks as well as shooting ranges. Toponyms in Liège 
and Maastricht indicate that this advice was based on actual practice, for they imply 
the presence of rabbit warrens (Tour aux Lapins and Konijnenberg) in or next to the 
city walls.68 These might even have inspired the miniaturists who made the Maastricht 
62 Bodart, Société et espace urbains, 101.
63 Maastricht, RHCL, 07.E01., inv. no. 1: Guarnisoensboek, B, December 17, 1784; Grauwels, ed., 
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Book of Hours (see figure 12). Many rulers, such as the dukes of Guelders, incorporated 
impressive menageries, which even included lions, in their residences.69
Archaeozoogical research is far more informative in this regard than written sources. 
The study of animal bones in fortress moats and waste pits has revealed the remains 
of animals that lived in or around these noble houses: peafowl, swans, pigeons, dogs, 
horses, sparrowhawks, and goshawks. Many of these species might have moved around 
more or less unimpeded, swans’ wings usually being clipped, but birds of prey typically 
stayed in cages when not being involved in a noble hunt. Still, these reports also make 
clear that most bones found are the remains of species eaten by the occupants and did 
not necessarily live near the fortifications. Others might come from animals that were 
just killed and discarded. In the fortress of Franchimont for instance the bones of west­
ern jackdaws have been found, deposited in the early sixteenth century. This species is 
often treated as a nuisance animal or pest because it nests in buildings.70
69 Marchal, Inventaire, 167, 174; Nijsten, In the Shadow of Burgundy, 329.
70 Boone, De Cupere, and Van Neer, “Social Status”; de Jong, “Huisdieren, jachtwild, vissen en 
Figure 12. Two foxes and a wolf assault a fortress built on top of a rabbit warren, and defended 
by monkeys. Book of Hours made in Liège or Maastricht, early fourteenth century (© The British 
Library Board, Stowe MS 17, fol. 244r). Reproduced with permission of the British Library.
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Incidental references in fiscal accounts corroborate a general impression that 
unwanted animals were ruthlessly pursued and exterminated. The city of Mons, for 
example, paid a bounty in 1324 for the killing of an otter, which threatened the exten­
sive fish stocks introduced into the moat. The accounts of the high bailiff of Montfort 
from 1397–1398 likewise indicate that someone was sent to Maastricht to buy lime for 
the capturing of house sparrows, which had established themselves in the fortress. The 
steward of Hambach (Jülich) paid a mouse­catcher for the killing of no fewer than one 
hundred and eight “large mice,” probably rats, in 1440–1441. Two hundred years later, 
in 1661, the town council of Maaseik retracted its own prohibition regarding the killing 
of pigeons, and ordered citizens to shoot those dwelling near the city walls, because 
their waste damaged the ramparts.71
Similar remarks can be made about plants. Archeobotanical research becomes ever 
more important and, as argued above, provides some of the best evidence we have about 
plant growth in or near fortifications. Their results can be complemented with what 
scarce written evidence remains. An exceptional inventory of the gardens of the lord­
ship of Chimay in 1606, for instance, lists no fewer than one hundred and twenty dif­
ferent species.72 Plants that expanded beyond these controlled contexts might initially 
have survived relatively unscathed, but sooner or later they would be curtailed just the 
same. The accounts of Grave thus mention the cutting down of an elder tree that grew 
next to the town wall in 1453.73 Even more revealing are payments by the city council of 
Luxemburg to labourers in 1445–1448, 1453–1454, and 1456–1457 for the mowing of 
grass, herbs, nettles, and thorns, which grew on or next to the city’s (earthen) walls, and 
prevented guards from conducting patrols.74 Exactly because fortifications were well 
integrated into people’s daily lives proper maintenance was rarely an easy matter.
Imposing Military Perceptions
Fortifications were clearly far more diverse than has traditionally been claimed and 
have to be studied as part of larger systems of defence. Their multiple functions were 
simultaneously a response to, and the source of, basic maintenance problems. The logi­
cal next step is therefore to consider the reaction of armed forces to these issues: the 
militarizing of fortifications from the sixteenth century onwards. This eventually cre­
weekdieren”; Gautier, Hoffsummer, and Vanguestaine, “Faune médiévale,” 78; Gautier and Fiers, 
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ated a divergence between a handful of permanent garrisons and a mass of traditional 
fortifications that were only militarized during armed conflicts.
In the Meuse Region, most settlements only constructed stone fortifications (for­
tresses, city walls, churches) after the tenth century. A handful had the advantage of 
being able to lay claim to continuity with a long­distant past (such as Verdun or Ton­
gres). The most important cities in the Meuse Region—Verdun, Namur, Liège, Maas­
tricht, Aachen, and ’s­Hertogenbosch—built a series of city walls during the Central 
and Late Middle Ages as the population grew. It is typically the second city wall, built in 
the thirteenth to fifteenth century, which remained in use until the nineteenth century.75 
Given the time, cost, and effort needed to build such elaborate stone structures, it comes 
as no surprise that in many late medi eval cities large parts of the walls were still made 
of earth rather than stone.76
This continuity between the Central Middle Ages and the nineteenth century is 
remarkable in light of the common emphasis on the supposedly “revolutionary” effects 
of gunpowder weapons on fortifications, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen­
turies. Medi eval walls were not abandoned, but simply became part of early modern 
defences. There are in fact only two examples of major fortifications where the original 
medi eval fortress was discarded in favour of an entirely new structure: Agimont­Char­
lemont (Givet, mid­sixteenth century) and Longwy (late seventeenth century).77 The 
famous engineer de Vauban, who was paradoxically also the mastermind behind the 
reshaping of Longwy, declared in his report of the 1692 siege of Namur that medi eval 
walls were “the best of all.”78
This is not to deny the significant effect gunpowder weapons had on fortifications. It 
is meant to demonstrate that many studies about military architecture, especially those 
affiliated with the “Military Revolution” thesis, underestimate the continued value of 
medi eval fortifications. Armed forces in the Meuse Region were familiar with gunpow­
der weapons by the mid­fourteenth century at the latest, as I mentioned in the introduc­
tion. The initial, mainly fifteenth­century, adaptations to gunpowder weaponry were 
relatively simple and consisted of constructing so­called barbicans to shield the gates 
from direct artillery fire, and adding bulwarks to provide firing platforms. When the 
effectiveness of gunpowder weapons increased, fortification design had to respond as 
well: by the mid­sixteenth century the famous trace italienne, low thick stone walls with 
bastions intended to eliminate blind angles, was introduced to the Low Countries.79
Very few settlements in the Meuse Region, however, could rely on such elaborate 
defences in the Italian manner; only the fortifications of Jülich, and a few new forts 
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(such as Philippeville and Mariembourg) were built entirely in this style.80 In most cases 
renewal consisted simply of adapting the old medi eval walls to new demands, which 
meant constructing new bastions, lowering the towers to the same height as the walls, 
and making both walls and towers wider by building an earthen embankment behind 
them or filling them with earth. Lowering the walls made them more vulnerable to an 
assault so the moats had to be enlarged and deepened as well. These works required so 
much earth that household waste, manure, and soil from gardens and cemeteries were 
used in emergencies to fill the new defences. Practical measures thus lie at the origin 
of the so­called Old Dutch system of defence, which developed during the Eighty Years 
War, and combined earthen walls with the extensive use of water and vegetation. Such 
fortifications are much faster and cheaper to construct than the expensive stone walls of 
the Italian system, and at least as effective.81
The literature on military architecture is quite extensive, but surprisingly few schol­
ars have commented on the eco logical effects of these changes, or even on the wide­
spread use of plants. Noteworthy exceptions are Philippe Bragard’s and Klaus Jordan’s 
studies on the function of plants in fortifications, which also clarify how complex the 
building of these earthen walls must have been. In the Low Countries labourers used 
special techniques to construct earthen defences, called gazonnage or placage, an 
important detail that is generally overlooked. These methods date back to at least the 
fifteenth century and consisted of constructing several layers of earth (placage) or grass 
blocks (gazonnage) with bundles of branches (fascines) in between. The earth had to be 
fairly thick (black) and was often filled with seeds or roots of plants in order to add to 
the strength of the whole. These techniques were a prerequisite for constructing walls 
with a slope of forty­five or sixty degrees, designed to resist both cannon balls and infan­
try assaults, as such steep walls cannot be constructed by simply making a mound of 
earth. They also required considerable cost and effort, as the actual construction had 
to be done by skilled artisans, and blocks of grass had to be dug from nearby mead­
ows. Because of its complexity and cost gazonnage was abandoned in the late eighteenth 
to early nineteenth centuries, and placage in the later nineteenth century. From that 
moment on, the earth was simply piled up and grass was sown later.82
A second, and far­better­known element in the increased use of plants was the 
planting of trees on the top of the scarp or main wall from the late sixteenth century 
onwards. The most common species were field elm, linden (or lime), aspen, oak, wil­
low, and common walnut. Gunners preferred field elm above all others for the making 
of gun carriages, and engineers appreciated its extensive root system. During the nine­
teenth century engineering treatises increasingly recommended planting Lombardy 
poplars and Canadian poplars, man­made varieties of the black poplar, which have a 
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very straight silhouette, produced good timber, and grow relatively fast. This large­scale 
introduction of trees served multiple purposes: their roots reduced erosion, strength­
ened the wall against artillery fire, and made mining more difficult. The trees’ crown 
denied the enemy a view of the inner city and also provided shade for guards stationed 
on top of the walls (see figure 13). The trunks also served as a welcome source of timber, 
especially since many garrisons lacked access to extensive woodlands.83
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Figure 13. Schematic depiction of the planting of trees and a hawthorn  
hedge on an earthen embankment, 1640 (Dilich, Peribo logia, page cli).
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Other considerations, aesthetic ones, played a role as well. When brigadier de Pich­
ard, commander of the citadel of Liège, wanted to convince the Estates, always reluctant 
to spend any more on military matters than necessary, of the need to provide funding to 
buy trees in 1744, he mentioned in his request that field elm provided suitable wood for 
gun carriages. It was only five years later that another staff officer, captain Colson, who 
lived in the citadel and had his own garden there, arranged with one of the councillors 
of Liège to buy field elms and lime trees in Amsterdam, and transport them to Liège. By 
1750 two hundred and fifty trees embellished the citadel, and were maintained by gar­
deners. Once these trees grew too big they were sold, for financial reasons, rather than 
cut down (1786).84 Techno logical improvements thus simultaneously brought about the 
expansion of fortifications, and a relative increase in the use of plants, though this does 
not mean that military concerns always governed their exact use.
The gradual encompassment of medi eval stone walls in extensive layers of earthen 
walls and ditches needs to be seen in the context of the history of engineering science. 
While master carpenters, masons, architects, and artillerymen served as military engi­
neers throughout the Middle Ages, during the fifteenth and sixteenth century the knowl­
edge required for such matters, especially fortress building, became so complicated that 
it stimulated the development of the engineer as a profession.85 The first engineers 
who appeared in the Meuse Region in the early sixteenth century came from Italy. By 
the turn of the century the Low Countries and other parts of the Holy Roman Empire 
supplied engineers of their own. These men were highly sought­after specialists, but 
not members of the military in the strict sense of the word. Distinctions between “mili­
tary,” and “civic” engineers only came about in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries.86 A major dividing line did exist, however, between architects who designed 
or improved fortifications (ingénieurs de places), and officers who had experience in 
assaulting them (ingénieurs de tranchées).87
The development of the engineering profession was of major importance for the 
ways armed forces interacted with eco logical systems, because it provided them with 
far more tools to influence landscapes, in the form of maps, drainage techniques, canal 
building, mining, ballistics, and similar. Local hydro graphy had after all exerted signifi­
cant influence on the construction of medi eval fortifications. The urban accounts of Gel­
dern indicate that in the fourteenth century living hedges, as opposed to fences or a 
combination of hedge and fence, could only be found on the east side of the city, near 
the Yssumer and Gelder Tor. Given that the river Niers, which is connected to the town’s 
moats, runs much further to the west, it is likely that the water level in this part of the 
moat was very low, and could occasionally even have dried up. The planting of living 
hedges might thus have compensated for a local deficiency of water as a barrier.88
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Medi eval armies did have knowledge of water management and mining, and cer­
tainly applied this during sieges (see below), but this was relatively basic in compari­
son to the large­scale projects early modern engineers designed. Fortresses located on 
hills, for example, rarely had access to running water, and thus depended on cisterns or 
wells. Medi eval armed forces could also construct or destroy dams, dikes, and sluices 
for defensive purposes.89 The castellan of Valkenburg, for instance, ordered the build­
ing of a dam in the Geul in 1465 to ensure that the water in the town moat remained 
deep enough during a potential siege.90 Difficulties associated with water management 
probably go a long way to explain why most noble houses were located near streams or 
waterlogged terrain rather than hills.91
By the 1700s the principal fortresses in the Meuse Region depended for their 
defence on floodplains and moats that could be filled with water through complex sys­
tems of sluices and canals. Breaching or building dams was easy enough but allowed 
very little control over the extent of the flooded area, the water level, and the speed 
of inundation. A major turning point was thus the construction of evermore extensive 
systems of inundation sluices from the late sixteenth century onwards. Such devices 
were only effective, however, if they could be secured against enemy attacks as well as 
local inhabitants who opposed the flooding of their lands. The security of water man­
agement systems therefore encouraged the building of ever more fortifications, such as 
detached forts.92
From the late seventeenth century onwards, engineers also created permanent 
(masonry) mining galleries in a handful of fortresses (Verdun, Maubeuge, Philippeville, 
Namur, Maastricht). Mining was already a well­known siege technique in the Middle 
Ages, but the spread of gunpowder made mining activities far more efficient and dan­
gerous. These galleries were often very extensive, with those of Philippeville, which 
have still been preserved, measuring about ten kilometres in length. Given the general 
humidity of these underground constructions, small gaps were left in the walls which 
could be closed at short notice, as it was impractical to install wooden doors in peace­
time. Ventilation shafts, some six metres in length, were indispensable as were small 
canals designed to dispose of the excess water. The galleries could also be used to store 
supplies, albeit only for short periods of time due to the humidity, and shield the defend­
ers during bombardments.93
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Nevertheless, even engineers had to take into account the environmental constraints 
posed by the landscapes they sought to defend. Casemates, cellars, and water­filled 
ditches were common enough, but only two fortresses depended on both inundations 
and mining galleries: Verdun and Maastricht. Engineers also focused on the tributaries 
of the Meuse to establish inundations, because its main current proved too strong to 
control. The Maastricht inundation thus operated with water from the river Jeker/Geer.94 
The landscape modifications that did succeed came moreover at a very high cost of man­
power and resources. The registers of the French Hôtel des Invalides give an original 
perspective on the difficulties faced when constructing or improving fortifications in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. During this period of intensive war­
fare thousands of soldiers became invalids, which led to writing down service records 
that would otherwise not have been preserved. These lists reveal that one soldier got 
affected with rheumatism because he spent long hours constructing sluices in Sedan, 
another one, a miner, fell down the rocks when making staircases for the fortress of 
Dinant, and many others got wounded during mine explosions because the hard under­
ground in Givet necessitated their use.95
The important role of engineers in the changing relationship between armed forces 
and the ecosystems with which they interacted lay in their role as government represen­
tatives as well as the increased potential of landscape modification that their profession 
represented. By the eighteenth century appointing military engineers to oversee the 
preservation of fortifications had become the norm, as revealed by the administration 
they left us.96 The combination of these specialists with the institution of more exten­
sive guard systems (see chap. 4) gave military forces much more leeway in imposing 
their view on fortifications, and urban defences in particular. The military engineer was 
the “expert” who knew best how to defend a landscape, and the permanent military 
garrison provided him with the means to enforce his view, against the wishes of local 
residents if necessary.
In a minority of cases the authority of military engineers became so all­encompass­
ing that governments charged them with tasks that had very little or nothing to do with 
military matters. The engineer brigade stationed in the Austrian Netherlands enjoyed 
a particularly high reputation, and became an important tool of government control. 
A typical example is the government in Brussels’ order to Philippe De Laing, major­
general of the engineers, to devise measures to prevent the flooding of the Meuse in 
the 1760s.97 In the kingdom of France by contrast a military engineering academy was 
only founded in 1749–1750, later than its civilian equivalent (1747), and in the Dutch 
Republic control over water was even more strongly concentrated in the civilian hands 
94 Moreau, Bolwerk der Nederlanden; Groussard, “Vauban et l’eau.”
95 Vincennes, SHD, GR, 2Xy09: Jan La Plaine; 2Xy12: Claude Croissant dit La Jeunesse; 2Xy13: 
Jean du Bord dit St Jean, Hubert Grangé dit Beaupré; 2Xy14: Jean Du Barry dit Leytoure; 2Xy22: 
Jean François Bourguignon dit Jassemin, Antoine Collardon dit Comtois; 2Xy25: François Paquet dit 
Belmont, Jan Bap.te Mazuret dit La Tulippe (transcript www.hoteldesinvalides.org).
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of water boards. Nevertheless, military engineers were quick to exploit opportunities 
created by natural disasters. In 1757, when melting ice water from the Rhine and Meuse 
basins destroyed dikes and flooded large areas of land, Dutch military engineers came 
to the aid of local governments, and simultaneously charted the regional hydro graphy 
to provide the military with a new mechanism of control.98 Engineers played a key role 
in military forces’ growing control over landscapes, but their efforts did not go unchal­
lenged nor were without their limitations.
The sheer cost of and complications resulting from adaptations to fortifications 
have been mentioned repeatedly, but one logical consequence has been left unexam­
ined: the fact that these changes, impressive as they were, only applied to a handful of 
major fortresses of which Heusden, ’s­Hertogenbosch, Venlo, Maastricht, Namur, Givet, 
Maubeuge, Mézières, Sedan, Longwy, and Verdun were the most important. The growing 
gap from the sixteenth century onwards between a handful of up­to­date fortresses with 
permanent garrisons and the great mass of more traditional fortifications, is relatively 
well known within military history. The main issue is that most scholars assume that 
these latter defences simply lost their military value altogether.
It cannot be emphasized enough that large armed forces of thousands of soldiers 
with the latest siege equipment did not constitute the most typical army, even in a zone 
as strategic as the Meuse Region. For most people up to the eighteenth century the most 
common, and most direct, threat remained that of relatively small bands of raiders who 
stole, kidnapped, and burned, or extorted money not to do so. More traditional fortifica­
tions, well imbedded in people’s daily lives, retained their effectiveness because bringing 
up artillery was such a complex process. It is revealing that many churches in the French 
département of the Meuse were not fortified in the Middle Ages, but only in the sixteenth 
or early seventeenth century, when political turmoil created a climate of insecurity.99
Another noteworthy example are so­called sconces or schansen, forts made from blocks 
of earth and fascines (the word schans originally referred to such a bundle of branches), 
which were commonly used by armed forces of a state to defend strategic routes in the 
late sixteenth and seventeenth century. They also spread rapidly throughout the Camp­
ine/Kempen during the Eighty Years War, as villagers had to find new ways to defend 
themselves, and their property. Some of the first forts appeared around parish churches, 
which again confirms these buildings’ central defensive role in rural areas. Most, however, 
were entirely new constructions in the most inaccessible part of the village: marshes or 
heathlands. These peasant schansen, an acre to two hectares large, existed in peace as well 
as war, and were in fact miniature villages or hamlets, since some villages had several 
schansen, in which every household had a plot of land, and was obliged to help with its 
maintenance. They only disappeared in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. 100
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The spread of gunpowder did make many medi eval fortifications redundant, but this 
was hardly the linear process traditionally presented. The diary of Splinter Helmich, a 
citizen from Utrecht who joined the “Sea Beggars” and participated in the taking of Den 
Briel, is a good example. He fought as captain of his own company in the area around 
Venlo and Roermond in the 1570s, and regularly encountered medi eval fortresses and 
village churches, which were unable to resist cannon, but remained quite effective 
against an unsupported infantry unit.101 In the 1700s military treatises still gave practi­
cal advice on how to adapt traditional defensive structures, such as hedges, churches, or 
castles, for use as field fortifications.102 Medi eval fortifications did not lose their defen­
sive value as a result of ineffectiveness, but because violent encounters between soldiers 
and local residents became increasingly rare (see chaps. 3 and 4). This meant that the 
general population felt increasingly less pressure to maintain multifunctional structures 
with respect to defensive needs. So­called fermes en carré, built in Hesbaye during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are a good example. These resemble medi eval for­
tresses, but only functioned as fortifications in exceptional circumstances (such as the 
farm of Goumont/Hougoumont during the battle of Waterloo).103
The ongoing importance of more old­fashioned fortifications, despite the spread of 
ever more effective gunpowder weapons, goes a long way to explain the Prince­Bish­
opric of Liège’s deviation from a general pattern towards the adoption of ever more 
extensive fortifications. The great majority of its fortresses and city walls saw few adap­
tations after the early sixteenth century, the citadel of Liège, constructed in the mid­
seventeenth century, being the only modern fortress erected by order of the bishop. The 
Prince­Bishopric correspondingly retained only a handful of permanent garrisons in 
the medi eval fortresses of Bouillon, Dinant, Huy, and Stokkem, as well as the citadel of 
Liège. Most of these forces were also quite small to contemporary standards: a surviving 
muster list of the soldiers stationed in the fortress of Stokkem in 1655 indicates that the 
garrison consisted of a mere forty­two men: the high bailiff, two lieutenants, and three 
squads of thirteen men headed by a corporal. By the eighteenth century only one gar­
rison remained: a single infantry regiment of six hundred men housed in the partially 
demolished citadel of Liège.104
This exceptional case has its origin in the bishopric’s policy of neutrality, adopted in 
the late fifteenth century, but is also related to the constant conflicts between the bish­
ops and their own subjects, which made the latter reluctant to provide funds for military 
forces that would have given their ruler too much power. In 1636 Bishop Ferdinand of 
Bavaria (1612–1650) even directed the infamous Imperial general Johann von Werth 
against his own subjects in order to bring them to obedience. The building of the citadel 
of Liège was a repercussion of this open war. The downside of this policy was the Prince­
101 Helmich, Journaal.
102 de Cessac, Le Guide, 236–41, 268–71, 276–87, 289–92, 308–11, 355–68; de Clairac, Ingénieur de 
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Bishopric’s vulnerability to almost every potentate that sought to take advantage of the 
strategic value of the Meuse.105
Attempts by the Habsburgs, French monarchs, and the Dutch Republic to secure 
their own frontiers, their “garden,” came regularly at the expense of the Prince­Bish­
opric: Givet, Mariembourg, Philippeville, and Bouillon were more or less forcibly ceded 
to Spain and France for strategic reasons, while the fortresses of Charleroi and Maas­
tricht expanded their defences by encroaching upon the bishop’s territory. When the 
French army occupied large parts of the principality of Liège during the Franco­Dutch 
War (1672–1678) they turned the towns of Dinant and Maaseik, Stokkem being con­
sidered too small, into fortresses capable of resisting modern siege artillery. When they 
retreated again, in 1678 in the case of Maaseik and 1698 for Dinant, they demolished 
everything, including large parts of the original medi eval defences.106
Similar processes could be observed in other parts of the Meuse Region that were 
unfortunate enough to lay on the edges or outside the French and Dutch “gardens.” The 
French army ruined fortifications in the Duchy of Bar–Lorraine and the Spanish Nether­
lands on a large scale in the second half of the seventeenth century, and the Dutch army 
demolished parts of the medi eval fortress of Valkenburg with explosives in 1672. An 
undefended fortification is after all a liability rather than an asset. The maintenance of a 
handful of up­to­date fortresses and settlements as the only proper fortifications within 
military structures, with the rest being dismissed as either irrelevant or simple field 
fortifications, was thus not left to chance, but enforced violently. Still, since urban walls 
and noble houses were too large to be destroyed at short notice, soldiers just created 
breaches with explosives to make them indefensible. These structures eventually turned 
into ruins because local residents no longer looked after them.107
The final demise of all existing fortifications in the Meuse Region, medi eval as well 
as early modern, originated as much in changing political contexts as in techno logical 
developments. Emperor Joseph II’s wish to expel Dutch garrisons stationed in the Aus­
trian Netherlands, a result of the so­called Barrière treaties in 1697–1715, led him to 
order the demolition of large parts of the fortifications of Namur in 1782. The French 
takeover of most of Western Europe in 1795–1814 likewise entailed the neglect of 
almost all remaining fortifications in the Meuse Region. The fortresses of Verdun and 
Givet for instance simply became gaols for British prisoners of war.108 The creation of a 
new kingdom of the Netherlands and the Belgian secession fifteen years later did seem 
to reverse this trend, since Liège, Huy, Dinant, Charleroi, Namur, and Bouillon were refor­
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tified, but these new forts were again replaced by the Brialmont fortresses around Liège 
and Namur in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The Dutch army also decided 
to abandon the fortresses of Maastricht and Venlo in the 1860s because of their isolated 
position, and fell back on the New Hollandic Water Line.109 These developments did not 
spell the end of vegetation in fortifications; their use was actually expanded towards the 
end of the nineteenth century because of an increasing emphasis on camouflage. What 
matters is that the thread linking medi eval fortifications to nineteenth century garrisons 
had finally been severed.
Conserving Fortifications
Techno logical change in combination with an increasing distinction between armies 
and the general population brought about a divergence between a handful of defences 
that became permanently incorporated into military structures, and the great majority 
which were only militarized during armed conflicts or lost their defensive value alto­
gether. So, our next object of study turns to how armed forces sought to preserve for­
tifications, as opposed to fortifications as multifunctional structures maintained by the 
general population. This focus on military management of fortifications allows the mak­
ing of a comparison between their current eco logical value and historical management 
practices.
The militarizing of fortifications, the fact that armed forces, initially just soldiers and 
later military forces in the strict sense of the word, took control over defensive struc­
tures, was a very gradual process. Individual watchmen and sentinels were ubiquitous 
in medi eval fortifications, but acted as urban officials or members of noble house­
holds (see chap. 4). The first permanent garrisons only became established in the late 
fifteenth century.110 The number of soldiers engaged in such garrison duty remained 
relatively limited, rarely exceeding a single infantry company before the late sixteenth 
century, and more importantly, was restricted to a handful of strategic fortresses and 
newly constructed forts in frontier contexts (such as Charlemont, Mariembourg, and 
Philippeville).
Furthermore, even though many such fortifications were closely integrated into 
urban defences the influence their garrisons could exert was rather small. Particularly 
revealing is a court record from Stokkem, dating to 1610–1612, regarding a man who 
built (pig)stables on or next to the walls. The high bailiff had ordered him to tear down 
the stables on multiple occasions, but the offending citizen claimed that his authority 
did not extend beyond the old medi eval fortress.111 Cities were not surprisingly very 
reluctant to accept garrisons, perceiving them as a threat to their autonomy, until the 
prolonged and large­scale wars of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (in turn, 
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the French Wars of Religion, the Eighty and Thirty Years’ Wars) forced them to give way. 
The city of ’s­Hertogenbosch for instance enlisted soldiers of their own during conflicts 
between Brabant and Guelders in the fifteenth and early sixteenth century, but by the 
1560s it had to accept the presence of Spanish soldiers sent by their monarch.112
Aspirations of urban autonomy did not stop with the establishment of large perma­
nent garrisons. While soldiers could more or less impose control over the newly estab­
lished earthen outworks and outlying forts, authority over the original city wall continued 
to be divided. This was the only part of the fortifications citizens could access, albeit with 
restrictions: in peacetime they could walk there during the day. The governor of Maas­
tricht, for example, made his soldiers construct the oldest public park of the city next to 
its main wall in 1653. This park, which still exists, was probably built to gain the citizens’ 
favour, but might have had the additional advantage of keeping them away from the rest 
of the fortifications. The records kept by the chief engineer in Maastricht reveal that he 
had to compensate the city council in 1741 for seven trees, which stood on the main wall, 
that were cut down and used as wood for gun emplacements. In December 1745 he even 
started an inquiry to find out to whom the trees on the walls actually belonged.113
Military control of fortifications ultimately rested on two pillars: the imposing of a 
more extensive guard system and the attribution of responsibility for fortification main­
tenance to (military) engineers. These engineers in their turn hired contractors to exe­
cute the necessary works. A surviving agreement from nineteenth­century Maastricht 
specified that plants such as rushes had to be removed from the water­filled moats twice 
a year, which seems like an improvement compared to earlier practices. This outsourc­
ing of government tasks was a characteristic of early modern warfare, but also created 
obvious security concerns. The constructing and maintenance of underground case­
mates or mining galleries, the most covert elements in fortifications, thus became the 
prerogative of military miners during the eighteenth century, as proven by surviving 
reports from Namur. They were not accessible to anyone else except engineers and high­
ranking officers.114
The increasing involvement of soldiers in fortification maintenance can also be seen 
in this light, although their main function seems to have been that of a cheap labour 
force. An early example comes from an account regarding the fortification of Geldern in 
1597–1598. It includes payments to two soldiers for cutting fascines, and digging.115 By 
the late seventeenth century soldiers regularly worked on fortifications to earn some 
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extra pay, either as day labourers with the contractors or under the direct orders of mili­
tary engineers.116 Particularly instructive for the low status attributed to this kind of 
work is that in 1748 in the Dutch army forced labour on the fortifications became the 
official punishment for desertion (see chap. 4).
The use of large numbers of labourers became a necessity, because of the vulner­
ability of these steep earthen walls to erosion. The average life expectancy of such a wall, 
if not maintained, was around three to four years. This explains why military authori­
ties were so concerned with limiting access to the fortifications. A garrison order from 
Namur, dating to June 1714, even forbad soldiers to lie on the grass. French regulations 
from 1750 similarly specified that governors could not cut the grass on the walls more 
than twice a year, and that they had to make sure that no one damaged these structures. 
A garrison’s staff officers were after all entitled to the income generated by the fortifica­
tions: hay production and the renting out of fisheries in the moats.117
 Two contracts from Maastricht, dating to 1710 and 1716, reveal that a representa­
tive of the garrison commander rented a considerable part of the outworks along the 
river Jeker/Geer to a sheep merchant.118 Such agreements must have been quite com­
mon, but they have rarely been preserved, possibly because officers considered them 
part of their private archive. Sheep are quite agile, and in contrast to cows or horses, 
would not have damaged earthen walls in any significant way. Other governors, such as 
those of ’s­Hertogenbosch, cut the grass as much as possible, which in turn prompted 
the Dutch government to buy off their entitlements, and grant contractors the right to 
cut the grass instead.119
This renting out of the fortifications in peacetime was, unfortunately for the military 
officers involved, not the only remnant of medi eval practices. Local residents continued 
to perceive fortifications as multifunctional structures, but instead of an accommodat­
ing city council, they now saw themselves confronted with an organization that had lit­
tle patience for such matters. Many citizens considered fortifications as an appropriate, 
perhaps the only suitable, place for pasturing livestock, for waste disposal, bleaching or 
drying linen, fishing, and playing games.120 The French engineer de Vauban lamented 
in a letter sent to the French Minister of War, Chamillart, in 1703 that the fortifications 
116 Maastricht, RHCL, 01.E01, inv. no. 1: Guarnisoensboek; Engelen, “Stokkem,” 77; Kappelhof, 
“Les dépenses,” 296–303; Rorive, Les misères de la guerre, 293; Van den Brand, “Spaanse vesting­
bouwwerkzaamheden,” 84–85, 98, 108–9.
117 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079, order June 28, 1714; Ordonnance du roi 
(June 25, 1750) article dcLciv; Vallée and Pariset, eds., Carnet, 82; Vermeesch, Oorlog, Steden en 
Staatsvorming, 222–25.
118 Maastricht, RHCL, 07.E01, inv. no. 40: Archief garnizoenscommandant, Pachtcontracten 
January 29, 1710, and May 1, 1716.
119 ’s­Hertogenbosch, BHIC, 178, inv. no. 188, fol. 632r; inv. no. 326, fol. 301r; inv. no. 331, fol. 
20r, inv. no. 332, fol. 124r; Maastricht, RHCL, 07.E01, inv. no. 1: Guarnisoensboek B, June 1, 1756; 
Ordonnance du roi (June 25, 1750) article dcLciv; Caminada­Voorham, Loevestein, 51–54; Sangers 
and Simons, Geschiedenis, 94–95, 105.
120 Caminada­Voorham, Loevestein, 93–94; Gaber, Les fortifications, 30–32; Moreau, Bolwerk der 
Nederlanden, 76–77, 149; Parmentier, Pays de Charleroi, 67, 79, 114.
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of Namur were in a horrific state. Everyone and everything could access them at will, 
they were filled with gardens, and groups of dogs assembled there and chased mice 
and moles. Medi eval walls were already closely associated with such activities, and low 
earthen embankments were even more appealing.121
Yet soldiers were also not without fault where the damaging of fortifications was 
concerned. Aside from fishing, hunting, and digging for loam (see chap. 4), many also 
created gardens in or near the fortifications. The governor of the fortress of Gennep, 
which controlled the junction of the Niers and the Meuse, gave two subordinate officers 
on May 5, 1650 permission to establish gardens in the empty space behind the guard­
house. Their example inspired others and less than a year later, in March 1651, when 
government representatives (gecommitteerden) inspected the defences, citizens and 
soldiers had already expanded their gardens to such an extent that in many places the 
walls had become too small to accommodate cannons. They had to be removed immedi­
ately, but appeared again during the 1654 and 1671 inspections.122 This example makes 
clear that officers had no issue with gardens as such; they recognized the value of hav­
ing access to fresh vegetables, but wanted to ensure that they did not impede defensive 
efforts. This meant in practice that generally only officers and military hospitals had 
their own gardens. Some of these would still have been quite large. The officers’ gar­
dens in the eighteenth­century fortress of Montmédy measured no less than six hundred 
square metres.123
Remarkably enough, given the importance of plants in fortifications, it is quite 
unclear to what extent military officers, and engineers in particular, had the minimum 
of botanic knowledge necessary to ensure their wellbeing. The French engineer de Cor­
montaigne gave some brief advice on how to remove worms and moss from the trees 
standing on walls in a 1741 treatise, but this was quite uncommon. The French mili­
tary engineering school in Mézières, founded in 1748–1751, did not consider botany 
to be a very important subject, and put it only occasionally on the curriculum.124 Some 
of the most detailed instructions regarding the cultivation of plants come from a jour­
nal on military engineering, which published an article on tree planting in 1829. This 
piece listed existing regulations applied within the garrison of Verdun, and addressed 
an apparently widespread concern among engineers at that time: that the planting of 
trees in fortifications often failed. The author, an engineering captain, blamed the care­
lessness and ignorance of the contractors and labourers who had to carry out this task. 
His own directives are relatively basic. He mentions, for instance, that plants raised in 
nurseries might have difficulty adapting to the soil of the fortifications and recommends 
121 Bragard, Dictionnaire, 312–13.
122 van den Brand and Manders, Vesting ’t Genneperhuys, 384–88.
123 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. no. 3007; Barbe, “Rocroy,” 119–20; Bragard, “Soldats et jardiniers,” 
87–88; Mourroux, “Stenay, ville militaire,” 42; Muller, “Arlon, Bastogne, Laroche, Marche,” 264; 
Muller, “Bouillon,” 76; Sartelet, La principauté, 60, 61, 63; See also Ottersbach, “Der Garten in der 
Festung.”
124 Blanchard, Les ingénieurs, 108, de Cormontaigne, Architecture militaire, 1:118–19; Jordan, 
“Grün in Festungen,” 106–17.
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specific species for different soil types. The rarity of this captain’s interest in botanical 
matters is corroborated by the fact that his name also appears in a horticultural journal, 
in which he describes a rare apple variety found at Verdun.125
Surviving records from the nineteenth­century garrison of Maastricht confirm this 
impression. The stronghold, like many other large garrisons at this time, had its own 
plant nursery that occupied more than one acre. In the year 1824 the director of the 
fortifications offered a contract for the delivery of five thousand field elms, sixteen 
thousand willows, eight thousand birches, eight thousand alders, two thousand hazel 
shrubs, two thousand oaks, and one thousand beech trees. Most of these were planted as 
coppice wood near the Boschpoort, on the northwest side of the city. Another fourteen 
baskets with acorns and thornapple seeds, seven pounds of alder and birch seed, eight 
thousand young ash trees, and three thousand Canadian poplars had to be supplied for 
the garrison’s nursery. Even if one takes into account the sheer size of the fortifications 
and that the garrison initiated a major planting program in this period, the number of 
plants that perished on a yearly basis must have been enormous. The year 1825 again 
saw the planting of at least one thousand six hundred and seventy trees (nine hundred 
and fifty Canadian poplars, four hundred and fifty field elms, one hundred and seventy­
five ash trees, seventy Lombardy poplars and twenty­five nut trees), and the planting of 
forty­four thousand young trees and shrubs in the nursery.126 Military forces consider­
ably expanded their control over fortifications, but they never fully succeded in impos­
ing their grip on a complex eco logical reality.
Maintaining fortifications was clearly no easy matter, neither for medi eval urban 
councils and high bailiffs nor for early modern military organizations. It was far from 
obvious that armies could enforce their views on how fortifications should be managed. 
We will now turn to the one, perhaps the only, circumstance in which military views 
predominated at the expense of all others: an actual siege. The term siege is interpreted 
here as a formal blockade of a fortification with the object of conquering it through attri­
tion or direct assault, not a sudden attack. This means that our next focus will be on the 
most extensive and stereotypical fortifications: fortresses and cities.
An actual siege was a rather rare event: the cities of Maastricht and Namur, both key 
locations for controlling the Meuse River, experienced only fourteen and eight sieges 
respectively in the entire period from 1250 to 1850. This was a consequence of the dif­
ficulties associated with the transport of artillery, and the financial cost a siege entailed. 
An additional consideration in medi eval contexts was that only a limited number of 
people, mostly residing in major urban settlements, had the experience necessary to 
construct or maintain complicated siege equipment.127 For instance, the siege of the for­
tress of Sampigny in 1358 necessitated the transportation of “two large machines,” and 
a battering ram from Verdun to Sampigny on ten wagons, thirty carts, and the mobiliza­
125 Piérard, “Instruction”; Piérard, “Rapport.”
126 Maastricht, RHCL, 07.E01, inv. no. 9: Performance specifications concerning the maintenance 
of the fortifications of Maastricht, no. 76; Lienard, “Le fort,” 103.
127 Purton, The Medi eval Military Engineer, 184–90, 213–18.
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tion of six hundred sergents de pieds (infantrymen) as guards.128 When the urban militia 
of Aachen participated in the siege of the fortress of Reifferscheid in 1385 they had to 
move a trebuchet, broken down into its constituent parts, over a distance of about sixty 
kilometres, a task that took sixty­one horses, fourteen wagons, and five days. Reassem­
bling and erecting the device before the besieged fortress took another six days and 
twelve skilled artisans, and the stones had to be specially brought from Nideggen. The 
burden of using this equipment was in fact so considerable that the cities of Aachen and 
Co logne shared the costs.129
When a siege did happen, however, it produced eco logical effects that can only be 
compared to a natural disaster. At first glance, it thus appears that the only occasion 
armed forces could really control defence structures was also the moment their very 
existence was threatened. This can best be described as succeeding steps of increas­
ing intensity. Simple preparation for an enemy attack, not necessarily a siege (see chap. 
4), entailed all vegetation and structures in the immediate surroundings of a fortress 
or city that could benefit the enemy, such as trees, hedges, buildings, ditches, and even 
hollow lanes, being demolished or flattened. Such destruction initially applied to every­
thing within bowshot range, but later to the effective reach of a gun or cannon.130 On the 
night of January 25 to 26, 1407, for example, watchmen from Maubeuge observed fires 
near the fortress of La Buissière. One of the town’s messengers went there the next day 
to investigate. It turned out that the fortress’ occupants had set fire to the hedges and 
bushes around the defences as a precaution.131 The actual carrying out of such orders 
must often have met with strong opposition, for resolutions of the city council of Liège 
reveal that mayors were permitted to enlist guards armed with halberds to accompany 
them on their inspection tours in 1568. We know that such defensive measures were 
quite often only partially performed, or even not at all, because of resistance from local 
inhabitants.132
It is precisely because of the reactions such orders generated that permanent gar­
risons in the eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries imposed restrictions in 
peace as well as wartime. The French Republic codified and expanded existing regula­
tions when it stipulated in 1791 that nobody could build anything within a radius of two 
hundred and fifty metres around the outermost defences. Structures that could be easily 
destroyed, such as wooden buildings or vegetation, were allowed within a radius of four 
hundred and fifty metres, but these could be destroyed in wartime without compensa­
128 Kraemer, “Arme et refuge,” 51; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 1:68–69.
129 Laurent, Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 287–95.
130 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 217, fol. 277v; Tongeren, SAT, Resoluties, inv. no. 
1, fol. 291r; Boonen, “De Maaseiker wallen,” 79; Hanssen, Inventaris, 451; Jacquet­Ladrier, “Vivre à 
Namur,” 170; Marchal, Inventaire, 165; Moreau, Bolwerk der Nederlanden, 42, 50, 56, 102; Sabron, 
De oorlog, 1:xxv–xxvii, 2:60, 2:63; Ubachs, Van tricolore tot driekleur, 5; van de Venne, Het beleg, 
15–18; van Zuijlen, Inventaris, 2:1001, 2:1015, 2:1055.
131 Deloffre, “Guerres et brigandages,” 272. See also Gentenaar and Hupperetz, “Personeel en 
werk zaamheden,” 186.
132 Bormans, “Table des régistres,” 11:268; d’Haynin, Mémoires, 1:165; Larosse, “Le siege,” 51–53.
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tion.133 Especially instructive of the eco logical effects of such a policy is a military map 
from 1753, which depicts Mézières and Charleville (see figure 14). These towns have 
very different street patterns because the former had a medi eval origin while the latter 
was constructed according to a set plan in 1606 by Charles I Gonzague, duke of Nevers 
and Rethel, as capital of his new principality. The most important difference between 
them is not their street pattern, however, but rather that Mézières was a key fortress in 
the defence of France’s northern frontier, while Charleville lost its defensive value in the 
late seventeenth century.134 Wide­open fields thus encircled Mézières, while Charleville 
counted numerous gardens in its immediate surroundings.
133 Ordonnance Corps du Génie (1776), 31–32; Delalleau, Traité de servitudes; Muller, “Bouillon,” 
57; Parmentier, Pays de Charleroi, 77; van der Woud, Het lege land, 369–72, 476–77.
134 The French army initially constructed a fort (Mont Olympe) on the Meuse’s left riverbank, 
opposite Charleville, to make sure the city could not serve as a stronghold against France. This fort 
lost its military value simultaneously with Charleville, but its remnants still appear on the 1753 
map (upper right corner). Hubert, Histoire de Charleville.
Figure 14. Military map depicting Mézières and Charleville in 1753 
(Paris, BnF, Cartes et plans, GE D–14449).
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Making sure that a potential enemy would be unable to find cover was only the first 
step in preparing for an adequate defence. The defenders also had to restore or expand 
the fortifications, store sufficient supplies, and otherwise prepare for a substantial 
increase in the number of occupants, man and beast, for an unknown length of time. 
This inevitably entailed further encroachments on nearby woodlands (see chap. 3). Two 
members of the garrison of Montaigle, near Dinant, received a financial reward in 1465 
to remove large amounts of compost and waste from the fortress, that had accumulated 
there as result of the many men­at­arms who came to garrison it, in combination with 
the livestock brought there for safekeeping. It filled the courtyard and soiled the water 
of the well.135 When Waultrin de Fillers, general receiver and forester of Longwy, orga­
nized this fortress for a potential siege in 1474–1475, he ordered the construction of a 
horse­drawn mill and the cleaning of the well and the latrines.136
The construction of horse­drawn mills, also attested in fifteenth­century Valken­
burg, was a practical response to the fact that defenders could lose access to the wind or 
water mills they normally used. Towns and cities sometimes constructed windmills on 
their walls, which safeguarded them against a direct enemy attack, but still made them 
very vulnerable to a bombardment (see the raid on ’s­Hertogenbosch in 1397 above).137 
If mills became unusable, grain could no longer be turned into flour, which effectively 
made available grain stocks next to useless. The Burgundian army forced Tongres/Ton­
geren to surrender after only eight days in 1482 by damming the river Jeker, on which 
the city’s water mills depended. An earlier attempt by Liégeois troops besieging Maas­
tricht in 1408 failed because the citizens constructed new water mills on the Meuse, 
which was too large to be diverted.138 Military garrisons also ran into conflicts with mill­
ers because water mills slowed down watercourses, which in turn obstructed defensive 
inundations. The French governor of Maastricht thus forbad the millers of Tongres/Ton­
geren to work in July 1678 until the inundation of the fields to the south of Maastricht, 
which also depended on the Jeker, was complete.139
Inundations were a regular feature of many sieges, and as argued before, became 
increasingly complex through the involvement of engineers. One of the most famous 
engineering feats was the siege of ’s­Hertogenbosch in 1629, where Dutch engineers 
nullified the defenders’ main eco logical advantage: the waterlogged soil around the 
city, aggravated by the deliberate inundation of the rivers Aa, Dieze, and Dommel. The 
besiegers built twenty­one horse­drawn mills, connected them to the inundation by spe­
cial canals, and then drained the area surrounding the fortress. They also rechanneled 
the Aa and Dommel to create a new inundation between themselves and a Spanish relief 
army. This event has become one of the most renowned feats of the Eighty Years War, 
135 Becquet, “Montaigle,” 104, 106. See also Dreiskämper, “Thonis Ongewassen en Johan Copper,” 181.
136 Bar­le­Duc, ADM, B 1879, fols. 130v–141r.
137 Barbe, Laverdine and Parizel, Moulins, 18; Marchal, Inventaire, 328–29; Milot, “Les garnisons,” 
733; Parmentier, Pays de Charleroi, 65; Sartelet, Sedan, 77; van de Venne, Het beleg, 18.
138 de Stavelot, Chronique, 115–16; Molinet, Chroniques, 1:376–77.
139 Ordonnance Corps du Génie (1776), 33–35; van den Brand and Manders, Vesting ’t Genneperhuys, 
415; Vandewal, Moerenpoort, 14.
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but was actually not that exceptional. Dutch forces already used similar drainage tech­
niques during the 1593 siege of Geertruidenberg.140 The fame of the 1629 siege is prob­
ably based on the numerous prints and paintings made to commemorate it (see figure 
15). A noteworthy detail is that the bottom image depicts a soldier fishing. This seems to 
have been a common practice, even though it could be dangerous. The chronicle of the 
Sint­Geertuiklooster mentions that a soldier was hit by a cannon ball and lost both his 
legs whilst fishing in the Dommel.141
Such inundations could serve both defensive and offensive purposes. The siege of 
Aachen in 1248 for example saw the besieging army, joined by pilgrims from the Low 
Countries, build a huge dam in the river Wurm in order to flood a considerable part 
140 De Cauwer, Tranen van bloed, 76, 125; De Graaf, Oorlog, 237–41, 527–32; van Bavel et al., De 
kroniek, 331–43; Verschure, Overleven, 134–36.
141 van Bavel et al., De kroniek, 335.
Figure 15. Etching of the Dutch siege of  ’s­Hertogenbosch in 1629 (detail),  
by Cornelis Danckerts, 1630 (Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum, RP–P–OB–77.706).
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of the city. The expertise for building this huge dam has traditionally been attributed 
to pilgrims originating from Frisia, but the Chronicon Regia Coloniensis indicates that 
they only arrived after the dam had been built. More landlocked areas might there­
fore still have had their own experts in hydro logy.142 Chronicles from the Prince­Bish­
opric of Liège in particular indicate that miners were regularly involved in attempts to 
divert watercourses during sieges. They undoubtedly used their experience in digging 
coalmines.143 As late as 1826–1827 the Netherlands regiment of sappers and miners, 
which was stationed in Grave and recruited most of its personnel in the Maastricht and 
Liège area, saved the city from the flooding of the Meuse by reinforcing the river dikes.144
The emphasis on establishing a breach or diverting streams was primordial, for 
sieges were governed by rules designed to limit unnecessary suffering. It is indeed sug­
gestive that few sieges, medi eval or early modern, lasted longer than two months after 
the initial encircling. (The siege of Aachen in 1248, which lasted almost six months is 
exceptional.) This also meant that starvation rarely became the main motivation for 
capitulating, although many marginalized groups did suffer from hunger. Disaffected 
citizens could be an important cause for surrendering early, since holding out until a 
besieging force fought its way into a fortress or city meant risking pillage, violence, and 
possibly massacres. The citizens of Saint­Mihiel thus diverted the watercourse that fed 
the garrison’s gunpowder mill in 1635 so that the governor had no choice but to yield 
to the besieging French army.145 By the seventeenth century the aim of most sieges was 
simply to breach the main wall, which was sufficiently large to allow a potential assault 
to be made. At that point most defenders surrendered.146
As a result of such de­escalation measures, sieges were in themselves rarely suffi­
cient to cause the destruction or abandonment of fortifications, despite their similarity 
to natural disasters. The demolition of major defences, such as the town walls of Dinant 
in 1466 or those of La Mothe in 1645, was time­consuming and labour­intensive, and 
therefore a highly symbolic political act that should be clearly distinguished from simple 
attempts to make a fortification indefensible, typically by creating a breach.147 Even so, 
repairing the damage of a siege could still be a long drawn­out process. The Sentence 
de Lille, the peace treaty between Liège and Burgundy from 1408, specified that the 
citizens of Tongres/Tongeren had to fill the trenches dug during the siege of Maastricht 
(1407–1408), or pay others to carry out this task. The city council of ’s­Hertogenbosch 
paid a contractor to supply trees in 1632, and again bought one thousand willows, four 
hundred field elms, and two hundred linden (lime) trees in 1636 to plant on the walls, 
142 Rhoen, Aachen, 41–46; Waitz, ed., Chronica, 293.
143 Gaier, “Aux origines”; Moreau, Bolwerk der Nederlanden, 102.
144 van Hoof and Roozenbeek, Grave, 50.
145 Abel et Bouteiller, eds., Journal, 238.
146 See the collection How Fighting Ends. A History of Surrender, ed. Holger Afflerbach and Hew 
Strachan (Oxford: Oxford Uni ver sity Press, 2012).
147 Brouwers, “La reconstruction”; Genicot, ed., Les tours, 41–44; Paviot, “La destruction”; Rorive, 
La guerre de siège, 199–214; Stercken, Königtum und Territorialgewalten, 130–35.
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which suggests that it took seven years to fully replace the trees cut down during the 
siege of 1629.148
Although most trenches might have been filled again relatively quickly, the dis­
turbances they caused changed the structure of the soil permanently. Archaeo logical 
research has benefitted significantly in the last decades from the study of soil and crop 
marks, particularly differences in soil colour and vegetation growth. These are observ­
able from the air and allow the identification of former fortifications as well as siege 
trenches. Furthermore, some structures remained a visible part of the local landscape 
for decades, sometimes even centuries. French engineers who charted the lands between 
the Sambre and Meuse in 1787, for instance, still depicted old retranchements made in 
1689. Four earthen hills constructed within Mézières as artillery platforms (cavaliers) 
during the siege of 1521 also survived into the eighteenth century.149 Sieges evidently 
left scars in the landscape, but they were on their own rarely sufficient to cause fortifica­
tions’ destruction.
Studying the ways armed forces sought to preserve fortifications, or indeed threat­
ened their very existence, is very helpful for understanding these structures’ eco logical 
impacts, but it still does not allow a convincing comparison to be made between the 
historical management of fortifications and the current importance environmentalists 
attribute to them. It is for this reason that we will now examine an exceptional source, 
whose value has been mostly ignored up till now: nineteenth­century studies by natu­
ralists of fortifications still actively managed by the military. There are many natural his­
tories or botanical works available for earlier periods, but these rarely provide detailed 
information where a specific species could be found.150 This is not to say that the infor­
mation these sources provide is unproblematic. Many naturalists exclusively focus on 
vascular plants, which means that animals, mosses, lichens, and fungi are underrepre­
sented. Latin names have also changed markedly in the last hundred and fifty years, and 
some plants identified by these scholars are no longer recognized as a separate species. 
It is also unclear to what extent such studies provide evidence about biodiversity in for­
tifications before the nineteenth century. 151
Still, there can be no doubt these naturalist studies, when put together, offer us a 
unique glimpse of the species that lived in fortifications when military organizations 
were still managing them. It is far from obvious that they would have been permitted 
148 Chevalier, “Les ‘attres’ fortifiés,” 41; van Bavel et al., De kroniek, 366; van Zuijlen, Inventaris, 
2:1375, 2:1398–99.
149 Feller, “Toponymie,” 100; Lemoine­Isabeau, La carto graphie, 53–54; Moranvillé, “Un 
incident,” 346; Renard, Toponymie, 90–91; Sartelet, Mézières, 28; Vanderbeken and Wesemael, “De 
belegeringen.”
150 Weeda, “Over de betrouwbaarheid van oude literatuurgegevens.”
151 See however, Dodoens, Cruijdeboeck, bk. 4, chap. 47, 555–56. Bellynck, Flore de Namur; Biot et 
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to do so. Outsiders had limited access to defensive structures, with officers especially 
concerned about enemy spies. Antoine de Lusy, a citizen of Mons, wrote down in his 
journal that a man from Brittany was arrested and executed in 1525 for inspecting the 
moats of the city (a war year). The eighteenth­century regulations of the garrison sta­
tioned in the castle of Namur also state that sentries had to arrest anyone found writing 
or drawing something near the fortifications, and the published results of a botanists’ 
excursion in Givet, dating to 1867, explicitly comment that the naturalists were only able 
to pass through the fortress of Charlemont after they obtained permission. A captain of 
the garrison, an amateur botanist himself, served as their guide.152 It is likewise hardly 
a coincidence that a military doctor, F. J. J. van Hoven, wrote the oldest guide to the flora 
of ’s­Hertogenbosch or that the pharmacist L. J. G. Dumoulin published his flora of Maas­
tricht in 1868, the same year the fortifications lost their military status (see the appen­
dix for a full overview of species found). Even members of the military had limited or 
no access to the more restricted parts of the fortifications, which might explain why van 
Hoven only considers lichens growing on trees and not those on the walls themselves 
(except one species on the outlying Fort Isabella).153
The plant and animal diversity in nineteenth­century fortifications, as revealed by 
these naturalists’ publications, can be explained by drawing attention to the military 
desire to close off access to these areas, as well as the very landscape diversity these 
fortifications generated. Military forces’ concern with maintaining an open field of fire 
in combination with their methods of grassland management—mowing the grass only 
twice a year or pasturing sheep—would in effect have stimulated plant diversity.154 This 
diversity in turn could have attracted different kinds of creatures, such as butterflies and 
moths. The naturalist Félix Liénard explicitly referred to the ditches of the fortifications 
and fields near the citadel of Verdun as the best locations for catching lepidoptera.155
Fortifications were also home to a wide range of water plants, a reflection of the 
fact that plant growth develops more easily in still or slow­moving water. Dr. van Hoven 
identified no fewer than three plants that could be found specifically near the inunda­
tion slush of Heusden. Mining galleries by contrast have a similar eco logical function to 
caves because of their high humidity and constant temperatures.156 French naturalists 
identified the fortress of Charlemont as a hibernation place for rare bats, such as the 
geoffroy’s bat (Myotis emarginatus) and the barbastelle (Barbastella barbastellus), as 
early as 1806. Finally, even plants typically associated with woodlands could be found 
in some fortifications, as Dumoulin disovered a very rare orchid, the violet helleborine 
152 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2078, Orders Castle of Namur, art.2; de Lusy, Le journal, 
358; Devos, “Compte rendu,” 321–22.
153 van Hoven, Flora van ’s-Hertogenbosch, 31–32.
154 Godron, Flore, 62, 258–59; Graatsma et al., eds., De flora, 105; van Hoven, Flora van ’s-Hertogen-
bosch.
155 Liénard, “Catalogue,” 377–78;
156 van Hoven, Flora van ’s-Hertogenbosch, 5, 8, 9.
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(Epipactis purpurata) in the coppice wood planted in the outworks beyond the Bos­
chpoort in Maastricht.157
The most striking element in fortifications, however, proved to be neither of these 
environments. Stone walls are home to relatively few species, but the species that they 
do accommodate can be found nowhere else. Steep stone walls, like those of fortresses, 
churches, or city walls are, eco logically speaking, quite similar to a rock or mountain 
environment. A typical example of such a rare species is tower mustard (Arabis glabra), 
a herb that grew on the medi eval city walls of Maastricht in 1868. Another typical wall 
plant, perennial wall­rocket (diplotaxis tenuifolia) could be found plentifully on the forti­
fications of Montmédy, Sedan, Givet, and Rocroy in the nineteenth century. Fortifications 
were especially important for these plants because only a small part was effectively used 
on a daily basis for living purposes (simply the towers, gates, and guard houses). If a wall 
gets heated from the inside the variations in temperature became too extreme for such 
plants during the colder seasons.158
The importance of stone walls lies indeed not only in their specific construction, 
but also in the creation of warm microclimates. The term microclimate refers to a local 
variation of the general climate, from a few square metres to several hectares. This 
variation can be caused by differences in soil structure, as the presence of stone typi­
cally generates higher temperatures, but also by vegetation coverage or the presence of 
water (both of which have a cooling effect), the angle of the incoming sunlight, and the 
wind. These microclimates are essential for biodiversity, because they can support a far 
greater range of species than a uniform climate.159
One of the most significant environmental impacts of the characteristic star­shaped 
fortifications of the early modern period might therefore be that they created a mosaic 
of microclimates, given the variations in sunlight (different angles), humidity (wet or 
dry moats), and vegetation (trees and hedges). This is confirmed by the study of bota­
nist André Devos from 1870, which records that hyssop grew abundantly in the ditches 
on the southwestern flank of the fortress of Charlemont and on the south side of the for­
tress of Montmédy, locations where the sunlight was most intense and winds could only 
exert limited influence. Many of the lepidoptera found in or near the citadel of Verdun 
were likewise typical of warmer climates.160
Hyssop is not native to the Meuse Region, but had been introduced as a garden plant 
in the late Middle Ages, being well known for its medical properties. Given that many 
other plants closely associated with the fortifications can be identified as archaeo­
phytes, it is likely that gardens had a major role in the spread of herbs and flowers to 
157 Biot et al., Nouveau dictionnaire, 35, 472; Dumoulin, Guide du botaniste, 56; Geoffroy­Saint­
Hilaire, “Mémoire,” 196–97.
158 Dumoulin, Guide du botaniste, 19; Francis, “Wall eco logy”; Pierrot, Cardot, and Vuillaume, 
Catalogue, 78–79; Segal, Eco logical Notes, 48–50.
159 Stoutjesdijk and Barkman, Microclimate.
160 Devos, “Deux jours d’herborisation,” 124–26; Devos, “Les plantes naturalisées,” 20, 89; Liénard, 
“Catalogue,” 399, 415, 419, 420, 426, 448, 466, 481; Liénard, “Addendum,” 290, 295, 297, 300.
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defensive structures.161 These transfers, deliberate or not, would have been facilitated 
by the suitability of stone walls for plants of a Mediterranean origin: a rock environ­
ment, warm microclimates, and calcareous soils. The fact that limestone constituted one 
of the most important building materials in the Meuse Region is a crucial element in the 
fortifications’ eco logy, because in northern Europe the diversity of calcareous soils is 
much higher than those of an acidic nature. This is a result of a historical bottleneck: the 
Ice Ages. During these periods of global cooling the Mediterranean, with its numerous 
calcerous soils, provided a refuge for species linked to warmer climates, while Europe 
north of the Pyrenees and Alps experienced a massive extinction. Fortifications might 
thus have assisted in the gradual recovery of Northern European ecosystems, a process 
that started after the last Ice Age and continues to this day. Their role might have been 
especially important in the context of the so­called Little Ice Age (during the sixteenth 
to nineteenth centuries).162
While the connection between gardens and fortifications is quite strong, it is far from 
certain who managed them. Devos identified gardens in or near the fortresses of Char­
lemont, Dinant, Namur, and Huy as the origin of some typical garden plants that could 
be found there in the nineteenth century.163 This brings us to the nub of the problem: 
there were many gardens in or near fortifications, but their cultivation was not a mili­
tary prerogative. One cannot be certain for instance that hyssop or other garden plants 
that grew in the fortresses of Charlemont and Montmédy had a military origin, for even 
these fortresses housed small communities that were not part of the garrison as such.164
In some cases garden plants established themselves despite intense opposition 
of the armed forces. Engineers stationed in Maastricht had to devise new inundation 
basins in 1764, since the old ones, constructed by French forces in the late seventeenth 
century, had become unsuitable because citizens used them for gardening. They thus 
made new basins, demolished the gardens in the process, and then used the lands for 
inspecting the units of the garrison in battle order to ensure no one tried to cultivate 
these lands again. When Dumoulin gave a lecture about the flora of Maastricht in 1832, 
however, he still mentioned the presence of wild daffodils (Narcissus pseudonarcissus 
subsp pseudonarcissus) on the dikes of the inundation basins, remnants of the gardens 
destroyed in 1764.165
161 Devos, “Compte rendu,” 303, 306; Devos, “Les plantes naturalisées,” 88, 93, 95, 99; Dumoulin, 
Guide du botaniste, 16, 18, 19, 42, 59, Lejeune, Flore, 21, 136; van Hoven, Flora van ’s-Hertogenbosch, 
12; Zeven et al., De introductie, 83.
162 Ewald, “The Calcareous Riddle”; Segal, Eco logical Notes, 58–67.
163 Devos, “Deux jours d’herborisation,” 124–26.
164 Bellynck, Flore de Namur, 10, 12, 21, 22, 24, 27, 32, 50, 59, 70, 76, 79, 120, 124, 136, 163, 167, 
208, 263, 279, 285, 296, 312–316, 318–19; Bragard, Le château, 43, 57, 101; Caminada­Voorham, 
Loevestein, 95–96; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 5:241; Leestmans, Soldats, 198; Richer, Abrégé 
chrono logique, 135.
165 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2057: Garnisoensorderboek, October 5, 1785; Graatsma 
et al., eds., De flora, 37, 47, 85; Moreau, Bolwerk der Nederlanden, 258–62.
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These daffodils were far from the only species that survived in fortifications despite 
attempts to remove them. One of the officers of the Maastricht garrison filed a request 
with the forestry department in the 1820s to put fox traps in the mining galleries. He 
claimed that the animals could damage these underground corridors with their bur­
rowing. This might have been a common attitude, for Eduard Lenz, a sapper lieutenant 
in the Bavarian army, also recommended the eradication of hole­digging animals in his 
treatise Ueber technische Truppen (1827).166 Contractors tasked with executing basic 
maintenance tasks similarly had to cut down caterpillar nests and remove nettles or 
thistles. Bats seem to have survived relatively unscathed, being considered just a minor 
nuisance. Lenz simply specified that droppings of bats and other creatures had to be 
cleared from the mining galleries.167
The bio logical diversity these naturalists encountered was therefore to a large extent 
unintended. It does not follow, however, that the role of the military in bringing about 
these eco logical results was negligible. Military forces created and maintained land­
scape diversity because it had military value, and this variety in turn made a remarkable 
166 Pelzers, de Rijk, and Thissen, “Zoogdieren,” 168; Lenz, Ueber technische Truppen, 33–34.
167 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. no. 3007; Maastricht, RHCL, 07.E01, inv. no. 9: Performance specifications 
concerning the maintenance of the fortifications of Maastricht, September 6, 1825; Caminada­
Voorham, Loevestein, 52; Hasselbrink, Manuductio ad Architecturam Militarem, 177.
Figure 16. The Hoge Fronten in Maastricht, now a nature reserve (photo graph by the author).
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diversity of species possible. This can best be illustrated by taking the fortifications of 
Nijmegen as an example. This city was the subject of two different botanical studies, one 
from 1848, the other in 1888, which allow a systematic comparison to be made between 
plant diversity before and after the city’s defences lost their military value (1874). While 
some typical wall vegetation survived in those parts of the walls that had not yet been 
broken down, in most cases ruderal plants (“weeds”) had replaced them.168
The parts of the fortifications that survived onslaughts of urban development typi­
cally became incorporated into parks. Others joined older defence structures that had 
become isolated ruins in the middle of woodlands. Such abandoned fortifications still 
have eco logical value, but their importance mainly lies in the fact that they are green 
islands in the middle of landscapes that were transformed as a result of industrializa­
tion, population growth, and an intensification of agriculture.169 Instead of allowing 
trees and shrubs to take over former fortifications, which eventually contributes to their 
destruction, many conservationists now opt for maintenance that strongly resembles 
historical management practices. Sheep graze in the largest surviving part of the early 
modern fortifications of Maastricht, the Hoge Fronten, and most woody plants have 
been removed (see figure 16).
Nevertheless, even ruins of medi eval fortresses, abandoned for several centuries, 
could still play an important eco logical role. A recent study of former castle mottes in 
French woodland environments has demonstrated that they exhibit significant differ­
ences in the composition of plant species, compared to the woodlands that surround 
them. These ruins act as eco logical islands that are valuable from a bio logical viewpoint 
because they add diversity to the landscape. They contain more species typical of cal­
careous and nutrient rich soils, as well as more competive ruderal species and epizo­
ochores. A similiar study regarding molluscs in the Czech Republic has confirmed these 
results. Even though these medi eval fortifications had been abandoned for centuries the 
chemical changes in the soil structure they brought about retain their influence till this 
very day.170
Conclusion
The current variety of plants and animals in disused fortifications is a logical conse­
quence of these structures’ eco logy when they still had military value. Neglect is not 
a prerequisite for fortifications to be bio logically significant. Up to a certain point it is 
even counterproductive, for the landscape diversity typical for fortifications depends on 
human involvement and regular maintenance. Plants, earth, and natural stone remained 
the main components of fortifications until concrete and barbed wire replaced them in 
the later nineteenth century. In the case of the Meuse Region continuity was so strong 
168 Dirkse, Hochstenbach, and Reijerse, Flora, 191, 283, 289, 336.
169 Cremers, Kaaij, and Steenbergen, Bolwerken, 125–29; Lawrence, City Trees, 195–98; van der 
Woud, Het lege land, 324–40.
170 Closset­Kopp and Decocq, “Remnant Artificial Habitats”; Jurickova and Kucera, “Ruins of Medi­
eval Castles.”
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that many stone fortifications built during the Central Middle Ages retained their defen­
sive role into the nineteenth century. Their presence defined militarized landscapes 
across the centuries.
The biodiversity value of fortifications, as reflected in the studies of nineteenth­
century naturalists, was directly related to the defensive value of preserving various 
landscape elements in a relatively compressed space. At the same time numerous spe­
cies spread to fortifications unintentionally, or even despite military opposition. This 
chapter consequently does not claim that armies deliberately made fortifications a suit­
able place for numerous species of plants and animals, only that the need for military 
defence created circumstances that allowed flora and fauna to thrive. Many conserva­
tionists actually manage former fortifications in a manner that strongly resembles pre­
modern practices. A ruin in the middle of woodlands, on the other hand, can also have 
eco logical value. Everything depends on local circumstances and establishing priorities. 
Leaving a former fortress covered with woody plants alone might be preferable if for­
est ecosystems are very rare in that specific area. One just has to keep in mind that in 
such instances abandoned fortifications become valuable because humans have over­
exploited ecosystems to such an extent that every green island in a sea of grey becomes 




Figure 17. Seventeenth­century pamphlet on the Thirty Years War (Dresden, 
SLSU, inv. no. 334171156: Abbildung des unbarmhertzigen, abschewlichen, 
grausam- und grewlichen Thiers, welches in wenig Jahren, den grösten Theil 
Teutschlandes erbärm- und jämmerlichen verheeret, aussgezehret und verderbet).
Chapter 3
DISTURBANCES
Armies: An Eco logical Disaster?
Consider a seventeenth­century German pamphlet depicting a “merciless, awful, horri­
ble and atrocious animal that has destroyed, consumed and corrupted most of Germany 
in a few years time” (figure 17). It denounced the suffering and misery armed forces 
caused during the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). This beast combines features from 
different creatures: a wolf’s head, a bear’s rump, a rat’s tail, a lion’s paw, a human arm, 
an armoured foot, and a horse’s leg. It carries weapons and a torch, while eating gold, 
trampling an armed man, and leaving a trail of burning buildings behind. Snakes, toads, 
locusts, and snails follow in its wake, and destroy the crops and vines depicted in the 
foreground. The woodcut represents armies as a destructive force, as a catastrophe, and 
serves as a leading thread throughout this chapter.
Studying disturbances means analyzing disruptive impacts of armies on eco logical 
systems, in peace as well as war, thereby engaging prevailing arguments about the 
destructive role of armies directly. It also entails moving to a different level within the 
concept of an ecosystem: biotic communities, or interactions between living beings 
amongst themselves rather than with environmental factors (the landscape level). This 
should not be interpreted as a strict dividing line, but more as a shift in emphasis, as 
the ecosystem concept implies that living beings and their non­living environment are 
intrinsically connected to each other. The following chapter examines to what extent 
armies contributed to eco logical change by disturbing biotic communities, in both the 
short and the long term; one has to take resilience into account, the ability of an indi­
vidual, species, or system to absorb shocks without losing any of its essential character­
istics. A distinction will thus be made between disturbances as temporary shocks and as 
contributing factors to long­term shifts in bio logical communities.1
A disturbance can be defined as “any relatively discrete event in time that disrupts 
ecosystem, community, or population structure and changes resources, substrate avail­
ability, or the physical environment.”2 Disturbances are a vital element in the functioning 
of an ecosystem and encompass everything from floods, storms, and volcanic eruptions 
to simple grazing. Ecosystems constantly change; there is no such thing as a delicate “bal­
ance” that can be upset by external events. The calcareous grasslands for which the Meuse 
valley itself has become famous, for instance, can only be preserved through regular dis­
turbances, in practice mowing and grazing.3 The maintenance of fortifications is also a 
series of disturbances, for it involves the removal of vegetation from ditches and walls.
1 Campbell, “Nature as Historical Protagonist,” 307–10.
2 Pickett and White, The Eco logy, 6–9.
3 van Dijk, Graatsma, and van Rooy, Droge stroomdalgraslanden, 6–10.
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Drawing attention to the multiple functions of disruptions is vital for challenging 
current assumptions about army–ecosystem interactions. The study of “environmental 
destruction” during warfare has been a major stimulus in bringing about a rapproche­
ment between military and environmental history, but it also suffers from the vague 
termino logy most scholars employ. Many analyses, whether they concern historic 
events, or contemporary effects of warfare, use the term “destruction” indiscriminately, 
thereby obscuring different gradations of damage. The word destruction should be 
reserved for a specific kind of disturbance; those instances when a community or eco­
system has disappeared or is permanently degraded.4
Establishing exact distinctions between different degrees of disruption is problem­
atic, however, since comparatively few historical sources allow a detailed study of the 
4 See especially Brauer, War and Nature, 19–26.
Figure 18. Miniature from a fourteenth­century French Bible depicting warfare 
disturbances (Paris, BnF, MS français, 160: La Bible hystoriaus, fol. 203v).
 disturbances 107
actual extent of damage caused. Administrative sources (fiscal accounts, correspon­
dence, court records, notarial acts) are generally more accurate than chronicles or lit­
erary works, but they still tend to focus on the economic value of destroyed property 
rather than giving explicit evidence about the area of land affected or the number of 
plants and animals stolen or killed. Many of these documents were created to prove 
that a settlement, institution, or individual should receive some sort of support or was 
unable to pay taxes or rents.5 As early as the Central Middle Ages rulers or cities could be 
obliged to recompense their former adversaries as part of a peace settlement. In 1179, 
for example, the bishop of Liège agreed to make peace with the count of Loon on condi­
tion that he did not owe the count anything for damage caused to the count’s lands. This 
suggests that paying some sort of compensation was the norm. Such practices might not 
only have provided a strong motivation for keeping records, but also encouraged fraud.6
What these sources do provide is ample evidence about the diverse forms of dis­
turbance: armed forces cut down or burned trees, shrubs, and vines, mowed or tram­
pled grasslands, harvested, trod or burned agricultural fields, damaged ponds and took 
the fish, stole or killed livestock and game, demolished buildings, and caused human 
communities to experience a sharp demo graphic decline. Contemporaries, particularly 
those involved in agriculture, portrayed warfare as a catastrophe, and more importantly 
as a shock that had similar effects to a natural disaster. A fourteenth­century miniature 
leaves little doubt about the nature of medi eval warfare (see figure 18). It portrays a 
party of men­at­arms burning a castle, stealing sheep, and cutting down a tree. A notar­
ial act from Sautour, near Philippeville, in 1597 provides an equivalent portrait in writ­
ing, for it included a clause that the tenant of a major forge was not obliged to pay rent 
when affected by war or another kind of disaster.7
While warfare in general did have a similar role to a natural disaster, there were still 
major differences, depending on the exact geo graphical and chrono logical context. As 
argued in the introduction, armies evolved from forces that primarily aimed to damage 
property, often relatively small groups of a few dozen or several hundred men, to mas­
sive entities of tens of thousands of people who generally refrained from attacking local 
populations, but still caused considerable damage because they required food and shel­
ter and built or attacked fortifications. These changes reflected a growing divergence 
between armies and general society, but also mounting problems regarding the basic 
maintenance of the former. Early modern rulers raised larger forces than their medi­
eval predecessors, and also kept them in the field for longer periods of time. This put a 
heavy burden on their administrative apparatus, so much pressure in fact that warfare 
could only be conducted by outsourcing it almost entirely (especially the recruiting and 
supply). By the early seventeenth century medi eval extortions under threat of burning 
down property (brandschatting / Brandschatzung) had developed into a complex sys­
5 Goorts, War, State, and Society, 290–91, 299–300; Gutmann, War and Rural Life, 66; Theibault, 
“The Rhetoric of Death and Destruction”; van Houtte, Les occupations, 1:44–47.
6 de Borman, Chronique, 1:78–79.
7 Sautour, 6931: February 18, 1597 (transcript Généamag).
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tem of contributions according to which local populations had to supply passing armies 
with everything they needed or face reprisals.8
Let us now analyze the first aspect of the horrible animal depicted on the seven­
teenth­century woodcut: the burning, killing, and pillaging. Such activities are closely 
associated with warfare in general, regardless of its exact geo graphical and chrono­
logical context, but need to be broken down into their constituent parts. This section 
will accordingly examine warfare’s eco logical effects in terms of cutting down wood, 
loss of harvest, raiding of livestock, poaching, and demo graphic decline.
 It would be very difficult to overstate the significance of woody plants in premodern 
Europe, for basic survival, as fuel, raw material, or for their fruit. Armed forces contin­
ued to slash or burn them, whether individually or in groups, whether forests, hedges, 
orchards, or vineyards, throughout the period from 1250 to 1850. Still, when chronicles 
or administrative sources declared that combatants cut wood or damaged forests they 
did not necessarily mean that entire trees were destroyed. In 1636, for example, the 
steward of the lordship of Rijckholt near Maastricht looked into complaints about sol­
8 Bothe, “How to ‘Ravage’ a Country”; Gutmann, War and Rural Life, 41–46, 61–66; Parrott, The 
Business of War; Strickland, War and Chivalry, 268–77.
Figure 19. Cavalrymen gather fascines and make gabions (left foreground), 
late seventeenth century (Guérard, L’Art militaire).
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diers and their wives leaving the forest with oak branches. While cutting them off one 
of them fell down the tree.9 Forty years later, in 1677–1678, French troops felled wood­
lands near Charleroi claiming that Dutch troops had used them earlier as cover when 
attacking the fortress. In 1684 the woodlands still did not yield any returns because pigs 
could not be sufficiently fed with their acorns. In other words: the woodlands were not 
destroyed, but they did need time to recover.10
These men and women contributed to more general processes of overexploitation, 
which is why these infringements on entitlements were so significant to contempo­
raries, but the eco logical damage of their actions was in itself quite limited. From the 
Middle Ages onwards most trees and shrubs in the Meuse Region were managed as pol­
lards or coppice wood. The former practice involved the removal of a tree’s crown, the 
latter cutting down the plant at ground level. Both forms of management encourage the 
regrowth of a multitude of new branches that could be harvested every few, typically 
seven, years.11 Soldiers certainly took advantage of these practices since manufacturing 
fascines (bundles of branches) or gabions (cylindrical wicker baskets filled with earth) 
was a basic prerequisite for building temporary fortifications from at least the fifteenth 
century onwards. It is depicted in Guérard’s seventeenth­century L’Art militaire (see fig­
ure 19), as well as in photo graphs made on the eve of the First World War, and appears 
regularly in military handbooks.12
This does not diminish the extensive harm done to woodlands in other circum­
stances, but does draw attention to the fact that there is considerable variety behind 
vague expressions such as “damaging” or “cutting down” woodlands.13 The amount of 
wood required by garrisons and mobile armies alike certainly must have been enor­
mous: the fiscal accounts of the counts of Hainaut reveal that the defence of Binche in 
1334 necessitated at least 1786 fascines, or the felling of seventy­two large oak trees, for 
the construction of small forts or large barricades (fortéreches), another six hundred fas-
cines for the men of war who stayed in the city, and four hundred and seventy­six mer-
rains, wooden staves, for the making of hourds (wooden battlements built as an exten­
9 Maastricht, RHCL, 16.0502 Familie de Bounam de Ryckholt, inv. no. 598.
10 Hasquin, Une mutation, le “Pays de Charleroi”, 233–34.
11 Warde, Eco logy, Economy and State Formation, 76–77; Vera, Grazing Eco logy.
12 de Keralio, Lacuée, and Servan, Encyclopédie méthodique. Art militaire, 2:345, 2:489–80; Fallot 
and Lagrange, Cours d’art militaire, 157–70; Guérard, L’Art militaire.
13 Geldern, Stadtarchiv, G9 Stadtrechnung, fol. 67v (1586–1587) (transcript Rien van den Brand, 
http://www.scriptoriumempeje.nl); Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 218, fol. 291r 
(transcript Rien van den Brand); Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 106; Bouwer, Een notabel 
domein, 106; Delcourte Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 107, 138, 372–75; de Stavelot, Chronique, 
251; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 1:194, 2:177, 3:23, 3:280, 4:231, 4:419; Habets, “Drie 
chronijkjes,” 407–8; Kaisin, Annales historiques de la commune de Chatelineau, 217–24; Marchal, 
Inventaire, 77, 162, 272, 315, 316; Petitot­Bellavène, “Verdun,” 86–87; Pionnier, Essai sur l’histoire, 
257, 270; Poncelet, “Nouveaux documents,” 501–2; Remmers, “Een schadelijst”; Rorive, La guerre 
de siège, 159, 163, 166, 177, 203–4; Stévenin, “Une fatalité,” 169; Teunisse, Onderdaan in Oranje’s 
oorlog, 69, 77; van den Brand and Manders, Vesting ’t Genneperhuys, 376–77.
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sion of walls or towers).14 This consumption grew even worse in later centuries. The 
defence of Geldern in 1701 required the procurement of seventy thousand pallisades 
and thirty­four thousand fascines.15 Preparing a fortification for a potential attack fur­
ther entailed the destruction of any vegetation within bowshot, and later cannon range 
(see chap. 2). Demand of firewood could also be very substantial: accounts from the gen­
eral receiver of Limburg and Outre­Meuse specify that the nobleman Carselis de Eupen 
and his retinue of eleven men stayed in the fortress of Argenteau, between Liège and 
Visé, from the end of August 1410 to the first of February 1411 to defend it. They con­
sumed thirty­six wagonloads of firewood, taken from the lordship’s own woodlands.16
Contemporaries particularly dreaded the harming of the few remaining trees with a 
full crown (in orchards, high forests, or as isolated individuals). This was undoubtedly 
a less common occurrence than the harvesting of coppice woods or pollards, but then 
these trees were also relatively rare because of the constant pressure on wood as a lim­
ited resource. The citizens of Fosses near Namur, for instance, had to declare in a 1276 
charter that they had only cut down trees belonging to the collegiate church of Saint­
Pholien because they had had to strengthen the city’s defences and no suitable trees 
could be found in their own woodlands.17 Wenceslaus, Duke of Brabant (1355–1383), 
similarly declared in a 1365 charter that the citizens of Aachen could keep a siege tower 
with battering ram (ein evenhoge ende ein catte in einem werke) because they paid for 
its construction, but since the wood came from his forests in the Duchy of Limburg, he 
reserved the right to borrow the tower.18
These needs are fairly practical, in the sense that they are connected to a combat­
ant’s health (firewood) or core activities (combat). Yet army members also burned or 
cut down woody plants and vines to punish their owners and affect their economic 
base, as in 1393 when Jan Uten Campe saw his house (castle), orchard, and willows, 
located near Woudrichem, destroyed. This was an act of retaliation for Uten Campe’s 
support of Willem van Oostervant against his father, Albert of Bavaria, Count of Holland 
(1358–1404).19 Early modern soldiers saw wood as a commodity that could be easily 
appropriated for their own ends, for instance to gain some extra income. The Spanish 
government singled out its own soldiers as perpetrators in legislation issued to pro­
tect woodlands in the Netherlands, and Louis XIV issued similar regulations for his own 
forces in the late seventeenth century.20
14 Devillers and Pinchart, Extraits des comptes, 12–13; Raynaud, “Défenses annexes.”
15 van den Brand, “Spaanse vestingbouwwerkzaamheden,” 102–8.
16 Gaier, “L’approvisionnement,” 573–74.
17 Poncelet, “Nouveaux documents,” 501–2. See also Roland, “Les seigneurs de Morialmé,” 58–59.
18 Berens, Territoriale Entwicklung & Grenzbildung, 163.
19 De Boer, Faber, and van Gent, eds., De rekeningen, 1393–1396, 4. See also de Stavelot, Chronique, 
111; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 4:342, 4:372; Girardot, “La guerre,” 6; Lefèvre, “Documents 
relatifs aux dégâts,” 44; Maguin, “Economie, politique et viticulture,” 196; Richer, Abrégé chrono-
logique, 212; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 2:329; van Doorninck, “Inneming,” 230.
20 Maastricht, RHCL, 01.004 Hof van Gelder te Roermond, inv. no. 1636; Reglements et ordonnances 
du roy pour les gens de guerre, 9:228 (August 28, 1695); Delcourte Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 
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Such disturbances are meaningful because they were part of long­term infractions 
resulting in the overexploitation of forests and the obstruction of regrowth. Villagers 
in effect took advantage of the turmoil armies created, and the resulting breakdown 
of authority, to evade the laws regulating the conservation of woodlands: regulations 
passed in 1559, regarding the use of woodlands in the County of Namur, explicitly 
mentioned that earlier legislation was being ignored because of the war with France. 
The year 1747 saw a similar renewal of legislation in the principality of Liège, during 
another French invasion.21
The widespread practice of villagers taking refuge in the most inaccessible locations 
when confronted with an invasion (often forests, but caves, hedges, ditches, marshes, 
and islands are also mentioned) exacerbated the disruption of combat itself. It caused 
a sudden and very substantial rise in human presence in areas that were normally left 
more or less alone. The seventeenth­century County of Namur, for example, saw several 
lawsuits about damage done to privately owned woodlands and meadows by refugees 
and their livestock. In one instance the barriers protecting a forest were broken down in 
order to gain access. In 1686 Gilles Marteleur, fifty­eight years of age, testified during his 
interrogation by the councillors of Pesche, near Couvin, that he had grown up in wood­
lands, in a house separated from the village by an hour’s walk, because of the wars.22
In a few instances quite precise data is available and these sources make it clear 
exactly how much damage premodern armies could inflict, even with the relatively basic 
tools at their disposal. French armies of about twenty­five thousand men settled near 
Tongres/Tongeren in 1746 and 1747 to build field fortifications. This involved the dig­
ging of trenches and the construction of batteries, but also procuring firewood. During 
their two stays, which lasted about a month each, every tree in the direct neighbour­
hood of the encampment seems to have been cut down, including those on the walls of 
Tongres and local orchards. The priors of the local hospital (gasthuis) claimed in their 
institution’s narrative of the events to have lost more than a thousand trees, mostly 
poplars and birches. In the nearby village of Overrepen, which encompassed one of the 
few remaining woodlands in the area (the forest of Kolmont), French soldiers took one 
thousand trees as well. Because the French king promised to compensate the popula­
374; Laurent et al., eds., Receuil des ordonnances des Pays-Bas, 2:24; Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst 
Overkwartier, 1:228–29; Bodard, ed., Receuil des ordonnances du Duché de Bouillon, 7; Goblet 
d’Alviella, Histoire des bois et forêts, 1:344–47; Jacquet­Ladrier, “Vivre à Namur,” 178; Rorive, 
Les misères de la guerre, 347; Schoetter, “Etat du Duché de Luxembourg,” 398–99; van Zuijlen, 
Inventaris, 2:1155.
21 ’s­Hertogenbosch, BHIC, 5121 Schepenprotocollen Sint­Michielsgestel, inv. no. 45, fol. 240r; 
Hasselt, RAH, Notariaat, Rekem, Caenen (microfilm no. 1462471, item 9): act October 26, 1748; 
Boosten et al., Bosgeschiedenis, 211–18; Goblet d’Alviella, Histoire des bois et forêts, 2:229; Laurent 
et al., eds., Receuil des ordonnances des Pays-Bas, 8:35–36; Marchal, Inventaire, 154; Rouche, 
“Journal de l’entréé,” 70–72.
22 Pesche, 6361: May 22, 1686 (transcript Généamag); Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 
3:195–96, 3:217, 4:106, 4:117, 4:123, 4:132, 4:186, 4:275, 4:346; see also Tongeren, SAT, inv. no. 1, 
fol. 46r–v; Cuppens, “Opoeteren,” 85–96; Delcourte Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 101, 333; Faujas 
de Saint­Fond, Histoire naturelle, 40–41, 43, 50; Jacob, Bruyères, 105; Marchal, Inventaire, 166
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tion for their losses, an exact survey was made. This reveals that in the forest itself three 
hundred and eighty­four oaks and ash trees had been cut down. The other major loss 
concerned the village’s fruit­bearing trees, with willows and coppice wood being con­
sidered less valuable.23 Still, even though the French army acted as a disaster, a shock, 
they did not destroy the local ecosystems. If the term destruction is appropriate, it is 
only in the short term, for the 1777 Ferraris map indicates that the area had by then 
recovered from this disaster.24
One should indeed be careful to distinguish theory from actual practice: command­
ers may have given orders to procure a certain amount of palisades or cut down a par­
ticular number of trees, but that did not necessarily mean that these orders were carried 
out, at least not to their full extent. This can be proven by letters kept in the prefect’s 
archive in Maastricht regarding the preparation of the fortresses of Grave, Venlo, and 
Maastricht for the Allied invasion in December 1813. French engineers calculated that 
this required between eighty­five and ninety thousand palisades as well as tens of thou­
sands of fascines and storm poles, or the cutting of about five thousand four hundred 
trees. Initially, they intended to use oak trees as well as conifers, but in order to preserve 
the remaining oak forests, and because transportation would be too expensive, these 
edifices were to be made from pinewood. Despite the use of more than two hundred 
wagons and a multitude of labourers, and to the growing frustration of the French direc­
tor of fortifications, the desired production rate of three thousand palisades a day was 
never reached and large numbers of felled trees had to be left behind. Accounts from the 
forest administration in 1814–1815 comment on the selling of wood left by the French 
in Rekem and by the Swedes, who blockaded the fortress of Maastricht, in Gronsveld.25
Military officers were well aware of the problems affecting the supply of wood, espe­
cially in periods of crisis. This is one of the reasons why they started taking control over 
woodlands and planting trees themselves (see chaps. 1 and 2). If possible, timber was 
brought from other areas and stored. The Meuse itself was after all a major transporta­
tion route for wood. During the siege of Utrecht in 1345, for example, the count of Hol­
land bought thousands of planks and poles of different sizes in Dordrecht, a significant 
part of which came from the Meuse Region. The construction of pavises alone consumed 
hundreds of planks which put together would have been more than three thousand 
metres long.26 Records kept by the chief engineer in the fortress of Maastricht in the 
second half of the eighteenth century reveal that several thousand to tens of thousands 
of palisades were kept in store and that about two thousand were planted each year in 
the fortifications to replace rotten ones. In case of necessity, major entrepreneurs were 
23 Tongeren, SAT, Schepenbank Overrepen–Kolmont III; De Harzé, “Manuscrit relatif aux batailles 
de Rocour et de Lafeld,” 265–67, 287–88.
24 Brussels, KBR, Cartes et plans, MS IV 5.567: Carte de Ferraris. See also Buridant, “Le rôle des 
forêts,” 238; Verbois, Rekem, 315.
25 Liège, AEL, Fonds Hollandais, inv. no. 396; Maastricht, RHCL, 04.01, inv. no. 81; 07.E01, inv. no. 
17; Frans Archief, inv. no. 1177.
26 Pavises are large shields behind which crossbowmen could hide while reloading. Hamaker, De 
rekeningen, 3:457–65, 3:476.
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contracted to supply thousands of palisades, fascines, poles, or gabions in a matter of 
weeks.27 The demands armed forces placed on wood as a scarce resource could certainly 
have devastating results, but they were in themselves rarely sufficient to cause long­
term damage.
While woodlands are relatively well studied and their disturbances significant, the 
same cannot be said about a very different kind of community: grasslands. Grasslands 
had a central role in contemporary agricultural systems either for pasture or for produc­
ing hay (meadows). Chronicles, fiscal accounts, and notarial or court records sometimes 
remark that these were trampled or mowed by, or for, passing armies but provide no 
further specifications. Often, they simply comment that an army “foraged.”28 In a charter 
from 1286 Jan, lord of Cuijk, declared that he would not raid the lands of the count of 
Guelders that lay west of the Meuse River, on condition that his lands were not damaged 
either. “Damage” is specified here as burning, stealing, and taking forage (voderigge).29 
Providing for an army’s animal component was plainly a factor of major importance.
A horse can be fed with green forage (freshly cut grass, herbs, grains) or dry fodder 
(hay, oats, straw). Procurement of the latter is an important requirement to keep up a 
horse’s strength or get it through the winter. A single horse needs about twenty­five kilo­
grams of forage or twelve kilograms of fodder each day.30 The area that this forage is pro­
cured from would of course differ according to local circumstances but seems to be quite 
considerable. The marquis de Puységur (1665–1743), a French marshal, calculated in the 
first half of the eighteenth century that a single horse required about one hundred and 
fifty square metres of grassland each day. One half was needed for forage and the other 
half was trampled and eaten in the process of collecting it, or simply left on the field.31 
Even a small raiding party, or a cavalry company of a few dozen horses, could therefore 
have significantly affected a village’s grass and agricultural lands. Still, grasslands recover 
faster than any other aspect under consideration here. Unless they were damaged repeat­
edly, because soldiers used them as training grounds or sources for the grass blocks 
incorporated in fortifications, these disturbances only lasted weeks or months. Besides, 
during the eighteenth century provisions of dry fodder, from supply depots or local vil­
lages, increasingly replaced “foraging,” at least until the army entered enemy territory.32
27 Maastricht, RHCL, 01.E01, inv. no. 1; Berens, Territoriale Entwicklung & Grenzbildung, 163; 
Suttor, La Meuse, 404–6.
28 Geldern, Stadtarchiv, A, no. G9, Stadtrechnung, fols. 48r, 75v,76r (transcript Rien van den 
Brand); Gonrieux, 4087: July 13, 1636 (transcript Généamag); Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 
1:250, 1:276, 3:171, 4:35, 4:239, 5:28, 5:120; Habets, Chronijk, 39–40; Richer, Abrégé chrono-
logique, 192, 195; Vandewal, “De kroniek,” 233; Verschure, Overleven, 138.
29 van Helen, Rymkronyk, 444–45. See also Boffa, Warfare, 189–90; Gaier, “L’approvisionnement,” 
556, 563–64; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 1:460.
30 Bachrach, “Animals”; Haldon, “Introduction”; Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 305; Perjés, “Army 
Provisioning,” 14–17.
31 de Puységur, Art de la Guerre, 1:398–402 and 2:63–65.
32 Engelen, “Stokkem,” 68–69; Lhoist­Colmon and Gabriel, “La colline,” 40; van Houtte, Les 
occupations, 1:70–71; van Nimwegen, De subsistentie, 11–12, 58–60.
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The disturbance of agricultural fields, most of which are also considered as grass­
lands from an eco logical perspective, was in many ways related to the aforementioned 
meadows and pastures, but being more valuable, they are better documented. Harvests 
were stolen, burned, or trampled by armies simply passing through, using scorched earth 
policies, procuring food for men and horses, or protecting themselves from the elements 
(see chap. 5).33 A particularly striking case is a letter written by a farmer living near Maas­
tricht in 1794 to his son, a corporal in a Dutch cavalry regiment. He responded somewhat 
angrily to his son’s earlier comment that he was looking forward to war by listing its 
effects on the villagers. He wrote that they had to seek refuge with their livestock in the 
quarries of the Sint­Pietersberg and that “no green leaf” was left in the fields. French and 
Imperial troops had trampled the “potatoes, clover, oats, vetches and other crops.”34
Agricultural fields illustrate that the sources under consideration here do not just 
focus on economic concerns, but show that military disturbances primarily cause eco­
nomic rather than environmental damage. The role of warfare as a major cause of har­
vest losses is well known within the history of agriculture, but burning agricultural 
fields or leaving them fallow for a few months or years also enriches the soil.35 Historical 
studies that reflect on agricultural systems in a long­term perspective agree that they 
normally recuperated fairly quickly from disturbances brought about by warfare, often 
within a few years or a decade at most. Farmers could go hungry or use their remain­
ing financial reserves in order to plant again, but their ability to withstand shocks was 
permanently reduced if forced to sell equipment, which affected their ability to work the 
land. Major landowners might also resort to reducing rents or share cropping to ensure 
the continuous occupation of their farms.36
Numerous lawsuits have been preserved from the County of Namur in the late six­
teenth and seventeenth century regarding tenant farmers no longer able to pay their 
rent due to external circumstances, often a combination of warfare and undesirable 
weather. Most agricultural systems do seem to have experienced their worst crises 
when several factors, such as the aforementioned two, coincided. These lawsuits also 
show, however, that landowners did not necessarily accept depredations by armies as 
an excuse for failing to pay rent. They apparently did not recognize their tenants’ predic­
33 Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 131–35; Cauchies, La législation princière, 369; De 
Cauwer, Tranen van bloed, 110–11; Engelen, “Stokkem,” 235–36, 253, 258; Foullon, Chronique, 
216; Genicot, La crise agricole, 9–10, 19–20, 98; Gutmann, War and Rural Life, 75; Hasquin, Une 
mutation, le “Pays de Charleroi”, 233; Richer, Abrégé chrono logique, 235; Rorive, Les misères de la 
guerre, 353–54; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 1:178; Sivery, Structures agraires et vie 
rurale, 2:379; Thielemans, “Une source d’histoire rurale,” 409–10.
34 The Hague, MC, Collectie Doesburg, letter no. 45–83. I am grateful to Renaat Gaspar for 
providing me with a transcript of this letter.
35 Thoen, “Oorlogen en platteland.” See also Driessen, Emundt van Oeteren, 740.
36 Campbell, “Nature as Historical Protagonist”; Driessen, Emundt van Oeteren, 744–52; Genicot, 
La crise agricole, 109–11; Gutmann, War and Rural Life, 75–102, 197–200; Hoffmann, “Warfare, 
Weather, and a Rural Economy”; Jansen, Landbouw en economische golfbeweging, 82–101, 154–61, 
185–90, 195, 205; Slavin, “Warfare and Eco logical Destruction”. See also Hanson, Warfare and 
Agriculture.
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aments as “unprecedented calamities,” which historians often associate with the seven­
teenth century.37 Armies’ devastations must have had a tragic impact on farmers’ lives, 
but their effects on agriculture as a whole were mostly transitory.
The trampling and burning of agricultural fields is closely connected to the eco logical 
consequences of livestock raiding. Livestock theft remained a general feature of warfare 
up to the late seventeenth century, to supply armed forces with food, and because it rep­
resents a very considerable, and mobile, form of wealth. After 1700, references become 
increasingly rare, which is connected to the changing relationship between armies and 
local populations.38 The records kept by the prévôt of Longwy regarding his income and 
expenses during the chevauchée against Verdun in 1318 reveal, for example, that of the 
481 sheep eaten by his followers, only about one in four was purchased. According to a 
book of fiefs from the County of Namur, written down in the 1340s, the count’s marshal 
was similarly entitled to all kinds of animals with greyish hair (touttes manieres de vaires 
bestes) taken in enemy territory, to half the compensation paid for horses given up to the 
count because they were sick or wounded, and to the skins of the horses that died while 
in the count’s care.39
Particularly instructive is a fiscal account kept by Willem IV van Egmont (1412–1483), 
brother of the Duke of Guelders, on his income and expenses in 1435, when campaigning 
in the area around the fortress of Herzogenrath during the war between Guelders and Jül­
ich. It provides a good example of the maxim that “war feeds itself,” for Willem’s income 
included extortions under threat of fire, ransoms, and stolen goods (geroefder haven). His 
men had taken one hundred pigs at the village of Baesweiler, “some pigs” and “two skinny 
cows” near Linden and Hoyngen (to the north of Aachen), and seven bags and three casks 
of salt. His expenses mostly concerned the purchase of food for man and horse. As reveal­
ing as this source is, the information it provides is rather incomplete. The account in fact 
explicitly states that part of the second herd of pigs, taken near Linden and Hoyngen, was 
eaten. The amount booked suggests that about thirty­six animals were sold.40
37 Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 1:178, 1:181–86, 1:188, 1:190, 1:192–93, 1:196, 1:198–207, 
1:210–26, 1:230–44, 1:261–80, 1:299–314, 1:325–41, 2:20–22, 2:29, 2:41–45, 2:49–50, 2:64–65, 
2:73–77, 2:84, 2:103–4, 2:112, 2:154, 2:181, 3:56, 3:90, 3:252, 4:24, 4:65, 4:130, 4:133, 4:212, 
4:228, 4:258, 4:269, 4:419–20, 5:21–22, 5:33, 5:37; Parker, Global Crisis.
38 Arlon, AEA, 062, 1121: Correspondance entre le Conseil de Luxembourg, le duc de Lorraine 
et le capitaine de Sedan; Maastricht, RHCL, 01.075 Landen van Overmaas, inv. no. 1487; Couvin, 
529: May 26, 1636 (transcript Généamag); Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 146–47; Bormans, 
Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., Cartulaire de Dinant, 4:186; Borgnet, Cartulaire, 12–13; Deloffre, 
“Guerres et brigandages,” 358–59; de Stavelot, Chronique, 363, 555, 569, 588; Girardot, “La guerre,” 
7, 9, 10, 26; Hagendorf, Tagebuch, 60; Helmich, Journaal, 248, 255; Hoeckx et al., eds., Kroniek van 
Molius, 178–79; Jenniges, Das Land zwischen Venn und Schneifel, 67; Kraus, Regesten, vol. 6, no. 
481; Le Bouvier, Le livre, 112; Lefèvre, “Documents relatifs aux dégâts,” 42–43, 48, 50, 53; Liégeois, 
“Compte de la recette de Chiny,” 159; Macaré, ed., “Dagverhaal,” 298; Mengels, Chronyk, 26–27; 
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39 Bormans, Les fiefs, 1:28–29; Collin, “Le travail,” 27–28.
40 Arnhem, GA, Hertogelijk Archief, inv. no. 445, fol. 1. See also Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, 
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Even if one takes this source­criticism into account, it is clear that a considerable 
part of livestock herds was traded rather than killed, and in some cases the original 
owners actually got the option of ransoming their animals back. An inquest made by the 
castellan of Stokkem has been preserved, which gives an exceptional insight into what 
happened to the livestock stolen by Imperial troops during the taking of the schans of 
Opoeteren in 1636. The investigation mainly concerned the attack itself, involving the 
taking of animals and goods, and the death of several villagers, but also included villag­
ers’ testimonies that they managed to get some of their livestock back by purchasing it 
from a local nobleman, tenant farmers, Spanish soldiers, and even one of the castellan’s 
own men, named Peter Colen. It is unclear whether anyone was actually pursued for 
purchasing stolen goods. Colen still served in the garrison of Stokkem in 1655.41
Nevertheless, in many areas livestock decline was a substantial problem. This can 
be proven because the Spanish Habsburg government taxed livestock ownership. We 
thus have access to relatively good overviews of the number of horses, cattle, and sheep 
present in specific communities. In the Prince­Bishopric of Liège by contrast such infor­
mation only became available after the French takeover in 1795. In Bastogne for exam­
ple, in the Duchy of Luxemburg, the number of sheep decreased by eighty­two percent 
between 1624 and 1656, and the number of cattle and horses was reduced by about 
half. Villagers were forced to lend animals because their own flocks had been stolen or 
died of disease.42
Assessing the eco logical consequences of the killing of fish and game is fraught with 
its own problems. The right to kill or own fish and game was carefully guarded by a 
small number of privileged persons, predominately nobles, which made poaching or 
illegal fishing a direct assault on their privileged status rather than just another form 
of pillaging. Army members therefore not only engaged in such practices to procure 
food, but were also asserting their social status and undermining a lord’s authority by 
attacking the environmental symbols of his lordship.43 The accounts of Grave mention 
for instance that swans were captured during a military expedition in 1463 to Herpen, 
a more or less independent lordship close­by. Given that the right to keep swans was a 
carefully guarded privilege, this action should be seen as symbolic for a larger conflict 
over jurisdiction. The specification that the count of Egmont, two high bailiffs, and the 
city council of Grave all attended this operation, confirms this impression.44
The close association of noble status with hunting is borne out as well by the fact 
that contemporaries repeatedly singled out military officers for their poaching activi­
ties. For officers, hunting was part of a noble lifestyle, but apparently they did not feel 
41 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. no. 3006: Muster list of the garrison of Stokkem, 1655; Cuppens, 
“Opoeteren,” 85–96.
42 Jacob, Bruyères, 115–117.
43 Medi eval rulers often brought their hunting dogs and falcons with them on military campaigns. 
See for instance Lyon, Lyon, and Lucas, The Wardrobe Book, 219, 225, 235. Bonet, L’Arbre des 
batailles, 96; De Dynter, Chronique, 3:860; Delcourte Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 454; van Helen, 
Rymkronyk, 155; van Werveke, Die Erwerbung, 20.
44 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 218, fol. 136r (transcript Rien van den Brand).
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obliged to respect property rights.45 The accounts of the high bailiff of Souilly specify 
that he investigated the killing of a “large deer” by a local squire and several captains of 
the garrison of Verdun in 1627.46 This example demonstrates that local populations also 
played a role in unlawful hunting. It was quite common for citizens and villagers to offer 
game to commanders as a bribe or as part of a larger spectrum of services.47
Illegal fishing is similarly well attested in the immediate surroundings of military 
garrisons, and near armies’ marching routes. Nicolas d’Ischen, citizen of Arlon and lease­
holder of seven ponds near the town, petitioned the Conseil de Luxembourg on August 
30, 1624 because soldiers of the garrison took fish from his ponds on a daily basis. He 
already asked their commander to intervene, but this request was apparently ineffective. 
He now sent a more or less veiled threat, arguing that if no effective measures were taken 
he would be obliged to end his lease, which would be particularly unfortunate in light 
of the government’s already precarious finances.48 Because freshwater fish and game 
were often kept in carefully controlled, but isolated, locations (ponds, rabbit warrens, 
and hunting parks), they were very vulnerable to the “shocks” warfare brought about.49
At the same time, the effects of these poaching activities should not be overesti­
mated. The argument of Jan Hendrik de Rijk, for instance, that the Eighty Years War 
caused the extinction of the common crane (Grus grus), great bustard (Otis tarda), and 
black grouse (Tetrao tetrix) in large parts of the Northern Netherlands as early as the 
1570s is tenuous because it is only based on indirect evidence provided by the with­
drawal of their names from hunting regulations. If these birds became extinct only a few 
years after the start of the Eighty Years War, then they must already have been on the 
verge of extinction when the fighting started. The famous Dutch hunting treatise Jacht-
Bedryff from 1636 blames habitat changes as a result of changes in agriculture rather 
than warfare for the disappearance of many species.50 The disastrous impact of warfare 
is on its own insufficient to explain permanent changes in animal populations.
Moving from animal to human demo graphics, it is worth noting that even though 
more reliable sources are available for the latter, it is still very difficult to pinpoint exact 
causes. Battlefield losses could be massive, particularly if involving locally recruited 
armies, but they were also relatively exceptional events. A surviving tax record suggests, 
for example, that the city of Liège might have lost more than half its adult male popu­
45 ’s­Hertogenbosch, BHIC, 178, inv. no. 193, fol. 86v; Maastricht, RHCL, 01.01. Staten van het 
Overkwartier van Gelre, inv. nos. 552, 556; Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst Overkwartier, 1:167; Bouwer, 
Een notabel domein, 102; Helmich, Journaal, 289; Illaire et al., eds., Les cahiers de doléances, 589.
46 Bar­le­Duc, ADM, B 1280, fol. Lxxviiv.
47 Jappe Alberts, “De eerste Bourgondische bezetting,” 63; Kaisin, Annales historiques de la 
commune de Chatelineau, 153, 164, 191, 235; Verschure, Overleven, 198.
48 Arlon, AEA, 062, 1287: Plainte de Nicolas d’Ischen. See also Vandermarliere, De troebele jaeren, 
57. See also Maastricht, RHCL, 04.01, inv. no. 81; Aimond, Les relations, 58; Ceyssens “Les premières 
hostilités,” 90; d’Haynin, Mémoires, 1:136; Girardot, “La guerre,” 3; Lefèvre, “Documents relatifs aux 
dégâts,” 48; Neirinckx, “A Letter,” 10–11; van Zuijlen, Inventaris, 2:796; Verbois, Rekem, 312.
49 Delcourte Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 448, 451, 454; Marchal, Inventaire, 166, 180.
50 de Rijk, “Vogels en mensen,” 64–65; van Heenvliet, Jacht-Bedryff, 1.
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Figure 20. Plan of the village of Biercée, 
1699 (Brussels, ARA, Cartes et plans 
manuscrits, 116). Reproduced with 
permission of the Algemeen Rijksarchief/
Archives générales du royaume.
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lation at the battle of Brustem (1467).51 Furthermore, the armies under consideration 
here rarely engaged in large­scale massacres outside the battlefield. The few references 
to mass killings come from very specific circumstances, such as fortifications taken by 
storm or rulers setting an example (e.g., Dinant in 1466), contexts where armed resis­
tance was perceived as illegitimate or unnecessary.52
Such spectacular examples do tend to obscure the fact that, compared to other fac­
tors, major battles had a relatively limited long­term impact (if we ignore the possible 
exception of chapels or cloisters built on the site of medi eval battlefields).53 It is well 
established in historical studies that warfare­induced demo graphic decline was related 
to disease, migration, and reduced fertility rather than fighting in the strict sense of the 
word. Warfare caused widespread insecurity, increased financial pressures, and encour­
aged the spread of epidemics (see chap. 5), but it was not the only factor influencing such 
patterns. The relative importance of warfare compared to economic conjunctures or the 
weather in particular is far from clear, especially before we are able to consult parish 
records. Assessing demo graphic developments up to the middle of the seventeenth cen­
tury largely depends on hearth lists, that is, numbers of households in a specific year.54
Given the fiscal nature of these sources and the ambiguous meaning of the term 
household, calculating population growth can be difficult. A comparison between hearth 
lists from the Duchy of Brabant in 1480 and 1496, a period of political instability and 
warfare, indicates for instance that ’s­Hertogenbosch grew by eighteen percent, while 
the number of households in nearby villages and towns declined. Helmond and Eind­
hoven lost almost seventeen and fifteen percent of their population in the same period. 
This suggests the demo graphic decline in the countryside during armed conflicts is at 
least partially caused by massive emigration to (larger) cities, where mortality rates are 
on average higher.55 Hearth lists from other areas confirm this pattern for the 1570–1715 
period. They also demonstrate that communities in the worst affected areas, such as the 
Duchy of Bar–Lorraine, typically lost between thirty and sixty percent of their inhabit­
ants, compared to their population levels before a particular war. These losses could be 
even higher for single settlements. Recovering from this decline was often a drawn­out 
process, lasting at least several decades.56
51 Balace and Gaier, “Catalogue,” 128–29.
52 Brouwers, “La reconstruction”; Kroener, Les routes, 114; Kroener, “Antichrist, Archenemy, 
Disturber of the Peace”; Lemoine, “L’enceinte de Liège,” 80–83.
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These demo graphic developments have also to be interpreted in the context of the 
destruction of buildings. Setting fire to buildings was a significant impact from warfare 
because it contributed to an already extensive overexploitation of wood. The duke of 
Burgundy, for instance, allowed villagers from the County of Namur in 1439–1440 to 
cut no fewer than two thousand oaks and eleven hectares of high forest to rebuild their 
houses, destroyed by forces from the Prince­Bishopric of Liège in 1430.57 This example 
is significant because it provides precise data. Many sources mention that buildings 
were set on fire, arson being a core element of warfare up to the seventeenth century, 
but they are rarely specific about the number of houses affected. Furthermore, one also 
has to take into account that extortion under threat of fire was an important source of 
income for armed forces (for example, the account of 1435 cited above). Fiscal accounts 
do show that raiders often targeted mills: mills represented wealth, had a crucial 
energy function, including the grinding of grain for passing armies, and were vulnerable 
because of their location on the edge of or outside their settlements.58
Fortunately, there is one source that provides very detailed information: a report 
from 1657 written by lieutenant colonel Jean Ernest de Terwel about the resources of 
each settlement in the governments of Reims, Rethel, and Sainte­Menehould. This docu­
ment would serve as the basis of a tax reform, intended to apportion the tax burden 
more equally. It indicates that in frontier areas, such as near Rocroi, houses had been 
burned down in almost every settlement, but also that few communities had no houses 
left. Here villagers lived in huts or their fortified church. A handful of settlements, mostly 
hamlets, had been abandoned completely.59
Still, it is revealing that de Terwel did not necessarily advise a significant tax reduc­
tion. In some instances he actually believed taxation should be increased. This suggests 
that he considered this war damage to be a merely temporary phenomenon. How rep­
resentative this report could be for other areas and periods is unclear, but hearth lists 
from the Hohes Venn and Ardennes from the same period confirm this image of partial 
destruction (around fifty percent of the houses). This also goes some way in explaining 
why complaints or petitions emphasize the economic cost of the destruction rather than 
its exact nature. A depiction from 1699 of the village of Biercée, between Maubeuge and 
Charleroi, ruined during the Nine Years War (1688–1697) has still been preserved (see 
figure 20). The houses had been demolished, but the hedges and even a few trees near 
the church remained standing.60
de Luxembourg,” 344–45; Stévenin, “Une fatalité,” 163–65, 168–77; Terwel, Les notices cadastrales.
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While deliberate disturbances such as these became more and more rare from 
the eighteenth century onwards, damage done during sieges seems to have increased 
because of techno logical developments. Bombardments with incendiary missiles were 
common in the Middle Ages, but it is unlikely that they were as devastating as eighteenth­
century artillery fire.61 In 1794, during the siege of Grave, French besiegers shot about 
two thousand and four hundred cannon balls and bombs into the city, killing only eight 
people and wounding another six, but damaging every single building.62 Several cities 
in the Prince­Bishopric of Liège experienced major fires in 1672–1714, either because 
soldiers set buildings on fire (e.g., Huy and Tongres/Tongeren) or bombarded them with 
incendiary devices (Liège). In all cases legislation was passed to ensure that houses 
were rebuilt in stone. Nearby Maastricht and Roermond, both of which had permanent 
garrisons, issued similar legislation several decades earlier since they ran a higher risk 
of being besieged.63 Warfare destroyed people’s and animals’ lives and homes, but it was 
rarely able to overcome the resilience exhibited by biotic communities as a whole.
Wolves and the Creation of Wilderness
Given that disturbances make nutrients available, one should keep in mind that for 
every species being affected negatively, there could be another taking advantage. The 
image at the beginning of this chapter depicts a beast that combines features of different 
animals (wolf, bear, lion/leopard, rat), and is associated with toads, locusts, snails, and 
snakes. All these species shared an association with negative traits, or even symbolized 
evil. This pamphlet suggested that armies’ depredations were a direct assault on human 
control over their environment, whether this was a deliberate act or not, and conse­
quently gave unwanted species a chance to migrate and reproduce. In other words: war­
fare encouraged the spread of wilderness or uncontrolled nature.64
The association between warfare and wilderness was particularly strong for one of 
the creatures depicted here, not coincidently the animal that became the model for the 
beast’s head. Chronicles in particular comment on an increased presence of wolves as 
the result of armed conflicts. The famous Journal d’un bourgois de Paris (1421–1423), 
which recounts that wolves entered Paris and attacked humans, is one of the best­known 
examples, but this association is much older than the fifteenth century.65 The Dialogus 
miraculorum by Caesarius of Heisterbach, dating to the early thirteenth century, tells 
61 The Count of Holland, for example, bought one thousand three hundred fire arrows for the 
siege of the house (castle) of Altena in 1393. De Boer, Faber, and van Gent, eds., De rekeningen, 
1393–1396, 56; Hoeckx et al., eds., Kroniek van Molius, 154–55.
62 Sabron, De oorlog, 2:81–96. See also De Cauwer, Tranen van bloed, 223–26; Roland, ed., 
“Chronique Namuroise,” 125, 131.
63 De Rycke, “L’architecture,” 204–5; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 5:252; Martin, “Maastricht,” 
63; Rorive, Les misères de la guerre, 85–90; van Beurden, De handelingen, 129; Vandewal, “Tongeren,” 
179–83.
64 These effects are also recognised in modern wars, but tend to be neglected in favour of the 
detrimental effects of warfare. Brauer, War and Nature, 166–68.
65 Moriceau, Histoire du méchant loup, 21; Siemer, “Wölfe in der Stadt.”
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the tale of a man who lived near Aachen and had three children, all killed by wolves. The 
connection between wolves and warfare is made twice. The narrator claimed that at the 
time Philip of Swabia was crowned, in 1198 and 1205, a time of major political unrest, 
there were many wolves in the area around Aachen. The third child also disappeared 
during a war, when his parents left him to guard the house and fled to Aachen, and it was 
assumed that wolves took him.66
The Dialogus miraculorum might just be a collection of stories to educate novices 
of the Cistercian Order, but hunting treatises confirm this perception: according to Gas­
ton Phoebus’ famous hunting treatise, Livre de la chasse (1387–1389), unburied corpses 
in war­affected lands gave wolves a taste for human flesh resulting in real attacks on 
humans. Edward Duke of York wrote an English translation of this work between 1406 
and 1413, The Master of Game, to which he added his own observation that wolves also 
follow armies to scavenge for the horse cadavers they leave behind.67 Wolves do feed on 
human remains if given the chance, the most famous example of which is the body of 
66 Heisterbach, Dialogus miraculorum, 2:260–261; Ortalli, Lupi genti culture, 69–70.
67 Cummins, The Hound and the Hawk, 132–33; Phoebus, Le livre de la chasse, 66; See also De 
Lisle de Moncel, Méthodes et projets, 47–49; Moriceau, L’Homme contre le loup, 50–59.
Figure 21. Shepherd killing a wolf and its young, mid­
seventeenth century (Meisner, Scio graphia Cosmica, Namur).
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Charles the Bold, discovered two days after the battle of Nancy in 1477.68 The same can 
be said about dogs, however. The priest Petrus Treckpoel observed in one of his chron­
icles that the citizens of Bilzen were very afraid of local dogs in 1483, because they ate 
the corpses left there after the massacring and burning of the town in February that year. 
The surviving citizens had in fact left the town, and only started to come back in June.69
It is often unclear whether the associations made in these sources provide evidence 
about the eco logical impacts of armies or are simply part of a rhetoric of destruction. 
The above­mentioned woodcut portrays warfare as both natural and social disorder. 
There is a clear religious undertone in these narratives, which is made very explicit in 
the image of “Namur ahn der Mase” by Daniel Meisner (1642), depicting a shepherd 
killing a wolf and its young “to the fourth generation” (see figure 21). It was also a cler­
gyman, Egbert of Liège, who wrote down in the early eleventh century one of the oldest 
versions of a folk tale now known as “Little Red Riding Hood.” In this account the girl’s 
baptism protected her from wolves.70 Jean­Jacques Moriceau, who studied historical 
wolf attacks in France, argues that the fear that a single attack generates goes far beyond 
the actual damage done. It is quite possible that the climate of insecurity brought about 
by war fed this fear. His findings for the départements of the Meuse and Ardennes indeed 
indicate that rabies, rather than predation, was responsible for the majority of attacks.71
Most of Europe’s largest animals, symbols of wilderness, had already become extinct 
in the Meuse Region by 1250, or were on the verge of extinction: aurochs disappeared 
in the Early Middle Ages, and bears, already very rare around 1250, were gone by 1500. 
Wild boar and red deer enjoyed protection because their killing was a noble prerogative 
but were also restricted to major hunting parks. The Capitulary of Quierzy (877) sug­
gests in fact that game had been severely depleted in the Carolingian heartland (citing 
Hesbaye and the Ardennes) by the late ninth century as result of overhunting.72 The wolf 
was the only large animal still present in most of the Meuse Region as late as the 1700s, 
despite centuries of intensive hunting by humans. Hunters killed the last wolves in the 
Meuse Region only about a hundred years ago in the Ardennes and Argonne and only 
now is the animal making a tentative comeback.73
68 Vaughan, Charles the Bold, 432.
69 Paquay, “Kroniek der stad Bilzen,” 39.
70 Ziolkowski, “A Fairy Tale.”
71 Consider also the study of Jay M. Smith, which makes a direct connection between the mythic 
status of the “Beast of the Gévaudan” and France’s defeat in the Seven Years War. Kling, “War­Time, 
Wolf­Time,” 19–27; Moriceau, Histoire du méchant loup, 492–98, 511–12; Siemer, “Wölfe in der 
Stadt,” 353–65; Smith, Monsters of the Gévaudan.
72 Boone, De Cupere, and Van Neer, “Social Status,” 1393; Boretius and Krause, eds., Capitularia 
regum Francorum, 2:355 (no. 281); Ervynck, “De bruine beer”; Garnier, “La peau de l’ours,” 264–69; 
Gautier, Hoffsummer, and Vanguestaine, “Faune médiévale,” 78; Gautier and Fiers, “Restes animaux,” 
87; van Vuure, Retracing, 56–59.
73 Butzeck, Stubbe, and Piechocki, “Der Wolf,” 280–91; Delcourte Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 
441; Luyts, Met vryaerts en resoelen, 41–51, 240–57; Molinier and Molinier­Meyer, “Environnement 
et histoire,” 236–37.
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Moreover, the connection between armies and wolves went further than the idea 
that warfare leads to an increase in wolf populations: not only were combatants them­
selves sometimes compared to raving wolves, but in seventeenth­century Lorraine 
gangs of armed men who used the woods as cover were referred to as loups du bois 
(“wolves of the woods”). Wolves and outlaws were already associated with each other 
during the Middle Ages because they lived in the same spaces: woodlands and border­
areas.74 There were also many similarities between the defence mechanisms directed 
against armies and wolves: the seventeenth­century accounts of Maastricht called pits 
dug out under the drawbridges wolfskuilen or “wolf pits,” hedges protected villagers 
against wolves as well as raiding parties, and hunting wolves was the last surviving 
medi eval form of armed service, being still required of the general population as late as 
the nineteenth century. Peasants also used the presence of wolves as a pretext for walk­
ing around armed.75
Remarkably enough, soldiers did not have a significant role in hunting wolves. Nico­
las de Moncel’s extensive account of officers from the garrison of Verdun chasing a wolf 
that approached the city walls in 1766, published in his hunting treatise from 1768, says 
more about his ambitions for the military in this regard, himself a former cavalry captain 
who became a lieutenant of the louveterie,76 than it does about the contribution French 
soldiers made to wolf hunting. His proposal to create a special corps of trained hunters 
to exterminate wolves was likewise inspired by his military background. Members of the 
maréchaussée or gendarmerie did occasionally kill wolves or led hunting parties in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, but their role was generally of minor significance.77 
The sous-préfet of Roermond’s request for soldiers in 1810 to hunt down a predatory 
wolf, or wolves, primarily reflects the general panic that these attacks generated as well 
as the traditional association of such assaults with warfare. He apparently believed that 
this wolf came from Germany where she had grown accustomed to human flesh during 
the recent wars. At some point a plan was made that involved the mobilization of no 
fewer than six thousand local men and more than two hundred soldiers. Military officers 
did not even consider using their soldiers for such a purpose.78
74 Barbier, “La Grande Pitié,” 256; Habets, Chronijk, 30; Helsen, De woorden, 10–15; Isaac, “Le loup 
et le mercenaire”; Laperche­Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine et Barrois, 116, 191–92; Pluskowski, 
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There are additional sources, however, that provide stronger grounds for assess­
ing whether the link between wolves and warfare is based on actual eco logical impacts. 
Regulations regarding wolf hunting are well known from the reign of Charlemagne 
onwards. Because humans perceived wolves as a threat to livestock, game authorities 
paid bounties for each confirmed kill. This means that one can reconstruct the histori­
cal presence of wolves and their numbers in a way that is impossible for most animals 
before the nineteenth century. This approach has its difficulties: an increase in bounties 
does not necessarily prove that the population grew, just that more wolfs died by hunt­
ing. Moreover, hunters often went around settlements near the location the animal was 
killed to claim a reward. In this way, an examination of accounts from neighbouring vil­
lages is likely to inflate the real number of wolves in the area, at least until the French 
government completely reorganized the issuing of bounties in 1795.79
Despite these problems, it is still possible to establish a direct link between warfare 
and increased presence of wolves. In 1486 Emperor Maximilian granted the inhabit­
ants of the Meijerij district of ’s­Hertogenbosch special permission to hunt down wolves 
(normally only ducal hunters being allowed to chase them) and organise a call to arms 
by sounding the church bells. This suggests that wolves became a major problem in 
the Campine/Kempen during the period of warfare following the death of Charles the 
Bold in 1477. There is no record of a wolf presence near the Meuse estuary during the 
late Middle Ages or sixteenth century, but in 1598, during the Eighty Years War, dozens 
appeared in the Langstraat, the area between Geertruidenberg and ’s­Hertogenbosch, on 
the Brabant–Holland frontier. Local fishermen had to make nets in order to catch them.80
Evidence from outside the Meuse Region, from the kingdom of France in the 
1430s, the area around Bruges in the 1490s and late 1500s, the Veluwe (Guelders) in 
1596–1630, and Ireland in the 1650s, confirms this connection. Despite assertions of 
contemporaries about unburied corpses, this expansion of wolf populations mainly 
ties in with the ceasing of wolf hunting during periods of intensive warfare. Hunting 
wolves was a labour­intensive activity and could include digging pits, making nets, or 
weaving hedges, using poison, maintaining packs of specially trained dogs, and mobi­
lizing local villagers. These activities either stopped during armed conflicts or became 
much reduced.81 The Journal official du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (October 19, 1815) 
explicitly attributed the more prominent presence of wolves to military movements, 
which is confirmed by a sharp decrease in the number of bounties claimed during the 
invasion years of 1813–1814.82
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The ability of wolves themselves to adapt to different circumstances and grasp the 
opportunities brought about by warfare should not be underestimated either. The capa­
bility of wolves to cover hundreds of kilometres in a matter of days is well known. It is 
likely that the Meuse Region, and more particularly the Ardennes and Argonne, had an 
important role as a reserve from which wolves could spread to other regions. This is at 
least argued by Louis Gruau in his 1613 hunting treatise.83 Wolf populations reached 
their highest density in France in the Ardennes and Argonne in 1795–1815, as proven 
by the surveys of wolves killed in a specific département, recently made on the basis of 
the French government’s extensive records, and these areas also figured prominently 
among their last places of refuge in Western Europe.84 Wolves can thrive in very varied 
environments, but likely started to favour more secluded spaces, such as woodlands, 
because of constant pressure from hunting.85
Nevertheless, this link between the spread of wolves and warfare was not univer­
sal: an examination of accounts from the Campine/Kempen in the eighteenth century 
reveals that wolves were killed on an almost yearly basis, but warfare did not have any 
significant effect on this pattern. This might have something to do with the changing 
character of warfare, but the available evidence from the seventeenth­century Camp­
ine is too incomplete to support or deny this hypothesis.86 In nearby Hesbaye toponyms 
referring to “wolf pits” confirm the existence of (relict) wolf populations in the Late 
Middle Ages, but there is no substantial evidence that its inhabitants perceived wolves 
as a major problem in subsequent centuries. The testimony of Petrus Treckpoel about 
fear for local dogs in Bilzen is noteworthy in this regard. Apparently, in this densely 
populated area, wolves were more or less exterminated during the Central Middle Ages 
and never managed to re­establish themselves afterwards.87 While wolves profited from 
warfare to spread and multiply on many occasions, there were still limits to their agency.
The emphasis on wolves is of particular interest because wolves were one of the 
few animals in Western Europe, aside from bears, which considered humans as prey, 
albeit in exceptional circumstances. This actually reinforced their general perception as 
symbols of wilderness. The role of wolves in the Meuse Region was in this sense quite 
similar to that of tigers in Southeast Asia, a species that is known to have profited from 
warfare as well.88 Many historical sources, hunting treatises as well as chronicles, indi­
83 Gruau, Nouvelle invention de chasse, 47. See also De Lisle de Moncel, Méthodes et projets, 
49–50, 62–63.
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le loup, 35–45.
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cate a general belief that warfare not only stimulated the spread of wolf populations, but 
also caused an increase in wolf attacks. The data published by Jean­Jacques Moriceau 
do show a rise in wolf attacks during some war years, but more research is required to 
confirm this link.89
Still, it is significant that contemporaries sometimes attributed attacks to were­
wolves because this kind of behaviour was considered abnormal, even unnatural. Wolves 
generally avoid humans, a fact people who lived side by side with wolves would be well 
aware of. The few trials concerning werewolves that occurred in the Meuse Region all 
date to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, a period of intensive warfare, 
and come from areas where wolves were common: Arlon, Namur, Limbourg, Liège, and 
Maaseik. This was of course also the heyday of witch trials in the Meuse Region, were­
wolves being treated as a specific kind of witch or sorcerer.90
The association between wolves, or wolf attacks, and warfare points to a specific 
influence of armies on eco logical systems: the eco logy of fear. This concept refers to 
the idea that predators, such as wolves, influence eco logical systems in ways that go far 
beyond the actual number of prey taken. Their presence ensures that potential victims 
are on constant alert, which reduces damage done to local vegetation. In other words, 
the presence of wolves stimulates the regrowth of woodlands because it reduces the 
time deer or other herbivorous animals can spend grazing. The sources examined here 
in effect suggest the same thing: the anxiety caused by armies reduced the pressure of 
local populations on their environment. To what extent this reduced pressure was offset 
by the ravages of armies themselves, is open to debate, but it is an effect that cannot be 
ignored.91
Wolves were only one species in a long list of “nuisance animals,” species that were 
considered unwanted or harmful and could therefore be killed with impunity and by any 
means possible. In some instances one could actually get a bounty. Changes in wolf pop­
ulations may not always have been representative for other animals, but theoretically 
every species on this list, which shows considerable local variation but generally included 
all members of the Mustelidae (badgers, weasels, etc.) and Corvus (crow) genera, most 
rodents, foxes, birds of prey, owls, sparrows, moles, caterpillars, and even woodpeck­
ers, could have profited from warfare.92 It is no coincidence that the merciless animal 
described at the beginning of this chapter has a rat’s tail. In the government of Bastogne, 
part of the harvest had to be left on the fields in 1636, during an invasion, due to a lack 
of manpower. Mice invested the fields the following year. A plague such as this also gave 
expanded wolf populations a more secure food base than corpses left on the battlefield.93 
89 Moriceau, Histoire du méchant loup, 25–26, 300–329.
90 Briggs, The Witches of Lorraine, 123–126; Brouette, “La sorcellerie,” 374; Moriceau, Histoire du 
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91 Ripple and Beschta, “Wolves and the Eco logy of Fear.”
92 De Schepper, “Geschiedenis,” 88–93, 96; Kolodziej, “La louveterie,” 67–84; Verbois, Rekem, 164, 264.
93 Jacob, Bruyères, 119–22; Laperche­Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine et Barrois, 123, 186.
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Warfare also allowed harbour seal populations in the North Sea to recover, simply 
because seal hunters did not dare to leave port.94
Aside from a reduction in wolf hunting, one of the most widespread effects of war­
fare was agricultural land left uncultivated because farmers were too afraid or not 
numerous enough to work their fields. The afore­mentioned chronicler Petrus Treck­
poel notes that in the County of Loon the land was left fallow for four years during the 
1490s due to the depredations of Evrard de La Marck’s horsemen, and this resulted in 
the fields being overgrown with “thistles, hedges, hedgerows and thorns, foul herbs; it 
turned into a wilderness.”95 A species such as hawthorn is certainly capable of rapidly 
colonizing abandoned land, and can actually hinder the growth of coppice wood, par­
ticularly if already present as hedges on the edges of those properties.96 When Bartholo­
maeus Macharii, a clergyman from Tongres/Tongeren, requested Charles the Bold in a 
poem from 1466–1467 to refrain from destroying his patria’s garden, and only remove 
the enemy thorns, he might therefore be referring to actual eco logical consequences of 
the ongoing war.97 The Dutch word verwildert (“become wild”) is again used in accounts 
from the same area dealing with farmland still left fallow in 1623, after having been 
deserted during the siege of Maastricht in 1579.98
Fiscal accounts from the Duchy of Bar in the mid­seventeenth century similarly 
mention fields overgrown with shrubs, and ponds turning into dry land for want of 
maintenance. Foresters patrolled with armed guards or postponed the felling of trees 
because of the general insecurity. They also suspended the planned fishing of ponds or 
moats.99 In the area around ’s­Hertogenbosch by contrast the term vogelweide denoted 
agricultural fields left fallow, a reference to the fact that wild birds, such as geese, used 
them for grazing or foraging. These changes could have long­lasting effects: in 1618 a 
man got permission to construct a bird trap on his lands, which had been left fallow for 
more than forty years. This was probably an eendenkooi, a rather complex trap to catch 
ducks, very common in the area, comprising a large pond, associated brooks and fences, 
all surrounded by woodland. Such traps could easily occupy several hectares, and so 
significantly altered the local landscape.100
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Contracts passed between landowners and their tenants are very informative in this 
regard as well: the commandery of Alden Biesen, near Maastricht, consented in a 1581 
contract that the new occupant of one of its major farms was allowed to cut wood and 
pasture pigs in its forest. In this way the coppice wood around his farm could be left 
standing, which made it less vulnerable to attacks from marauding soldiers. In 1650 
Anne Pennas from Vireux (near Givet), who owned the right to fish in the Meuse, asked 
for a reduction of her rent because her employees had been unable to fish in 1635. A 
French cavalry regiment had been encamped next to the Meuse at that time and sta­
tioned guards at strategic points. The best time to fish, according to this testimony, was 
before sunrise and after sundown, but when fishermen approached the river under 
cover of darkness, the sentries unsurprisingly raised the alarm and shot at the intrud­
ers. A similar request, dating to 1322–1323, has been preserved from Namur, which 
suggests that armed conflicts regularly led to declining rates of catch.101 Warfare thus 
encouraged the spread of wilderness through the widespread fear it generated as well 
as through its direct action.
The spread of wilderness serves as a remarkable counterweight to armies’ depreda­
tions examined earlier, but it still does not illustrate long­term eco logical effects. Pre­
cisely because wolves figured as symbols of wilderness and disorder, their extermina­
tion became a top priority as soon as peace returned. The French government passed 
special legislation to this end after the Wars of Religion (1583, 1597, 1600, and 1601) 
and in Champagne in 1660. Regulations concerning the reestablishment of wolf pits in 
Bar–Lorraine and Luxemburg in the second half of the seventeenth century can also be 
read in this light.102
The above­mentioned revival of wolves in the Langstraat, on the Brabant–Holland 
frontier, was likewise short­lived: seventy­seven of the ninety­five bounties were dis­
bursed in 1609–1621, during the Twelve­Years Truce. Although war broke out again in 
1621, no more than two bounties were paid; the last one in 1631. The hunting treatise 
Jacht-Bedryff from 1636 indeed notes that there were no more wolves in the County of 
Holland. In the Campine/Kempen so many wolves were killed in 1611 that the authori­
ties reduced the amount of the bounties. From a more practical viewpoint, the financial 
rewards paid for killed wolves were probably a welcome addition to the income of local 
villagers, often impoverished by the war. One could argue, however, that without the 
constant warfare in the Meuse Region up to 1714 wolves would have disappeared cen­
turies before they actually did.103
The consequences of these military disturbances can therefore be overstated. There 
is little evidence for instance to support the statement made by J. R. McNeill that warfare 
101 Namur, AEN, Chartier des comtes de Namur, inv. no. 448; Majewski, “Pêches contrariées”; See 
also Hoppenbrouwers, “Een middeleeuwse samenleving,” 23­24, 270­271; Thoelen, “Damereis,” 
112–13.
102 La vie quotidienne dans les Ardennes, 40–41; Delguste­van der Kaa, Histoire des loups, 18; 
Kaisin, Annales historiques de la commune de Chatelineau, 125, 134, 192, 199, 217, 226, 272; 
Kolodziej, “La louveterie,” 300; Moriceau, L’Homme contre le loup, 82–93, 365–82.
103 Luyts, Met vryaerts en resoelen, 71–72; van Heenvliet, Jacht-Bedryff, 1; Verschure, Overleven, 269.
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could lead to a spontaneous resurgence of forests.104 This is a literary topos typical of 
chronicles and petitions.105 Alain Girardot’s study of the late medi eval Prince­Bishopric 
of Verdun documents hedges evolving into woodlands during the fourteenth and fif­
teenth centuries, but these were cleared again in the early sixteenth century. Further­
more, many of these changes were very localized: in the 1480s the cathedral chapter 
of Verdun refused a squire’s request to turn lands of the uninhabited village of Forbeu­
villers into a rabbit warren, because it feared that these rabbits would damage nearby 
fields. The squire released some rabbits anyway, which consequently multiplied and 
caused considerably damage. In 1501 the woodlands were cut down and the rabbits put 
in an enclosed warren next to the castellan’s house (castle). Girardot claims in effect that 
in the Prince­Bishopric of Verdun the entire landscape structure changed as a result of 
wartime disturbances, with agricultural fields, ponds, and forests being established in 
places most suitable for them.106
Not only does the pressure on woodland appear to increase rather than decrease, 
trees also mature much more slowly than shrubs or bushes. The seventeenth­century 
inhabitants of Bastogne and Chaumont thus had to use heath as fuel due to a lack of 
wood, even though many fields lay deserted. The adminstrative sources examined 
here indicate that lands were brought under cultivation again as soon as possible, and 
that changing agricultural practices prohibited the growth of forests. The villages of 
Romerée, Hanzinelle, and Cornelle, near Givet, saw several disputes during the first half 
of the seventeenth century about farmers keeping sheep on common land for commer­
cial gain. The village of Sevenum, near Venlo, likewise saw a massive increase in the 
number of sheep (from 1579 to 3037) in the period 1595 to 1680. This was probably 
an economic response to a declining population, abandoned fields, and an increasing 
demand for meat from armies themselves.107
The combination of armies’ mobility and their disruptive force could have had 
another ambiguous effect on ecosystems, an influence that is well known in twentieth­
century wars. As early as the Franco­Prussian War of 1870–1871 botanists remarked 
that warfare caused the introduction of new species, species that could become inva­
sive. Making similar observations about the pre­1850 period is very difficult, because 
of the nature of the evidence: while it is possible to trace the appearance of a species 
to a general period or area, by historical or archaeo logical sources, the exact manner of 
this migration is open to interpretation. The crusades are traditionally credited with the 
introduction of herbs from the Eastern Mediterranean to Western Europe, but a recent 
archaeo logical study about the spread of spinach indicates that Muslim Spain, and trade, 
would have been at least as important factors. The fact that most armies operating in the 
Meuse Region came from similar ecosystems does not help either, because it means that 
any plants transported in their wake would have served to promote genetic diversity 
104 McNeill, “Woods and Warfare,” 401.
105 See for instance Deloffre, “Guerres et brigandages,” 336, 411–12.
106 Boutruche, “The Devastation”; Girardot, Le droit et la terre, 2:518–20, 2:524, 2:799–801, 
2:830, 2:834.
107 Billen, “Het Waalse platteland,” 264; Jacob, Bruyères, 112; van den Munckhof, “Jeneverbessen,” 192.
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Figure 22. Print of a failed 
Dutch attempt to isolate 
Spanish troops on an 
island in the Meuse in 
December 1585, made by 
Frans Hogenberg in 1586 
(Amsterdam, Rijks museum, 
RP–P–OB–78.784–250).
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rather than become new introductions. Tracing genetic diversity is an important part of 
eco logical studies but is next to impossible to do based on historical sources.108
In 1814, for example, Russian troops carried seeds of Corispermum Marschallii west­
wards, to Baden and Fontainebleau. To what extent they are responsible for the estab­
lishment of warty cabbage (Bunias orientalis) in the fortress of Namur is far less clear. 
The botanist André Devos noted the abundance of this plant in the grasslands of the cita­
del of Namur in 1870. He concluded that Russian soldiers brought seeds with them when 
they stayed in Namur during the 1813–1814 campaigns against France, but also claimed 
that the plant was deliberately introduced as forage in the Southern Netherlands in the 
1820s. Given that studies from later wars are quite consistent in arguing that most of 
these exotic species disappear as soon as the disturbances to which they are related 
cease, warfare does not seem to be the main factor in the spread of this species. Dutch 
or Belgian troops might instead have introduced the plant in a more peaceful manner.109
The destruction of dikes by contrast makes a strong case for long­term effects. 
Breaching dikes is a well­known phenomenon of medi eval warfare near the Meuse estu­
ary. The accounts of the high bailiff of ’s­Hertogenbosch specify, for instance, that he 
ordered the breaching of the dike at Maasdriel to force troops from Guelders to stop 
the siege of the fortress of Ammerzoyen in 1387.110 It is a very good example of army­
induced disturbances functioning as a disaster as well as the spread of wilderness. After 
all, damaging dikes results in rivers adopting a more natural behaviour, which includes 
flooding. In December 1585 the Dutch army managed to isolate several thousand Span­
ish infantrymen, the elite of the Army of Flanders, on an island in the Meuse by breach­
ing the dikes and conducting patrols with warships. The trapped soldiers would have 
either had to surrender or die from exposure and lack of food, but were eventually saved 
through the intervention of Count Peter Ernst von Mansfeld and the garrison of ’s­Her­
togenbosch, who used artillery to drive off the Dutch ships. The freezing of the Meuse 
complicated the latter’s retreat, however, and several were destroyed (see figure 22).111
It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that larger conflicts about water manage­
ment were often more important than strategic considerations, especially when it came 
to repairing war damage.112 The count of Holland, for example, prohibited extracting 
peat near the sea dikes of the Meuse–Rhine estuary (the Grote Waard) in 1375 because 
it increased the risk of flooding. All noblemen, cities, and settlements received permis­
108 Hallavant and Ruas, “The First Archaeobotanical Evidence”; Thellung, “Stratiobotanik”; Zeven 
et al., De introductie, 67–91.
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sion to destroy new dikes constructed to facilitate peat­cutting (moerdijken), and chase 
away the diggers. In 1379 the urban militia of Dordrecht actually launched an attack on 
the lord of Zevenbergen and destroyed his new dikes. Short­term financial gain proved 
to be stronger than security concerns, however, and the peat­cutting simply continued. 
This eventually contributed to the infamous St. Elizabeth’s flood of 1421.113
Perhaps most enlightening about the nature of the disturbances examined here 
is that there is very little evidence to suggest that settlements were deserted perma­
nently because of army­induced disturbances. Some individual farms, mills, and hamlets 
were abandoned for decades, probably never to be rebuilt again, but armies very rarely 
caused entire villages or cities to disappear.114 There is one exceptional example: the 
fortress of La Mothe, the second largest city in the Duchy of Bar, which was besieged 
by a French army in 1634 and 1644–1645. It was systematically destroyed after its sec­
ond surrender to set an example for anyone daring to challenge French authority in the 
area again. Its population dispersed; most settled in nearby parishes. The French gov­
ernment eventually divided the land between two neighbouring villages, but ruins con­
tinued to overshadow the plateau on which it was located for at least another century. 
Girardot’s study from late medi eval Verdun also demonstrates that the lands of “aban­
doned” settlements continued to be cultivated, either by landowners living somewhere 
else or by neighbouring villages. This was what actually prevented the rebuilding of the 
original settlement.115 There are therefore few indications that warfare­induced wilder­
ness had permanent effects.
Long-Term Consequences
Up till this point we have evaluated a wide range of disturbances caused by armies, but 
also the paucity of evidence regarding long­term impacts. Assessing such shifts in eco­
logical systems will be the main subject of this section. Consider the woodcut described at 
the beginning of this chapter again and especially one particular detail still left unexam­
ined: the beast eats gold. The idea that the economic consequences of these disturbances 
could have been more important than eco logical ones has been noted before. This does 
not imply that armies’ disturbances lacked long­lasting eco logical effects, only that these 
impacts were often of a more indirect nature. The first factor that needs to be taken into 
account is the impoverishment brought about by warfare, or rather transfers of wealth.116 
Rising taxes, for instance, appear to have been a more important cause for permanent 
emigration from the Campine/Kempen during the Eighty Years War than insecurity.117
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114 Genicot, La crise agricole, 92–98; Girardot, Le droit et la terre, 2:520–34; Laperche­Fournel, La 
Population, 37–55, 133–36; Miart, “La population,” 162.
115 Marchal, “Description”; Martin, Une guerre, 284–87; Villa­Sébline, La sénéchaussée, 98–100.
116 Enqueste ende informatie (1494), 198, 214, 216; Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 225–52; 
Carolus­Barré, “Benoit XII”; Engelen, “Financiële en fiscal repercussies”; Rorive, Les misères de la 
guerre, 219–61.
117 Mertens, “Bank van Pelt.”
136 chapter 3
Land represented a major financial reserve, especially woodlands because the right 
to cut wood could be sold separately from the actual ownership of the land. It comes as 
no surprise therefore that rulers, ecclesiastical institutions, and villages traded access to 
woodlands to pay off debts brought about by armies, generally through warfare.118 The 
duke of Bar, for example, granted five of his fiefholders the product of two and a half 
hectares of forest in 1403, because they were wounded while serving him, and the town 
of Mouson gave up the profits of the annual cuttings in their woodlands for twenty­five 
years in 1730 in order to pay for the construction of barracks and stables.119
Actual selling of land was a more complex phenomenon. It affected common lands 
and peasants more than anyone else, but could produce very dissimilar results because 
there were significant differences in land ownership throughout the Meuse Region. His­
torical studies regarding the effects of warfare on agriculture note that major tenants 
were generally less affected than peasants. Landowners took care to ensure that their 
lands continued to be cultivated, for instance by resorting to sharecropping. They were 
far less willing to show comparable leniency for small tenants, unless these were in 
short supply. Peasants also had to bear a disproportional part of the tax burden, includ­
ing wartime contributions, as absentee landlords owned a considerable part of agri­
cultural land, but refused to pay their share. The previously mentioned report made by 
lieutenant colonel de Terwel was specifically meant to put taxation on a more secure 
and equal footing.120
In this way warfare actually reinforced or accelerated existing economic transforma­
tions resulting in the proletarianization of a significant part of the rural population. In 
the counties of Holland and Hainaut, villages and individual peasants were increasingly 
forced to sell their (common) lands to wealthy farmers or inhabitants of nearby towns 
during the seventeenth century. This resulted in the establishment of large commercial 
farms. The area around Namur likewise experienced an evolution towards enclosing 
common lands, very much to the displeasure of the governors of the city (see chap. 1). 
In the Campine/Kempen, the area between Liège and Maastricht, and the Ardennes, by 
contrast, peasants mostly managed to hold on to their (common) lands until the nine­
teenth century, the result of the dominance of small­scale land ownership in these areas. 
The fact that these peasants had various sources of income (cf. protoindustrialization) 
118 Dinant, Archives Ecclésiastiques, inv. no. 312, fol. 100: January 1, 1323; Gimnée, 3939: 
February 15, 1624; Grand conseil de Malines, Luxembourg, no. 400 c, August 14, 1636 (transcript 
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also gave them a stronger financial reserve to overcome calamities. Wealthy citizens 
buying land in the Campine/Kempen in the seventeenth and eighteenth century con­
tinued to exploit these as individual farms or turned heathlands into forests or parks, as 
part of a rhetoric of making such lands fertile again.121
Notarial acts and court records reveal how the selling of land in sparsely populated 
areas could have very divergent results: in the seventeenth­century Ardennes villages 
saw themselves forced to sell part of their common lands, often woodlands, to owners of 
forges or local noblemen. There can be no doubt that in the first instance trees were cut 
down and ended up in furnaces, but most noblemen had a vested interest in preserving 
these woodlands, for example as hunting parks. Some noblemen definitely took advan­
tage of crisis periods to expand the environmental symbols of their lordship, such as 
forests or ponds (see the squire’s rabbit warren above).122
Aside from contributing to transformations in landownership military disturbances 
also acted as a catalyst or contributor to other long­term processes, the most famous 
of which is the Meuse’s declining importance as a transportation route. The Eighty 
Years War saw a multiplication of tolls and tariffs along the Meuse because of the need 
to finance states’ military endeavours. Remarkably enough, these charges initially did 
not impede transportation. Traffic actually increased in the early seventeenth century, 
reaching far higher levels than before, because of the Dutch Republic’s blockade of the 
Scheldt.123 In the long run, however, these tolls contributed to a significant decrease of 
traffic along the Meuse, reducing it to a route of only regional importance by the early 
eighteenth century. Changes in the volume of transportation on the Meuse River had 
major eco logical significance because efforts to ensure the continuous navigability of 
the river would have been either expanded or neglected. These included the construc­
tion and maintenance of dams and sluices, but also the clearance of vegetation next to 
the river. Boats could only move upstream along the Meuse, and sometimes downstream 
as well, when pulled by horses. These horses needed a towpath to walk on.124
The disappearance of vineyards from the northern half of the Meuse Region in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by contrast was primarily caused by climate 
change, and more specifically a relative decrease in average temperatures commonly 
known as the “Little Ice Age.”125 In 1469, for instance, Burgundian soldiers testified in 
the context of a judicial inquest opened to prove that a nobleman from Hainaut died 
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during the siege of Liège (1468), and more specifically during the famous night assault 
on their encampment. A recurring aspect in these statements is the omnipresence of 
vineyards in the immediate surroundings of the city, which might have had an important 
role in hiding the attackers’ advance from Burgundian sentries. The Burgundian army 
attempted to destroy these vineyards after the surrender of the city, but many of them 
had recovered as early as 1470.126 Even though armed conflicts might have contributed 
to and accelerated the demise of vineyards, their impact was too limited to actually initi­
ate their decay.127
The decline of the Dutch herring fisheries, a major activity in the Meuse estuary, on 
the other hand, can best be explained as a mixture of eco logical, political–military and 
economic factors (tariffs). Techno logical developments (e.g., the herring buss) in the fif­
teenth century gave Dutch fishermen an advantage initially, because it allowed them to 
catch herring further from the coast. This is important given the migratory behaviour of 
the species as well as its changing geo graphical distribution due to climatic fluctuations. 
But this expansion on the North Sea also brought them into mounting conflicts with 
English and Scottish fishermen and made them more vulnerable to privateers. Fisher­
men from the Meuse estuary suffered major losses during the Eighty Years War and the 
three Anglo­Dutch Wars (1652–1654, 1665–1667, 1672–1674), and finally had to give 
way to their English and Scandinavian counterparts.128
As important as these combat­related effects were, there is another set of impacts 
that is often overlooked, but might have been more significant in the long run than any 
of the impacts analyzed so far: the ways that an army actually obtained its teeth, par­
ticularly arms manufacturing, gunpowder production, and ship building. The wood 
consumption of these activities was immense, and in contrast to the depredations men­
tioned before, did not act as an exceptional event, but as a constant in peace as well as 
war. Although it can be difficult to connect specific eco logical impacts to the demands of 
armies (general iron production as opposed to arms manufacturing, for example), there 
is no doubt that most of the disturbances examined here were closely associated with 
military needs.
Arms production was a major economic activity in the Central and Late Middle Ages. 
The area between Givet and Maastricht in particular had a key role in this regard, and 
also exported weapons. The St. Odilia shrine, from the late thirteenth century, provides 
one of the oldest surviving depictions of the kind of flat­bottomed boats typically used 
for river transport in the middle of the Meuse basin (see figure 23). Customs regis­
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ters from fourteenth­century Dordrecht note single vessels carrying several hundred 
to two thousand lance or pike shafts downstream to the city. These ended up in the 
hands of combatants in Holland, Zeeland, or Flanders, and possibly even England. The 
fourteenth­century Tower of London stored several hundred pieces of armour made 
in Maastricht in 1337–1338.129 The Meuse Region also started to export yew bows to 
England as early as the late thirteenth century, for a list of tariffs from Dordrecht (1287) 
already mentions bow staves.130 Custom registers dating to the late fourteenth century 
mention the passage of ships carrying hundreds to more than a thousand bow staves, 
but only a minority of these originated from the Meuse Region, which means that yew 
trees must already have become very rare by this time.131
It is unclear to what extent armed forces within the Meuse Region used bow staves 
made of yew, given the predominance of crossbows, and the fact that other kinds of wood 
could be used as well. As far as crossbow bolts are concerned, some numerical data is 
available: in the late Middle Ages every city and fortress of some strategic importance 
had at least one crossbow and bolt maker at its disposal, who was primarily occupied 
with supplying local arsenals with weapons and ammunition. City accounts and castle 
inventories show that these specialized craftsmen produced several hundred to several 
thousand bolts a year in times of necessity, and that thousands of bolts were kept in 
129 Niermeijer, Bronnen, 1:411, 1:419, 1:582, 1:589; Richardson, The Tower Armoury, 24–25, 55.
130 Gaier, L’Industrie, 212–16; Suttor, La Meuse, 406–14; van de Wall, Handvesten … der stad 
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Figure 23. Detail of the Shrine of St. Odilia, made in the Meuse valley for the house of the Crosiers 
(“Crutched Friars”) in Huy, late thirteenth century (© KIK–IRPA, Brussels, cliché X059109).
140 chapter 3
store.132 These numbers should be seen in light of the huge consumption of ammunition: 
Geldern sent three crossbowmen in 1387 to the siege of the fortress of Middelaar, near 
Cuijk, according to its accounts. They left the city for fifty­six days in total and spent 
eight hundred bolts.133
The environmental damage caused by arms production was thus already very sub­
stantial before the spread of gunpowder weapons. There are signs that craftsmen tried 
to limit wood consumption, for instance by making crossbow bolts out of old wine bar­
rels. Techno logical changes further contributed to and transformed an existing overex­
ploitation. The construction of a large gun weighing about four thousand seven hundred 
kilograms for the city of Mons in 1378 required no less than two thousand kilograms of 
charcoal (or six thousand kilograms of wood), and sixteen thousand kilograms of coal. 
In this context it is hardly surprising that Gilles le Bouvier, also known as the herald 
Berry, notes the scarcity of woodlands in Namur and Liège, especially near the Meuse 
River, as early as 1451. Most people were forced as a result to use coal for fuel.134
Given the need for woodlands or coalmines as a source of energy, mineral deposits 
for raw materials, and streams as a source of biopower and for transportation, metal­
lurgy, including arms manufacturing, became concentrated in the southern parts of the 
Meuse Region, from Liège to Lorraine. By the early seventeenth century major entrepre­
neurs, such as Jean Curtius and Louis de Geer, dominated this trade. Liège and Charlev­
ille stood out as major arms­manufacturing centres. Liège profited from the neutrality 
of the Prince­Bishopric to supply arms to both sides, while Charleville became the heart 
of French arms production from the late seventeenth century onwards. The Charleville 
musket, the standard infantry weapon of Napoleon’s infantrymen, was developed here 
in the 1770s.135
While the area around Liège, especially Herstal, retained its key role long after the 
1850s, most forges in the principalities of Namur and Liège reached their heyday around 
the mid­seventeenth century, after which they suffered from increasing international 
competition, including the newly founded Charleville. The Dutch Republic, for instance, 
replaced its arms imports from the Prince­Bishopric of Liège through prefabricated iron 
parts during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, before shifting to iron 
imported from the Baltic. While this competition is often seen in economic or political 
terms, including the destruction of forges by armies, the eco logical contribution can­
132 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 217, fol. 248r; inv. no. 218, fol. 31r (transcript 
Rien van den Brand); de Groot, De stadsrekeningen, 1384 fol. 16, 1385 fols. 7 and 42, 1387 fol. 7, 
1388 fol. 6, 1390 fol. 29, 1391 fol. 5, 1398 fol. 12, 1399a fol. 9, 1403 fol. 10; Dinstühler, ed., Die 
Jülicher Landrentmeister-Rechnung, 76–77; Drooghaag, “Visitation en Limbourg et Outre­Meuse,” 
196, 203–4, 208, 215; Gaier, L’Industrie, 66–85, 98–104, 141–56. See also Bachrach, “Military 
Industrial Production.”
133 Kuppers, “De stadsrekeningen,” 23–24, 39.
134 Gaier, L’Industrie, 207; Le Bouvier, Le livre, 109.
135 Belhoste, “Une sidérurgie frontalière,” 12–15; de Jong, “Staat van oorlog”, 46–49, 87–90; 
Gillard, L’Industrie de fer, 47–49; Suttor, La Meuse, 441–52; Parrott, The Business of War, 196–202; 
212–19; Yernaux, La métallurgie liégeoise, 33–61; Zunckel, Rüstungsgeschäfte, 61–77.
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not be forgotten either.136 Deforestation had already reached such an extent by the early 
sixteenth century that authorities in Liège, Bouillon, and Namur passed legislation to 
oblige forge owners to replace the trees they cut down or leave a certain percentage of 
woodlands standing. They also increased the penalties for illegal cutting down of wood. 
In the seventeenth century the production of four to five kilograms of iron required 
twenty kilograms of charcoal, or one hundred kilograms of oak wood.137
In practice damage done to forests seems to have been limited more by environmen­
tal constraints than legal action. The Ferraris map (1777) clearly shows the deforestation 
along navigable rivers such as the Meuse, Sambre, and Ourthe. Trees were spared simply 
because the transportation costs became too high. It is no coincidence that in the Duchy of 
Luxemburg, with a very different hydro graphy, woodlands still occupied relatively large 
areas of land. In this context the testimony of a weapon­smith from Chiny who lived in 
Namur in 1648 becomes especially relevant: he stated before a notary that in Luxemburg 
it was common practice to use charcoal rather than coal for arms production, because the 
resulting iron was of better quality.138 It is because of the constant need for fuel that the 
remaining woodlands in Namur and Liège were increasingly reduced to coppice wood, 
which in turn made the soil more vulnerable to erosion. It is worth noting that the sea­
sonal floodings of the Meuse became more frequent during the early modern period.139
Gunpowder weapons not only also worsened existing processes of deforestation by 
stimulating iron production, but also because they required large amounts of saltpe­
ter (potassium nitrate). In the late fourteenth century gunpowder was still made with 
approximately equal amounts of sulphur, charcoal, and saltpeter, whereas by the late 
sixteenth century gunpowder makers mixed six parts of saltpeter for one each of char­
coal and sulphur.140 This growing importance of saltpeter presented a challenge, for in 
the Meuse Region it could only be found in small quantities. Rulers certainly attempted 
to obtain natural saltpeter: a charter from the County of Namur specifies that the lord 
of Han­sur­Lesse gave saltpeter makers permission in 1487 to gather it in rocks (caves) 
situated within his lordship. This saltpeter served the needs of the guns kept in the for­
tress of Namur. The high bailiff allowed them likewise to work in the cellars and stables 
of this fortress. Efforts to produce saltpeter from domestic sources were also made in 
Jülich, Bouillon, and Liège in the sixteenth century.141
136 de Jong, “Staat van oorlog”, 182–217, 230–32, 244–52; Harsin, “Etudes sur l’histoire 
économique,” 73–80; Pirotte, “L’industrie métallurgique,” 160–61, 182–83; Yernaux, La métallurgie 
liégeoise, 109–88.
137 Liège, Chambre des Comptes, Couvin 656: January 14, 1570 (transcript Généamag); Caffiaux, 
Essai sur le régime economique, 291–94; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 1:317, 4:358; Gaier, 
L’Industrie, 206–8; Hoffmann, An Environmental History, 222–25; Jacob, Bruyères, 85; Suttor, “Les 
ressources forestières,” 26–27, 34.
138 Brussels, KBR, Cartes et plans, MS IV 5.567: Carte de Ferraris; Bouvignes, Notaire Waulthier, 
Act January 16, 1648 (transcript Généamag); Charruadas and Deligne, “Cities Hiding the Forests.”
139 Tomsin, “Frequence des crues de la Meuse,” 297–302.
140 Gressy, Saltpeter, 11–12; Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 67–104.
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From an eco logical perspective, the main issue is that these natural quantities were 
far too meagre to satisfy a rising demand for gunpowder. By the fifteenth century, saltpe­
ter makers therefore attempted to extract saltpeter from earth rich in decaying organic 
matter, an environment that allows the bacteria responsible for the occurrence of 
nitrates to thrive. Such refinement processes inevitably required large volumes of fire­
wood, even more than for the refinement of natural saltpeter.142 The need for large quan­
tities of firewood provided the duchies of Bar–Lorraine with an opportunity to focus on 
the production and export of saltpeter from the seventeenth century onwards.143
This domestic production experienced increasing rivalry from the English and Dutch 
East India Companies, which started to import large quantities of saltpeter from India, 
where it could be obtained more easily. Yet the importance of this salt was such that 
many saltpeter makers continued their practices, especially in the kingdom of France, 
because their government loathed dependence on their enemies’ overseas imports. Stra­
tegic considerations thus encouraged the further depletion of woodlands.144 In response 
to these pressures French saltpeter makers began to experiment with using plants con­
taining high nitrate contents. In 1794, when the republic was in particularly desperate 
need of saltpeter, hundreds of citizens and soldiers were sent out to the woodlands near 
Verdun to pull out suitable plants.145 Overexploitation of woodlands to satisfy military 
needs for arms and gunpowder, in peace as well as war, was clearly one of the armed 
forces’ most long­lasting eco logical impacts.
The final disturbance that needs to be examined here is shipbuilding. This means 
once again stressing the importance of wood and its overexploitation, but in a very 
different way. Iron or gunpowder production mainly consumes wood as fuel. Manag­
ing woodlands as coppice wood or pollards is in these instances a common way to 
limit eco logical damage and ensure the continuous supply of firewood. The building of 
ships required large quantities of timber, mostly trees managed as high forest.146 Dif­
ferent pressures, economic or otherwise, could thus potentially have a major influence 
on forest management. The question is how these contrasting pressures related to 
each other.
The link between ships and armies might seem ambiguous, given that sharp dis­
tinctions between naval and other types of ships only become discernible from the late 
seventeenth century onwards, but this confirms rather than questions their close asso­
ciation. Up to the mid­seventeenth century few ships were kept permanently in service 
(transcript Généamag); Bodard, ed., Receuil des ordonnances du Duché de Bouillon, 33–34; de 
Jong, “Staat van oorlog”, 234–35; Gaier, L’Industrie, 181–87; Lejeune, La formation du capitalisme, 
190–95; Pauls, “Wirtschaftsgeschichtliches aus dem Herzogthum Jülich,” 325.
142 Cressy, Saltpeter, 15–25, 66–72; Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 74–79.
143 Laperche­Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine et Barrois, 184–85; Zunckel, Rüstungsgeschäfte, 
80–100.
144 Cressy, Saltpeter, 34, 133–35, 145–51; de Jong, “Staat van oorlog”, 206–8; Le Moigne, “Le rôle 
économique,” 211–12; Zunckel, Rüstungsgeschäfte, 103–5.
145 Cornette, Mémoire sur la formation du salpêtre, 7–9, 54–60; Pionnier, Essai sur l’histoire, 449–50.
146 Lake­Giguère, “The Impacts of Warfare.”
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as warships, as most were used for trading or fishing and became part of a naval fleet 
when required. The main market for timber was Dordrecht, which procured a consider­
able part of its supply from the more forested areas of the Meuse Region, aside from the 
Rhine basin and the Baltic. Wood was after all one of the main commodities transported 
along the Meuse from the Early Middle Ages onwards. Customs registers from the four­
teenth and fifteenth centuries demonstrate exactly how frequent the passage of ships 
loaded with planks or poles must have been. In some cases entire tree trunks were even 
bound together and floated down the Meuse from Sedan or Givet.147
Remarkably enough, the importance of this transport of lumber decreased from the 
late sixteenth century onwards, precisely when Dutch naval industries experienced a 
major expansion. Timber for shipbuilding was now mainly imported from Norway 
and to a lesser extent the upper Rhine Region. The reason for this development lies in 
the aforementioned expansion of the iron and arms industries as well as regulations 
against deforestation. Shipbuilding requires a very different form of forest management 
and had to make way for these expanding industries.148 In the mid­eighteenth century 
the construction of a man­of­war of seventy­four cannon, a common type of warship, 
required almost two thousand one hundred cubic metres of wood. The Meuse Region 
did however retain a limited role in shipbuilding, especially in France from the 1730s 
onwards, when it became increasingly difficult to find suitable wood closer to the coast.149 
Most timber originating from the Meuse Region was floated down the Marne towards 
Rouen. The wharfs of Toulon obtained only one percent of their timber from Champagne 
in 1755–1769.150
The French takeover of the Southern Netherlands in 1795 could have served as a 
major turning point, because of the development of Antwerp as a major military port 
from 1810 onwards in combination with the massive expansion of state­owned forests. 
In absolute numbers the Rhine basin again supplied far more timber than the Meuse 
Region, but the remaining forests were still significantly affected. In June 1813, for 
instance, Napoleon ordered the extraction of no less than six to seven thousand cubic 
metres of wood from the woodlands near Namur and Dinant. In the long run this grow­
ing need for timber could have exerted a major influence on forest management through­
out the Meuse Region, but given the abrupt ending of Antwerp’s naval wharfs later that 
same year, it just seems to have contributed to the deterioration of the remaining high 
forests. The pressure on woodlands only ended in the 1860s, with the final demise of 
wooden warships.151 The supply of timber for shipbuilding contributed significantly to 
147 de Jong, “Staat van oorlog”, 64–70; Fanchamps, “Transport et commerce”; Niermeijer, Bronnen; 
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148 Buis, Historia forestis, 2:505–13; Nusteling, “Strijd om de binnenvaart,” 155–59.
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the overexploitation of woodlands in the Meuse Region, but its long­term impact was 
relatively limited because arms and gunpowder production were considered to be more 
important.
Conclusion
The eco logical damage that premodern armies could inflict was significant, even with­
out the possibilities of industrial warfare, and with tools as simple as iron axes, spades, 
and torches. To what extent this damage is comparable to that inflicted by current mili­
tary forces, in absolute or relative terms, certainly merits further analysis. Armies func­
tioned like a natural disaster, but the “shocks” they brought about were in themselves 
rarely sufficient to bring about “shifts” in eco logical systems. Outcomes might have been 
very different if not for the intervention of other actors, human or non­human. The 
strongest evidence for long­term effects comes in fact not from warfare as such, but its 
preparation and aftermath: arms production and destitution. Especially in these cases, 
making a distinction between armies and other, external or internal, influences is very 
problematic.
The key characteristic of military disturbances in the Meuse Region from 1250 
to 1850, then, is that they put pressure on the substantial yet fragile control humans 
exerted over ecosystems. Survival strategies of the general population in wartime, espe­
cially rural dwellers, are quite meaningful from an eco logical perspective because agri­
culture and livestock­raising dominated landscape use throughout the Meuse Region. 
Access to scarce natural resources, such as wood, fish, or game, was limited and care­
fully regulated. When armed forces challenged this control, wolves and other unwanted 
species could still take advantage of the resulting turmoil to reassert themselves. They 
no longer had such an opportunity during the World Wars, for wolves had been almost 
exterminated by 1914. The destruction these later conflicts brought about was in fact so 
extensive that it stimulated new forms of eco logical conservation (such as the reforest­




The conservation of Africa’s large mammals, especially elephants and rhinos, has 
become dominated in the last decades by heavily armed men wearing military uniforms, 
who patrol the savannah to hunt down poachers. This bellicose defence of animals that 
have a central role in today’s notions of “nature” is a key element in current armies’ 
allegedly modern behaviour towards eco logical systems. The military has become a pro­
tector of nature. Although many environmentalists support this kind of nature conser­
vation, it is not without its opponents. Critics argue that declaring war on poachers sim­
ply means fighting symptoms rather than real causes (a lack of other means of income, 
the general political turmoil in many border areas, and a growing demand for ivory). It 
is only relatively recently that authorities recognised the need to cooperate with local 
residents to combat poaching.1
Such a situation has historical precedents. The U.S. army also had a major role in 
the creation and protection of the country’s first national parks in the decades after the 
American Civil War (notably Yellowstone). The military was after all the government ser­
vice best equipped to handle the difficulties connected to controlling such vast spaces. 
They had the necessary manpower and resources, and already had vital knowledge with 
frontier management (cf. carto graphy). These soldiers ran into regular conflict with 
both Native Americans and new settlers over poaching and illegal wood cutting, since 
the underlying assumption of national parks, then and now, is the idea that true “nature” 
is something that needs to be protected from human interference.2
The present chapter examines whether armed forces’ safeguarding of specific types 
of animals and plants can be traced back to a far more distant past. It connects military 
conservation of biotic communities to an army’s core function: organized violence. The 
examples just cited are all conflicts about entitlement or access to eco logical systems. 
Military involvement goes further than preservation in the strict sense of the word, 
shielding biotic communities from disturbances. It is also about upholding a framework 
of law enforcement with the intention to control behaviour. For this reason the chapter 
specifically uses the term “policing.”
The aim of this chapter, then, is to provide a new perspective on the history of 
state formation as well as contributing to a better understanding of past army–eco­
system interactions. The role of armies in the controlling of biotic communities has to 
be studied in the context of the historical evolution of armed forces themselves. It is 
1 Duffy, “Waging a War to Save Biodiversity”; Henk, “Biodiversity and the Military”; Lunstrum, 
“Green Militarization.”
2 Jacoby, Crimes against Nature, 99–120; Meyerson, Nature’ s Army, 68–83, 106–17, 233–45.
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well established that a state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force is a rela­
tively recent phenomenon.3 As will be further referred to in subsequent sections, it 
is only in the (late) eighteenth century that states really appropriated the right to use 
organized violence against external enemies. It is at that point that “army” more or less 
became synonymous with “military.” This evolution is closely related to another major 
development: increasing distinctions between external and internal organized violence, 
between organizations that are today called “the military” and “the police.” A growing 
number of scholars consider soldiers as agents of repression in the early modern period, 
but so far no one has analyzed soldiers’ involvement from an eco logical perspective.4
In order to evaluate whether armies protected biotic communities in the past, a short 
overview has to be provided of the people who regulated access to natural resources 
in the medi eval and early modern period. In the region in which we are concerned so­
called high bailiffs, stewards, or castellans (drossa(a)rd, hoogschout, Burggraf, chatellain, 
prévôt), as well as ordinary bailiffs, were of central importance because these men rep­
resented a ruler or state in a given area. In this way they combined the duty of fighting 
internal or external threats to the maintenance of public order with the responsibility of 
enforcing environmental laws. High bailiffs often shared these latter duties with foresters 
and park keepers (forestier, gruyer, Waldmeister, warandemeester, waldgraaf, houtvester). 
Armed servants or wardens (garde, sergent, bode, vorster, schutter/Schütze) functioned 
as the main law enforcers at its lowest level and supported both bailiffs and foresters.5
Given that the military role of bailiffs is well known, it is useful to examine the con­
nections between foresters and armies in more detail. In the Middle Ages foresters 
served in an army context simply because they were representatives of a potentate in 
a given area.6 A 1278 charter for example, of the kind typically written during peace 
talks, lists a number of complaints made against subjects of the bishop of Liège by rep­
resentatives from the County of Namur. It includes one entry alleging that the bishop’s 
forester of Havelange, woodlands located on the Liège–Namur frontier, conducted raids 
and stole horses in Jallet. This note should be read in light of the fact that in this case 
jurisdictional disputes provided the casus belli.7 A proclamation of the city council of 
Liège in 1486, on the other hand, called upon its citizens to identify the man who cut off 
two fingers of the forester of Visé at a muster of men­at­arms. The forester’s exact role 
in this military review is unclear, given the absence of other administrative sources, but 
it is likely that he ran into a conflict with one of the soldiers.8
3 Muchembled, A History of Violence; Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe. Late medi eval 
feuding practices are especially well studied. See for example Glaudemans, Om die wrake wille; 
Stercken, Königtum und Territorialgewalten.
4 Antonielli and Donati, eds., Corpi armati; Denys, Police et sécurité; Emsley, “The Military.”
5 Bartlett, “The Impact,” 87; Denys, “Les sergents de ville”; Jacobs, Justitie en politie, 20–30, 
103–4; Smolar­Meynard, La justice ducale, 118–27, 426–39.
6 Delcourte Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 298, 322; Deloffre, “Guerres et brigandages,” 344; 
Gresser, La gruerie, 207–9; Thompson, “Chaucer’s Warrior Bowman.”
7 Poncelet, “La guerre,” 275–87, 322–24, 345.
8 Bormans, “Extraits des cris du péron,” 168.
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The accounts of the high bailiffs of ’s­Hertogenbosch, of which an almost continuous 
series has been preserved from the mid­fourteenth century onwards, also indicate that 
during the Late Middle Ages high bailiffs first mobilized other officials, including forest­
ers and wardens, when faced with an internal or external threat to the maintenance of 
public order. Medi eval notions of service had a strong connotation of armed service, and 
in this sense the participation of these men in warfare can hardly be considered surpris­
ing.9 Perhaps most illuminating is a household inventory of Henrick van Boutershem, 
forester of the Nederrijkswald (wood­ and heathlands located between the river Meuse 
and Nijmegen), in 1414. His posessions included a full set of armour (partially made of 
steel plates and partially of mail), three helmets (a steel one with a bevor, a hounskull, 
and a kettle hat), five crossbows (two with a cranequin, and three with a goat’s foot 
lever), an “English bow,” two quivers, and a mace. This might not even be a full overview 
of Henrick’s weapon arsenal, for this list does not include a sword or dagger.10
The armed role of all the aforementioned officials decreased from the late sixteenth 
century onwards, in parallel with a shifting emphasis on mobilizing the general popula­
tion for armed service, but never disappeared. The connections between foresters and 
armies transformed and adopted a different form (see further below). Mobilizing law 
keepers had in effect major drawbacks as their departure reinforced the breakdown of 
authority in war­affected areas. A particularly revealing example is the decision of the 
newly established Belgian government in 1831 to mobilize its foresters to fight off a 
potential invasion from Luxemburg. These men could have brought special skills, such 
as sharp shooting, to the military, and were familiar with the local terrain. The experi­
ment was terminated after a few months because they simply served as garrison troops 
while locals plundered abandoned woodlands in their absence. It is significant that the 
French army picked up the idea of militarizing foresters again in the late nineteenth 
century, but took care to stress their role in woodland defence.11
The role of armies in the protection of biotic communities was ordinarily aimed 
at supporting these officials, when confronted with a superior force, rather than the 
other way round. The participation of different kinds of armies, armed members of the 
general population versus soldiers, derived from the specific contexts in which these 
conflicts occurred. A court record from Roermond, from the late fifteenth century, con­
cerned an incident which involved villagers from Echt, in the lordship of Montfort, tak­
ing up arms and rushing to nearby woodlands in order to chase away outsiders cut­
ting wood. A nobleman who rode ahead was killed in the encounter.12 A record of this 
homicide has been preserved because the local court found itself unable to judge the 
9 Brussels, ARA, 137.01, inv. nos. 2779, 2784, 2785, 2788, 2789, 2793, 2795, 2800, 2803, 
2657, 2818, 12991, 3015b (transcript Henk Beijers Archiefcollectie, http://www.henkbeijers­
archiefcollectie.nl).
10 Thissen, “Städtischer Alltag.”
11 See Maastricht, RHCL, 01.187E Hoofdgerecht Thorn, inv. no. 1386 for a forest warden who 
claimed exemption from guard duty in 1793 because of his function. Breton, Du role des forêts; 
Leconte, “Le Corps des Guides Forestiers,” 67–69.
12 Janssen de Limpens, Geldersche Wyssenissen, 218–20.
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case and had to ask the councillors of Roermond for their opinion. In such conflicts, 
fatalities were probably quite rare. Fiscal accounts from high bailiffs in the Duchy of 
Bar also indicate that they paid guards to protect falcon nests. These men had to make 
sure that no one stole the chicks, valuable for falconry. The accounts of the high bailiff 
of Etain from 1504 to 1505 mention, for example, that in a nearby high forest a nest of 
lanner falcons, a species that rarely breeds in the Meuse Region, received protection for 
six weeks, day and night.13
Soldiers acted in a very similar support role, but their interference served the inter­
ests of their paymaster. In this way they could operate against local populations. The 
accounts kept by the high bailiff of La Mothe, near Neufchâteau, specify that in 1658 
the depredations of villagers reached such an extent that dragoons, mounted infantry 
that often served in policing operations, had to restore order in the forest of Ozières. In 
this case the intervention of soldiers was facilitated by the fact that the same nobleman 
fulfilled the duties of high bailiff, general receiver, and forester.14
Yet soldiers also acted in other, less confrontational capacities, as in 1478 when the 
general receiver of Hainaut received permission to keep twelve soldiers in the fortress 
of Locquignol to help protect the Forêt de Mormal against French incursions. Two hun­
dred years later, in 1648, a notarial act lists several testimonies regarding pasturing 
rights of the villagers of Daussois in the neighbouring village of Yves, near Philippeville. 
One of these witnesses was a soldier, sixty years old, who claimed that he had guarded 
the sheep of Daussois for the last fifteen years.15 Eighteenth­century legal records con­
firm that soldiers patrolled agricultural fields or operated as gamekeepers at the behest 
of urban councils or major landowners.16
Hiring individual soldiers probably had its origin in changes within wartime safe­
guarding systems. From the late sixteenth century onwards it became not only com­
mon for military commanders to issue safeguards in writing, but also to station soldiers 
at the place requesting protection to guarantee that these safeguards were effectively 
respected. Once soldiers were stationed in a village they could perform related tasks at 
their hosts’ request. In the early seventeenth century for example the villagers of Sprang, 
near ’s­Hertogenbosch, asked the soldier staying there to arrest someone who had cut 
down newly planted oak trees.17 Court records demonstrate that several decades later, 
during the Nine Years War (1688–1697), so­called partisan companies secured entry 
to the woodlands near Brussels and Namur, both against other soldiers and local vil­
13 Bar­le­Duc, ADM, B 1281, fol. Lxxvir; Marchal, Inventaire, 145–46, 163–64, 200.
14 Marchal, Inventaire, 334, 372; Driessen, Emundt van Oeteren, 57.
15 Philippeville, Notary Degeldre 122: Act July 6, 1648 (transcript Généamag); Delcourte 
Debarre, “Espaces forestiers,” 321. See also Namur, AEN, Conseil provincial, inv. no. 4266: Court 
records regarding the stealing of a flock of sheep and the horse of the soldier who guarded them 
(Bolline, 1654–1659) and Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 166.
16 ’s­Hertogenbosch, BHIC, 9 Raad en Rentmeester­Generaal, inv. no. 454, fol. 114; Maastricht, 
RHCL, 20.085B: Indivies laaggerecht Maastricht, 4487.
17 Verschure, Overleven, 50–51, 220–21, 259.
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lagers without travel permits (“passports”).18 Armed forces continued to participate in 
the safeguarding of natural resources until well into the nineteenth century, but only 
in exceptional circumstances, when the policing officials ordinarily tasked with this 
responsibility needed support.19
While armed forces only intervened in the protection of fauna and flora in excep­
tional circumstances, they did contribute to the preservation of unique landscapes in 
the context of frontiers and fortifications. As argued in chapter two, fortifications pro­
vided safety in a general sense, often by controlling access to specific areas. Defensive 
structures have little value, and one could even consider them counterproductive, if no 
one guards them. Guarding fortifications is the second major element of defence sys­
tems, and also had a key role in the preservation of biotic communities on a daily basis. 
Preparing for a potential attack invariably involved enforcing or expanding watch duties 
as well as paying permanent guards (often members of shooting guilds).20 The city 
council of Maastricht, for instance, responded to a possible threat in 1403 by stipulating 
that one guild should stand guard every night, and by assigning each strategic gate or 
tower a complement of three or four crossbowmen and a gunner.21
The obligation for adult males to stand guard on fortifications (city gates and walls, 
fortresses, or defensive lines) survived in different forms until the French Revolution, 
but was a very unpopular one that was bought off whenever possible. The accounts from 
Venlo specify that in 1406 the waeckgelde, the charge paid by individual citizens to buy 
themselves out of this duty, brought in more than two hundred and twelve gulden (a 
paid sentinel would earn five gulden a year).22 During actual threats, these mechanisms 
no longer applied and guard duty had to be performed in person; a clear indication that 
defence systems were only activated during armed conflicts. In fact, while some of the 
famous “watch and guard” (guet and garde) duties of rural populations can be traced 
back to the corvées of the Central Middle Ages, the majority only became established 
during periods of insecurity; either during the late Middle Ages, or the late sixteenth or 
early seventeenth centuries.23
18 Cayron, Jacques Pastur, 33–46, 55, 73–84; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 4:406; Philippart, 
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20 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 218, fols. 172r, 183v, 184r, 193r, 225v, 260v, 
275v, 294r, 299v, 304r, 316r (transcript Rien van den Brand, http://www.scriptoriumempeje.
nl); Bormans, “Extraits des cris du péron,” 173, 199; Bormans, “Table des régistres,” 11:268 and 
11:270; Devillers, “Documents relatifs,” 92, 98; Koreman, De stadsrekening, 136–38; Kraus, Die 
Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 187, 191, 417, 421, 431–32, 435, 437, 448, 452, 455; Laurent, Aachener 
Stadtrechnungen, 104, 107, 147, 166, 176, 182, 187–88, 249; Piérard, Les plus anciens comptes, 
1:185, 1:199, 1:285, 1:622–23.
21 van der Eerden­Vonk, Raadsverdragen, 162–63.
22 de Groot, Stadsrekeningen, 1386 fol. 2, 1404 fol. 27, 1405 fol. 2, 1406 fol. 2.
23 Borgnet, Cartulaire, 78–79; Bormans, Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., Cartulaire de Dinant, 4:344–48; 
Coulson, Castles in Medi eval Society, 285–90; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 3:77, 3:173, 3:174, 
4:154; Fruin, De oudste rechten, 1:20–21, 1:181–89, 1:302, 1:321–22; Girardot, Le droit et la terre, 
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The most direct danger to most fortifications, especially before the establishment of 
several layers of earthen walls in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, did indeed 
not come from a major army with specialized siege equipment, but from relatively small 
groups of armed men who simply scaled the walls or broke down the gates at an oppor­
tune moment, generally at night.24 An inventory of the fortress of Rode (in Herzogen­
rath) from 1408 accordingly lists twenty­eight crowbars and twelve assault ladders 
among the items stored. In 1404–1405 the high bailiff of Bassigny called upon a cer­
tain Naldenat, who “made ladders to assault fortresses and knows how to place them.” 
Another option was to bribe or overpower the gatekeeper and simply storm through 
the gates. Johan van den Vogelsanck, member of the town council of Venlo, stood by the 
gates around 1486 to prevent such surprise attacks. When the sentinel made known 
that horsemen were approaching, he tried to close the gates, but the gatekeeper pre­
vented him and his son gave them a sign. Johan was badly wounded as a result and later 
brought the pair of them to trial.25
Such examples are mostly neglected in studies about (medi eval) siege warfare, a fact 
that is emblematic for the assumption that a certain scale is a prerequisite for using 
the terms “army” or “warfare.”26 These techniques were still of major use in the Eighty 
Years War, the fortress of Huy being taken in 1595, for instance, by Dutch soldiers who 
climbed through a window on Saturday night and took its occupants prisoner at Sunday 
mass.27 A particularly remarkable testimony is a notarial act written in Mariembourg 
that very same year in which a soldier declared that his brother­in­law, also a soldier, 
fell out of a castle window and died during such an assault.28 It is because of the threat 
these tactics posed that special officials, often men of some standing such as aldermen 
or noblemen, had to ensure that guard duty was carried out properly.29
Sudden assaults on fortifications (“coups de main”) remained a viable alternative to 
formal sieges because the number of occupants tasked with defending them on a day to 
day basis was surprisingly small. Until far into the sixteenth century few fortresses or 
2:476–78; Habets, “Costumen,” 169–70; Hoeckx et al., eds., Kroniek van Molius, 250–53; Thewissen, 
De gezworen schutterijen, 107–60; Villa­Sébline, La sénéchaussée, 190–92.
24 “Attaque de Dinant”; Cleves, Instruction, 111–19; de Stavelot, Chronique, 362–63; Koreman, 
De stadsrekening, 131; Kuppers, “De stadsrekeningen,” 72, 77; Laurent, Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 
181–82; Raynaud, A la Hache!, 346–49; Toureille, Robert de Sarrebrück, 107, 118; Waale, De Arkelse 
oorlog, 123.
25 Janssen de Limpens, Geldersche Wyssenissen, 356–57; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 
1:63; 2:378; Uitterhoeve, Burg Rode, 23, 41, 43.
26 One of the few studies dedicated to this type of tactics is Harari, Special Operations. See also 
Rogers, Soldiers’ Lives, 248–50.
27 Fréson, “Prise du château de Huy.” See also Bourguignon, “La surprise d’Arlon”; Caldecott­
Baird, The Expedition in Holland, 145–50; de Graaf, Oorlog, 404–7; Duyck, Journaal, 1:298, 1:350, 
1:358, 1:526–27; Parker, The Army of Flanders, 7–8; Richer, Abrégé chrono logique, 201, 203.
28 Mariembourg, Notary Lecomte, 11: Act November 6, 1595 (transcript Généamag).
29 Bormans, “Table des régistres,” 12:34–35; de Groot, Stadsrekeningen, 1388 fol. 8; Meisen, 
“Brabant, Limburg und die U� bermaaslände,” 180; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 1:43; van 
de Venne, Het beleg, 16.
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cities housed a “garrison” of more than ten men (gatekeepers, sentinels, watchmen or 
sergeants or soldiers, a crossbow maker, or a gunner), as stipulated in their accounts.30 
When the prévôt of Longwy mobilized the duke of Bar’s fiefholders to pursue raiders 
who invaded his jurisdiction in 1346–1349, he paid three horsemen (sergents à che-
val) to stay in the fortress so it was not undefended in his absence. They resided there 
for five weeks, and presumably served alongside the fortress’s normal household. The 
prévôt’s next account, covering the years 1349–1352, specifies that he called upon six 
local noblemen or four sergents à cheval to guard the fortress for a few days whenever a 
threat presented itself.31
The term garrison is used here for want of a better word since these men were urban 
officials or members of noble households. Actual garrisons only appeared during major 
conflicts with the activation of defence systems. The 1435 accounts from the fortress of 
Hambach (Jülich) make a very clear distinction between its five permanent guards and 
a temporary garrison of more than fifty horsemen who only stayed for a few weeks.32 
Such reinforcements could also include local citizens or nearby villagers; in the Central 
Middle Ages some charters of liberties were granted for precisely this purpose.33
In the same way as fortifications provided safety in a general sense, guard duty had 
multiple functions that went beyond discouraging violence. Paid watchmen or citizens 
on guard duty had a central role in fire prevention in medi eval and early modern cit­
ies for instance. This role also applied to sentinels positioned on strategic locations 
(towers). Appointments of a permanent guard for one of the watchtowers of Aachen’s 
Landwehr in 1458 and 1497, specifically read that he had to make sure that no foreign 
livestock entered the territory of the city.34 Officials in charge of guarding fortifications, 
such as shooting guilds in fifteenth­century Dordrecht or the newly appointed castellan 
of Geldern in 1497, were entitled to the income provided by a certain part of the forti­
fications (fishing and pasture rights) as an incentive to ensure that they did their duty.35 
30 The medi eval termino logy regarding sentinels (eskerwaite, torenwachter) and watchmen 
(waite, wachter) is somewhat confusing. Sentinels had to stand on the lookout, typically on a 
tower, while the armed men who patrolled the fortifications, especially at night, were denoted as 
watchmen. Guard duty of rural populations generally encompassed both functions (the duty of guet 
et garde). Balon, “L’organisation militaire,” 12–16, 30, 46–48; Bodard, Receuil des ordonannces, 6, 
44, 85; Bormans, “Table des régistres,” 11:263; Burgers and Dijkhof, eds., De oudste stadsrekeningen, 
10, 42; Den Dooven, “Les émoluments,” 98–99; Kraus, Die Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 441, 465–66; 
Meisen, “Brabant, Limburg und die U� bermaasländer,” 160, 162, 166–67, 180, 208–9, 247–48; 
Mougeot, “De la périphérie à la frontière?,” 160–62; Salamagne, “Les garnisons,” 707–11.
31 The word sergent derives from Latin serviens and could refer to any armed man who did not 
have a knight’s title. In some contexts it specifically denoted a low ranking official (such as a forest 
warden). Bar­le­Duc, ADM, B 1853, fol. 10; B 1854, fols. 16v–29v.
32 Dinstühler, ed., Die Jülicher Landrentmeister-Rechnung, 76–78, 81, 90.
33 See, for instance, Lejeune, “La charte.”
34 Pick, “Verpflichtungsurkunden,” 224–25, 246–47.
35 Fruin, De oudste rechten, 1:264; Jacobs, Justitie en politie, 161; Laurent, Aachener Stadt-
rechnungen, 242, 379; Salamagne, “Les garnisons,” 720; Thewissen, De gezworen schutterijen, 108–9.
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Medi eval guards had multiple functions, in the same way as the fortifications they had to 
protect, and were relatively well integrated into general society.
These observations apply to a much lesser extent to military guard systems, refer­
ring to the military as an organization, which became established from the late sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries onwards. These were far more extensive than their predeces­
sors and can be studied through a more detailed corpus of sources: garrison orders and 
regulations. There is in fact a significant upsurge in legislation from the last decades 
of the seventeenth century onwards regarding the maintenance and policing of forti­
fications. It is unclear whether this reflects changes in effective management, implying 
that guard duty was laxer earlier, or simply demonstrating increased state involvement. 
Military control over fortifications was hardly unchallenged, as we have argued above, 
which means that guard duty should be seen as a key method by which the military tried 
to safeguard its interests (the conservation of what they perceived as desirable biotic 
communities and landscapes).
The number of soldiers on guard duty in permanent garrisons was vast. The garrison 
orders of Namur, which are very specific in this regard, indicate that at the end of May 
1759, four hundred and eighty­eight soldiers on guard duty were spread throughout the 
city at any given time, of which a hundred and twenty­one actually stood guard by day 
and a hundred and fourteen at night. A remarkable notebook, kept by the eighteenth­
century private soldier Michael Andrist, who served in the Swiss regiment Stürler from 
Figure 24. Guard post 
on the fortifications of  
’s­Hertogenbosch, 1820s. 
Sketch by captain August 
von Bonstetten (Bern, BB, FA 
von Bonstetten–shelfmark 
EK 2008/400: Skizzenbuch 
August von Bonstetten, fol. 46). 
Reproduced with permission of 
the Burgerbibliothek Bern.
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1779 to 1784, demonstrates that such forces were quite typical. It lists the guard posts 
for Maastricht and ’s­Hertogenbosch for respectively 1780 and 1783. In Maastricht 
five hundred and fifty­five soldiers were on guard duty, and in ’s­Hertogenbosch two 
hundred and thirty­seven.36 Soldiers who were not standing guard or on patrol had to 
remain within guardhouses from where they could quickly come to their comrades’ aid. 
Such an organization is without equal in the history of premodern policing,37 as most 
early modern governments had to depend on a handful of police officials, shooting 
guilds, and the general population to arrest offenders.38 Guard duty was not without its 
risks, however: records of the French Invalides reveal that one wrong step or a strong 
current could entail a fall of several metres down into the moat leading to crippling inju­
ries or even death.39
This display of force was meant to ensure that surprise attacks of the kind described 
above became impossible, but also fulfilled a major role in the maintenance of public 
order, by ensuring that curfew was respected. Anyone walking the streets at night with­
out a legitimate reason was liable to get arrested. These sentries moreover had to pre­
vent members of the garrison from deserting and regulated entrance to the fortifica­
tions.40 According to eighteenth­century garrison regulations, citizens were only allowed 
to walk on the main wall by day and children were forbidden to play there. They needed 
written permission, a permit (“passport”), from the governor in order to access the out­
works (the fortifications lying beyond the main wall). At night no one was allowed in 
the fortifications, except the guards, the patrols, the garrison’s staff, and the engineers.41
A sketch made by the Swiss officer August von Bonstetten in the 1820s, when he 
served in the garrison of ’s­Hertogenbosch, provides a rare glimpse how fortifications 
might have looked like when military forces still managed them (see figure 24). It depicts 
the outworks as large green spaces, guarded by sentries. Because uninhabited lands in 
an urban context were relatively rare, military defences became the locale for a series of 
conflicts: bird catchers had to be chased off the glacis and counterscarp, no hunting was 
allowed in these same areas, and no one was to fish in the moats, cut grass or reed, and 
pasture livestock in the outworks without written permission.42 If domestic animals 
36 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2087; Soesterberg, NMM, inv. no. 00216132: Notebook of 
soldier Michael Andrist, fols. 63r, 64r. See also G. Vallée, “Le journal du marquis de Langeron,” 161.
37 With the possible exception of the eighteenth­century Garde de Paris, but this is very much a 
military unit in everything but name. Chagniot, Paris et l’armée, 117–57.
38 Denys, Police et sécurité, 51–64, 156–62, 398–401.
39 Vincennes, SHD, GR, 2Xy09: Pierre de la Vergne; 2Xy14: Alexis Loir, Simon Remy; 2Xy18: 
François d’Armagnac; 2Xy20: Pierre Beaumont, Remy Ronseme; 2Xy23: Jean Gillot; 2Xy24: 
Jean Baptiste Reuter; 2Xy26: Johannés Scherumpf; 2Xy45: François Camus (transcript www.
hoteldesinvalides.org). See also The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2088: order November 27, 
1771; Teunisse, Onderdaan in Oranje’s oorlog, 40–41.
40 Augoyat, Aperçu sur les fortifications, 82–83; Isambert, Decrusy and Taillandier, eds., Receuil Gé-
né ral des anciennes lois françaises, 20 (1830) 611–14; Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst Overkwartier, 1:234.
41 Ordonnance du roi (June 25, 1750); Reglement en orders Maastricht (1786); Reglement en 
ordres ’s-Hertogenbosch (1770).
42 The glacis refers to the open fields lying around the outer fortifications, within cannon shot 
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were found within the fortifications without permission they were, theoretically, confis­
cated (horses, cows, sheep) or simply shot (dogs, poultry). The trees and hedges could 
not be damaged in any way either. Such a range of restrictions can perhaps best be sum­
marized by a nineteenth­century saying from the French Meuse department: “whatever 
falls into the moat, belongs to the soldier.”43 Given that a garrison’s staff was entitled to 
the fishing and pasture/hay benefits in the fortifications, in a similar way to their medi­
eval predecessors, they must have had a direct socio­economic interest in ensuring that 
these regulations were carried out.44
The garrison orders of Namur, which regulated everyday life in this fortress, indi­
cate that the garrison’s own members were quite often the very people against which 
sentries had to intervene. Officers and their attendants were repeatedly singled out for 
breaching the hunting regulations. Disregard of fishing rights in the fortifications, the 
Meuse, Sambre, and local ponds, seems to have been commonplace, as was the taking 
of wood from nearby forests by soldiers as well as their families. The same applied to 
digging loam in the fortifications. In 1762 non­commissioned officers were tasked with 
inspecting the barracks for illegally procured wood, the normal policing mechanism, the 
guards at the gates, apparently being insufficient to prevent its smuggling into the city.45
In practice, enforcement might very well have been less strict than the regulations 
indicate. Personnel records of the eighteenth­century Dutch army reveal that running 
away from one’s guard post was a popular way of deserting (representing nineteen per­
cent of the deserters for whom the manner of desertion is provided).46 A garrison order, 
dating to June 20, 1772, also forbad soldiers standing guard to cut young trees on the 
walls with their sabres.47 Implementing garrison regulations must have been difficult 
if the sentries themselves were not always reliable. In the County of Namur peasants 
still conducted armed patrols in the countryside, and were encouraged to arrest desert­
range. The counterscarp is the outer side of a moat. The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079: 
Order March 23, 1714; Ordonnance du roi (June 25, 1750) articles dcLxv–dcLxx; Reglement en 
orders Maastricht (1786); Reglement en ordres ’s-Hertogenbosch (1770).
43 ç que cheu do l’foussé c’ ost pou l’souldat. Labourasse, Glossaire abrégé, 288.
44 Petitot­Bellavène, “Verdun,” 91; Roebroeck, Het land van Montfort, 114; Rorive, La guerre de 
siège, 211.
45 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. nos. 2079, 2081, 2087, 2088: Garrison Orders of Namur. 
Prohibitions against hunting by members of the garrison: February 1, March 15, July 31, October 
15, 1714; January 27, April 13, June 11, September 31, November 1, November 20, 1716; March 17, 
May 1, 1717; May 21, 1739; June 15, August 16, 1759; July 28, 1761. Against fishing: January 26, 
February 21, July 21, 1714; May 27, August 2, 1715; May 28, August 13, and September 13, 1716; 
February 15, April 22, May 25, 1717; February 5, 1739; June 18, July 6, 1740; July 15, 1742; June 8, 
1759. Against bringing wood into the city: November 28, 1714; July 4, October 15, 1715; September 
8, 1716; November 13, 1738; November 7, 1741; June 2, 1760; October 10, 1762. Against digging 
loam: April 19, 1717; November 14, 1738; January 31, 1741. See also Philippart, “La pêche,” 92.
46 Based on a database of 199 deserters, originating from the Dutch speaking part of the Prince­
Bishopric of Liège who served in the Dutch army between 1770 and 1795. Govaerts, “‘Fire­Eaters.’”
47 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2088: June 20, 1772.
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ers and soldiers on leave who damaged their fields or hunting traps.48 The commander 
of ’s­Hertogenbosch released several proclamations in 1835–1837 about the ban on 
livestock in the fortifications, before he lost his patience. He subsequently issued live 
rounds to a non­commissioned officer, ordered him to take one soldier on guard duty 
with him every week and shoot any poultry still found wandering about.49 
Despite these problems, it does seem that such guard systems were overall quite 
successful in enforcing garrison regulations.50 In 1803, for instance, the leaseholder of 
the fisheries in the moats of the fortress of Heusden petitioned the Batavian government 
for an extension of his contract. He had been unable to make good his initial investment 
as a result of overfishing. Because of the absence of a garrison everyone tried to fish at 
night.51 Non­military forces in fact passed similar legislation to safeguard the mainte­
nance of fortifications. Rules introduced in Campine/Kempen villages with regard to 
their refuge forts (schansen) in the seventeenth century, as well as orders given to Liège 
patriot troops in 1790, both include prohibitions regarding the damaging of the fortifica­
tions, fishing in the moats, discharging guns, and cutting wood or stealing crops.52 Some 
garrisons, such as those of Liège in the eighteenth and Grave in the nineteenth century, 
went a step further, and used their guard system for disaster response. Soldiers fired 
cannons to warn citizens respectively of a fire and of flooding from the Meuse.53 Guard 
duty was key to military forces’ control over garrison towns, but ironically enough the 
main threat came from their own colleagues.
Controlling Migration
The role of armies in the protection of biotic communities was clearly quite complex, 
because they acted simultaneously as agents of order and disorder. We will now exam­
ine how rulers or states responded to this issue, and to what extent they made efforts to 
control the movement and behaviour of the people and animals (horses) who served in 
their armies, or could potentially be incorporated into them. The protection of natural 
resources in the strict sense of the word is thus contextualized within larger policing 
issues. The symbolism of the garden (see chap. 1) in effect came to imply that the move­
ments of every living being in this garden became subject to state control. Given that 
these processes are relatively well studied for conscription armies in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, this analysis emphasizes their working in systems of voluntary 
recruitment and their medi eval origin.
Passports as documents that specifically regulate movement originate in the Central 
Middle Ages. They evolved out of letters of safe conduct, and initially served to safe­
48 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079: August 30, 1714; inv. no. 2081: July 17, 1739; inv. 
no. 2088: May 30, 1773; Denys, Police et sécurité, 141–56.
49 Bruggeman, Bestedingen dienst der Fortificatiën.
50 Denys, Police et sécurité, 265–66; Tixon, “Une garnison en ville: facteur d’ordre ou de désordres?.”
51 Besluiten van het staats-bewind der Bataafsche Republiek, December 9, 1803, no. 28.
52 Hansay, “Documents inédits,” 162–64, 192–93; Molemans, “De Luikse Revolutie,” 79.
53 Lhoist­Colmon and Gabriel, “La colline,” 73–74; van Hoof and Roozenbeek, Grave, 63.
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guard the passage of a group of travellers or the transportation of goods. The mobility of 
the person(s) conveying these commodities was much less of a problem and to a large 
extent implied.54 The accounts of the high bailiff of ’s­Hertogenbosch from 1486–1487 
specify, for example, that he fined five men because they demanded to see the passport 
of a soldier who passed through Vught with three horses. They claimed his passport 
was false and confiscated the horses.55 The increasing use of such documents for people 
derived from several factors: prevention of epidemics, supervision of vagrants and beg­
gars, but also a growing interest in the criminal activities of soldiers. Charles the Bold 
made sustained efforts to control the movements of his men, and instituted passports 
by 1473 at the latest.56 In the late fifteenth century passports for soldiers must still have 
been quite exceptional, however, for at an unspecified date in 1459–1487 the council­
lors of Roermond had to judge a case in which three men from Lobberich claimed that 
the bailiff had given them oral permission to leave the army, a statement he denied.57
The lasting association of passports with soldiers, who were, for whatever reason, 
separated from their unit, came about in the first half of the sixteenth century. At that 
point there was a growing unease about the actions of soldiers who begged, extorted, 
and stole from the settlements they passed through, generally to overcome the period 
between their discharge and enlistment with another paymaster. Dutch and German 
sources use the word ga(e)rden or garten for this kind of behaviour. The word appears 
as early as 1494–1495 in the accounts of the high bailiffs of ’s­Hertogenbosch.58 Pen­
sioned or discharged soldiers were common protagonists in early modern folk tales and 
were also increasingly linked to other mobile people associated with criminality, such as 
vagrants, beggars, and Roma. Repression of all these groups was stepped up during the 
same period.59
The study of passports is complicated because these were personal documents of 
a temporary nature, which means that those that have been preserved are often kept 
in family archives and personal collections. It is useful to have a look at one specific 
example, the passport of Gerard Vilansin, trumpeter in the French cavalry regiment 
Melac, garrisoning Maastricht in 1677 (see figure 25). It is one piece of paper contain­
ing a discharge from his captain and an actual passport from the governor. It was given 
to him because he left for the recently established Hôtel des Invalides. The passport is a 
simple text in which the governor states his destination and reason for travelling, while 
simultaneously asking anyone concerned to let him pass through. Eighteenth­century 
54 van Doorninck and Molhuysen, eds., Briefwisseling, 36–37.
55 Brussels, ARA, 137.01, inv. no. 12995 (transcript Henk Beijers Archiefcollectie).
56 Cauchies, “La désertion,” 140; Groebner, Der Schein der Person, 117–19, 124–27; Scholz, 
Borders, 37–48, 134–45; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 2:461; Verreycken, Pour nous servir 
en l’armée, 156–70.
57 Janssen de Limpens, Geldersche Wyssenissen, 140–41.
58 Brussels, ARA, 1107 Rekeningen Hoogschout ’s­Hertogenbosch, inv. no. 12995; Behr, “Garden 
und Vergardung”; Burschel, Söldner, 88–96, 278–86, 311–17.
59 Bois, Les anciens soldats, 307–16; van Kappen, Geschiedenis, 121, 129, 139, 152–53, 155, 
158–59, 161.
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passports became more elaborate with a pre­printed text in which features of the man’s 
appearance were often included as well. The garrison orders of Namur from January 
31, 1717 explicitly mention that soldiers could only go outside the gates with a printed 
passport signed by general du Portal.60
The practical enforcement of these regulations, or the repression of unwanted 
migration, remained the responsibility of (high) bailiffs and their counterparts until the 
suspension of all these officials at the end of the Ancien Régime. It is one of the specific 
contexts in which the general population was not only allowed to act in an army context, 
but even obliged to do so.61 Soldiers assisted occasionally in hunting down deserters or 
as an exceptional government clampdown. During the eighteenth century, however, the 
patrols made by members of the general population were increasingly supported and 
taken over by uniformed police officials, of which the military police was a relatively 
small part.62 The only soldiers for whom migration control became a core duty served in 
the small eighteenth­century army, one infantry regiment, of the bishops of Liège. This 
60 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079: Orders January 31, 1717.
61 Tongeren, SAT, inv. no. 1, fols. 296v, 297r, 305r, 319r, 321; Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst Overkwartier, 
1:167; Bodard, Receuil des ordonnances du Duché de Bouillon, 222, 304, 315–16, 342–43; Boonen, 
“Repressie van vaandelvluchtige soldaten”; Bormans, “Table des régistres,” 12:14; Reiche, Vom 
bewaffneten Hausmann zum Polizisten, 20–46.
62 Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst Overkwartier, 2:110, 2:174; Desbrière, Chronique critique, 232–33; 
Piraux and Dorban, eds., Douane, commerce et fraude, 126–27; Verschure, Overleven, 50, 70–74, 
Figure 25. Discharge and passport for Gerard Vilansin (Maastricht, Private Collection).
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unit already started to provide villages in the Campine/Kempen with individual soldiers 
to chase away vagrants in the 1720s. This slowly changed into a deliberate government 
policy by the 1740s with major operations involving up to one hundred soldiers. The 
archives of the estates reveal that a special military tribunal was instituted in Liège to 
judge captured beggars and vagabonds.63
Authorities typically forced arrested vagrants or deserters into specific kinds of 
work because of their supposed idleness, including service as galley rowers or main­
221–22; van Kappen, Geschiedenis, 190–91, 197–98, 414, 440, 446, 451; Winter, “‘Vagrancy’ as an 
Adaptive Strategy,” 256.
63 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. nos. 268, 2974; Jamar, “Prinsesoldaten.”
Figure 26. Fifteenth­century army on the march (Brussels, KBR, MS 9242: Chroniques du Hainaut, fol. 184r). 
Reproduced with permission of the Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique / Koninklijke Bibliotheek van België.
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taining fortifications. In this way the policing of biotic communities contributed to the 
maintenance of militarized landscapes and defence systems.64 According to the accounts 
of the high bailiff of ’s­Hertogenbosch these practices date back to at least 1463–1464, 
when twenty­five vagrants were arrested and sent to the galleys in Sluis (Flanders) at 
the request of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. Galleys, being of Mediterranean ori­
gin, are not well adapted to weather conditions in the North Sea, but they remained 
valuable for river defence. The presence of punished soldiers on a galley is still attested 
in Rotterdam as late as 1634.65
64 Dorreboom, “‘Gelijk hij gecondemneert word mits deezen,’” 204–8; Petitot­Bellavène, “Verdun,” 
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Vandewal, “De kroniek,” 246–47.
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Soldiers figured prominently among premodern migrants. The introduction of pass­
ports should therefore also be seen in the context of attempts to secure the supply of 
manpower for the armed forces. As argued in the introduction, an army could contain 
large numbers of people who were not expected to fight, or more precisely did not have 
a recognized combat role and the wages associated with it. This distinction is signifi­
cant since it makes counting and identifying these people problematic, but also because 
efforts to secure army recruitment were primarily directed towards soldiers. During 
the Middle Ages combatants typically brought their own wagons with them, and eccle­
siastical insitutions could also be expected to provide transportation (see figure 26). 
From the 1500s onwards armed forces increasingly had to rely on the communities they 
passed through, as well as contractors.66
Noteworthy in this regard is a charter from the village of Genoelselderen, near Ton­
gres/Tongeren, written down in 1431, in the aftermath of a major attack on the County 
of Namur. It reads that in case of a military campaign (heervaert) the villagers and their 
lord each had to bear half the expenses made for the construction of an army wagon 
(heerwagen) pulled by three horses. The villagers were also allowed to put their travel 
bags and equipment on this wagon and could ride on it if they felt weak. A French mil­
itary map from the Austrian War of Succession (1740–1748) by contrast depicts the 
Duchy of Limburg and the lands of Outre Meuse, and is accompanied by a list of these 
lands’ resources (the acreage devoted to agricultural lands, grasslands, and woodlands, 
the number of adult males, horses and wagons/carts).67
As for soldiers, during the Central Middle Ages the concept of “foreign military ser­
vice” did not even exist. One could fight for anyone or any cause, and accept wages, pro­
vided only that it was a “just” war. Noblemen for instance could, theoretically, not fight 
someone to whom they owned fealty. As long as military service was closely tied to land 
ownership, either in the context of feudal obligations or urban and rural militias (see the 
1301 charter from Couvin in chap. 1) there was little need to control combatants’ move­
ments. This changed with the growing importance of a monetary economy from the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries onwards. If rulers, noblemen, or urban councils could 
reward combatants by giving them fief rents or wages they could increase their military 
potential by cnlisting the aid of people living beyond the boundaries of their own lands.68
This development fits into a more general tendency to put less emphasis on obliga­
tory military service, and only recruit people who were willing and able to wage war­
fare. Surviving fiscal accounts from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries demonstrate 
that commanders first called upon “those who came voluntary,” generally family mem­
bers, friends or retainers. If this was insufficient, men “living nobly,” fiefholders who 
Henk Beijers Archiefcollectie); Rotterdam, SAR, ONA, inv. no. 93, no. 286: May 29, 1634; Sicking, 
Zeemacht en onmacht, 189–90, 200.
66 Borgnet, Cartulaire, 10; Darquenne, La conscription, 48–49; Gaier, Art et organisation, 96–101; 
Gorissen, “De karweien”; Gutmann, War and Rural Life, 39–41; Kroener, Les routes, 82–83; Petitot­
Bellavène, “Verdun,” 44.
67 Lemoine­Isabeau and Helin, Cartes inédites, 47–63; Nijssen, “Een akkoord.”
68 Govaerts, “From Knight Errants to Disloyal Soldiers.”
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served on horseback, were mobilized. The same applied to members of shooting guilds, 
if these were available. The general adult male population was only called upon to serve 
if the former methods were inadequate.69 When war broke out between Holland and 
Brabant in 1334, Daniel van der Merwede, bailiff of Zuid­Holland, consequently send 
a messenger to everyone living in his district that he thought was a fiefholder of the 
count. According to his fiscal account citizens of Heusden stole the warhorses of several 
of these noblemen when they made sure no supplies entered the Duchy of Brabant. This 
suggests that they patrolled the Meuse on a boat (possibly a cog).70
The increased emphasis on monetary rewards had one major drawback, however: 
it made these same men less dependent on one lord or employer. This was especially 
so in the politically fragmented Meuse Region. On June 24, 1297, for instance, Guy de 
Dampierre, Count of Flanders and Margrave of Namur, hired Warnier de Dave, a knight 
from the County of Namur, to serve in his campaign against the King of France with 
three other knights and twenty­one squires. The contract specified that Warnier would 
receive one thousand pounds in wages and did not have to enter the lands of one of his 
other lords (the bishop of Liège, the duke of Brabant, the count of Hainaut, and the lord 
of Valkenburg). This restriction did not apply to any of his men who were not fiefholders 
of those lords.71 In order to gain more control over their soldiers, both rulers and urban 
councils thus started to develop new ways to link military service to land during the Late 
Middle Ages: living or being born in a certain area increasingly came to imply the exis­
tence of a personal bond between subject and potentate. So, the gradual development 
of a new concept, “foreign military service,” can also be seen as a territorial practice, a 
practical way to maintain control over the relatively limited pool of men willing and able 
to engage in warfare.72
The accounts of the high bailiff of ’s­Hertogenbosch, who controlled more or less the 
area encompassed by the current Dutch province of Noord­Brabant, provide an excel­
lent starting point because they reveal to what extent military service for another poten­
tate was a punishable offence on the Brabant–Guelders frontier. The only reference to 
an explicit prohibition comes from 1402. In that year the high bailiff sent messengers 
to proclaim in churches that it was forbidden to join either side in the war between the 
count of Holland and the lord of Arkel. He only prosecuted two men, however, because 
they pursued the war in his jurisdiction. The first had stolen horses from subjects of the 
count of Holland and brought them into Brabant, the second, Floris van der Aa, was one 
of the noblemen who took the lord of Arkel prisoner when he passed through the duchy 
in 1415.73 We know that Duchess Johanna of Brabant (1355–1406) had earlier forbid­
den her subjects to join the Frisian expedition of the count of Holland in 1396, but the 
69 Brussels, ARA, 137.01, inv. nos. 2779, 2781, 2784, 2785, 2786, 2787, 2789, 2790, 2800, 2803, 
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70 Smit, ed., De rekeningen, 54–56.
71 de Saint­Genois, Chartes, 266–67.
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Armorial Beyeren, which depicts the armorials of noblemen taking part, indicates that 
at least eleven attended.74
From 1393 until 1550, that is before the outbreak of the Eighty Years War, the 
accounts of the high bailiff of ’s­Hertogenbosch include thirty­nine cases of “foreign” 
service (see figure 27). It is noteworthy that only a minority got punished, with a fine, 
for enlisting with a lord or ruler other than the dukes of Brabant, and even here there 
was a strong connotation of enemy service.75 The others were prosecuted for treason 
(serving “against their natural prince”), frequently in combination with other offences, 
such as desertion from the imperial forces. In these cases execution was the most com­
mon form of punishment. The high bailiff pursued both men born and living in his 
jurisdiction and anyone who committed a crime there. According to his account from 
1506–1508 he executed a soldier who was born in “the Indies.” His name, “Christoffelen 
Myn,” suggests that he might have been a native converted to Christianity. He was sen­
tenced for deserting from the imperial army, serving the duke of Guelders, and pressing 
locals for food and drink after returning to the imperial forces.76
74.2.3.10; 75.4.3.10 (transcript Henk Beijers Archiefcollectie). For Floris van der Aa see Damen, 
Prelaten, edelen en steden, 100.
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75 Two men who fought in Frisia against the duke of Saxony, an ally of the Habsburgs, in 1497, and 
1502–1503 respectively. A servant (jongen) was fined in 1491–1492 for participating in the feud 
against a certain Willem Trant.
76 Brussels, ARA, 1107 Rekeningen Hoogschout ’s­Hertogenbosch, inv. nos. 2797, 12990, 12991, 
12995, 12996. See also Bormans, “Extraits des cris du péron,” 180, 195; de Lusy, Le journal, 348, 
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Figure 27. Overview of people prosecuted for foreign military service in the 
Meijerij of ’s­Hertogenbosch, 1393–1550 (Brussels, ARA, 1107 Rekeningen 
Hoogschout ’s­Hertogenbosch, inv. nos. 2797, 12990, 12991, 12995, 12996).
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A particularly remarkable case is a twelve­ or thirteen­year­old boy from Someren 
who was sent by his mother to the imperial forces near Mézières, presumably during 
the siege of 1521, to look for his sister, who served there with her partner. When the 
boy learned that this soldier had shortly before deserted to the French side with some 
comrades, he followed them there as well. He stayed in the French army for two months 
because he could not come back, and was fined along with two soldiers. Still, his sister, 
who probably acted in the same way, does not appear in the accounts. Given that this 
boy would have served as a soldier’s servant, this case demonstrates that the ban on 
foreign service applied to any male serving in an army context, soldier or not, but not to 
women. There is another case of a jongen (servant) who was sentenced for joining the 
French. The fact that he did not receive any wages is explicitly stated.77
The emphasis on enemy service is important because serving in foreign armies as 
such did not really become an issue for at least another century, except in very spe­
cific circumstances, such as when governments raised or expanded their own armies 
and manpower became scarce. Former soldiers were actually encouraged to enlist with 
another potentate because it resolved the social problem of discharged veterans and 
released their paymasters from distributing their arrears in wages.78 Notarial acts from 
Rotterdam dating to the first decades of the seventeenth century indicate that the armed 
forces of Venice, France, Denmark, Portugal, and Muscovy all sent recruiters to Rotter­
dam.79 Even if officials wanted to enforce the law, evidence might have been difficult to 
come by. A miller from Roly, near Philippeville, declared before a notary in 1692 that he 
had not enlisted with the king’s enemies in Charleroi (the Spanish army), and claimed 
that these allegations were based on village gossip.80
In the long run, the establishment of large standing (permanent) armies at the end 
of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries turned out to be a key 
turning point. Now governments and commanders had a vested interest in keeping 
large numbers of soldiers with the colours. The kingdom of France also reorganized the 
military obligations of its subjects around this time and in effect introduced conscrip­
tion, albeit only for militia regiments.81 The resulting change in attitudes is well studied 
for the Austrian Netherlands, where the government adopted a much harsher attitude 
towards foreign service after the reorganization of their forces in 1725. Nevertheless, in 
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practice enforcing regulations for soldiers serving below commissioned rank remained 
very difficult. Foreign recruiters were arrested when discovered and subjects joining 
other armies had to enlist in an imperial regiment in exchange for amnesty, but every 
year hundreds of men, often deserters, simply crossed the border and joined another 
army.82 The Prince­Bishopric of Liège and a multitude of imperial immediacies in its 
close neighbourhood did assume a major recruiting role at a European level during 
the following decades precisely because they allowed foreign recruitment, sometimes 
openly, sometimes more clandestinely. A considerable part of the recruits gathered here 
had deserted from the Imperial, Dutch, and French armies, as proven by a systematic 
comparison of military personnel records. The bishops did sign cartels for the exchange 
of deserters, but enforcing these treaties was not in their interest.83
In historical studies, the introduction of conscription is often presented as a “solu­
tion” to these recruitment problems, a perception based to no small extent on the writ­
ings of Enlightment thinkers, but such a view does not take the eco logical framework 
and perceptions of other contemporaries into full focus.84 This can be clarified by taking 
the Bouillon regiment, raised in 1757 by the duke of Bouillon for the French army, as an 
example. Because every settlement had to provide able­bodied men for the militia, it is 
possible to get an idea of the principality’s recruiting potential. The militia totalled 741 
men in 1776. Furthermore, a small number of documents relating to the organization of 
the colonel’s company have been preserved. This is a very senior company, theoretically 
commanded by the duke as colonel proprietor of the regiment, organized by taking sol­
diers from all the other companies. In this way, it gives a unique insight into the compo­
sition of the regiment. Of sixty­one men, only two came from the duchy itself. Even if one 
takes into account the age structure of the population, the exclusion of married men, and 
the physical standards required from soldiers at this time (see chap. 5), this percentage 
is surprisingly low.85
The duke could surely have filled a larger proportion of his regiment, or at least his 
own company, by recruiting his own subjects, but this was not in his or his unit’s inter­
ests. His explicit instructions, namely that one half of the soldiers provided had to be 
“known and native,” with the other half being “foreigners and deserters,” reflects a prac­
tical problem of recruiting soldiers who met certain physical standards without desta­
bilizing the demo graphic framework on which one’s own government rested.86 Only in 
82 Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst Overkwartier, 2:238; Lorgnier, La maréchaussée, 2:86–91; Sonkajärvi, 
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86 It is unclear what “known and native” in this context means, given that the Duchy of Bouillon 
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1759 did the duke make an effort to recruit his own subjects, primarily to replace war­
time losses. From 1763 to 1776 eighteen men from Bouillon served in the ranks of the 
colonel’s company, of whom seven died during the unit’s tour of duty in the Caribbean 
(Martinique). In 1788 the regiment still counted only twenty­seven soldiers from the 
duchy among more than one thousand men.87 Even the widespread adoption of con­
scription in the first decades of the nineteenth century did not fully eliminate foreign 
recruitment, which continued to be the norm for colonial units, such as the Dutch Indies 
Army, and the navy. It is only from the 1850s onwards that the enlistment of foreign­
ers truly disappeared, with the notable exception of the French Foreign Legion.88 Gov­
ernments had prohibited their subjects from joining foreign armies from at least the 
fourteenth century, but despite steadily increasing migration control they never fully 
succeded in suppressing it.
Armed forces did not just depend on people, however, but also included a sizeable 
animal component. How armies obtained the horses, on which so many of their func­
tions depended, is a fundamental question, but also one that is often taken for granted.89 
In a similar way to human recruitment, a distinction has to be made between riding 
horses and draught horses. There is much more information available about the first 
type because these are the animals used by an army’s combat element. Draught horses 
were before the nineteenth century exacted from the general population as part of a 
larger spectrum of services, or provided by contractors.90 A list of fifty­eight horses req­
uisitioned in the lordship of Grevenbroek, in the far north of the Prince­Bishopric of 
Liège, for the siege of Huy in 1695, provides an exceptional insight into this matter. This 
document is very detailed, provides a physical description of each animal, and makes 
clear that sixteen of the horses were old and worn out. The villagers likely selected their 
least useful animals for army service, though the state of these specimens might also 
simply reflect the general impoverishment of the Campine/Kempen at this time.91
Of special interest here is thus whether there existed a type of horse that was specifi­
cally raised for warfare, a “warhorse.” Administrative sources classified horses accord­
ing to many different types during the Central and Late Middle Ages, but only one of 
these referred indisputably to a warhorse, the destrier. This is the so­called “great horse” 
on which a fully armoured knight charged in battle. Because rulers were expected to 
recompense their combatants for horses lost in their service up to the late fourteenth 
century, it is possible to get some idea about the horses used by medi eval armies. In 
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some ways these sources are even more informative than those of subsequent centuries, 
given that individual animals figure prominently among them.92
A comparison of two receipts for horse loss, both from horsemen serving the duke of 
Brabant, will be taken as an example because they show the diversity of horses used by 
medi eval armies as well as the difficulty of establishing whether the horses used in war 
were effectively “warhorses.” The first receipt concerns a reimbursement to Dietrich von 
Heinsberg and his men for seventy­six horses lost during the 1339 campaign of Edward 
III (1327–1377). Of these twelve are described as destriers, nineteen as cavalli, and forty­
five as equi. Cavallus and equus both mean “horse” in general, but the term cavallus has 
a strong connotation of a horse used in warfare, especially in medi eval Latin. It is likely 
therefore that in this document the word cavallus referred to a warhorse of lower value 
than a true destrier (possibly a “courser”).93 The second receipt sums up forty­three 
horses lost by horsemen from Namur who served Robert of Namur, marshal of Brabant, 
during the siege of Chaligny in 1363. Here three horses are described as coursers, high 
value riding horses used for warfare or hunting, seven as horses, thirty as rounceys, rid­
ing horses of low value, and three as draught horses.94
The sharp distinctions between these two groups may reflect the socio­economic 
status of their riders to some extent, but mainly derive from the environmental condi­
tions in which these campaigns took place. Duke Jan III of Brabant (1312–1355) con­
tracted Dietrich von Heinsberg (Count of Loon, 1336–1361) to serve with three hun­
dred armoured horsemen, which entailed a force of at least six hundred horses, in the 
royal army of Edward III that raided through the fertile Scheldt and Sambre valleys. The 
horsemen of Namur served on a much smaller campaign led by the marshal of Brabant, 
directed against demobilized soldiers and required navigating the inhospitable Woëvre, 
in Lorraine. Bringing their best horses meant relatively little gain in terms of prestige 
at a much higher risk of loss.95 It is noteworthy that late medi eval fiscal accounts fre­
quently note that horses had been “ridden to death.”96
Medi eval fiscal accounts also indicate that it was quite common for mounted combat­
ants to lend or buy horses at the beginning of a campaign. This does not necessarily mean 
that someone did not own a horse or “warhorse,” only that he did not have a horse fit for 
92 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 39–51; Bennett, “The Medi eval Warhorse Reconsidered”; 
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the task at hand.97 The accounts of lord Frank van Borselen, a close supporter of the Bur­
gundian dynasty in Holland–Zeeland, demonstrate for instance that he bred horses on 
his estates, both for his own use and as gifts, but he still had to send a subordinate to buy 
one or multiple horses every time his bastard son went off to war in the 1460s.98
 While commanders did have a role in the supply of horses, the main responsibility 
lay by the combatants themselves. This was possible because in the late Middle Ages ser­
vice as an armoured horseman was one of the signs of noble status.99 In the seventeenth 
century mounted military service still carried such prestige that bringing a horse could 
be a prerequisite for being accepted into a cavalry regiment. Lambrecht Claes, a soldier 
in Maastricht and native from Oostham in the principality of Liège, thus sold his share 
of his parents’ inheritance in exchange for a horse, bridle, coat, shoulder belt, and spurs 
in 1638.100 By 1666, such practices seem to have become more exceptional, for lieuten­
ant John Grove specified before a Rotterdam notary the conditions under which Edward 
Feeck, an English nobleman living in ’s­Hertogenbosch, enlisted in his cavalry company. 
He had to supply a good horse himself, but would receive double pay and could buy his 
own food.101 Rulers also continued to call upon their fiefholders to serve in emergencies, 
until the last decade of the seventeenth century in France and Liège, but at that point the 
institution had visibly outlived its military usefulness.102
Nevertheless, delegating most of the responsibility to the combatants themselves, 
or increasingly to their commanders (captains and colonels), solved only part of the 
horse supply problem. Horses still had to be available for purchase at an acceptable 
price. Differences in agrosystems—the availability of grasslands (pasture)—became a 
key concern. The northern part of the Meuse Region, Brabant, Holland, and Guelders, 
exported horses and had access to major horse raising areas in Utrecht, Frisia, and Hol­
stein. The kingdom of France, on the other hand, was a major importer of horses from 
at least the fourteenth century onwards, with the Southern Netherlands and Lorraine 
as facilitators. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century horse breeds from the north 
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were also on average larger than those of the south because the latter were raised in a 
more extensive way.103
The Meuse Region’s importance as a transit zone for the warhorse trade can be made 
clear by a document from 1389, which lists the rights of the duke of Limburg, the lord of 
Dalhem, and the lands of Outremeuse/Overmaas. It was written down in the context of 
the purchase by Philip the Bold (Duke of Burgundy, 1363–1404) of these lands from the 
heavily indebted Johanna of Brabant. According to this survey the duke of Limburg held 
the high justice on the main roads from Liège to Co logne, including the rivers Meuse 
and Rhine as far as he could ride a white warhorse (blanc destrier) into the water and 
still reach the bottom with his lance. Because of this obligation to safeguard the roads 
the duke was entitled to tax certain merchandise moving between the Meuse and Rhine, 
including warhorses (destriers).104
Because of the aforementioned environmental characteristics horse smuggling 
became a major problem in the sixteenth century with Dutch and to a lesser extent 
Spanish soldiers making sustained efforts to prevent horse exports from reaching their 
adversaries.105 Marguerite and Catherine, wives of Jean and Martin le Rosseau, even had 
to appeal in 1580 to the councillors of Couvin to attest to the good fame of their hus­
bands. The brothers had bought four horses at Tongres/Tongeren, an intermediary in 
the long­distance horse trade between Holland and France, but were taken prisoner at 
Bouvignes by members of the garrison who thought that they were soldiers of a for­
eign potentate. Few soldiers wore uniforms at this time so there was little to distinguish 
them from any other armed man.106
In 1691 Allied forces, which included the Dutch Republic, the Habsburg Netherlands, 
and the Prince­Bishopric of Liège, went a step further and devised extensive legislation 
to prevent horse imports from reaching the French army. Horses could only be sold in 
controlled circumstances, they could not be moved without a passport, and all fences and 
hedges had to be repaired so no horse dealer could divert from the main road.107 These 
efforts intended to worsen their opponent’s desperation for suitable mounts: earlier 
that year the French government had lowered the minimum height for cavalry horses 
from 1.50 m to 1.37 m (that is, almost 15 hands down to 13½ hands). Dragoons could 
take horses as small as 1.32 m (13 hands). Even though the legislation was renewed dur­
ing the Spanish War of Succession (1701–1714), merchants from Brussels and Dinant 
103 Bautier, “L’élevage du cheval,” 68–69; Geisweit van der Netten, Antwoord op de vraag, 41–42; 
Laperche­Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine et Barrois, 190; Mulliez, Les chevaux, 15–25, 71–82; van 
Leeuwen, Geschiedenis, 39, 48, 63, 64–65, 83; van Oebschelwitz, De Nederlandsche stalmeester, 50–53.
104 Quicke, “Une enquête,” 359, 376.
105 Rotterdam, SAR, ONA, inv. no. 46, no. 20: October 19, 1605; inv. no. 142, no. 145: April 8, 1637; 
inv. no. 204, no. 201: April 24, 1643; inv. no. 390, no. 256: November 30, 1639; Borgnet, Cartulaire, 
74–75; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 3:86, 3:221; Stradling, “Spain’s Military Failure,” 212–14; 
Verschure, Overleven, 66–70.
106 Wearing uniforms only became standard practice among soldiers in the second half of the 
seventeenth century. Couvin, 1969: Act May 31, 1580 (transcript Généamag).
107 Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst Overkwartier, 2:196, 2:238–39; Dibbetz, Het Groot Militair Woorden-
boek, 493–96.
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still managed to supply the French army with thousands of Dutch and German horses.108 
Jean­Baptiste de Colbert and his successors had sought to avoid this reliance on imports 
by the distribution of stallions brought in from abroad, efforts that evolved in 1717 in 
the creation of the haras, a series of depots spread throughout the countryside housing 
stallions for breeding. This demonstrates the government’s assumption that it was the 
task of farmers to supply the military with low­priced horses of good quality.109 
The haras was very unpopular, appearing regularly in the 1789 cahiers de doléances, 
lists of complaints addressed in the Assemblée Nationale, because farmers felt they had 
to pay for the breeding of animals they did not need. The Revolutionary government 
consequently abolished them, only to be recreated in a reduced form by Napoleon’s 
regime (including two in the Meuse Region: in the Ardennes and Roer departments). 
In the end, the problem of horse supply remained unresolved. France continued to be 
a major importer of horses throughout the nineteenth century. Napoleon’s army man­
aged to make good its immense losses of horses by a combination of requisitioning, pur­
chase, and simply taking the horses of defeated enemies. Neither of these practices fun­
damentally changed France’s structural lack of inexpensive and good cavalry mounts. 
The only development of note was the increased emphasis on so­called light cavalry in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, which led to a reappraisal of smaller 
indigenous horde breeds; especially from the Ardennes and Lorraine (see figure 28).110 
108 Bogros, “Les chevaux de la cavalerie française”; de Bruijn, De hoeve en het hart, 237–45; de 
Peuter, “Paarden, geldhandel en haute finance,” 351–62.
109 Mulliez, Les chevaux, 82–91, 106–9, 149–62, 167; van Leeuwen, Geschiedenis, 75–76.
110 The huge draught horses which are today closely associated with the Ardennes are the 
Figure 28. Two Ardennes horses in the service of the French horse artillery,  
drawing by Hippolyte Lalaisse, 1850 (Gayot, Atlas statistique).
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Throughout the premodern period armed forces continued to rely on agriculture to 
supply them with suitable mounts, which gave major horse raising regions a significant 
advantage over their counterparts.
Notions of Military Professionalism
The aspiration to limit access to certain biotic communities, as well as the need to 
ensure a continuous supply of those living beings that constitute an army, involved very 
basic problems. A constant tension existed between different human actors, different 
kinds of combatants, especially because of the varying ability to employ organized vio­
lence, so the capacity to raise armies remained diffuse into the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Soldiers brought both order and disorder and were therefore not 
completely reliable as policing agents. Let us turn now to how increased distinctions 
between armies and society at large, conceptions of military professionalism as a code 
of conduct and a practical social reality, evolved as result of these issues. The establish­
ment of the military as an institution and a principal state actor came about because of 
these developments.
The first element in the changing distinctions between armies and the general popu­
lation, the making of “civilians,” was disarmament. In the Middle Ages every able­bodied 
adult male had, at least theoretically, to serve in a military context when required to do 
so. For that reason, they all had to own weapons and armour according to their means.111 
The accounts of Grave show, for example, that in 1438 members of the town council 
went from house to house to ensure that everyone owned appropriate weapons and 
equipment. This widespread ownership of weapons and armour created obvious con­
cerns in terms of the maintenance of public order, but they also had an important eco­
logical impact.112
Most missile weaponry, such as (cross)bows and guns, could be employed for both 
hunting and warfare. In this context the widespread adoption of gunpowder weapons 
from the latter Middle Ages onwards became a major issue. Medi eval handguns, while 
not as accurate as early modern rifles, were used for hunting by the last decade of the fif­
teenth century at the latest.113 The close relation between ownership of guns and hunt­
ing is confirmed by a list of armed men from the district of Dinant in 1570. Numerous 
documents of this kind have been preserved from the sixteenth century. They originate 
in governments’ efforts to (re)enforce military obligations among the general popula­
descendants of horses introduced during the second half of the nineteenth century in the context of 
new breeding programs. Brun, “Le cheval”; Illaire et al., eds., Les cahiers de doléances; Le Bouvier, Le 
livre, 110; Mulliez, Les chevaux, 317–20; van Leeuwen, Geschiedenis, 99–130.
111 Registers van de Hollandse Grafelijkheid, WI 562 (online at www.resources.huygens.knaw.nl); 
Tongeren, SAT, inv. no. 1, fol. 5v, fol. 42; Bormans, “Extraits des cris du péron,” 199; Gaier, “Pauvreté 
et armement individuel,” 153–64.
112 Grave, SLC, Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 217, fol. 195v (transcript Rien van den Brand); 
Glaudemans, Om die wrake wille, 112–14, 341–42.
113 Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 97–99.
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tion. What is noteworthy about this list is that differences in the arms carried by the men 
of these villages (the relative number of guns versus staff weapons) can be explained by 
the local availability of game. Communities with the largest area of woodlands are also 
those with the largest number of guns.114
For authorities the most obvious concern was indeed that men took advantage of 
their military obligations to poach or otherwise be a threat to public order. The regula­
tions regarding the organization of the militia in the Prince­Bishopric of Liège in 1632 
explicitly mention that the militiamen were under no circumstances permitted to shoot 
partridges, pigeons, hares, rabbits, or other game. In the district of La Mothe the weap­
ons used by the élus, the men elected to provide military service, were kept in the castel­
lan’s fortress in the late sixteenth century in order to avoid misuse.115
Even though the military obligations of the general population were significantly 
reduced over time processes of disarmament were far from straightforward. One has 
to distinguish between the general population’s contribution to rulers’ or states’ forces, 
which had by the late sixteenth century become reduced to sending manual labour­
ers (“pioneers”) and wagoners, and their continuous role in local defence. The latter 
included repression of unwanted migration and wolf hunting. Military obligations in a 
militia structure were in fact expanded during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, to deal with the problem of marauding soldiers. In the Germanic part of the 
Meuse Region such militias were generally denoted as “shooters” (schutters, Schützen), 
which suggests a link with medi eval shooting guilds. These older associations continued 
to exist, but became submerged in larger militia structures, and more or less took over 
their policing role.116
The major turning point lay around the last decades of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. At that time efforts to curtail assaults by soldiers on locals coin­
cided with an increased emphasis on buying protection. It is useful to take the mobi­
lization of the rural population by the French government as an example. Since 1644, 
attempts had been made to establish defensive lines along the Sambre and/or Meuse 
Rivers, mainly against raiding parties (see chap. 1). These had to be manned by villagers 
drawn from the area between the Meuse and Aisne Rivers. An inventory of guns owned 
by these men, dating to the 1740s, a list that also indicates whether someone had mili­
tary experience, shows that the percentage of guns owned by former soldiers, 137 guns 
for 494 men, was lower than those owned by the population at large (1928 guns for 
6122 men). This can be explained by the fact that gun ownership was a mark of status, 
being a reflection of the right to hunt. Noblemen included in this list often owned several 
guns. It is likely that most of the men on this list with military experience had served in 
114 Bormans, Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., Cartulaire de Dinant, 4:109–11.
115 Hansay, “Documents inédits,” 213; Polain and Bormans, Receuil des ordonnances de la princi-
pauté de Liège, 3:107–8; Richer, Abrégé chrono logique, 206; Villa­Sébline Nicole, La sénéchaussée, 
191, 230–31.
116 La vie quotidienne dans les Ardennes, 32–33; Borgnet, Cartulaire, 89–90, 221–23; Bormans, 
Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., Cartulaire de Dinant, 6:238–39; Denys, Police et sécurité, 93–97, 118–23; 
Jacobs, Justitie en politie, 160; Verschure, Overleven, 222–27.
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militia regiments, recruited through conscription and generally associated with a low 
socio­economic status.117
In this way, the list represents a changed relationship between armies and society. 
Military obligations were not abolished, they were expanded, but the emphasis was 
gradually moved towards service in the military, which allowed much more control from 
the government’s viewpoint. Attempts to re­arm and mobilize all able­bodied adult 
males in the traditional way were certainly made during the revolutionary years and 
major invasions (in 1784–1787, 1790–1794, 1809, 1813, and 1830) but they all pro­
duced very mixed results, and quickly gave way to either disbandment or incorpora­
tion in military structures.118 Widespread ownership of arms remained both a military 
necessity and a threat to government control over natural resources until well into the 
eighteenth century. This ambiguity could not be durably solved until increasing distinc­
tions between “military” and “civilians” made the latter’s armament redundant.
Militias continued to function, despite their obvious threat to public order, in order 
to prevent the governments’ own soldiers from pillaging the countryside. One of the 
reasons why these combatants proved so difficult to manage was their special status 
in contemporary justice systems. This gave them, or at least created a perception, of 
impunity. The high bailiff of ’s­Hertogenbosch, for instance, declared in his account from 
1423–1424 that he did not punish two malefactors to the full extent of the law because 
they had served the duke regularly, and lived “on the borders of the realm” (de palen van 
de lande).119 The pressing need for men willing to serve in an armed capacity thus has 
direct repercussions on the maintenance of law and order.
Military justice in the proper sense of the word developed from the late fifteenth cen­
tury onwards and had a direct impact on the capability of authorities to arrest soldiers. 
The High Bailiff of ’s­Hertogenbosch explicitly stated in 1508–1509 that he was only 
able to fine a culprit because he was a soldier.120 It also had a major influence on environ­
mental crimes. A court record of Breust, dating to 1684, includes several witness state­
ments regarding a certain Jan Lindekens and his son. The latter had been arrested for 
cutting wood illegally in the lordship of Rijkholt. After his release he became a soldier in 
Maastricht and used this status as a pretext for walking around armed and shooting the 
forester’s pigeons. Given that no statements of the offender(s) themselves are included, 
it is conceivable that the son’s military status shielded him from arrest. Authorities 
for their part were not completely powerless to pursue military offenders. In 1702 for 
instance the lord of Rekem started a lawsuit against Renier Schrammen because he had 
117 Corvisier, L’Armée française, 1:197–251; Desbrière, Chronique critique, 30–31, 224–25, 230, 
267–70.
118 Maastricht, RHCL, 04.01, inv. no. 18; Leconte, La Révolution brabançonne dans le duché de 
Limbourg; Rosendaal, Tot nut van Nederland, 41–53, 164–76, 197–208; Sabron, De oorlog, 2:12–14; 
Terlinden, Les souvenirs historiques, 81–105; Wanty, Le Milieu militaire belge, 10–16.
119 Brussels, ARA, 137.01, inv. no. 12990, fol. 179 (transcript Henk Beijers Archiefcollectie).
120 Brussels, ARA, 137.01, inv. no. 12996. See also Boonen, “Repressie van vaandelvluchtige sol­
daten,” 30, 36, 41, 43, 46; Storrs, “Military Justice”; Verreycken, Pour nous servir en l’armée, 110–14, 
188–99; Wilson, “Early Modern German Military Justice.”
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cut wood on the village’s lands and attempted to have his belongings confiscated. The 
latter, who served as a soldier in Maastricht, claimed that only a military court could 
judge him.121 The impression that soldiers could transgress environmental laws with 
relative impunity is confirmed by the repeated assertions in the Habsburg Netherlands 
that military privileges did not apply when it concerned hunting offences.122
Another issue, of no less importance, is to what extent such environmental crimes 
were perceived as important within a military context. The high bailiffs of ’s­Hertogen­
bosch fined a mere three combatants for environmental crimes over the course of more 
than one hundred and fifty years. One man was fined fifty gulden in 1495–1496 for mul­
tiple offences: fighting, threats, cutting down shrubs and a young nut tree, draining a 
pond and stealing the fish while serving with soldiers in the County of Loon. A soldier 
received a fine of six gulden in 1512–1513 for shooting an arrow in a beer barrel and 
cutting some willow branches for firewood, and one of his colleagues had to pay twenty 
gulden in 1514–1515 for garden (or gaerden, garten, that is, pillaging or begging in a 
violent manner) and cutting some oaks managed as coppice wood.123
Military officers, who were fond of hunting themselves, probably considered these 
offences above all as a form of insubordination. The garrison orders of Namur regularly 
mention that it was forbidden to fish in specific locations and that offenders were liable 
to lose their fishing equipment as well as risking some sort of undefined punishment. 
Nevertheless, they provide very few explicit references to the enforcement of these 
orders: one soldier had to ride the “wooden horse” for an hour in 1716 and two sol­
diers had to run the gauntlet seven times up and down in 1742.124 Given that the latter 
punishment was carried out a month after one of the governor’s prohibitions, they were 
probably being made an example of. A 1704 court record from the Dutch army similarly 
concerns a trooper, Willem Moens from Tongres/Tongeren, who had intercourse with 
a mare. The sentence leaves no doubt about the heinous character of the crime and the 
need to punish it accordingly, by executing and burning both man and horse, but it is still 
striking how it emphasizes that this soldier had transgressed the regulations on military 
discipline in particular (it was his captain’s horse).125
The military court of Namur, which processed 2805 cases between 1815 and 1851, 
only considered two explicitly environmental crimes: two soldiers cutting wood in a 
royal forest in 1818, and a soldier who cut down trees and damaged fences in 1839. 
121 Hasselt, RAH, Schepenbank Rekem, inv. no. 938; Maastricht, RHCL, 01.176 Schepenbank 
Breust, inv. no. 1491. See also Bouvignes, 1340: Act August 25, 1649 (transcript Généamag).
122 Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst Overkwartier, 2:223; Lelièvre, “De la jurisdiction militaire,” 133–34.
123 There are also a few entries about stealing horses or other livestock. Brussels, ARA, 1107 
Rekeningen Hoogschout ’s­Hertogenbosch, inv. nos. 12995, 12996.
124 The wooden horse is a punishment device in the shape of a horse with a sharp back on which 
the offender has to sit. It is typically located near the main guardhouse on the parading grounds. 
It might be a common punishment for this kind of offence since the main character of the semi­
fictional Simplicius Simplicissimus (in the mid­seventeenth century) was also punished in this way. 
The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2081, August 12, 1716, July 15, 1742, August 16, 1742; von 
Grimmelshausen, Der Abentheurliche Simplicissimus Teutsch, bk. 4, chap. 9.
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Military authorities could also hardly claim to have played a proactive role: forest guards 
arrested the former offenders, and the gendarmerie the latter.126 Military regulations 
from at least the fifteenth century onwards encompassed a wide range of environmental 
crimes: cutting down woody plants, damaging gardens or fields, and shooting pigeons 
or rabbits, but if these were dealt with at all it would likely have been in a way that does 
not find reflection in military court records. One solution to this problem could be to 
examine monthly reports, which have been preserved for some eighteenth­century regi­
ments and note minor punishments, but these too do not indicate a concern for environ­
mental crimes.127
Archives of nineteenth­century military courts have the advantage that they included 
excerpts of a soldier’s livre de punition, a list of earlier offences including those that did 
not involve a court martial. Louis Eeckhout, for example, deserted from the Belgian army 
in 1844 and joined the French Foreign Legion, but came back after his five­year enlist­
ment. This was a fairly common practice at that time.128 His records indicate that he 
received twenty­seven minor punishments in little more than five years before desert­
ing. These included eight days’ confinement for throwing stones at a citizen’s apple tree, 
and another fifteen for breaking out of prison (the cachot) and stealing fruit from an 
enclosed garden.129
In this context the military court of Namur seems to have been surprisingly lenient 
towards the two German soldiers who cut down trees in 1818, claiming in effect that the 
minutes only provided sufficient evidence for the soldiers hacking down one tree with 
their sabres, not the other twelve firs the forest guards found felled. The defendants 
were consequently condemned to eight days in prison and the costs of the trial. The sol­
dier arrested by the gendarmerie by contrast was punished more severely (one month’s 
detention), but he had also been drunk and had caused a public outcry.130 Military jus­
tice in general was therefore not particularly concerned with repressing environmental 
offenders.
Soldiers were not solely perpetrators. They were both enforcers and lawbreakers. 
Growing distinctions between armies and general society in 1250–1850 originated in 
the difficulty of enforcing military obligations as well as concerns about the mainte­
nance of public order. Men who derived their main income from military service there­
126 Namur, AEN, Conseil de Guerre Provincial, inv. nos. 227, 1424.
127 Liège, AEL, Conseil Privé, 2634: Report from the regiment Royal Liégeois (French service) 
regarding punishments given in December 1788. Militair Wetboek, articles 175–182; Reglements 
et ordonnances du roy pour les gens de guerre, 9:228 (August 28, 1695); Berkvens, Plakkatenlijst 
Overkwartier, 2:249; Bikar, “Aperçus de l’état militaire,” 239–44; de Laurière et al., eds., Ordonnances 
des rois de France, 13:307–8; Rase, Maréchal and Bodart, Inventaire, 23–84; Rorive, Les misères de la 
guerre, 344; Teunisse, Onderdaan in Oranje’s oorlog, 29.
128 Bastin, La justice militaire, 186–88.
129 Eeckhout might have come into conflict with the Belgian military justice system again, for 
he became a French citizen in 1862, when serving as a grenadier corporal in the French Foreign 
Legion. Namur, AEN, Conseil de Guerre Provincial, inv. no. 2678; Bulletin des lois de l’empire français, 
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130 Namur, AEN, Conseil de Guerre Provincial, inv. nos. 227, 1424.
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fore gradually came to dominate an army’s combat element from the Late Middle Ages 
onwards. The fifteenth century saw the creation of the first permanent military units in 
the Meuse Region: the famous bandes d’ordonnance. These were mostly mounted troops 
of noble origin. The transformation of these first units into the large standing forces of 
modern states is a core theme in the history of early modern Europe. This book specifi­
cally analyzes to what extent changes in the organization of military service influenced 
biotic communities.131
The growing emphasis on permanent armies came to a certain degree at the cost of 
the combatants themselves, as demonstrated by the detailed accounts of the castle of 
Blitterswijk near Venlo in 1584–1591. The local steward paid nine soldiers in 1584 to 
serve as guards, a number gradually reduced to two. As argued earlier, these men did 
not constitute a garrison, but fulfilled analogous roles to medi eval sentinels and watch­
men, officials that are notably absent from the accounts.132 The towns of Dordrecht and 
Sedan also retained soldiers in their pay and they patrolled the city and enforced the 
council’s police regulations during the sixteenth century. These men received different 
wages: either three or four brabantse gulden a month. It is a well­known feature of six­
teenth­century armies that private soldiers could receive different pay rates depending 
on their equipment and/or experience.133
By 1586 only three soldiers were left, including one earning higher pay. He had to 
accept a uniform pay rate, but got two pair of shoes in return. More importantly is that this 
man performed all kinds of chores to complement his income: as a hunter, builder, miller, 
and field warden.134 This is not an isolated incidence, but a reflection of processes occur­
ring all over the Meuse Region. A considerable part of the eco logical impacts of soldiers 
included in this study—working on fortifications, gathering or selling wood, and fish­
ing—originate in these processes of standardization which lowered their social status.135 
A watchman certainly performed comparable chores in Venlo as early as 1386–1387, 
namely making fences and repairing roads, but the status of these officials was much 
lower than that of medi eval soldiers. In fourteenth­century Aachen, Soldeneren, who 
invariably served mounted, earned ten to twenty­five times the wages of a watchman.136
Soldiers who performed their service well could conversely be rewarded in a way 
that was of direct significance to the policing of biotic communities. In 1418 Jan IV, 
Duke of Brabant (1415–1427), allowed Carselis de Eupen, who occupied the post of for­
ester in the duchy of Limburg since 1411, to retain his function until the duke repaid 
his debts. These arrears had a military origin: de Eupen already appeared briefly in the 
previous chapter when his men garrisoned the fortress of Argenteau in 1411, and his 
131 Contamine, Guerre, état et société, 278–90; Guillaume, Histoire des bandes d’ordonnance.
132 Dreiskämper, “Thonis Ongewassen en Johan Copper,” 184, 190.
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134 Dreiskämper, “Thonis Ongewassen en Johan Copper,” 184, 190.
135 Bas van Bavel, The Invisible Hand, 177–206; Burschel, Söldner, 38–44; Swart, “From Lands­
knecht to ‘Soldier’”; von Grimmelshausen, Der Abentheurliche Simplicissimus Teutsch, bk. 4, chap. 9.
136 de Groot, Stadsrekeningen, 1386 fol. 7, 1387 fol. 20; Laurent, Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 9, 
218–19, 249, 256–57, 260, 314.
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father had been taken prisoner at the battle of Baesweiler (1371). Apparently, the family 
had, after more than forty years, still not received full compensation for losses suffered 
at this famous debacle.137
These medi eval notions of service were expanded from the sixteenth century 
onwards in response to changing social realities. On January 10, 1559, for example, the 
governor of Chimay appointed a certain Yzaye Faucquesseau as forest warden. This man 
served as “archer” (heavy cavalryman) in the company of the prince of Chimay, part of 
the bandes d’ordonnances, but he also owned land in the area (Baileux). The prince thus 
rewarded a subject for his loyal military service by assigning him to a different kind 
of service, by making him a functionary with a central role in the management of his 
natural resources. Given the special status of these units, most soldiers did not have to 
remain with their company in peacetime, he did not even have to give up his military 
role, and he was still denoted as archer in 1563.138
During the early modern period former soldiers were gradually perceived as par­
ticuarly appropriate candidates for serving in other government functions, particularly 
if these involved arms. The bailiff of Kempenland, for instance, declared in 1651 that all 
his field wardens were former cavalrymen of the Dutch army, apparently because he 
could not find suitable candidates among the local villagers. This can be explained by 
the recent takeover of the mostly Catholic northern part of the Duchy of Brabant by the 
Dutch Republic, which required all state officials to be Protestant. At the same time it 
is emblematic for the position of soldiers as one of the oldest and most prominent ser­
vants of the state, which made them a model for other branches of government.139
By the eighteenth century military service had clearly become a desirable experi­
ence for police officials, for it gets explicitly stated in candidates’ records. Former sol­
diers also constituted a significant minority among customs officials at that time. In 
1825 the Netherlands government established an official list of government functions 
preferably given to former members of the military, including prison guard, servant of 
the provost (stokkenknecht), engineer with the department of water management, lock 
keeper, porter, provost, exciseman, mailman, and gamekeeper. The nineteenth­century 
French government also employed officials called gardes forestiers de la marine who had 
nothing to do with forest protection as such, but whose work involved selecting trees 
suitable for shipbuilding. They were recruited among members of the militarized crafts­
men who built warships.140
137 Govaerts, “‘Mannen van wapenen,’” 302–6, 318–19; Yans, Histoire économique, 89–91.
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The general idea behind these practices was to solve three problems at once: reward 
soldiers for their service, reduce violence while they are vagrant by helping discharged 
veterans find employment, and gain loyal subordinates (see figure 29). In practice, the 
situation was far more complex, partially because soldiers were not necessarily moti­
vated to serve in these capacities and partially because they were not paid very well. 
The town of Maaseik, for example, appointed a new field warden on April 2, 1782. His 
nomination explicitly mentions that he was a former soldier to the point of naming 
his regiment, an Imperial unit. Three months later the town had to find a replacement 
because the man had enlisted again, this time in the Spanish army.141 The recruitment of 
reliable field guards, the nineteenth­century successors to these wardens, also proved 
particularly difficult because of their low pay.142 Still, a list of former soldiers resident in 
Maaseik, dating to 1815, reveals that three police officials (a field guard, agent de police, 
and guard of the fisheries) all had military experience.143
141 Maaseik, Stadsarchief, Oud archief, Magistrale Rol, fol. 91: Stadsrekening 1782–1783; Boonen, 
Misdaad en straf, 21–22.
142 Maastricht, RHCL, 04.01., inv. no. 30: letter of the mayor of Rutten (Tongres/Tongeren), March 
22, 1814; Receuil général des lois et ordonnances, 11 (1841), 462; Kort, Bromsnor in Zeeland, 39–43, 
50–56, 115–21; Parmentier, Pays de Charleroi, 268–69.
143 Maastricht, RHCL, 04.01., inv. no. 124.
Figure 29. Arrest of a poacher (1813–1839), litho graph based on a painting by Horace Vernet. 
Note that the forest guard has only one arm (Art Institute of Chicago, 1927.5653).
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The uncertainty whether these men really were the models of discipline and loy­
alty that their military service supposedly guaranteed was an even more serious issue 
from the government’s viewpoint. Cutting down wood in the forest of Rekem, meant to 
prepare Maastricht for an imminent Allied siege in December 1813 (see chap. 3), was 
considerably delayed because Lambert­Henri­François Frantzen, head of the forestry 
department and nominally in charge of the operation, was absent for several days. It is 
possible that his specific background, rising to officer’s rank in the revolutionary years 
without prior military experience, did not qualify him as the prototype of a disciplined 
soldier. His second­in­command, who took charge of the operation, had served Napoleon 
as a non­commissioned officer and initially asked the prefect for a position as a court 
clerk.144 Yet it is significant that an 1804 attempt to establish a French veteran camp 
near Jülich, based on Roman examples, also had to drop its military aspects because the 
veterans wanted to become ordinary farmers.145
Armies evidently had an important function in the policing of biotic communities 
during the premodern period. Still, incessant conflicts continued between the military 
as an organization that gradually came to represent the state and the ongoing ability 
of the general population to provide armed service, often in order to repress soldiers’ 
own disorderly behaviour. This paradox eventually contributed to the rise of organiza­
tions that controlled both members of the military and civilians, still built on ideas about 
rewarding military service and cultivating a specific image about military professional­
ism. The best known of these organizations is the French gendarmerie, created in 1791 
through a reorganization of the maréchaussée.
The maréchaussée was a medi eval institution, founded in the fourteenth­century 
kingdom of France to deal with marauding soldiers within a changing context of mili­
tary justice. Their creation was directly connected to the function of provost, the official 
specifically tasked with maintaining order among army members. This rather quickly 
evolved into a general obligation to provide safety on the road and the organization lost 
its specific association with warfare by the seventeenth century.146 A major reform in 
1720, not coincidently the same period that saw the consolidation of France’s perma­
nent armed forces, militarized the organization. It adopted uniforms, a strict hierarchy, 
and serving in the military became a prerequisite for obtaining an officer’s commission. 
The French government expanded its military aspects during subsequent reforms, with 
the requirement of prior military service being extended to all ranks.147
144 Maastricht, RHCL, Frans Archief, inv. no. 613: letter July 17, 1811; inv. no. 1177: letter 
December 21, 1813; 04.01, inv. no. 30: Lists of former soldiers receiving pensions; Terlinden, Les 
souvenirs historiques, 123.
145 Woloch, The French Veteran, 232–46. See also Meyrac, Traditions, 324.
146 For the role of the prévôt des maréchaux, see Bouvignes, 1197: Act May 21, 1495 (transcript 
Généamag). Brouillet, “La maréchaussée des origines à 1720”; Smolar­Meynard, La justice ducale, 
356–61.
147 Emsley, Gendarmes; Iung, “La maréchaussée de Lorraine et Barrois”; Lorgnier, Maréchaussée, 
1:89–102.
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It is easily overlooked, because of its later success, that the maréchaussée was just 
one of several examples during the eighteenth century. In the Habsburg Netherlands 
the armed followings of the prévôt général, the high bailiffs, and the forester of Brabant, 
were militarized as well at the turn of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century. In 
late eighteenth­century Jülich and briefly also Liège cavalrymen patrolled the country­
side. These resembled the French maréchaussée in many ways, but prior military ser­
vice was not a precondition for entry.148 One can consider these horsemen as a sort of 
intermediary for they also adopted the green uniforms typical of police officials in other 
parts of the Holy Roman Empire. The use of the colour green reflects the hunter ori­
gin of today’s German police forces. In the Thirty Years War the Swedish government 
had drafted its gamekeepers and forest wardens into special units that acted as military 
police, a practice that then quickly spread to nearby German territories, notably Hessen 
and Prussia (the military Jäger).149
A major issue proved to be the need to maintain a balance between the cultivation 
of military ideals and these units’ role in policing. Looking specifically at one unit, the 
flanqueurs-chasseurs of Napoleon’s Guard, illustrates this dilemma. The regiment was 
formed in 1812 and recruited hunters and/or woodsmen. Relatives of forest guards 
were especially encouraged to volunteer by promising them a position in the forestry 
department. The unit’s personnel records show that a hundred and twenty­nine sol­
diers from the Meuse Region, and more specifically the départements with large areas of 
woodlands (the Ardennes, Meuse, and Roer) enlisted. The relative precision of military 
records from the Napoleonic period is of note here, because the professions of these men 
rarely point to a direct relationship with forests. It is the professions of their fathers, 
rarely included in earlier records, which makes all the difference (forty­four soldiers 
were indeed sons of forest guards). After the disastrous Russian campaign only nine of 
the original hundred and twenty­nine remained. They were consequently replaced with 
conscripts, which effectively put an end to the unit’s special status. Napoleon did not 
draft any serving forest guards, so the forestry department continued to function, but the 
loss of so many potential successors and family members likely affected it in other ways.150
It is significant that the maréchaussée/gendarmerie, which eventually became the 
formula adopted throughout the Meuse Region, emphasized difference from regular 
military units. In terms of activities, they were in many ways remarkably similar to 
their medi eval and early modern predecessors. A series of reports from the company 
maréchaussee151 stationed in the province of Liège (1816–1830) suggest an emphasis 
on arresting deserters, vagabonds, thieves, and so forth, with references to poachers or 
148 Balace, “La maréchaussée”; Emsley, Gendarmes, 13–36, 149–54; Goblet d’Alviella, Histoire des 
bois et forêts, 2:30–31; Reiche, Vom bewaffneten Hausmann zum Polizisten; van Belle, Le premier 
projet de police, 15–23, 191–202.
149 Murk, “Rekrutierung und Ausbildung,” 109–10; Nyrén, “Riksjägmästarambetet.”
150 Vincennes, SHD, GR 20Yc99: Contrôles Régiment de flanqueurs chasseurs. For the insistence 
that the Landdragoner in the duchy of Jülich would not come under control of the military, see 
Reiche, Vom bewaffneten Hausmann zum Polizisten, 67–68, 76–78.
151 The newly founded kingdom of the Netherlands (1815–1830) adopted the name marechaussee 
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woodcutters being quite rare (thirteen arrests in fifteen years). Environmental crimes 
only appear when members of the company intervened on behalf of forest or field 
guards or during exceptionally cold winter months, when large numbers of people were 
desperate for firewood. This is very much in line with the official policy of serving as 
support and supervisers of forest and fields guards.152
One of the oldest reports, from April 1816, is exceptional because it states that mul­
tiple nightly patrols conducted by the company put an end to the frequent thefts of wood 
in royal forests. It also specified that citizens refused to do their guard duty and that 
public officials set a bad example. In other words, the maréchaussee interfered because 
normal protection mechanisms were ineffective. This should be seen in the context of 
two regime changes in less than two years. The archives of the forestry department in 
fact include a complaint about the inhabitants of Malmédy taking advantage of the pres­
ence of Prussian soldiers in 1814 to plunder state forests. In this way the interference 
of this specific kind of armed force had to resolve the disarray brought about by distur­
bances caused by other armies.153 This demonstrates the military police’s core function 
as a controlling mechanism for both the military and the general population.
Conclusion
Protecting fauna and flora is hardly a prerogative of modern armies or of today’s con­
ceptions of nature, since the role of armed forces in the safeguarding of biotic commu­
nities is well attested from the Middle Ages onwards. Their contribution derives from 
the inherent connection between armies and organized violence. The precise ways in 
which armies intervened transformed markedly over the course of six centuries and 
demonstrate, more explicitly than any other chapter, how changing conceptions of what 
an army is or should be influenced the interactions between these groups and eco logical 
systems. Distinctions between different kinds of organized violence (military versus 
police) or armed forces and society at large (military versus civilians), which are consid­
ered normal today, originated in these developments.
The essential characteristic of the Meuse Region from the thirteenth to the nine­
teenth centuries was one where soldiers gradually became the dominant type of com­
batant, but other forms of military service were not entirely abolished. This stimulated 
the formation of a group of people who depended on military wages as a primary source 
of income. They became both key actors in ongoing processes of state formation, and a 
constant source of problems, a paradox that was, from the governments’ point of view, 
not satisfactory resolved until the nineteenth century.
 
instead of gendarmerie because of the latter’s association with the French Revolution and 
Napoleon’s regime.
152 Liège, AEL, Fonds Hollandais, inv. no. 800; Delguste­Van Der Kaa, Histoire des loups, 89–92; 
Emsley, Gendarmes, 53–62, 91–92, 96, 109–10, 112; Iung, “La maréchaussée de Lorraine et Barrois,” 
355–79.






Armies as a Hazard to Public Health
On July 5, 1847 the French Chambre des députés became the scene of an important 
parliamentary debate, concerning peacetime mortality in the French armed forces. 
Representative Desjobert started the discussion by arguing that the death­rate in the 
military in peacetime significantly exceeded that of comparable age­groups in the gen­
eral population. The Minister of War and another general denied the claim. The debate 
eventually ended inconclusively but serves as a powerful symbol that contemporaries 
were well aware that armed forces lost far more men to environmental factors, mainly 
diseases, than to enemy action.1
A consensus exists among historians that warfare not only caused important health 
issues, including the spread of epidemics, but also stimulated significant changes in 
medical practices, from wound treatment to inoculation. Because of this perceived dia­
lectic relationship, the narrative of progress, the slow ascendency of “modernity,” is par­
ticularly strong in studies about the history of military medicine.2 It notably builds on 
the assumption that medi eval armies did not take basic measures of disease prevention 
and lacked well­educated medical practioners.3 The Parisian anecdote above reveals 
that nineteenth­century armies still had to cope with serious health issues.
The study of military health has a long history since it is rooted in the writings of army 
doctors themselves, who examined as early as the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
past occurrences of epidemics. By the First World War the connection between warfare 
and epidemics had become firmly established.4 Exchanges between medical and environ­
mental history, however, are a far more recent phenomenon. Historians have traditionally 
placed their main emphasis on European troops in tropical contexts, environments to 
which they proved particularly vulnerable, and ship crews on long sea voyages. Hospitals 
and wounds have also benefited from far more attention than mechanisms of disease pre­
vention.5 The findings of battlefield excavations have in fact become increasingly impor­
tant for the study of military medicine in historical contexts during the last decades.6
1 Discours prononcés par M. Desjobert.
2 Gabriel and Metz, A History; Garrison, Notes; Hargreaves, “The Long Road”; Smallman­Raynor 
and Cliff, War Epidemics, 32–40.
3 Gabriel and Metz, A History, 1:205–10, 2:143–54; Garrison, Notes, 85–97; Vollmuth, Die sanitäts-
dienstliche Versorgung, 117–18. For a different view, see Geltner, “In the Camp and on the March.”
4 Heizmann, “Military Sanitation”; Hirsch, Geo graphical and Historical Patho logy; Prinzing, Epi-
demics.
5 Lenihan, Fluxes, Fevers, and Fighting Men; McNeill, Mosquito Empires; Mitchell, Medicine; 
Mounier­Kuhn, Chirurgie de guerre; van Meerbeeck, “Service sanitaire”; Wagner, Die Seuchen.
6 See for instance Meller, ed., Schlachtfeldarchäo logie.
184 chapter 5
The current chapter questions this idea of progress by considering the changes in 
the ways members of an army sought to preserve their health within a larger spectrum 
of eco logical interactions. The term “pathogens,” disease­producing microorganisms 
or materials, refers to the lowest level in eco logical systems, that between species and 
individual organisms. Rather than assume that medi eval armies remained apathetic 
towards epidemics and that soldiers became increasingly aware of the importance of 
prophylactic or preventative healthcare during the Renaissance or subsequent centu­
ries, it considers whether changes in the organization of armies themselves made them 
more vulnerable to eco logical pressures. Significant medical developments eventually 
occurred, but these changes might have been more evolutionary than revolutionary and 
could furthermore have been brought about by a steady deterioration of military health 
over time.
The main theoretical framework underpinning military health practices through­
out the 1250–1850 period remained in effect that of Hippocrates and Galen. The Greek 
physician Hippocrates (who lived in the fifth to fourth centuries bce) is traditionally 
credited with formulating the idea that pestilential or corrupt air (miasmas) produced 
disease for the first time in a European context. The Roman doctor Galen (from the sec­
ond century ce) considerably expanded this theory and connected susceptibility to “bad 
air” to the balance of humours in the body. The four humours are black bile, yellow bile, 
phlegm, and blood. According to humoral theory any imbalance in these four substances 
can cause disease. In order to remain healthy, one had to maintain equilibrium between 
the six non­naturals (air, motion and exercise, sleeping and waking, food and drink, 
excretion, and passions/emotions) for these influenced the four humours.7
Furthermore, there remained a strong continuity in the functions attributed to vari­
ous kinds of medical practitioners. From the Central Middle Ages until the early nine­
teenth century strict divisions existed between physicians on the one hand and surgeons 
on the other. Physicians were mainly concerned with disease, or their patients’ interior 
health, and followed a university education. Surgeons by contrast set bones and dressed 
wounds, a trade most of them learned as apprentices. Aside from physicians and sur­
geons, there were also barbers or barber­surgeons, skilled in shaving and bloodletting. 
This provided them with a basic knowledge of the treatment of wounds. Attaching medi­
cal practitioners, invariably surgeons or barber­surgeons, to specific military units only 
became general practice during the sixteenth century. We know that physicians, uni­
versity­educated surgeons, and pharmacists, all served as members of a ruler’s or com­
mander’s household (an army’s “general staff”) during the Middle Ages. They continued 
to do so during the early modern period but were from the sixteenth century onwards 
also attached to military hospitals. The majority of medical practitioners actually pres­
ent with armed forces in the field were therefore surgeons and barber­surgeons.8
The maintenance of army health on the most basic level did not involve either medi­
cal practitioners or miasmas, but simply resolved around defence against environmen­
7 Jouanna, Greek Medicine, 119–36.
8 Howard, Napoleon’s Doctors, 5–18; Kerkhoff, “Over de geneeskundige verzorging,” 49–59; 
Vollmuth, Die sanitätsdienstliche Versorgung.
 army heaLth 185
tal pressures. Reading the “ego documents” left by army members, particularly those 
written by private soldiers, provides a stringent reminder of the omnipresence of 
inclement weather and climate. These eco logical impacts had a major, but in historical 
studies somewhat neglected, effect on military health. Hendrik Conscience, a seventeen­
year­old volunteer with the Belgian army in 1831, still vividly remembered in 1858 how 
he spent his first night in the open field and that he immediately fell sick.9 While ear­
lier centuries might lack the prevalence of such personal testimonies, they are by no 
means absent. As early as the fourteenth century, the poet Eustache Deschamps, who 
participated in the French invasion of Guelders (1388), recorded his experiences (see 
chap. 1). An anonymous gunner from Utrecht who fought with the imperial army dur­
ing the 1554 campaign in the Meuse valley mentioned in his journal that on the night of 
October 26 three soldiers froze to death when standing guard. The French engineer de 
Vauban included a note in his account of the 1692 siege of Namur that the trenches were 
constantly full of water because of the incessant rain.10
Chronicles and fiscal accounts can be very informative as well and provide a more 
detached perspective. Melis Stoke’s chronicle, dating to the early fourteenth century, 
records for instance that Haarlem lost its warship in the Meuse estuary during a storm. 
The prior of St.­Jakob’s hospital in Tongres/Tongeren, on the other hand, corroborated 
the observations of the aforementioned gunner when he noted that imperial troops 
passed by in 1552 “with running noses and with chattering teeth, and many were very 
sick and died like dogs.”11 In November 1585 the town of Weert had to accommodate 
twenty­six Spanish soldiers arriving from the Bommelerwaard with frozen feet. For sev­
eral of these men help came too late.12
While armed forces certainly took seasonal fluctuations, and general weather cir­
cumstances, seriously (there being examples of medi eval mounted raids being can­
celled because of heavy rain), one should not go so far as to assume that they never 
campaigned before late spring and always stopped fighting in late fall.13 In some cases 
continuing military action, despite such environmental constraints, could bring a com­
mander significant advantages. In 1386 the presence of a strong west wind encouraged 
the urban militia of Brussels to lead an assault on Grave. One chronicle claims that they 
thought incendiary missiles would be more effective, another asserts that dust clouds 
9 Conscience, De omwenteling, 54–57.
10 Deschamps, Oeuvres, 1:123–24, 3:24–26, 5:121–22; de Vauban, Journal, 139, 153; Macaré, ed., 
“Dagverhaal,” 284, 303–4. See also de Rabutin, Commentaires, 1:164; d’Haynin, Mémoires, 1:131, 
1:145, 1:158, 1:217, 1:221, and 2:85; Duyck, Journaal; Hexham, A Iournall; Jacquet­Ladrier, “Les 
mésaventures,” 85; Laukhard, Leben und Schicksale, 3:106, 3:110, 3:122, 3:123, 3:130, 3:140, 3:141; 
Vallée and Pariset, eds., Carnet, 7, 57; Peters, ed., Peter Hagendorf, 62; von Adlersfels­Ballestrem, 
ed., Memoiren, 12.
11 Stoke, Rijmkroniek, vv. 590–608 (http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/rijmkroniek); Vandewal, 
“De kroniek,” 235, 241. See also de Stavelot, Chronique, 112; Kraus, Regesten, vol. 6, no. 827.
12 This would have shortly before Dutch troops breached the dikes and isolated the Spanish 
infantry on an island in the Meuse (see fig. 22 above). Klaversma, Weert tussen 1062 en 1602, 217.
13 van Boendale, Brabantsche yeesten, 2:348 (bk. 6, vv. 10110–10114 and 10125–10128); 
Buisman, Duizend jaar wind, weer en water 1300–1450, 577.
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Figure 30. The French army crosses the frozen Meuse during 
the winter of 1794–1795. Painting by Dirk van Langendijk, 
an eyewitness. The soldiers in the foreground are marching 
on a dike (Rotterdam, Atlas van Stolk, inv. no. 3224).  
Reproduced with permission of the Atlas van Stolk.
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would blind the defenders (possibly referring to the river dunes and drift sands near 
the city). Whatever the advantages the gale might have brought, their attack ultimately 
failed.14 The French Armée du Nord was more fortunate during the winter of 1794–1795. 
The freezing of the Meuse and other major rivers nullified the defensive value of the 
Hollandic Water Line and allowed the French army to invade the republic’s heartland 
(see figure 30). It is noteworthy that H. A. Sabron, captain in the Dutch general staff, pub­
lished tables with mean temperatures as early as 1893 to demonstrate that extremely 
cold temperatures hampered the republic’s defensive efforts.15
The rapid collapse of the Dutch defence in 1795 confirms Dagomar Degroot’s con­
clusion that climate changes were “a catalyst for, but rarely a cause of, military victories 
and defeats.”16 It is the combination of environmental pressures and a society’s range 
of adaptive strategies, which are based on earlier experiences and existing develop­
ments, that really matters (see also chap. 3). We know that the Dutch army suffered 
from a range of structural problems in the late eighteenth century, which prevented it 
from responding adequately to its French enemies. The Dutch traditionally relied on 
large numbers of foreign soldiers, for example, which worked well during the Eighty 
Years War but caused significant difficulties during the eighteenth century, because they 
gradually lost access to their traditional recruiting grounds.17 The renewed interest in 
weather and climate does have the merit, however, of placing armies’ well­known vul­
nerability to disease in perspective. It shows that military health concerns cannot be 
limited to hygiene awareness.
The ways that armies sought to protect themselves from the elements might 
seem rudimentary, but they fulfilled a key role in health preservation. The con­
struction of huts, made from straw and wood, sometimes with linen and possibly 
added with moss, remained common on campaign up to the nineteenth century. 
Such huts appear on late medi eval miniatures, seventeenth­century sketches or 
paintings, and photo graphs of the camp of Beverlo.18 Tents were of course prefer­
able but were also quite expensive. During the Middle Ages they were consequently 
mainly restricted to noble retinues and urban militias. According to the accounts 
of Dordrecht from 1283–1287 the tents of the urban militia were washed and then 
stored in a church after they returned from a military campaign.19 It is only towards 
the end of the seventeenth century that using tents became the norm for all armed 
forces. The Prussian marshal von Natzmer, who served in the Dutch army in the 
14 de Dynter, Chronique, 3:113–14; van Boendale, Brabantsche yeesten, 2:280–83 (bk. 6, vv. 
8127–8215).
15 Sabron, De oorlog, 2; the tables are published on pages 32–33 of the attachments (bijlagen).
16 Degroot, The Frigid Golden Age, 195. See also more generally chap. 3 on disturbances.
17 Essai sur l’armée hollandaise, van Nimwegen, De Republiek.
18 Desbrière, Chronique critique, 50; de Solemne, La Charge du Mareschal des Logis, 21; Martin and 
Russon, Vivre sous la tente, 196–200; Richer, Abrégé chrono logique, 212; Spaans, “Legerkampen,” 
171–73; Weuts, Honderdvijftig jaar kamp van Beverlo, 18–20.
19 Bolsée, ed., La grande enquête, 87–88, 279; Burgers and Dijkhof, eds., De oudste stadsrekeningen, 
10, 23, 24, 44–46, 55, 57, 63, 72; Martin and Russon, Vivre sous la tente, 184–96.
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1670s, recalled in his memoirs that he still had to construct such huts and that they 
needed to be of uniform appearance, even though they were broken down again the 
very next day.20
The issuing and repairing of clothing and shoes should be seen in a similar light. The 
accounts of Aachen specify that it paid a shoemaker to repair the footwear of citizens 
taking part in military expeditions during the fourteenth century.21 More than four cen­
turies later (1788) a list of recruits of the Royal Liégeois regiment, assembled in Liège 
before their march to their new garrison in Givet, reveals that several of these men not 
only received a money bounty but also a new pair of shoes.22 The most common mea­
sure taken to preserve the wellbeing of horses was likewise the repairing or reshod­
ding of horseshoes. In 1378 the prévôt of Chiny rewarded a village farrier for shoeing 
the horses of his followers, mobilized fiefholders. This force, sufficiently large since this 
task took eight days, apparently did not include a farrier. From the sixteenth century 
onwards farriers appear regularly on muster rolls, which suggests that their enlistment 
became standard practice around this time.23
Guards and sentries were even more vulnerable to the elements, as suggested by 
the accounts of the high bailiff of Montfort from 1397–1398. These mention that the 
fortress’s sentries received wool or fur trimmed cloaks. Urban accounts likewise include 
references to the construction or repairing of guardhouses, later made famous in the 
paintings of the Dutch Golden Age.24 The accounts from the town of Geldern (1387/88) 
mention the making of arrow slits in one of these. They must have been common in 
fortresses as well, for the chronicler Petrus Treckpoel claimed that a gunner shot down 
the guardhouse from the main tower during the siege of the fortress of Reydt near 
Mönchengladbach (1464), so that the feathers of the sentinel’s bed “flew around as if 
it has snowed.”25 Eighteenth­century garrison regulations were more specific and ruled 
that a soldier only had to stand guard for two hours at a time, or one hour during the 
winter months.26
20 Dibbetz, Het Groot Militair Woordenboek, 300, 613; Melder, Korte en klare instructie, 72–73; 
von Adlersfels­Ballestrem, ed., Memoiren, 12.
21 Laurent, Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 278, 279, 281.
22 Brussels, CDMRA, Ancien Régime, inv. no. II/20.
23 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. no. 2965: Muster roll of two hundred horsemen led by captain de 
Cortenbach, 1552; Liégeois, “Compte de la recette de Chiny,” 158, 162. See also Boffa, Warfare, 
164; de Keralio, Lacuée, and Servan, Encyclopédie méthodique. Art militaire, 1:589–97; Laurent, 
Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 292.
24 Archiv Haus Welbergen, inv. no. 754: Accounts city of Goch, 1626–1677, fol. 63; Grave, SLC, 
Archief Gemeente Grave, inv. no. 217, fols. 7v, 46r, 122r, 133r, 193v, 227r, and inv. no. 218, fols. 
15v, 52r, 72v–73v (transcripts Rien van den Brand); Gentenaar and Hupperetz, “Personeel en 
werkzaamheden,” 202; Renes and Wessels, “Loen ende Werck,” 113; Rosen, Soldiers at Leisure.
25 Kuppers, ed., “De stadsrekeningen,” 9, 11, 14, 22, 28; Paquay, “Kroniek der Luiksche Oorlogen,” 207.
26 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079: Orders November 31, 1715, December 22, 1716; 
inv. no. 2081: January 8, 1739; Vincennes, SHD, GR, 2Xy09: Germain Vincent dit Parisien; Reglement 
en orders Maastricht (1786), art. 36; Bovy, Promenades, 1:76–77.
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The emphasis on environmental pressures is imperative because it provides an eco­
logical context for the spread of actual epidemics. Given the traditional image of medi­
eval armies as being too ill­equipped to enforce basic hygiene standards, one would 
expect references to the latter to be bountiful. In practice relatively few sources explic­
itly comment on epidemics, or fear thereof, in a military context before the late fifteenth 
or sixteenth centuries. Emond de Dynter’s description of Duke Antoine of Brabant’s 
failed attempt to besiege Dordrecht in 1418 does not remark on anyone falling ill, but he 
Figure 31. Etching of the Dutch army besieging the castle of 
Namur, 1695, by Jan van Huchtenburg. Note the soldier in 
the foreground lying next to his horse and the dogs feeding 
on a cadaver (Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum, RP–P–OB–77.339).
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did admit, nonetheless, that citizens from Dordrecht took members of the ducal house­
hold prisoner when they returned by boat because of sickness.27 A claim for compensa­
tion made by Engelbert of Nassau, lord of Breda, regarding losses suffered in ducal ser­
vice, reveals that the Brabant army had to conduct a desperate fighting retreat on foot 
towards Geertruidenberg, and that fifteen of his own followers, of a contingent total­
27 De Dynter, Chronique, 3:806–8.
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ling about fifty­five horsemen, were taken prisoner. The account also notes that most of 
them were captured when the ship carrying his retinue’s equipment was overwhelmed. 
It is unclear, however, whether all of these men were also sick, for at least three of them 
were not combatants (a cook, clerk, and surgeon).28
Medi eval fiscal accounts, which give evidence about all kinds of expenses made dur­
ing military campaigns, only mention the purchase of medicine for individual horses 
and provide no indication that massive numbers of men or animals were struck down by 
disease.29 A major inquest from 1389 lists seventy­five cases of individuals or groups of 
men fined by officials of Duchess Johanna of Brabant, because they left the army prema­
turely during one of the sieges of Grave (in 1386 and 1388). Thirteen of these provided 
an excuse: seven claimed poverty or lack of pay, two were wounded, and four were sick. 
Of the latter only one gave a detailed statement: he was a man­at­arms who fell ill in 
1386 when he reached Bladel near Eindhoven, that is before he had even left the duchy, 
and sent his bastard brother to serve in his place in 1388, because he had still not recov­
ered. His illness might therefore have had nothing to do with camp life. Several other 
people also claimed exemption from military service because of sickness.30
Historical research regarding medi eval military medicine has neglected to point out 
that unambiguous references to epidemics or epizootics come from very specific cir­
cumstances, unrepresentative for warfare in general: sieges and extended campaigns 
in different environmental contexts (such as the crusades or the imperial campaigns 
in Italy).31 The poet Jan van Heelen, for instance, did not comment on the presence of 
disease during Jan I of Brabant’s campaigns between the Meuse and Rhine in the 1280s, 
but devoted several lines to nine prominent knights killed by an epidemic during the 
Aragonese Crusade (1284–1285); apparently even the duke himself had to fear for 
his life.32 This inclusion of the Aragon campaign is significant because Jean de Meun’s 
famous criticism that the armies of Latin Christendom lacked the basic hygiene of their 
Byzantine, Muslim, and Mongolian counterparts in his 1284 translation of Vegetius, also 
originates in such experiences.33
Many historians of medicine thus assume that since armies in recent centuries suf­
fered from epidemics, these must have been at least as commonplace in medi eval times. 
Such a belief does not take changes in armies or warfare into account, or the fact that 
some diseases may have evolved significantly over time. This issue is further compli­
cated by the difficult identification of specific illnesses in a historical context. Sixteenth­ 
and seventeenth­century chronicles or ego documents that comment on epidemics in 
28 Juten, “Engelbrecht I van Nassau,” 27–33.
29 Brussels, ARA, 137.01, inv. no. 12991; van Doorninck, ed., De tocht van Jan van Blois 1371–1372, 
32, 62, 63, 76–77, 87.
30 Bolsée, ed., La grande enquête, 26, 95, 220, 324.
31 Bradbury, The Medi eval Siege, 83; Decourt, “Paludisme”; Martin and Russon, Vivre sous la tente, 
226–28; Mitchell, Stern, and Tepper, “Dysentery”; Prinzing, Epidemics, 12–15; Wagner, Die Seuchen.
32 Boffa, “Les soutiens militaires,” 17–18; van Helen, Rymkronyk, 102–4.
33 Richardot, Végèce et la culture militaire, 167–68.
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a military context often refer to any epidemic disease as “plague.”34 Sick soldiers do 
appear regularly in prints and paintings, but these images rarely allow an identification 
of specific diseases (see figure 31). A detailed breakdown of mortality causes for 4232 
soldiers from the Jemappes department (in the Belgian Hainaut) in 1798–1814, based 
on billets for hospital admittance, shows that 64.4 percent died from “fevers,” without 
further specification.35 These are just afflictions that caused someone’s death.
The association between venereal disease and soldiers became well established 
during the major outbreak of syphilis in the 1490s. It reached the Meuse Region by 
1497–1498 at the latest. Up to the nineteenth century exact distinctions between syphi­
lis and other venereal diseases remain vague, however.36 According to overviews of hos­
pital admittance for Napoleonic soldiers in the “Belgian” departments more than one 
in five patients was admitted because of a venereal disease. Statistics of “syphilis” pub­
lished around the middle of the nineteenth century indicate that it affected more than 
ten percent of the French, Dutch, and Belgian armies. In the Dutch navy approximately a 
quarter of the personnel suffered from such ailments.37
What the sources do show is that the vulnerability of army members to diseases was 
not a simple reflection of their awareness of hygiene, or a lack thereof. Insects have a 
very important role in disease transmission within military contexts: lice spread typhus, 
mosquitos malaria, and house flies dysentery, trachoma, and typhoid. The house fly pre­
fers horse manure for breeding, an environment that could be found in large quantities 
near armed forces and it causes disease by transferring bacteria from its breeding place 
to human food. It is also worth noting that the insects themselves are not responsible 
for epidemic outbreaks, they simply act as vectors for the bacteria that actually produce 
disease in humans or animals. This means that epidemics or epizootics mainly occur in 
very specific environmental circumstances: when the presence of both pathogens and 
vectors is combined with human and animal bodies that have been weakened by stress, 
lack of proper food, and insufficient shelter.
The fear of marshes and “marsh fevers,” for example, is expressed as early as the fifth 
century ce in Vegetius’s famous treatise on military matters, which served as the main 
military handbook throughout the Middle Ages.38 These “marsh fevers” might refer to 
one or several diseases, but it is likely that they included malaria, spread by mosquitos 
of the Anopheles genus. The parasites of the Plasmodium genus, which cause malaria, are 
not native to the North Sea area, but became established there in Antiquity or the Early 
Middle Ages. It is possible that Roman or Frankish armies played a role in their trans­
34 Burschel, Söldner, 258–68; de Graaf, Oorlog, 498–500; Leboutte, “D’Austerlitz à Liège,” 442–45; 
Mitchell, Medicine, 209–19; Mitchell, “Retrospective Diagnosis.”
35 Darquenne, La conscription, 244–68.
36 Burschel, Söldner, 260; Garrison, Notes, 108–9; Schmitz­Cliever, “Pest und pestilenzialische 
Krankheiten,” 135.
37 Darquenne, La conscription, 244–46; Haneveld and van Royen, Vrij van zichtbare gebreken, 
184–85; Hirsch, Geo graphical and Historical Patho logy, 2:70.
38 Vegetius, De re militari, bk. 3; Allmand, The De Re Militari of Vegetius.
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mission.39 Pliny the Elder, who might have been involved in the construction of a canal 
between the Meuse and Rhine while serving as an officer on the Roman Rhine frontier 
in the first century ce, records that a spring in the lands of the Tungri, possibly near 
Tongres/Tongeren, cured tertian fevers. Malaria remained endemic in the northern part 
of the Meuse Region, the Meuse–Rhine estuary and the Campine/Kempen, until the late 
nineteenth or even twentieth century.40
Local inhabitants would have been to some degree immune to the disease, given its 
prevalence, but this did not apply to soldiers originating from elsewhere. The death of 
massive numbers of British soldiers who campaigned in the Campine/Kempen during 
the Austrian War of Succession (1740–1748) led to two major publications on army 
health by John Pringle and Jacob Grainger. Both connected epidemics of intermittent 
fevers among British soldiers to the marshes or inundations near Heusden and ’s­Her­
togenbosch.41 These floodings were just a temporary phenomenon, but since military 
defence in the shape of individual fortifications and the Hollandic Water Line necessi­
tated that large stretches of land remained waterlogged they also preserved an ideal 
habitat for mosquitos over a long­term period. The government of Charleroi did in fact 
note in 1795 the difficulty of removing stagnant water from the fields inundated by the 
garrison.42 Fifty years later the infamous “fevers of Beverlo” kept medical circles in Bel­
gium occupied. The publications of these doctors connected the “miasmas” coming from 
marshes near the camp with summer heat, in other words circumstances that allowed 
members of the Anopheles genus to thrive. In this case assembling soldiers from all over 
the country to train in a wilderness had unintended results.43
The relative scarcity of information on epidemics in a medi eval military context is 
therefore not just related to the nature of the sources, but also to army members’ grow­
ing vulnerability to disease. Armies grew in size (with forces of tens of thousands of 
people becoming more common), which caused major logistical difficulties, their mem­
bers were drawn from a larger area than before, and they were more likely to move into 
different disease environments. It is hardly a coincidence that references to epidem­
ics spread by armed forces increase from the late fifteenth century onwards. Because 
soldiers regularly switched garrisons they kept getting exposed to different pathogens. 
Imperial troops coming back from the Hungarian front in 1566–1567 brought the “Hun­
garian Disease” or typhus to Western Europe. The Danube region served as a reservoir 
for spreading typhus during subsequent centuries as well.44
39 Hoffmann, An Environmental History, 299–302; Newfield, “Malaria.”
40 Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, bk. 31, chap. 8; Devos, “Malaria,” 205–8; Haneveld and van 
Royen, Vrij van zichtbare gebreken, 107, 218–20; Kort and Raczynski­Henk, “The Fossa Corbulonis”; 
van Nispen, Willemstad, 67.
41 Grainger, Historia febris anomalae Batavae, 20; Hirsch, Geo graphical and Historical Patho logy, 
1:218; Kerkhoff, “Over de geneeskundige verzorging,” 67; Pringle, Observations, 53, 62–67, 101, 
170–77; Wittmann, “Verhandeling,” 105–10.
42 Parmentier, Pays de Charleroi, 92; van Mastrigt, Willemstad Prinsheerlijk, 197.
43 Delameillieure, “Het kamp van Beverlo,” 92–93; Devos, “Malaria,” 210–14, 218.
44 Agoston, “Rivers, Forests and Forts,” 77–78; Garrison, Notes, 130–31; Prinzing, Epidemics, 
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Another illuminating example of this internationalization is the spread of ophthal­
mia or trachoma in the early nineteenth century. Blindness was not unknown in military 
contexts, but chronicles rarely specify why a certain individual became blind. Jacques 
de Hemricourt, for example, mentioned the participation of two blind noblemen at 
the battle of Donmartin (1325), one of whom was even knighted before the battle.45 In 
1799–1801, however, trachoma, a disease endemic in many parts of Egypt, infected 
invading French soldiers on a massive scale. This bacterial infection was highly conta­
gious and is traditionally seen as the main cause for ophthalmic epidemics that affected 
European armies in subsequent decades, but it became especially virulent in the Nether­
lands and Belgian military. In 1826 almost ten percent of the soldiers in the Netherlands 
army suffered from this ailment.46 We may infer that morbidity rates in medi eval armed 
forces might have been far lower than traditionally assumed, while a relative growth in 
army size made their early modern counterparts more vulnerable to disease.
The chrono logical changes observed within armies themselves were mirrored in 
their relations with society at large. From the late sixteenth century onwards, chronicles 
and parish records increasingly referred to a general perception that armies spread dis­
ease. In 1553 the mayor of Bouvignes wrote to his counterpart in Namur: “Where the 
Spanish infantry has stayed, people die quickly.” The parish records from Burtscheid 
near Aachen likewise specified in 1629 that someone died from the “Hungarian or mili­
tary disease” (typhus).47 The expressions “camp fever” and “army fever” are also sig­
nificant in themselves.48 The medi eval evidence by contrast is far more ambiguous, the 
lasting connection between syphilis and soldiers being the major exception.49
In order to evaluate the perceived association between armies and the spread of 
disease, a distinction has to be made between the direct and indirect impact of armed 
forces. The former will be studied first. The people and animals that composed an army 
could simply spread disease by transporting pathogens in their bodies over hundreds 
or even thousands of kilometres: from one theatre of war to the next. A councillor’s act 
22–24; Schmitz­Cliever, “Pest und pestilenzialische Krankheiten,” 132–35, 139–40; Zinsser, Rats, 
Lice and History, 266–77.
45 Bellwald, “Das Augenleiden”; Masson, “La guerre,” 435, 437.
46 Haneveld and van Royen, Vrij van zichtbare gebreken, 212–14; Howard, Napoleon’s Doctors, 
209–10; Vandendriessche, “Ophthalmia,” 49, 54–55; Vleminckx and van Mons, Essai sur l’oph-
thalmie, 7–8, 15,
47 Jacquet­Ladrier, “Les épidémies de peste,” 125; Schmitz­Cliever, “Pest und pestilenzialische 
Krankheiten,” 150–51.
48 La vie quotidienne dans les Ardennes, 30; Corvisier, L’Armée française, 2:670–71; Gutmann, War 
and Rural Life, 164–66; Jacob, Bruyères, 53–56; Martin, Une guerre de trente ans, 211–15; Miart, 
“La population,” 130, 137–38; Richer, Abrégé chrono logique, 150, 195–96; Verschure, Overleven, 
232–33, 286.
49 The infamous Black Death certainly made assembling armies and waging warfare more 
difficult, for example by the relative impoverishment of families living nobly, but armies did not 
have a significant role in its spread through the Meuse Region. Hans Ditrich has in fact recently 
suggested that the role of the siege of Caffa (1346) in the spread of Yersinia pestis to Europe, is 
overstated. Ditrich, “The Transmission.” See also Newfield, “Early Medi eval Epizootics,” 98–100.
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from Couvin, dating to 1598, indicates that the citizens prepared to resist with force of 
arms the entrance of troops suspected of bringing disease. The town of Tilburg simi­
larly paid a soldier suspected of carrying “the plague” in 1603 so he would move on to 
a neighbouring village.50 Troops led by Ernst von Mansfeld (a bastard son of the count 
mentioned in chap. 3) and Johann von Werth brought respectively typhus and the plague 
to the Meuse Region in 1622 and 1636.51
Especially devastating were those instances where epidemics and epizootics struck 
more or less simultaneously. Winand Mengels, a farmer living near Maastricht, wrote in 
his chronicle that the French army started to suffer from a disease with symptoms that 
resemble those of dysentery in 1747–1748. The villagers attributed the unknown dis­
ease to eating unripe fruit, but then they started to suffer from it too.52 To make matters 
worse, the invaders also brought a cattle disease with them. The French army was more 
reliant on oxen and mules as draught animals than its opponents because horses were 
more difficult to procure (see chap. 4). A similar epizootic struck the Prince­Bishopric 
of Liège in 1711–1714, and it is quite possible that in this case too warfare was the cru­
cial factor. The parish priest of Sibret, in the Duchy of Luxemburg, likewise declared in 
1656 that an epizootic struck flocks of sheep in 1636, the very year that Imperial troops 
invaded the area, so that almost no sheep were left.53
The relative growth in the size of armed forces facilitated this spread of epidemics 
and epizootics. In the Middle Ages soldiers often lodged in inns or taverns, as shown 
by fourteenth­century accounts. The Roman of Heinric and Margriete van Limborch, 
from the same period, tells us that one of the protagonists had difficulty finding a room 
because the town where he was staying was filled with soldiers.54 From the sixteenth 
century onwards individual soldiers had to be billeted in private houses due to lack of 
space. Seventeenth­century court records from Namur reveal that some inhabitants 
even kept a room for exactly this purpose.55 Massive building programmes during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries eventually ensured that soldiers lived in barracks 
and received care in military hospitals, but this only applied to garrison towns. In 1779 
imperial soldiers returning to the Austrian Netherlands from the Bohemian front during 
the Bavarian War of Succession (1778–1779) spread dysentery along the routes of their 
marches. The aforementioned ophthalmia quickly spread to Belgium’s civilian popula­
50 Couvin, 1976 (transcript Généamag); Verschure, Overleven, 286.
51 Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 274–75; Engelen, “Stokkem,” 45–46, 84–85; Gutmann, 
War and Rural Life, 152–56; Kayser, “Le phénomène épidémique,” 76–77; Klinkenberg, “Dye quade 
siecte,” 274–75; Mertens, “Oorlog, epidemie en emigratie,” 129–32; Miart, “La population,” 144, 
146–53; Schmitz­Cliever, “Pest und pestilenzialische Krankheiten,” 141–44.
52 De Harzé, “Manuscrit,” 275; Mengels, Chronyk, 46–47, 55–62.
53 Boonen, Ziekten en genezers, 89; Daenen, “Bijgelovig volk en ziek vee”; de Saxe, Mes Rêveries, 
153–54; Jakob, Bruyères, 117; Rouche, “Journal de l’entrée,” note 24.
54 Gaier, “L’approvisionnement,” 565; van Aken, Roman van Heinric en Margriete van Limborch, 
(bk. 5, vv. 967–968).
55 de Graaf, Oorlog, 364; Douxchamps­Lefèvre, Inventaire, 4:86; Gutmann, War and Rural Life, 
37–38; van Ryckenroy, Kroniek, 197.
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tion in the 1830s because military doctors sent infected soldiers home, expecting they 
would recover faster that way.56
The caring for sick or wounded soldiers remained in fact to a large degree the 
responsibility of the general population, especially those of large urban environments, 
which had the infrastructure to organize hospitals or could provide access to existing 
ones.57 Huy obtained permission in 1690 and 1691 to assemble sick soldiers in a hos­
pital located far way from the town centre. Apparently, some citizens had already died 
as a result of contamination, and the soldiers’ waste increased the chance that epidem­
ics would spread. During the siege of 1695 the Carmelites of Namur likewise cared for 
wounded soldiers and buried the deceased in their garden (a practice attested archaeo­
logically at Tongres/Tongeren).58
The indirect role of armies in spreading disease was more ambiguous but at least 
as significant. In eco logical terms an army of several thousand people functioned as a 
town on the move, a town that proved to be particularly demanding in terms of food and 
shelter and infringed on other people’s entitlements. The spread of epidemics would 
at the very least have been stimulated by the destruction or confiscation of crops and 
general impoverishment.59 On September 28, 1794, for instance, the governor of Grave 
instructed its citizens to procure provisions for two months or leave the city, in prepara­
tion for the coming siege. By December 12 many citizens had ran out of food and asked 
the governor to distribute some from the military depots. The governor argued that the 
two­month limit only applied to the actual investment of the city, which had started on 
October 20, and refused to accede to their demands. The freezing of the water in the 
moats finally forced him to surrender on December 30.60
Fear in itself further deteriorated the health of those unfortunate enough to be liv­
ing in warfare­affected areas (see chap. 3). The accounts from 1636 of the prévôt of La 
Marche, in the Duchy of Bar, speak of villagers dying in the woods where they had sought 
refuge. In that same invasion year, the high bailiff of Stokkem gathered testimonies from 
villagers and the parish priest from Opoeteren who had hidden for weeks in ditches, 
hedges, woods, marshes, stables, and barns after the taking of their schans (fort). The 
city council of ’s­Hertogenbosch had to warn its citizens in 1794 not to stay in their cel­
lars for days on end, for fear of bombardments, because of the resulting stench.61 Quen­
56 Bruneel, “L’épidémie,” 208–13; Vandendriessche, “Ophthalmia,” 49.
57 de Cauwer, Tranen van bloed, 183–84; Engelen, “Stokkem,” 228–29; Kerkhoff, “Over de genees­
kundige verzorging.”
58 Creemers and Vanderhoeven, “Archeo logische Kroniek,” 317; Jacquet­Ladrier, “Vivre à Namur 
en temps de guerre,” 176, 187; Rorive, Les misères de la guerre, 117–22.
59 Adriaenssen, Staatsvormend geweld, 274–75; Colombier, Préceptes, 368–80; de Cauwer, 
Tranen van bloed, 234–35; Felsenhart, “L’invasion,” 349; Gutmann, War and Rural Life, 36–39, 
166–68; Outram, “The Socio­Economic Relations,” 164–74; Patist, Het beleg van de stad Grave, 
39, 82; van der Heijden and Sanders, eds., De levensloop, 226; van Ryckenroy, Kroniek, 137, 148, 
155–57, 159, 164–65, 172–73.
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tin Outram has in fact argued that the worst wartime crises in mortality happened when 
relations between armies and societies at large deteriorated into violence with flows of 
distress migration resulting.62
The perceived relationship between armies and epidemics was, however, not clear­
cut. Armies did not inevitably bring disease and epidemics occurred in peace­ as well as 
wartime. Historical studies have repeatedly emphasized the role of weather and climate 
as significant factors in explaining patterns of disease. The aforementioned Imperial 
forces led by von Mansfeld and von Werth did not come from just anywhere, but respec­
tively Bohemia and the Palatinate, areas especially heavily affected during the Thirty 
Years War.63 The Prussian invasion of France in 1792 serves as a reminder of how a 
combination of adverse weather (incessant rainfall) and terrain (the Argonne) could 
break even an army famous for its Reinlichkeit (“cleanliness”), with dysentery outbreaks 
and lice–flea infections as a result. We are fortunate to have access to two eyewitness 
accounts written by common soldiers, one by the Prussian infantryman Laukhard, the 
other by the French dragoon Marquant. Both provide vivid descriptions of the disor­
derly Prussian retreat after the battle of Valmy, which left a trail of abandoned cannons, 
wagons, and horse cadavers behind.64
Up till this point we have assessed the vulnerability of armies to the weather, epi­
demics, and their involuntary spread of pathogens. Still, armies could also deliberately 
seek to affect their opponent’s health without the use of arms. Bio logical warfare is 
defined here as the use of pathogens or toxins of bio logical origin to affect human, ani­
mal, or plant health during conflicts. The study of bio logical warfare in a historical con­
text is far from unproblematic because it has a strong connotation of being an unethical, 
or at least unconventional, way to fight. It presents a methodo logical problem insofar as 
the very success of these tactics often depends on secrecy. Most of the sources examined 
here therefore indicate a fear of bio logical warfare, rather than unambiguous evidence 
of intention.65
One of the most common examples presented in historical studies of bio logical war­
fare is the throwing of human or animal corpses into a besieged fortress. This was a 
gruesome, but probably relatively rare, alternative to a far more common tactic: throw­
ing excrement. The chronicles of de Dynter and Froissart both mention that a besieging 
force led by the duke of Brabant threw cadavers into Grave during the siege of 1388.66 
Urban militias from Liège besieging Argenteau in 1347 by contrast threw stones, 
earthen pots with melted iron, and burning metal into the fortress and when this did 
gezondheidstoestand,” 74; Ritter, “Verhandeling,” 15; Schoetter, “Etat du Duché de Luxembourg,” 
341–42.
62 Outram, “The Socio­Economic Relations,” 180–84.
63 Gutmann, War and Rural Life, 156–63; Jakob, Bruyères, 119; Outram, “The Socio­Economic 
Relations,” 162–64.
64 Laukhard, Leben und Schicksale, vol. 3; Vallée and Pariset, eds., Carnet, 147, 150, 162, 168–70, 
174–77.
65 Frischknecht, “The History”; Mayor, Bio logical and Chemical Warfare, 28–29.
66 de Dynter, Chronique, 3:124, 3:625–26; Froissart, Chroniques, 13:160–61.
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not have the desired effect, brought the contents of cesspits from Liège to pollute the 
defenders’ water. The chronicle of Jean de Stavelot also remarks that when troops from 
Liège besieged Bouillon between December 1406 and January 1407 they defecated into 
barrels in order to throw these into the fortress and soil its cisterns and water supply.67 
Fortifications located on a hill were very vulnerable to such tactics because they rarely 
had direct access to a stream.68
A chronicler from ’s­Hertogenbosch on the other hand wrote that many citizens 
believed that the defenders of Tiel had fired poisoned projectiles during the storming 
of that city in 1528 because many of their injured died.69 The militiamen had brought 
the wounded to religious houses and hospitals where numerous women helped to take 
care of them. Whether the defenders really used poison is unclear, but this remark does 
reveal something about the quality of healthcare at that time and the chances of recov­
ery. Poisoned projectiles were certainly used in medi eval Europe, but the available evi­
dence mainly concerns hunting rather than warfare. Many sixteenth­century surgeons 
also believed that gunpowder wounds were poisonous, but this chronicle does not say 
so explicitly.70
Sudden and apparently inexplicable deaths could easily be attributed to poison. 
Reginbald Möhner, for instance, a chaplain of an imperial regiment serving in support of 
the Spanish crown in 1651, left an account of his experiences, marching from Austria to 
the Spanish Netherlands, before invading the kingdom of France and eventually turning 
back. According to his testimony the regiment entered a village near the Sambre, where 
one soldier found milk in an abandoned house, drank it, and immediately fell dead. His 
wife and comrades discovered, or assumed, that the milk was poisoned and the com­
mander gave the order to burn all abandoned houses from then on.71 In 1831 Dutch 
soldiers were likewise anxious that their Belgian opponents had poisoned the food and 
water supplies. Poisoned herbs were effectively used in wolf hunting, and it must have 
been relatively easy to apply such knowledge to warfare as well.72 In May 1714 the com­
mander of Namur even received complaints that officers and soldiers threw drugs or 
poison in the Meuse to kill the fish.73
Meanwhile, gunpowder continued to be associated with poison well into the sev­
enteenth century. Many artillery manuals gave practical information to their readers 
on how to make “poisonous” or “stink” bombs, but it is unclear to what extent gunners 
actually applied this advice.74 During the siege of ’s­Hertogenbosch in 1629 a soldier of 
67 Ly myreur des histors in Chronique de Jean des Preis dit d’Outremeuse, ed. Borgnet and Bormans, 
6:179; de Hocsem, La chronique, 358–59; de Stavelot, Chronique, 101–2, 254.
68 Bragard et al., La termitière, 54–56; Burger, “Wasserversorgung,” 229–30.
69 Hoeckx et al., eds., Kroniek van Molius, 270–71.
70 Bisset, “Arrow and Dart Poisons,” 4–5; Gabriel and Metz, A History, 2:56; Garrison, Notes, 
110–11; Schreiber, “Plant Poisons.”
71 Brunner, ed., Reise des P. Reginbald Möhner, 88.
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73 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079: Order May 27, 1715.
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the garrison claimed that the besieging Dutch troops shot bombs that spread a terrible 
smell. Others spoke of bombs filled with antimony. The governor was worried enough to 
order the inspection of unexploded projectiles. Nothing unusual was found, but several 
citizens still claimed to have noticed a strong scent of camphor. Camphor was some­
times mixed into gunpowder, especially for fireworks or incendiary bombs, and could 
very well have given these projectiles a different appearance. Its use in itself was not 
new. Fiscal accounts of the duke of Brabant mention the purchase of camphor for the 
making of gunpowder as early as 1411.75
The French engineer de Vauban, who would certainly have mentioned the use of poi­
soned projectiles, was visibly more concerned with traditional miasmas. He wrote in 
his journal of the siege of Namur in 1692 that ten or twelve dead horses, lying near the 
front of the covered way, hindered the final attack on the castle more than the fire of 
the besieged did. However, every time the wind turned they had their share of stench. 
He clearly implied that the garrison wanted to disrupt the besiegers, but other issues 
might have played a role as well.76 The chronicle of the Sint­Geertruiklooster in ’s­Her­
togenbosch recorded that during the siege of 1629, after horses taken as booty started 
to eat tree leaves for lack of fodder, the gunners drove them into the moat towards the 
enemy lines; some drowned in the process. Simply slaughtering and eating the horses 
could have been an alternative, but in Western Europe strong taboos existed against 
the eating of horse­meat, which effectively ensured that this became a very exceptional 
measure.77 Even though the sources rarely provide definite proof of intention, it is clear 
that premodern armed forces were well aware that their enemies might try to spread 
disease among them.
Vulnerable Bodies
Military vulnerability to disease cannot be understood without taking changing notions 
about human and animal bodies into account. Army commanders perceived some bod­
ies as being more suitable for military service than others. These views, and changes 
therein, had a major influence on army members’ susceptibility or resistance to patho­
gens. In 1818, doctor Georg Heinrich Ritter summarized a notion prevalent among offic­
ers as follows: “a soldier must be as strong as iron, and be able to withstand anything, 
without experiencing any negative consequence.”78 In practical terms this means look­
ing into selection criteria for combatants, and their horses, rather than armies at large. 
As argued in the previous chapter, there is little information available about so­called 
camp followers because of the unofficial nature of their presence. The requirements 
listed by Vegetius in his De re militari (written in 383–450) will be taken as a start­
75 De Cauwer, Tranen van bloed, 225; van Werveke, Die Erwerbung, 11.
76 The covered way refers to the space between the glacis, the open terrain near a fortress, and 
the moat. Vauban, Journal, 161.
77 Felsenhart, “L’invasion,” 349; Patist, Het beleg van de stad Grave, 46–47, 49, 64; van Bavel et al., 
De kroniek, 343; Wittmann, “Verhandeling,” 118.
78 Ritter, “Verhandeling,” 32.
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ing point because this work remained an authorative military manual throughout the 
Middle Ages and subsequent centuries.79
Vegetius specified that recruits had to be enlisted as adolescents, that they had to 
be tall and strong, and had to come from the countryside. Rural dwellers were in his 
opinion accustomed to all kinds of weather and used to hard labour.80 There is another 
criterion, so obvious that neither Vegetius nor most other military writers bothered to 
comment on it: a combatant had to be male. While traditional gender divisions in an 
army context are well known, this criterion is not as evident as it might seem. Only ser­
vice as a paid, and thus officially recognized, combatant, was strictly forbidden. Women 
who served as soldiers invariably did so as “men.” This makes their identification dif­
ficult, but not impossible. Jan van Ryckenroy from Roermond for example wrote in his 
chronicle that in 1589, after the taking of the castle of Bleijenbeek, a girl was discovered 
among the enemy dead, and John Stedman, a captain in the eighteenth­century Dutch 
army, noted in his diary that a Swiss regiment in Maastricht chased away two soldiers: 
man and wife. The identity of the latter was only discovered because she became preg­
nant. The enlistment of women as soldiers might have been facilitated by the absence of 
a thorough medical check­up.81
Not only is the nature of the examination of recruits unclear, there are actually rela­
tively few sources that provide unambiguous evidence about a combatant’s background. 
Rulers compiled lists of soldiers as early as the late thirteenth century, but before the 
late seventeenth or early eighteenth centuries few of these muster lists mention any­
thing other than the soldier’s name and function. Some of these names, or rather nick­
names, do however give some indication of the soldiers’ backgrounds. Muster lists of 
infantry units raised for the bishop of Liège in the 1550s show for instance that many 
soldiers adopted nicknames such as Jonck Bloet (“Youngblood”), ’t Kint (“The Child”), 
Jonck Hart (“Youngheart”) and variations (e.g., Verlorenkint—“Lostchild”) which sug­
gests young unmarried males, possibly teenagers.82
Military personnel records became more detailed over time, and by the eighteenth 
century typically wrote down information such as a soldier’s birthplace, age, height, 
trade, and features in order to reduce fraud. These eighteenth­century lists confirm that 
most soldiers enlisted in their late teens or early twenties.83 It is quite possible, however, 
and indeed suggested by the study of skeletal remains and the age of a handful of Bur­
gundian soldiers written down in a court record from 1469, that medi eval combatants 
79 Allmand, The De Re Militari of Vegetius; Richardot, Végèce et la culture militaire.
80 Vegetius, De re militari, bk. 1.
81 Thompson, ed., Journal, 103–4; van Ryckenroy, Kroniek, 239. See also Dekker and van de Pol, 
Vrouwen in mannenkleren, 24–25, 33–35, 105–7; Desbrière, Chronique critique, 140; Gaier, Art et 
organisation, 175; Leestmans, Soldats, 180–81; Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 343–46.
82 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. no. 2965: Muster lists of infantry companies raised in 1552. See also 
Contamine, Guerre, état et société; Bell et al., The Soldier.
83 Bois, Les anciens soldats, 133–40; Corvisier, L’Armée française, 2:615–37; Leestmans, Soldats, 
22; Ruwet, Soldats, 64–66.
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were on average somewhat older because they had to provide their own equipment.84 
Still, the majority served when in their twenties or thirties. This reflects a basic bio­
logical reality that most males are fully­grown around the age of twenty. From the age 
of thirty, muscle strength tends to decrease. These indications should be treated with 
caution, however, since different ways of army organization entailed a different type of 
recruit. Furthermore, as military personnel records make clear, it was an individual’s 
capability to serve that really mattered, not official instructions about age.85
Similar remarks could be made about horses used by the army. Given that a horse 
is only fully grown after four years, military regulations from the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries specified that units could only take horses between the ages of four and 
seven. Reviews from Dutch cavalry regiments from the early 1780s mention that eleven, 
twelve, and fourteen­year­old horses were replaced because they were “sick” or other­
wise unable to perform their duties.86 A mass grave of at least sixty­five horse skeletons, 
found at Borgharen and dating to the French siege of Maastricht in 1794, contains the 
remains of animals which were between three and sixteen years old when they died, the 
majority being between four and twelve. Even though one horse had not yet reached the 
age of four, it was as one of the largest individuals found.87
The height of this horse is significant, because it relates to Vegetius’s criterion that 
recruits had to be tall, although this was less important than strength. Jacques de Hem­
ricourt, who wrote a treatise on the nobility from Hesbaye in the fourteenth century, 
called Godefroid, lord of Harduemont, “the smallest knight in the Prince­Bishopric of 
Liège, but a brave knight, and a great and strong captain.” The phrasing of this sentence 
suggests that de Hemricourt considered men of small stature to be generally unsuit­
able for military service.88 Detailed estimates of height only become available from the 
eighteenth century onwards, when personal records started to note a soldier’s height 
more or less accurately. A systematic comparison between these eighteenth­century 
soldiers and Napoleonic conscripts proves that these men were significantly taller than 
the average male, even though many enlisted when not fully grown. The reduction of 
average heights in nineteenth­century conscript forces was primarily aimed at incorpo­
rating as many men as possible into the army, but also reflected more pressing health 
and tactical issues.89
A larger physique needs more nutrients to keep functioning, or in other words: has 
less stamina. Medi eval commanders might already have favoured taller combatants, 
but eighteenth­century notions about the ideal military body had evolved to such an 
extent that height in itself, rather than strength or another ability, became the primary 
84 DeVries, “Teenagers”; Poncelet, “Le combat,” 278–93.
85 Colombier, Préceptes, 149–52.
86 The Hague, NA, 1. 01.19, inv. nos. 1945, 1946: Reviews and reports of Dutch cavalry regiments, 
1780s; Geisweit van der Netten, Algemeen Samenstel, 114–15.
87 Loonen and van de Graaf, “Het massapaardengraf van Borgharen,” 31–38.
88 de Hemricourt, Le Miroir des Nobles, 1:117.
89 Bois, Les anciens soldats, 140–42; Govaerts, “‘Fire­Eaters,’” 19–21; Leestmans, Soldats, 189; 
Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 46–47.
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criterion for admission into elite units. Despite the fact that practically minded officers 
gradually became more assertive in voicing their criticism towards the end of the cen­
tury, prejudices died hard.90
Officers did not just select recruits because of their height, but also because of their 
background. It is unclear to what extent medi eval captains heeded Vegetius’s preference 
for rural dwellers. Urban militias became in fact more important during the Central Mid­
dle Ages because they were better organized and better armed than their rural coun­
terparts.91 Many so­called men­at­arms, heavy cavalrymen with two or more horses, 
cannot be considered as rural combatants either, since they switched regularly between 
urban and rural settings, often by owning houses in a town as well as the countryside.92 
The aforementioned muster lists of the bishop of Liège’s army in the sixteenth century 
indicate a predominance of urban recruits, but most came from relatively small settle­
ments such as Tongres/Tongeren or Valkenburg rather than Liège itself.93
Eighteenth­century personnel records likewise reveal an overrepresentation of sol­
diers from an urban background, especially from garrison and/or larger towns, but it 
is significant that elite units (cavalry, artillery, and miners) counted a larger number of 
rural dwellers in their ranks or were primarily composed of men born in the country­
side.94 These records thus suggest that high­status units, who could pick their members, 
did adhere to the criteria recommended by Vegetius. The arguments of the Belgian colo­
nel de Thierry in 1835 confirm this. He published a small report in response to claims 
about excessive loss of horses in the army, declaring that his men had little affinity with 
horses and did not know how to take proper care of them. The colonel therefore strongly 
advised refraining from admitting certain recruits to the cavalry in the future: urban 
dwellers top the list. The preference for recruits from rural backgrounds was therefore 
not limited to physical stature as such but included a whole range of skills that officers 
associated with this origin.95
In ideal circumstances new arrivals were actually not recruits at all, but veteran com­
batants.96 During the parliamentary debate mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
the general responded to the alleged high mortality of the French armed forces by argu­
ing that recruits drove up the death rates. Hans Jakob von Grimmelshausen, the author of 
the famous novel Abentheuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch, wrote of recruits of the Walloon 
regiment de Merode in the Thirty Years War of whom large numbers could be seen rest­
ing below hedges alongside the road. He also noted that the verb marauding (marode) 
90 Essai sur l’armée hollandaise, 30–32; Corvisier, L’Armée française, 2:637–54.
91 Bachrach, “Urban Military Forces”; Hosler, John of Salisbury, 66–68; Verbruggen, “Flemish 
Urban Militias.”
92 Govaerts, “‘Mannen van wapenen,’” 312.
93 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. no. 2965.
94 Corvisier, L’Armée française, 1:387–448; Ruwet, Soldats, 41–50; Zwitzer, De militie van den 
staat, 48–50.
95 de Thierry, Mémoire, 5–15.
96 Parrott, The Business of War, 163–67.
204 chapter 5
in German derived from the name Merode.97 His observation is etymo logically incorrect, 
the word deriving from the French maraude, but is significant from the perspective of 
health preservation because it associated pillaging with novice troops who could not 
keep up. The French doctor Jean Colombier (1736–1789), who wrote an authorative 
treatise on military health in the late eighteenth century, argued that there was nothing 
worse than enlisting children. They were useless to the army and almost all died.98
Notions of an ideal military physique went further than the selection of specific 
types of recruits. They also encompassed intrusions into the chosen human and animal 
97 von Grimmelshausen, Der Abentheurliche Simplicissimus Teutsch, bk. 4, chap. 13.
98 The data published by André Corvisier on the basis of personnel records indicate that 
mortality among recruits was actually higher than among veterans. Colombier, Préceptes, 124, 148; 
Corvisier, L’Armée française, 2:686–89.
Figure 32. Medi eval men­
at­arms, miniature from the 
early fourteenth century, 
made in Liège or Maastricht. 
Note that the miniaturist has 
taken care to identify the 
horse as a stallion (London, 
BL, Stowe MS 17, fol. 244r). 
Reproduced with permission 
of the British Library Board.
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bodies themselves. These measures originated both in the need to construct and main­
tain a specific “military” identity, distinct from that of other social groups, as well as 
issues of discipline and control. They are of major importance within the context of this 
chapter because of their potential detrimental effects on military health.
Medi eval fiscal accounts provide quite detailed information on the horses lost by 
combatants, as argued in chapter five, but do not indicate whether the owners made 
deliberate changes to the horses’ appearance. They mention for instance horses with 
a “long” or “short” tail. Eighteenth­ and early nineteenth­century military forces often 
docked their horses’ tails for aesthetic reasons, but medi eval soldiers had rather dif­
ferent opinions on what an ideal horse should look like. One fiefholder of the duchess 
of Brabant shaved his horse’s manes and tail to make it “as ugly as possible,” so the 
bailiff would not want to take it with him on campaign to Guelders in 1388. His plan 
worked, but he did have to pay a fine. In a similar manner, if medi eval accounts indi­
cate gender, it is invariably “stallion” (hengst). This should not be taken to imply that 
the unnamed horses were geldings or mares. The medi eval word hengst had a more 
general meaning than its modern equivalent and might have been used as a synonym 
for “warhorse” or “destrier.”99
Medi eval noblemen in fact expressed a strong preference for stallions, and even con­
sidered riding a mare humiliating (see figure 32). The French poet Eustache Deschamps 
lamented the loss of his horse in the 1388 Ardennes campaign and wrote that if the 
duke of Bar did not provide him with another one he would have to stay home or ride 
a mare, jack, or jenny.100 Albertus Magnus, who wrote an authorative encyclopedia on 
animals in the thirteenth century, stated that a warhorse had to be a stallion because 
he is more aggressive than a gelding.101 Despite this widespread belief, the use of geld­
ings did become more common from the fourteenth century onwards, possibly due to 
the influence of armed forces from Eastern Europe (the French and German words for 
a gelding are respectively hongre—Hungarian, and Wallach—Wallachian). The oldest 
explicit reference to a gelding (hongre) in a military context comes from a 1347 account 
from Namur regarding a group of noblemen who were wounded near Calais. The horse 
in question belonged to a servant.102
By the late seventeenth century the use of geldings and mares had become the norm 
in cavalry and dragoon regiments. A review of a dragoon company headed by captain 
de Thiribi, part of the army raised by the bishop of Liège in 1692, gives an exceptional 
99 Brussels, ARA, 137.01, inv. nos. 12990, 12991; Arnhem, GA, Hertogelijk Archief, inv. no. 1580, fol. 
9v; Arkenbout, Frank van Borselen, 199; Bolsée, ed., La grande enquête, 31; Herborn and Mattheier, 
ed., Die älteste Rechnung, 62–64; Martens van Sevenhoven, “Een betalingsordonnantieboek”; Miller, 
“‘Tails’ of Masculinity”; Renes and Wessels, “Loen ende Werck,” 127–28; Smit, De rekeningen, 
2:54–56; van Doorninck, ed., De tocht van Jan van Blois 1362, 124, 125, 127, 133; van Wissekerke, 
Van kwade droes tot erger, 344–47.
100 Contamine, “Le cheval noble,” 1705; Deschamps, Oeuvres, 5:121–22.
101 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, 2:1378.
102 Rotterdam, SAR, ONA, inv. no. 332, no. 32: January 28, 1644, no. 238: September 17, 1644; 
inv. no 417, no. 32: May 20, 1638; Balon, “Un train sanitaire,” 285; Davis, The Medi eval Warhorse, 
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description of both soldiers and their horses: of the animals for which gender is pro­
vided, seven were geldings and eighteen mares. A note at the end of the list specifies, 
however, that the animals denoted as “horse” were all geldings, which brings the total 
number of geldings to twenty­one.103 During the eighteenth century the French army 
went a step further and even issued prohibitions against the use of stallions. The arche­
typical army horse remained without doubt male, as at least seventy percent of the 
horses found at the 1794 mass grave of Borgharen could be identified as such, but the 
gelding had replaced the stallion.104
This development is noteworthy because it implies that military forces preferred 
the discipline and obedience that castrating implied above a stallion’s natural agression. 
The choice in favour of geldings is a very practical one: a stallion will fight other, unfa­
miliar, stallions for dominance of “the herd,” especially if mares are present. A troop of 
geldings and mares is easier to control, a trait that could make a great difference during 
warfare. Still, not everyone agreed with this reasoning. The Dutch officer Geisweit van 
der Netten, who wrote several influential books on horses and cavalry service in the 
early nineteenth century, was a strong opponent of gelding. He argued that it affected 
the horses’ health and energy. 105
The soldier’s physique similarly became subject to aesthetic criteria, the height pref­
erence having been mentioned earlier. For eighteenth­century Dutch military courts the 
cutting of one’s hair served as proof that the defendant had planned his desertion. The 
infantry regulations of 1772 stipulated that a soldier had to wear his hair in a tail of no 
less than sixty centimetres (two feet). If his own hair was not long enough, he had to 
use extensions made from horsehair.106 The French doctor Colombier criticized these 
practices because they caused health issues on campaign, by increasing the chances of 
retaining parasites such as lice and ensuring that the hair remained permanently wet 
after a rainy day. Soldiers of the French republican army simply abolished the practice 
and cut their hair short in the 1790s. Other armed forces followed suit.107
The second main element in the forging of a military identity was corporal punish­
ment. Medi eval commanders did use the death penalty in exceptional circumstances, 
but normally punished malefactors through fines, which is a more indirect form of cor­
poral punishment, because it affected someone’s economic well­being.108 The general 
adoption of more direct forms of corporal punishment, notably caning, took place in 
the first decades of the sixteenth century, and was not limited to armies as such. Cor­
poral punishment became an inseparable element of a military identity, however, not 
only because military forces continued to employ it long after it had been abandoned 
103 Liège, AEL, Etats, inv. no. 2966: Liste de la compagnie capitaine de Thiribi du régiment 
monsieur genéral mayor de Jaymaert. See also Driessen, Emundt van Oeteren, 691.
104 Loonen and van de Graaf, “Het massapaardengraf van Borgharen,” 35.
105 van Wissekerke, Van kwade droes tot erger, 95, 342–44.
106 Reglement en generaele ordres voor de regimenten infanterie van den staat, 198; Dorreboom, 
“‘Gelijk hij gecondemneert word mits deezen,’” 253, 258, 259.
107 Colombier, Préceptes, 41.
108 Geltner, Flogging Others, 21–23.
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elsewhere in society, but also because they gave their own interpretation to these pun­
ishments. Soldiers retained a strong connection to nobility throughout the medi eval and 
early modern period, and perceived being touched by an executioner or his assistants as 
dishonourable. For this reason, soldiers carried out punishments themselves, unless the 
offender was considered unworthy to continue serving.109 This evolution can be illus­
trated through a comparison between two punishments for the same offence: one medi­
eval, the other early modern. The prévôt of Bouconville in the Duchy of Bar condemned 
in 1411 a sentinel who had fallen asleep while guarding this fortress to a fine of sixty 
sous. Three hundred years later, in 1717, the commander of Namur sentenced two sol­
diers to running the gauntlet up and down twice: one had left his guard post, the other 
had fallen asleep.110
These notions caused a major divergence between the military, as an organization, 
and other types of armies that continued to function. When the governor of Roermond 
found a citizen absent from his guard post in 1656, he punished him in the proper mil­
itary way: with a beating. The latter responded by taking his gun and threatening to 
shoot him. The city council resolved the situation by imprisoning the guard for a few 
days, but asked the governor to refrain in future from beating its citizens. When French 
troops started to expand the fortifications of Dinant in 1690–1691, the governor issued 
a proclamation that soldiers who entered the parapets or banquettes of the walls and/
or soiled them risked corporal punishment. Citizens on the other hand only risked a 
fine.111
The taking of an offender’s freedom, which increasingly replaced caning from the 
eighteenth century onwards, was an important development within the context of army 
health because of the nature of the places in which he was confined. In medi eval con­
texts this was typically a tower, gate, or the basement of the town hall, for the simple rea­
son that these were enclosed spaces with someone present as a guard, typically a sen­
tinel or gatekeeper. Imprisonment mainly served to hold people temporarily and oblige 
them to pay. The amount of comfort depended on a prisoner’s wealth, given that one had 
to pay one’s own costs of imprisonment.112 Still, the stereotypical image of the medi eval 
dungeon might have some factual basis. On August 18, 1465 the city council of Dinant 
wrote to its colleagues in Liège about one of their citizens who was held prisoner in Bou­
vignes. The Burgundians not only had refused to release him, but also threatened to put 
him in a hole filled with “worms” and wild beasts (vermines et bestes sauvages). Philippe 
de Vigneulles, a citizen of Metz who was held captive in the fortress of Chauvency near 
109 Dorreboom, “‘Gelijk hij gecondemneert word mits deezen,’” 126–27, 132, 190–96, 208, 
236–37; Geltner, Flogging Others, 63–65.
110 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079: Orders February 25, 1717; Marchal, Inventaire, 201.
111 Bormans, Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., Cartulaire de Dinant, 6:251–52; van Beurden, De 
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Montmédy in 1490–1491, recorded in his chronicle that, after an attempted escape, his 
guards put him in the basement of a tower, where mice, rats, and other animals stole his 
bread.113
Even though these medi eval fortifications lost much of their defensive value in sub­
sequent centuries, they often continued to serve as prisons. More importantly, impris­
onment became a punishment in itself.114 The order book of the Dutch “hunter” unit de 
Sternbach noted that a sergeant was put into “the hole” for neglecting his patrol duty 
in 1785. The garrison orders of Namur also referred to a certain prison as “the hole.” 
Colombier again provides a valuable perspective when he observed that there is no good 
reason to use an underground space as a cachot, since it is detrimental for the prisoners’ 
health.115 The regulations of the French non­commissioned officer from 1811 did in fact 
make a distinction between three different forms of confinement, from simply imprison­
ment in one’s own room to the cachot, where a soldier had to sleep on a straw covered 
floor and only received water and bread. A prisoner could not be kept in the cachot for 
more than four days.116
The third and final element in the forging of a military identity was the building 
of barracks. The building of large houses to accommodate soldiers dates back to the 
sixteenth century. At that point, however, it was very much for lack of any other suit­
able housing. From the late seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century onwards 
governments all over the Meuse Region initiated building programmes to provide gar­
rison towns with barracks.117 This was primarily a control issue: housing soldiers in 
barracks made desertion far more difficult. Only seven percent of the soldiers from the 
Dutch­speaking part of the Prince­Bishopric of Liège who deserted from the Dutch army 
between 1770 and 1795 ran away from their barracks, compared to thirty­five percent 
quartered in private households.118
Complaints about the health hazards of barracks were commonplace, both in pub­
lications of military physicians and reports of military engineers (see figure 33). Con­
sistent with prevailing medical theories most criticized the humidity and lack of air 
circulation.119 The French engineer de Vauban planned the construction of what could 
113 The Latin word vermis, from which our word “vermin” derives, literaly means “worm,” but 
during the Middle Ages it was used as a general term for a wide range of invertebrates, including 
non­flying insects, moths, snails, spiders, and leeches. Bormans, Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., 
Cartulaire de Dinant, 2:116–17; Lamort and Huguenin, Les Chroniques, 536.
114 Leestmans, Soldats, 82; Lefebvre, “Bastogne,” 357; Marchal, Inventaire, 348; Monbrun, 
Considérations, 7; Muller, “Bouillon,” 56.
115 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2057: Garnisoensorderboek, February 20, 1786; 
Colombier, Préceptes, 87–88.
116 Le guide des sous-officiers, 277–86.
117 Leestmans, Soldats, 19; Milot, “Les garnisons,” 731; Parker, The Army of Flanders, 140–41; 
Rooms, De organisatie, 246–50.
118 Based on a database of a hundred and ninety­nine deserters, originating from the Dutch­
speaking part of the Prince­Bishopric of Liège who served in the Dutch army between 1770 and 
1795. Govaerts, “‘Fire­Eaters.’”
119 Colombier, Préceptes, 158–65; Huvet, “Topo graphie médicale”; Kerckhoffs, Hygiène militaire, 
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be considered one of the longest barracks in Europe at that time, in Givet alongside the 
Meuse in 1680 (almost 430 metres). After an inspection in 1691 he noted that it was 
difficult to pass through the area because he encountered manure everywhere. He thus 
gave instructions to ensure that from then on they were regularly cleaned.120 The fact 
that the commander of Namur likewise instructed his officers in 1716 to keep the bar­
racks dirt­free suggests that this had not yet become standard practice. One hundred 
years later the worst problems occurred in barracks not located near a stream, such as 
those of Rocroi. The latrines built next to the main wall in 1832 apparently produced 
such strong “memphitic and pestilential vapours” during the summer months that the 
neighbours claimed that it was impossible to live there, even when all the doors and 
windows remained locked.121 So, the need to forge a specific military identity came at 
the cost of the soldiers’ own health.
65–67; Milot, “Les garnisons,” 725–26.
120 Guénoun, “Deux edifices,” 80–81.
121 The Hague, NA, Raad van State, inv. no. 2079: Orders October 12, 1716; inv. no. 2081: Generale 
Figure 33. Dutch militiamen (schutters) in their mouse­ and  
flea­infested barracks, 1830s (Soesterberg, NMM, inv. no. 00104106).  
Reproduced with permission of the Nationaal Militair Museum, Soesterberg.
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As significant as the selection of army members and further physical intrusions 
were, the most important aspect of military physique remained proper nourishment. 
This derived of course from the widespread adoption of Galenic theory, which classified 
food and drink as one of the six non­naturals. Medi eval fiscal accounts are surprisingly 
detailed and, in many ways, even more informative than sources from subsequent cen­
turies. The accounts kept by the city of Aachen regarding its expenses during the siege 
of the fortress of Dyck in 1383, for instance, allow a reconstruction of the food eaten 
on a particular day of the week. The basic food was bread, beer, and meat, mostly poul­
try, with fish (herring and to a lesser extent salmon and river fish), eggs, and/or cheese 
mostly reserved for days of fasting. Parsley, garlic, beans, mustard, garden vegetables 
(moes), oil, wine, milk, and game, the latter as gifts from the bishop of Co logne, are also 
mentioned.122
Medi eval accounts in fact provide clear patterns as far as nutrition is concerned: 
cooks prepared food in large cauldrons, alcoholic beverages (beer and/or wine) were 
the norm, and the food was quite rich in meat (poultry, cattle, sheep, pig, game), fish 
(herring, cod, pike, carp, salmon), dairy products (cheese and butter), eggs, bread, and 
herbs or spices (mostly parsley and to a lesser extent mustard). Fruit and vegetables 
were relatively rare: cooked peas, and almonds, onions, garlic, and moes being the most 
common. Calculating the exact nutrient intake of an average combatant is difficult 
because the quantities specified in accounts have to be converted into modern mea­
sures, which involves all sorts of assumptions and estimates, but it does seem to have 
been quite generous.123
The diet of early modern soldiers pales by comparison: provision of meat and bread 
(or its alternatives: biscuits and rice) could more or less be guaranteed, but fish, eggs, 
and dairy products became much rarer or disappear from the menu. This might be 
related to changing religious beliefs, since many soldiers no longer respected days of 
fasting from the sixteenth century onwards, but the French doctor Colombier explicitly 
stated in 1775 that most privates did not have enough money to buy fish or eggs.124 Fur­
thermore, because armies grew larger over time, and the number of wagons each unit 
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brought with it had to be reduced in order to preserve some mobility, provision of even 
the most basic food could become problematic: from the late sixteenth century onwards 
soldiers were issued a specific form of bread, the so­called commission or munition 
bread, which was rather coarse and made of a mixture of rye (two­thirds) and wheat 
(one­third), but could be supplied by contractors at relatively short notice. 125
Drinking water also became relatively more important. Hendrik Conscience and Jan 
Teunisse, antagonists in the Ten Day’s Campaign (1831), both recounted that because 
of the scarcity of water in the Campine/Kempen they were reduced to drinking dew 
and muddy water from wagon tracks. The latter claimed it affected the soldiers’ eye­
sight.126 The increasing importance of water could explain why dysentery became one of 
the most important scourges of armies. Seventeenth­century soldiers responded to this 
threat by mixing vinegar or olive oil with water before drinking or cooking. This method 
is still attested during the Napoleonic Wars, which suggests that it was a widespread 
and ongoing practice.127 The medical qualities of wine were already well known in the 
Middle Ages and it is quite possible that combatants drank wine and beer rather than 
water for health reasons as well as taste.128
Since regulations rather than fiscal accounts constitute the main evidence for 
the food supply of early modern forces, it is possible that differences with medi eval 
armies were in practice much less pronounced. There was also a significant distinction 
between life in garrisons or quarters and in the field, but even when on campaign the 
diet of soldiers might have been richer than the regulations indicate. So­called sutlers or 
vivandier(e)s had an important role in military supply and many paintings depict them 
selling various items, including food, to soldiers. Plundering was a much­used alterna­
tive when official supplies did not suffice.129 A councillor’s act from Sautour (1643) lists 
the possessions of a cavalryman from the garrison of Givet killed in a skirmish with the 
local militia. These include a loaf of bread, an apple, a pear, and a small axe (presumably 
to cut wood). The fact that the councillors went to such trouble to record the deceased’s 
possessions suggests that they feared retaliations by the soldier’s comrades.130
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The information provided by medi eval fiscal accounts can also be quite difficult to 
interpret, for these documents rarely mention exactly what food was supplied to spe­
cific members of an army. During the 1411 campaign in Luxemburg, for instance, a mer­
chant from Namur supplied the duke of Brabant’s army with three barrels of tuna fish, 
and two of seal.131 These were undoubtedly intended for the duke’s own table, as were 
eight barrels of river fish. The “many people of arms” who stayed at Virton on the other 
hand received only one barrel of river fish, but large quantities of cod. The high bailiff of 
’s­Hertogenbosch did not include eight barrels of old herring, destined for the defend­
ers of the fortress of Middelaar, in his 1387–1388 accounts because when one of the 
barrels was opened the herring turned out to be so rotten that nobody would eat from 
it, nor could it be sold. It was thrown into the Meuse instead.132 In this way, one might 
argue that our comparison between the diet of medi eval and (early) modern armies is 
baseless because evidence for the latter is biased towards the subordinate ranks, non­
commissioned officers, and privates.
Still, combatants of high social status, such as men­at­arms, were far more common 
in medi eval armies than commissioned officers in early modern military forces. In other 
words: the diet of the average combatant changed markedly from the fifteenth and/or 
sixteenth century onwards because the social status of soldiers declined significantly 
in the same period (see chap. 4). The chronicler Lodewijk van Velthem described the 
“Meuse lords” (Maselanders here) who served the count of Flanders in 1297 as being so 
fond of wine and good food that no one could satisfy their wants.133 The master hunter of 
the duke of Bar stayed more than a month in the lordship of Souilly near Verdun in 1402 
so he could supply his master’s army, which was besieging the fortress of Dudelange, 
on the Bar–Luxemburg frontier, with game. Four years later the prévôt of this fortress 
supplied wine for the flasks of the duke’s horsemen.134 These actions derive logically 
from the noble status of men­at­arms. Noblemen expected to eat the same food they 
consumed when staying in their own households. The similarity of the evidence regard­
ing the consumption of meat and fish in fiscal accounts of military expeditions with the 
animal bones found during the excavations of medi eval castles is striking.135
In this context the outbreak of scurvy, a disease generally associated with crews on 
long sea voyages and armies under siege, in the garrison of Givet in 1847 deserves par­
ticular attention.136 It occurred after the garrison had been weakened by typhoid and 
affected the military hospital most. Aside from the traditional emphasis on miasmas 
131 Seals were classified as fish in the Middle Ages and could therefore be eaten on days of fasting.
132 Brussels, ARA, 137.01, inv. no. 2784 (transcript Henk Beijers Archiefcollectie); van Werveke, 
Die Erwerbung, 8. See also Boffa, Warfare, 54.
133 van Velthem, Spiegel Historiael, pt. 5, bk. 3, vv. 3553–3558.
134 Marchal, Inventaire, 186; Servais, Annales historiques du Barrois, 2:340–41, 2:391. See also 
Deloffre, “Guerres et brigandages,” 280; Dinstühler, ed., Die Jülicher Landrentmeister-Rechnung, 
91–124.
135 Ervynck, “Medi eval Castles”; Ervynck and Woollett, “Top­Predator or Survivor”; Gautier, 
Hoffsummer, and Vanguestaine, “Faune médiévale”; Gautier and Fiers, “Restes animaux.”
136 McCord, “Scurvy and the Nations’ Men­of­War”; McCord, “Scurvy and the World’s Armies.”
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and the corresponding measure of transporting sick soldiers from the hospital or their 
barracks, both adjacent to the Meuse, to the fortress of Charlemont, located on higher 
ground, the official report emphasized discrepancies between different units. Appar­
ently, the cuirassiers counted only a single sick soldier even though they occupied the 
same barracks as their infantry comrades. Doctor Scoutetten, the author of the report, 
therefore suggested that the higher pay of these men, the direct descendants of medi­
eval men­at­arms from a tactical if not social viewpoint, shielded them from a sudden 
rise in food prices, as military pay remained constant. This case is not only noteworthy 
because it confirms the importance of socio­economic status for discrepancies within 
armed forces, but also because it demonstrates that scurvy struck a nineteenth­century 
army in peacetime, which supposedly should have benefited from three hundred years 
of medical progress.137 Rather than gradual improvement military health, as exemplified 
by the soldiers’ food intake, seems to have declined over time.
Disease Prevention
We have seen that armed forces’ vulnerability to disease should be seen in conjunction 
to evolving notions about military physique, the body, and how it should be fed, so we 
can now turn to more explicit mechanisms of disease prevention in an army context. 
Fortifications constitute a logical start given their central role in long­term interactions 
between armies and ecosystems. The traditional image of the polluted medi eval city has 
come under increasing criticism in the last decade with a growing number of historical 
studies demonstrating that waste disposal and hygiene standards were of major con­
cern to medi eval urban authorities. Despite this recent emphasis on the relative cleanli­
ness of the medi eval city its organization came at the cost of its periphery.138
Because comparatively few people lived there, fortifications became the place par 
excellence for waste disposal.139 In 1439, for instance, one of the towers protecting Wijck 
(Maastricht) was apparently so filthy that no one would stand guard there.140 Fortifica­
tions were hardly unique in this regard since every abandoned building or uninhabited 
structure was susceptible to be used in such a way. The restrictive nature of the forti­
fications at the edges of a settlement reinforced such practices, however, as archaeo­
logists found two cesspits from the sixteenth century in the arches of the city wall of 
’s­Hertogenbosch. When Maaseik was struck by an epidemic in 1575 the council like­
wise ordered its two gravediggers to work only at night and remain in a tower during 
the day. In eighteenth­century Sedan public slaughterhouses, latrines, and collection 
137 Scoutetten, “Note sur une épidémie de scorbut.”
138 Coomans, “In Pursuit of a Healthy City”; Creighton and Higham, Medi eval Town Walls, 45, 235; 
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63; Bormans, “Extraits des cris du péron,” 189–90; Bormans, “Table des régistres,” 12:27; Bormans, 
Lahaye, and Brouwers, ed., Cartulaire de Dinant, 3:155, 3:162–63; Jacquet­Ladrier, “Les épidémies,” 
134; Parmentier, Pays de Charleroi, 68, 82; van Zuijlen, Inventaris, 2:903.
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points for waste disposal were all located alongside the walls to keep them away from 
the town’s centre.141
This pollution not only encouraged the growth of ruderal plants such as nettles or 
thistles (see chap. 2), but also had a major influence on the introduction of domesti­
cated carp (Cyprinus carpio f. domestica) in Western Europe from the late thirteenth 
century onwards. Their presence is already attested in 1289 Namur. Carp are able to 
survive in slow or stagnant, oxygen­poor water with much vegetation, such as moats or 
ponds. They swim to the surface to breathe and feed on bottom­ or plant­dwelling ani­
mals. This made them a valuable alternative for native river fish, which were becoming 
increasingly rare at that time as a result of pollution, overfishing, and the use of smaller 
streams for milling and other activities (as we see with the disappearance of catfish and 
salmonids).142
Still, even carp would not have survived long in polluted water so the maintenance 
of basic hygiene standards in the fortifications became a vital issue. Significantly, these 
efforts retained a close link with the conservation of the fortifications themselves (see 
chap. 2). The city council of Aachen, for example, rewarded watchmen in 1385 for 
removing manure and their colleagues in Dordrecht commanded citizens to clean the 
moats in 1509 in order to prevent fires and the bad air that could cause the plague. The 
city council of Rotterdam also supplied two chamber pots to the members of shooting 
guilds who guarded the walls in 1556–1557.143
Military organizations were, because of their close connection to fortifications, par­
ticularly concerned with standards of hygiene. Eighteenth­century garrison regulations 
emphasized that sentries had to keep their post clean and prevent anyone from relieving 
himself or otherwise soiling its surroundings. These directives were enforced with very 
practical measures: the guard’s officer simply did not let a soldier off guard duty until 
his post was dirt­free. Citizens who transgressed either risked losing their hats or hav­
ing to clean up their mess themselves. A respectable person wore a hat when going out­
side, which made its taking a symbolic punishment (aside from the obvious economic 
cost).144 In 1811 a military engineer stationed in Sedan warned the town council about 
the water in the fortress’s moat, which had become stagnant. The citizens had to close 
141 Boonen, Ziekten en genezers, 8–9, 76–77, 87; Dardart, “La rue à Sedan,” 85, 185–86, 188–89, 
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off their access to the moat, in the form of latrines, sewers, etc., or the military would 
carry out the necessary adjustments themselves.145
Armed forces had the advantage that they could always resort to violence, or 
threats, if other measures failed. This link to violence, however, questions the very char­
acter of military control, for soldiers themselves also contributed to the range of (semi)
illegal activities associated with fortifications by organizing duels.146 One might in fact 
wonder how effective military regulations actually were. The water in the moats was 
considered less than healthy: de Vauban specified in his journal of the siege of Namur 
that on June 25, 1692, towards the end of the siege, the defenders cooked water drawn 
from a cistern in the castle moat before using it to make bread. The castle’s wells had 
become unusable at this point, one due to a direct hit by artillery fire and the other 
because a soldier had fallen into it and drowned. This pond dates back to at least the 
fifteenth century and served to collect rainwater running down from the plateau.147 The 
eighteenth­century garrison of Rocroi, on the other hand, had a special ramp leading to 
the moat so that horses could drink there. This also increased the chances of the water 
becoming polluted.148
Ultimately even military commanders could not escape the fact that fortifications 
remained the most obvious place for disposing waste, particularly for the very men who 
guarded the fortifications. The medi eval accounts of Grave from the late fifteenth cen­
tury mention payments for the repair of privies in front of, or near, the gates and at the 
guardhouses, and those of Venlo from 1409 refer to a privy on one of the towers.149 The 
fact that archaeo logists regularly recover hundreds of animal bones from fortress moats 
is revealing in itself. The French governor of Maaseik also ordered the construction of 
latrines on the city walls in 1673 as prevention against disease, and in 1794 gravedig­
gers at ’s­Hertogenbosch buried the garrison’s dead in one of the bastions or outlying 
forts for lack of other space. Dead horses were interred in the drill square near the 
citadel.150 Armed forces had a significant role in efforts to improve general hygiene in 
and near the fortifications because of their close connection to these spaces, but their 
attempts never fully succeeded.
Disease prevention did not stop with maintaining fortifications, however. Command­
ers also put considerable effort into making sure their subordinates upheld certain 
standards of cleanliness. While historical studies about military medicine place much 
emphasis on the fact that medical treatises, starting with Arnald of Villanova’s famous 
regimen on military camps, the Regimen Almarie, discuss hygiene precautions such 
145 Dardart, “La rue à Sedan,” 92, 191–92, 196–97, 201.
146 Liège, AEL, Echevins de Liège, inv. nos. 286, 750; Biemans, August von Bonstetten, 55; van der 
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147 Bragard et al., La termitière, 54–56; de Vauban, Journal, 151.
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as examining the quality of the water or burying the dead properly, it is quite unclear 
whether this reflects an increasing awareness of preventative health.151
As far as the Meuse Region is concerned, we are fortunate to have access to an excep­
tional eyewitness testimony of army life in the Central Middle Ages. The abbot of Sint 
Truiden/Saint­Trond (in the Prince­Bishopric of Liège) accompanied a mounted army 
of about two thousand horsemen marching down the Meuse valley in 1107 to join the 
emperor at Verdun, and left an account of his experiences in his abbey’s chronicle. The 
monk apparently thought that he would be able to lodge in a house every night and 
was absolutely horrified to see his new travel companions pitch camp in the open field. 
He complained that the stench of the excreta left by the horses and men “who did not 
remove themselves from them—his servant and himself—to relieve themselves” tor­
mented him daily and made him vomit repeatedly. He also grumbled about the swarms 
of flies that harassed him by day and the mosquitos that stung him at night. At first 
glace this evidence fits into the traditional image of a medi eval army which neglects to 
take even the most elementary health precautions. Yet the abbot also mentioned that 
the milites and squires set up tents for the nobles, constructed huts for themselves and 
their horses, and camped in a well­shaded environment near a stream. In other words: 
they followed health precautions also prescribed in Vegetius’s De re militari.152
The role played by the Aachen urban militia in the sieges of the fortresses of Dyck 
and Reifferscheid in 1383 and 1385 provides another excellent example because the 
richness of the city’s accounts can be complemented by six letters the contingent’s com­
manders wrote during the latter siege to the rest of the city council. None speak of the 
presence of disease, but they do mention essential health precautions such as payments 
to clean the tunics of moths, for the making of tents, and the repairing of shoes. It is also 
clear that one physician and two surgeons, with attendants, were present. The accounts 
indicate that the 1385 contingent totalled more than one hundred men, perhaps even 
close to two hundred, since they do not include servants and other support personnel. 
The urban militia lost a few combatants, but to enemy action rather than disease.153
This is hardly the only evidence regarding the existence of basic hygiene in medi eval 
army camps. Honoré Bonet’s L’Arbre des batailles, dating from the 1380s, a prescriptive 
work on the conduct of war, stipulated that an army’s marshal had to look after the sick 
and wounded and make sure they got better. He also had to take care that no one bathed 
in the drinking water of the horses because that affected the latter’s eyesight.154 The 
fiscal accounts of Albert of Bavaria, Count of Holland, specify that a certain Haestgen 
vander Vuyr received a payment of one schild on July 8, 1393 because he supplied soap 
151 Garrison, Notes, 94–95; McVaugh, ed., Regimen Almarie, 167–72, 197–200.
152 Foetor enim fimi equorum et hominum, non longe a nobis ad secessum declinantium, paene 
me cotidie enccabat, crebro perurgens ad vomitum. The term miles (plural milites) refers here to a 
mounted warrior who was of subordinate status, compared to actual nobles. The transformation of 
these groups into “knights” is still the subject of major debates: de Borman, Chronique de l’abbaye 
de Saint-Trond, 1:102–3.
153 Laurent, Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 61, 89–95, 277, 278, 279, 281, 292, 296.
154 Bonet, L’Arbre des batailles, 96–97.
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“that one needed in the army” (diemen inden heer behoefde). His troops besieged the 
house (castle) of Altena at that time.155 One of the versions of the English military ordi­
nances, dating to the early fifteenth century when English soldiers overran the southern 
half of the Meuse Region, likewise commanded that offal from slaughtered animals in 
camps had to be buried to prevent infections.156 These were health precautions essen­
tially similar to those taken by seventeenth­ and eighteenth­century armed forces.157
Archaeo logical research might be far more informative in this regard. Excavations 
in Bouge, a village next to Namur on the east bank of the Meuse, found remains of fire­
155 A schild is a golden coin minted in the County of Holland. The amount of soap bought cannot 
have been large, for the count also paid two men who brought him cherries on multiple occasions 
one schild each. De Boer, Faber, and van Gent, eds., De rekeningen, 1393–1396, lx–lxii, 124.
156 Curry, “The Military Ordinances”; Hargreaves, “The Long Road,” 440, 442.
157 Colombier, Préceptes, 245–64; de Keralio, Lacuée, and Servan, Encyclopédie méthodique. Art 
militaire, 2:408–12; Hexham, The Second Part of the Principles of Art Military, 23–24; Lenihan, 
Fluxes, Fevers, and Fighting Men, 89–90; Stevin, Castrametatio, 41.
Figure 34. Fifteenth­century miniature, made in the Burgundian Netherlands, representing the 
siege of Narbonne by Charlemagne’s army. Note the horseman charging at the quintaine on the left, 
and the foot soldier in the middle, who seems to be digging a drainage ditch next to the imperial 
tent (Brussels, KBR, MS 9068: Les Croniques et conquests de Charlemaine, fol. 73). Reproduced 
with permission of the Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique/Koninklijke Bibliotheek van België.
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places, left by three separate army encampments. The oldest of these camps dates to the 
late fifteenth or early sixteenth century, and included a shallow ditch measuring thirty 
metres in length, three metres in width, and about one metre in depth to the east of the 
location of the hearths. The authors of the report suggested that it might have served as 
the camp’s boundary. Another, and far more intriguing option could be that this ditch 
had a role in the camp’s waste disposal system or water drainage, possibly serving as 
(one of) the camp’s latrine(s). A second excavation, at Frameries near Mons, discovered 
the remains of shallow ditches, about five and a half metres long, in an army camp from 
the early modern period (late sixteenth to eighteenth centuries). These might have pre­
vented rainwater from flowing into the tents (see figure 34), but they also contained 
food waste and charcoal. A final interesting detail from Bouge is the discovery of a post­
fifteenth­century skeleton burried rather hastily in a ditch rather than a proper grave.158
Burying corpses remained a responsibility largely left to local inhabitants or the 
family and friends of the deceased rather than army members in general; sometimes the 
numbers might be counted.159 This created major problems when large numbers of bod­
ies were involved. According to the chronicler Jean de Stavelot, the miasmas of the dead 
at the battlefield of Othée (1408) forced the Burgundian army to relocate to adjacent 
villages. The soldiers did, however, retrieve the bodies of leading noblemen, and brought 
those to Maastricht to be interred.160 It is possible that the corpses, initially burried in 
mass graves, were reinterred in 1410, when a chapel was constructed on the battlefield 
with a large cemetery around it. It is worth noting that the village might have suffered 
from an epidemic in the immediate aftermath of the battle.161
Subsequent centuries saw no significant change in this regard. Ambroise Paré wrote 
in his treatise on military surgery that he wanted to leave the battlefield of Saint­Quen­
tin (1557) due to the stench of the wounded and dead. He also remembered numerous 
flies swarming as a result of the humidity of the bodies and the heat of the sun, blocking 
the sunlight, and spreading the plague wherever they settled.162 His experiences were 
not that different from the farmer, Winand Mengels, who visited the battlefield of Lafelt 
(1747) after the fighting had ended. He was particularly horrified to see his fellow vil­
lagers robbing the dead and wounded instead of helping them. The corpses, deprived 
of all their belongings, were eventually buried in mass graves.163 The Dutch army might 
have passed a regulation in 1673 that all filth, carcasses, and other foul­smelling matter 
had to be removed from the roads on which the soldiers marched, but it is quite unclear 
158 Authom and Denis, “Exploration”; Denis, “Frameries”; Siebrand and Collette, “Namur/Bouge,” 
276–277.
159 Devillers, “Documents relatifs,” 97–98; Gagné, “Counting the Dead,” 800–803; Gaier, Art et 
organisation militaires, 69–70.
160 de Stavelot, Chronique, 119.
161 Domken, “Histoire,” 49–50, 207–9.
162 Packard, ed., Ambroise Paré, 242–43. Original French text in Paré, La bataille de Saint-
Quentin, 8.
163 Mengels, Chronyk, 39–46.
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if this regulation was ever enforced.164 The above­mentioned mass grave of horses near 
Maastricht, buried in a siege trench, as well as a skeleton of a soldier who died at one 
of the sieges of Namur indicates that many bodies were interred in existing ditches or 
wherever they fell.165
The large numbers of horses many armies brought with them could aggravate these 
problems, given the amount of waste produced by a horse. The newly established jour­
nal of French military medicine, for example, attributed an epidemic affecting the gar­
rison of Sedan in 1776–1777 to the location of the barracks’ wells. These had to be built 
next to a depository for horse manure in order not to hinder military exercises.166 Most 
contemporaries, however, perceived horse waste as an asset rather than a problem, 
for it had a key role as fertilizer in agricultural societies. French regulations from 1750 
stated that the majors des place, staff officers in a military garrison, could dispose of the 
manure from cavalry regiments as well as the contents of the latrines providing that 
they ensured that the buildings were not damaged.167
As for soldiers, maintenance of basic hygiene quickly became reduced to simply 
taking care of one’s equipment. The famous military manual of Johann Jakob von Wall­
hausen, published in 1615, already mentioned that the Kapitän d’armes, a non­commis­
sioned officer responsible for a company’s arms, had to take care of his unit’s sick. The 
regulations issued to his men in 1757 by the colonel of the Horion regiment, a unit raised 
in Liège for French service, indicate a focus on cleanliness, but also show that the colo­
nel was mainly concerned with the image his men presented to the general public. The 
soldiers had to wash their hands and faces regularly and powder their hair. Sixty years 
later captain von Bonstetten wrote in his diary about inspections of his men’s laundry, 
food, feet, and underwear. At that point basic hygiene had clearly become incorporated 
into the military’s range of mechanisms for discipline.168
The role of military discipline becomes far more ambiguous if one considers prohi­
bitions regarding swimming or bathing. The governors of the eighteenth­century gar­
rison of Namur forbad their soldiers from swimming or bathing in the Sambre or the 
Meuse alongside the city from the training grounds near the Bulet gate until beyond 
the training grounds of the Saint­Nicolas gate. In 1760 the commander even instituted 
special patrols to ensure that his orders were respected. The garrison regulations of 
Maastricht mention similar prohibitions for the Meuse between Maastricht and Wijck.169 
The inclusion of specific places near these cities’ centres is of major significance. Mili­
164 Kerkhoff, “Over de geneeskundige verzorging,” 73.
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tary commanders might have recognized the value of these activities, but they did not 
want naked soldiers splashing around where citizens could see them. Officers banned 
smoking for similar reasons not only near gunpowder storages, but also on the street or 
when on guard duty. The ashes had to be deposited in ashtrays.170
In specific circumstances the military might actually have spread basic health stan­
dards among society at large. The mutineers of the Spanish Habsburg army who occu­
pied Weert in 1601–1602, for instance, ordered the mayors to remove filth from the 
streets and repair the gutters under the city walls. The town council also had to make 
sure that the guardhouses were regularly cleaned.171 The military concern with keeping 
the immediate environment of guard posts dirt­free in fact not only benefited fortifica­
tions but also urban centres, since soldiers guarded important locations, such as the 
town hall or markets. A letter from a civilian recruiter for the French Royal Liégeois 
regiment in Maaseik (1789) even specifies that he bought a recruit new spats and had 
his linen washed before sending him to the officer in charge of recruiting. Conversely, 
the garrison commander of Namur had to remind his men in 1760 to respect the city’s 
regulations to keep the streets clean. In this way the legislation passed by military and 
urban authorities was complementary rather than conflicting.172
Women present with the army also played important, and generally gender­specific, 
roles. Medi eval and sixteenth­century armies had special officials tasked with both 
organizing the camp followers and maintaining basic hygiene: the king of the “ribauds” 
and the “whores’ sergeant” (Hurenweybel). The former performed all sorts of menial 
tasks for rulers or urban councils and also supported armies on campaign. The latter 
had to ensure that the Tross or camp followers, did their duty, which included cleaning 
the camp’s latrines.173 The regulations of the eighteenth­century garrison of Namur stip­
ulated that soldiers’ wives had to clean the barracks on Wednesdays and Saturdays, once 
drummers had beaten the order around one p.m., while cantinières were still expected 
to help treat the wounded in the nineteenth­century French army.174
Military quarantine measures were far more far­reaching, however, than the tradi­
tional association of women with prostitution. A soldier serving in the Spanish garri­
son of Namur testified before the provincial court that he had spontaneously offered 
his help to carry sick soldiers who had arrived in the city in 1689. When his officers 
Medianée, arts. 4, 5; inv. no. 2081: Generale Orders, arts. 14, 24; inv. no. 2087: June 14, 1759, June 
10, 1760; Reglement en orders Maastricht (1786), art. 35.
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learned about this, they beat him and forbade him from approaching the same sick sol­
diers again.175 The eighteenth­century Dutch navy on the other hand controlled incom­
ing ships suspected of bringing epidemic disease. The Admiralty of the Maze (Meuse) 
established a special harbour near Hellevoetsluis where ships arriving from the East 
Indies had to remain in quarantine from seven to forty days. This suggests that the his­
torical concept of a frontier included health aspects as well. Guards stationed at fortress 
gates likewise had to turn away people suspected of spreading disease.176
Yet maintaining military health was not solely a top­down process. Common soldiers 
were also quite capable of constructing shelters and seeking food themselves if the need 
arose. The disruptive activity traditionally denoted as “foraging,” for instance, encom­
passed a wide range of actions, ranging from thousands of soldiers collecting forage to 
individual men and women stealing a cow or gathering wood (see figure 35). Armed 
forces were very vulnerable to an enemy attack when foraging, which meant that such 
activities should ideally only be carried out under the commander’s supervision. The 
chronicle of Emond de Dynter records for example that during the siege of Grave in 1388 
a considerable part of the Brabant forces went foraging on their own, despite instruc­
tions only to do so under the marshal’s command. In a subsequent Guelders counter­
175 Jacquet­Ladrier, “Vivre à Namur en temps de guerre,” 166.
176 Denys, Police et sécurité, 244–45; Leuftink, Harde heelmeesters, 186–88; van Wissekerke, Van 
kwade droes tot erger, 309–22.
Figure 35. Soldiers gathering forage, late seventeenth century (Guérard, L’Art militaire).
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attack many were killed, which demoralized the army.177 It comes as no surprise, there­
fore that seventeenth­ and eighteenth­century armies included “foraging” in the range 
of activities employed at military training camps (see chap. 1).
Commanders obviously wanted to control the movement of combatants, but there 
is far more at stake here than responding adequately to enemy action. The pertinent 
question was whether individual army members were deemed capable of managing to 
maintain their own good health. Conflicts about foraging also relate to tensions between 
formal versus informal knowledge.178 The French military doctor Colombier suggested 
that experienced soldiers should guide newer members when looking for vegetables or 
herbs on campaign, so they did not bring anything poisonous or useless, and his Dutch 
colleague Joseph Kerckhoffs (1789–1867), the medical officer in charge of the Roer­
mond garrison, argued in 1815 that soldiers should be prevented from gathering plants 
with which they were unfamiliar.179
These perceptions were hardly unique. In 1747 the French commandant at Huy 
ordered the guards at the gates to ensure that no plums entered the city because they 
caused dysentery. The commanders of Namur gave similar instructions to their subordi­
nates in 1740, 1741, and 1760. These officers shared a general assumption that the eat­
ing of unripe or rotten fruit was a major cause of dysentery and saw it as their respon­
sibility to prevent lower­ranking soldiers, who in their view did not have the necessary 
knowledge, from doing something that damaged their health. Jean Colombier, who did 
recognise the benefits of eating fresh fruit, vehemently criticized this practice in his 
1775 handbook.180
Even though physicians and surgeons regularly, if not invariably, accompanied 
armies from at least the Central Middle Ages, it is quite unclear to what extent they could 
control medicinal practices within their armies. The Freiherr von Natzmer recounted 
in his memoirs that as a young ensign in the Dutch army he became ill from a “camp 
disease” (Lagerkrankheit), in the aftermath of the failed siege of Maastricht in 1676. His 
comrades put him on a wagon with other sick soldiers, after which he started to suffer 
from dysentery. He then drank lapis prunellae, a mixture of saltpeter, sulphur, and barley 
water, felt better, left the wagon, and arranged to stay at an inn. He relapsed later and 
had to go to a local doctor. Of special interest here is that he learned about this con­
coction from the count of Dohna, a Prussian general whom he served as a page before 
entering the army. This recipe must have been, or have become, quite widespread, since 
Samuel Hahnemann mentioned it as an ineffective treatment in his famous eighteenth­
century Apotherkerlexikon. Still, during the Napoleonic Wars many soldiers continued to 
trust in the healing properties of gunpowder.181
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Medicinal use of gunpowder is not only indicative of soldiers helping themselves, 
but might actually be rooted in specific medical theories. Colombier argued for example 
that the smoke of tobacco and gunpowder drove miasmas away. The perceived impor­
tance of miasmas was such that the burning of aromatic herbs became standard practice 
in spaces where wounded or sick combatants were kept. A fiscal account relating to the 
care given to wounded horsemen from Namur in 1347 accordingly notes the purchase 
of herbs for the room where the wounded lay.182 The regulations for “the prevention and 
curing of diseases” of the Dutch army (1673) required the burning of herbs in hospitals 
or other places where sick soldiers stayed. These hospitals also adopted the medi eval 
practice of keeping gardens so they could grow their own herbs.183
The emphasis on gardens is crucial because they existed everywhere soldiers stayed 
for extended periods of time: fortifications, army camps, and hospitals. This implies at 
the very least that some soldiers had acquired basic botanical knowledge. Doctor Jean 
Pierre Paul Bovy, who grew up in the citadel of Liège in the late eighteenth century, still 
recalled the magnificent gardens of the garrison’s officers when writing his memoirs 
in the late 1830s. Many plant species found in nineteenth­century fortifications in fact 
originated in nearby gardens. It is only uncertain who maintained these (see chap. 2).184
Natural knowledge within an army context went beyond the formal medical practi­
tioners. In the fourteenth century Guy de Chauliac (ca. 1300–1368), a university­edu­
cated surgeon, made a list of people who he thought should not be allowed to practise 
medicine. He mentioned among others “men­at­arms or Teutonic knights and others 
who serve in war,” who “with conjurations and concoctions, oil, wool, and leaves of cab­
bages dress all wounds, and base on this that God has put his virtue in words, herbs 
and stones.”185 The notebook of the Swiss soldier Michael Andrist, who served in the 
garrisons of ’s­Hertogenbosch and Maastricht in the 1780s, included several basic treat­
ments against drunkenness, tremors in the hands and feet, infections of the fingers 
(panaritium), nose bleeds, and bad breath. It is conceivable that knowledge of the plants 
employed in such recipes (wild arum, rosemary, lavender, marjory, St. John’s wort, sting­
ing nettles, betony, creeping cinquefoil, and similar) was widespread among common 
soldiers.186
The close connection between army life and travel brought men of war into con­
tact with unfamiliar creatures, but soldiers did not have to explore other continents to 
encounter exotic species. In 1467–1468, for example, a wild animal (schamper Tier) was 
captured near the Landwehr of Aachen, and then shown to the city council. The city’s 
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accounts do not identify the species, but since it was put on display, it is reasonable to 
suggest that it was considered rare for some reason. It might have been a lynx, given that 
this is an animal that is native to the area, but very rarely seen.187 In 1600, on the other 
hand, soldiers and fishermen killed a “sea monster” in the Meuse estuary near the fort 
(schans) of Werkendam, which turned out to be a pregnant hooded seal. This species is 
significantly larger than a harbour seal, and normally lives around the North Pole.188 A 
French dragoon named Marquant, a native of Commercy, stayed for some time in Mal­
médy during the 1792 invasion of the Southern Netherlands, and recorded a description 
of a black grouse in his notebook, because he had never seen such an animal before. This 
bird requires a very specific habitat and may have disappeared from most of the Meuse 
Region by the eighteenth century (see also chap. 3). Today, the Hohes Venn is one of its 
last refuges in Western Europe.189
Armies therefore contributed in several ways to the preservation and spread of zoo­
logical and botanical knowledge. The accounts of the Count of Blois from 1362 mention 
that his farrier went to Dordrecht to buy horse medicine (theriac, laurel oil, dialtea, tur­
pentine, dragon’s blood, olive oil, sagimen vitri) for his forthcoming military expedition 
to Guelders. He also took care to compile a book on this matter (boec van medicinen van 
187 Kraus, Die Aachener Stadtrechnungen, 426.
188 ’t Hart, “Zeehondenjacht,” 100.
189 Vallée and Pariset, eds., Carnet, 220–21.
Figure 36. Engraving of the killing of a hooded seal in the Meuse/Merwede, by 
Julius Goltzius, 1600 (HVG, Collectie Atlas van Gijn, VG864: Julius Goltzius, Een 
zeehond in de Merwede, 1600). Reproduced with permission of the Huis van Ghijn.
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paerden). This might have been a copy of another work, which the farrier could not bring 
with him. Farriers continued to have a major role in horse medicine until the founding of 
veterinary schools in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.190 Gédéon Boni­
vert, a Huguenot from Sedan, served as a lieutenant in the British army in the 1690s, and 
collected plants, lichens, and fungi in the Low Countries, England, and Ireland. Part of 
his herbarium has still been preserved.191
One could question the representativity of these examples, given the close connec­
tion between medicine and botany, or the fact that these men were relatively well edu­
cated. The Dutch militiaman (schutter) Jan Teunisse from Amsterdam wrote down how 
his comrades and he made soup in the Campine/Kempen during the Ten Days’ Campaign 
(1831). He was lucky enough to obtain salt, but those who did not threw some herbs 
into the cauldron instead. Apparently, it made their soup look like mud and blackened 
their lips and tongue.192 The aim here, however, is not to prove that the average soldier 
had extensive natural knowledge, especially if he came from an urban background, but 
that armies as organizations played a significant role in the spread of bio logical knowl­
edge. Basic forms of natural knowledge were almost a prerequisite for military life. As 
Erik A. Lund has argued, a general had to be able to estimate the amount of grassland 
needed to produce forage for his men’s horses, while the common trooper had to actu­
ally gather grass and herbs. The same applies to cutting wood, hunting, fishing, and dig­
ging or destroying dams, dikes, or trenches.193
Highlighting this informal knowledge also helps us to reconsider traditional gen­
der divisions within armies. Regulations for the Dutch army from 1729 specified that 
soldiers’ wives were allowed to shoe military horses. They presumably obtained the 
practical know­how from having to fend for themselves during campaigns. The garrison 
orders of Namur include one peculiar order from July 12, 1742, which says that sol­
diers could search for wild strawberries in nearby forests, but not bring them into town. 
Apparently, they peeled the fruits, which ruined them. The fact that soldiers themselves 
are targeted here, and not their families, who are mentioned elsewhere in the garrison 
orders, is noteworthy.194
What these examples make clear is that the role of the Dutch and French military in 
the discovery of the mosasaur genus, as mentioned in the introduction, relate to much 
wider practices of armies’ spreading and conservation of natural history. Basic forms 
of bio logical knowledge were indispensable for army members to preserve their own 
health as well as that of the animals on which they depended. Medical practitioners, 
such as Dr. Hoffmann, commemorated in the name of the mosasaurus hoffmanni, played 
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a key role in this regard, but at the same time many common soldiers and their families 
also proved to be quite knowledgeable about plant and animal life.
Conclusion
Armies had a major role in bringing about changes in healthcare, but the grand narrative 
of progress in which armed forces suddenly became aware of disease prevention during 
the Renaissance can no longer be maintained. This assumption originates in a misun­
derstanding of medi eval armies and a tendentious reading of the available sources, or an 
altogether lack of primary source material to begin with. Medi eval armies suffered from 
epidemics during sieges and extended campaigns in different environmental contexts, 
but such circumstances can hardly be considered typical for the kind of warfare, namely 
mounted raiding, that went on in the Meuse Region most of the time.
Rather than persisting in such a mistaken teleo logy, this chapter has argued that 
epidemics might have become more common towards the end of the fifteenth century, 
as a result from shifts towards larger and more permanent armed forces, which were 
also more likely to move into different disease environments. From 1250 to 1850 medi­
cal theories first formulated in Antiquity, and frameworks developed during the Cen­
tral Middle Ages, notably the hiring of physicians and surgeons to accompany armies on 
campaign, continued to define healthcare within armed forces. Informal medical prac­
titioners, such as soldiers, their families, and farriers, also retained an important role in 
the preservation of both humans’ and animals’ physical wellbeing. It was not until the 
nineteenth century that military doctors, equipped with new medical principles, took 
full control. Even though some elements support an idea of “progress,” as it is tradition­
ally understood, the historical reality is far more complex.
CONCLUSION
The role of military men in the discovery of the mosasaur genus, a major contribution 
to natural history, was clearly not an isolated event, but should be seen as emblematic 
for the wide­ranging, and often surprising, spectrum of army–ecosystem interactions. 
Armies’ conscious and concerted protection and conservation of ecosystems did indeed 
precede the rise of environmentalism by at least several centuries, as demonstrated 
throughout this study, whose chapters represent the ecosystem concept: frontiers, forti­
fications, disturbances, policing, and army health.
Fortifications in the Meuse Region enhanced the diversity of the landscape by their 
use of linear elements such as ditches, hedges, stone walls, and underground galleries. 
The plant and animal diversity in nineteenth­century fortresses was so extensive that 
it drew the attention of contemporary naturalists. Armed forces also created or con­
served wilderness in the form of woodlands, inundations, and heathlands. Some of these 
served as defensive elements within frontiers, others developed as a consequence of 
military training practices. Many have now become nature reserves. Simply maintaining 
the health of the people and animals that constituted an army led to the construction or 
preservation of gardens.
This protective role has its limits. Armed forces preserved specific landscapes, 
biotic communities, and species, but in the long run their contribution remained largely 
restricted to militarized landscapes, landscapes for which military use was a defining 
element. Armies played a very significant role in the conservation of unique ecosystems 
within frontiers and fortifications, but outside these contexts they only interfered when 
normal regulating forces (such as forest or field guards) proved to be insufficient. Sol­
diers mainly became involved in policing practices when restricting access to ecosys­
tems or natural resources resolved around attempts to control the movements of people 
and horses perceived as indispensable for them.
Armies were an essential, but not exclusive, factor in the eco logical richness of mili­
tarized landscapes along the Meuse. These landscapes came about as a result of complex 
and constantly changing interactions between several protagonists. Aside from geo­
graphical and geo logical features, other social groups, animals, and plants also proved 
quite capable of exerting an influence, sometimes in direct competition with soldiers. 
The use of mining galleries and inundation basins was largely determined by local 
hydro graphy and soil structure. The spread of garden plants in fortifications cannot be 
explained by referring solely to gardens managed by army members, but also needs to 
take the presence of calcareous materials, gardens cultivated by local inhabitants, and 
the capacity of plants themselves to colonize new spaces into account.
The eco logical richness of these landscapes, then, was to some extent unintended. 
Armed forces protected specific ecosystems, and promoted landscape diversity, because 
this diversity had military value, not because they had an interest in the natural world in 
the same way as environmentalist organizations. Military courts and regulations, refer­
ring to the military as an organization, did not consider environmental degradation as 
a particularly important crime, unless it was considered as a form of insubordination. 
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When armies did interfere in the protection of ecosystems, they often had to act against 
their own colleagues or adversaries. The importance of natural history in a military con­
text likewise derived from the need to ensure army members’ own wellbeing and simple 
survival on campaign.
At the other end of the spectrum the role of military disturbances proved to be as 
ambiguous as protective behaviour in the strict sense of the word. Premodern armies 
could exert destructive forces similar to natural disasters on eco logical systems, even 
with the relatively primitive tools at their disposal, but the short­ and long­term effects 
of such disasters remains open to debate. Permanent degradation was more an excep­
tion rather than the rule, testimony to the surprising resilience of the affected humans, 
animals, and plants. Despite large­scale cutting down of wood, trampling of agricultural 
fields, floodings, and burned houses, very few settlements were abandoned perma­
nently as the result of warfare.
Disturbances were also not necessarily detrimental to the survival of eco logical 
systems. Some ecosystems can only exist when processes of eco logical succession are 
slowed down or interrupted. Frontiers and fortifications present a very strong case for 
long­term interactions, but they could only be conserved through short­term distur­
bances or interventions: simple maintenance and military training exercises. If peas­
ants, citizens, or paid labourers did not remove vegetation from the walls and ditches 
at regular intervals, the walls would have crumbled and the ditches became land. The 
grazing of sheep in military fortifications and the keeping of carp in water­filled ditches 
were likewise very practical measures to ensure basic maintenance.
The emphasis on human intervention is primordial, because all ecosystems within 
the Meuse Region were man­made to some extent. Unwanted species, such as wolves, 
but also weeds and thorn bushes, could therefore profit from the lack of repression 
during warfare and re­establish themselves. This also draws attention to the agency of 
animals and plants, for the capability of these species to react quickly to such sudden 
opportunities is remarkable. Even though this spread of wilderness, or uncontrolled 
nature, was quickly reversed as soon as peace returned, restoring a community and 
associated ecosystems to a pre­war state could take several decades.
It is in fact unclear to what extent warfare in itself is an adequate factor to explain 
permanent eco logical changes. The best examples of such long­term effects, such as the 
deforestation of the banks of the Meuse River and the disappearance of vineyards in the 
northern half of the Meuse Region during the early modern period, cannot be under­
stood by considering armed conflicts on their own. Deforestation processes originated 
in a pressing need for wood as fuel and timber. Arms and gunpowder production, as well 
as shipbuilding, had a far more important role in this regard than sieges, which, while 
very destructive, were relatively rare and short­term events. In the case of vineyards and 
herring fisheries, warfare seems to have simply accelerated the impact of climate change.
The continuous role of environmental pressures, weather, and climate, but also geo­
graphical and geo logical features, on the behaviour of armies should therefore not be 
underestimated. It confirms the value of referring to reciprocal interactions between 
armies and eco logical systems. The often­harmful effects of the weather on fortifications 
and army members were a constant factor throughout the 1250–1850 period, and in 
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many ways they still are. While engineers did devise increasingly effective measures to 
control local hydro graphy, actual supply of water in times of need, as a defensive line or 
as drinking water, remained problematic. The Meuse itself continued to be a constant 
source of problems because it was fed by rainwater. Depending on the season, multiple 
fords could appear or disappear, river traffic could become impossible, and, worst of all, 
the Meuse could leave its riverbed and flood the very defences built on its banks.
Military forces responded to these challenges by creating their own artificial wil­
derness. They made or contributed to the construction of canals, and planted or pro­
tected woods on heathlands, near frontiers, and in the outworks of fortresses. This 
demonstrates the difficult distinction between man­made environments on the one 
hand, symbolized by gardens, and uncontrolled nature, symbolized by wilderness, on 
the other. Ideas about wilderness also contained a very practical yet cynical element, 
for the areas perceived as being outside one’s own garden, outside one’s main defences, 
were far more likely to become victims of the disruptive activities of armies, which in 
turn encouraged the spread of actual wilderness or geo graphical features and species 
considered to be undesirable.
Because of this importance of eco logical pressures substantial differences could be 
observed within the Meuse Region. The choice of particular forms of defence, such as 
water versus woodlands or mining galleries, was largely determined by soil characteris­
tics. Marching armies preferred the banks of the Meuse itself or fertile agricultural lands 
such as Hesbaye, and avoided large stretches of perceived wilderness, in the shape of 
the seemingly endless wood­ or heathlands of the Argonne, Ardennes, and Hohes Venn 
whenever possible. These areas still experienced a significant military presence, but 
it assumed different forms. Such stretches of wilderness served as frontiers, refuges, 
sources of wood, and military training grounds. In this way, armed forces actually con­
tributed to the apparently unchanging geo graphical characteristics of these areas.
Political or economic factors were essential as well. Many scholars have overem­
phasized their importance, however, and neglected eco logical impacts. Fortifications 
built alongside the Meuse River did not just defend river crossings, but also served to 
collect tolls. The Campine/Kempen saw relatively limited military action until it found 
itself in the middle of war­making parties during the Eighty Years War. The construc­
tion of new village forts (schansen), often in the most inaccessible part of a settlement, 
was a direct response to changing political circumstances. The policy of neutrality of the 
Prince­Bishop of Liège from the late fifteenth century onwards, which entailed a relative 
absence of standing armies and fortresses adapted to resist artillery, was of major con­
sequence for army–ecosystem interactions.
Standing armies and artillery fortresses refer to two main, well­known changes 
within the early modern period. They brought about tensions between the military as 
an organization and more traditional forms of military service, and contributed to the 
use of former soldiers as government officials tasked with controlling natural resources. 
The spread of gunpowder weapons simultaneously encouraged further diversity within 
a limited number of medi eval fortifications and brought about the abandonment of most 
others. The use of larger armies, which also tended to move regularly between differ­
ent disease environments, increased morbidity and mortality rates, with early modern 
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soldiers on average being more likely to succumb to an epidemic than their medi eval 
predecessors.
Despite these developments, major continuity could be observed in the Meuse 
Region between the Central Middle Ages and the nineteenth century. Key aspects of cur­
rent armed forces, such as the military–civilian divide, gunpowder weapons, passports, 
engineers, university­educated doctors, industrialized arms production, and military 
domains, originated in this era, but at the same time older traditions and structures con­
tinued to play a significant role. The garden–wilderness contrast dominated the military 
perception of frontier landscapes, medi eval stone fortifications retained their defensive 
value, wolves profited from warfare to spread to new areas, distinctions between armed 
forces and the general population were not drawn too rigidly, and soldiers still had some 
control over the preservation of their own health.
The years 1250 to 1850 can therefore be seen as an intermediary period in the his­
tory of the Meuse Region, during which military attempts to control ecosystems became 
more intensive, without causing a break with older management practices. Most of the 
tools army members employed to maintain and improve their own place in eco logical 
systems (axes, spades, shovels, and torches, but also man and animal labour, manure, 
and herbal remedies) had been around for thousands of years. Human interventions 
are not necessarily detrimental. They can actually increase biodiversity by creating 
more variation within landscapes. Armies contributed to this diversity because their 
needs often opposed those of other social groups. They protected or damaged specific 
biotic communities to preserve their own health or gain a strategic advantage. Historical 
armed forces had close and extensive contacts with the other components of ecosys­
tems. Military commanders valued horses and waterways because movement would 
have become almost impossible without them, while their subordinates had to gather 
food and forage on the spot, and needed wood for the building of fortifications, the mak­
ing of weapons, and shielding themselves from the cold.
In modern armed forces, by contrast, soldiers have to devote much less attention to 
such matters, for military engineers and doctors ensure that environmental constraints 
on military operations (such as difficult terrain or disease) are reduced as much as pos­
sible. Military organizations are not unique in this regard, since humans’ general impact 
on eco logical systems has become so intensive and all­encompassing during the last 
century and a half that many other species are driven to extinction. The nineteenth cen­
tury can be considered as a main turning point because several key changes occurred in 
a relatively short time­frame: military forces established their own domains, which civil­
ians were no longer allowed to enter, they adopted on a massive scale new gunpowder 
weapons (the machine gun, breech­loading rifles, and artillery), fortifications (concrete 
and barbed wire), means of transport (railways and steamships), and communication 
(the tele graph and radio), and university­educated doctors introduced innovative medi­
cal theories, all of which became especially important in increasingly global and indus­
trialized conflicts.
Any chrono logical limit is to some extent artificial. The succesful German invasion of 
France in 1940, for instance, was made possible by French generals’ misguided percep­
tion of the Ardennes as an impassable wilderness, and even though this campaign will 
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foreover be associated with tanks and other mechanized vehicles, the Wehrmacht still 
depended on the labour of tens of thousands of horses. The use of plants in fortifica­
tions did not disappear with the introduction of concrete and barbed wire, but remained 
important in the context of camouflage. Interactions between armies and ecosystems 
remained as complex as in the Middle Ages. In fact, current debates about the eco logical 
impact of military forces demonstrate that even today these impacts are quite ambigu­
ous and cannot be reduced to environmental destruction or conservationism.
In this way, the military–eco logical interactions examined here shed new light on 
military history in general. Rather than focusing on techno logy and the beginning of 
modernity, it demonstrates the continuous importance of frameworks established dur­
ing the Middle Ages and draws attention to the eco logical aspects of state formation. The 
emphasis on ecosystems rather than political actors contributes to a more global mili­
tary history in which techno logy and military doctrines are just two elements among 
many in the complex interactions between armies and eco logical systems. Instead of 
highlighting the impact of gunpowder and drill, it is worth explaining to what extent 
European armies could establish themselves on other continents because they managed 
to adapt to and influence local ecosystems, something that they would not have been 
able to do without native support and indigenous knowledge.
This emphasis on placing discussions about the eco logical impacts of military forces 
on a sound historical footing is not to ignore the very real changes that have come about 
in recent decades through the efforts of environmentalist organizations. The spread of 
chemical and atomic weapons has added a whole new level to problems regarding the 
“environmental footprint” of the military. Self­congratulatory statements that today’s 
military forces are doing something unprecedented or are more environmentally con­
scious than their predecessors are not only simplistic but also counterproductive because 
they imply that further efforts are unnecessary or at least not urgent. Armies’ destructive 
capabilities have increased significantly in the last century and a half. It is only logical 
that conservationist efforts have to be stepped up in parallel. Merely continuing practices 
that are centuries old and calling them “progressive” and “modern” will not do.
The Meuse Region in the period 1250–1850 provides an excellent case study that 
challenges traditional interpretations of the relationship of armed forces with their sur­
rounding world partly because of its strategic importance, but also because it is rela­
tively small when seen in a global, or even European context. What the debate really 
needs therefore is more research regarding historical army–ecosystem interactions, 
preferably in a long­term and transnational perspective. This will reveal whether the 
army–ecosystem interactions that can be observed in the basin of the Meuse River are 
unique or resemble those in other regions. Armies around the world have influenced 
ecosystems and were influenced by them from the very beginning of human warfare, 
firm evidence of which dates back at least to the Neolithic period. Despite the praise­
worthy efforts of peace organizations it is unlikely that the near future will see the end 
of warfare. A better understanding of how armies and ecosystems interacted in the past 
will be indispensable for dealing with the eco logical consequences of today’s and future 
military actions. In this way, we might be able to bring about a real green turn in the 
present world as well as military history.
Appendix
OVERVIEW OF PLANTS FOUND IN THE 
FORTIFICATIONS OF MAASTRICHT IN 1868 
BASED ON DUMOULIN, GUIDE DU BOTANISTE 
Species Location Current presence in the area Remarks
Common snapdragon (Antirrhinum majus) First city wall of Maastricht (Lang Grachtje) Rare Garden plant of Mediterranean origin
European columbine (Aquilegia vulgaris) Old (medi eval) wall Rare
Tower mustard (Arabis glabra) Medi eval city walls Threatened with extinction
Nettle­leaved goosefoot (Chenopodium murale) Walls fortifications Very rare Archaeophyte
Long­headed poppy (Papaver dubium) Ramparts fortifications Relatively common
Corsican stonecrop (Sedum dasyphyllum) Rocks and walls in Maastricht Rare Garden plant of Mediterranean origin
Common alder (Alnus glutinosa) Coppice wood outside the Boschpoort Relatively common Probably planted by the garrison 
Grey alder (Alnus incana) Coppice wood outside the Boschpoort Relatively common Probably planted by the garrison
Wild cherry (Prunus avium) Coppice wood outside the Boschpoort Relatively common Probably planted by the garrison
Aspen (Populus tremula) Coppice wood outside the Boschpoort Relatively common Probably planted by the garrison
Bird cherry (Prunus padus) Coppice wood outside the Boschpoort Relatively common Probably planted by the garrison
White wood­rush (Luzula luzuloides) Coppice wood outside the Boschpoort Rare Also at Fort Willem (see below) 
Wood speedwell (Veronica montana) Coppice wood outside the Boschpoort Rare
Violet helleborine (Epipactis purpurata) Coppice wood outside the Boschpoort near the canal Extinct
Bur­chervil (Anthriscus caucalis) Rampart of the Boschpoort and on the talus (slope)  of a nearby battery (artillery emplacement)
Very rare in 1868.  
Currently rare
Weasel’s snout (Misopates orontium) Outside the Boschpoort Rare Archaeophyte. Also outside the Wijckerpoort (see below)
Golden dock (Rumex maritimus) Outside the Boschpoort Rare
Pepper­saxifrage (Silaum silaus) Outside the Boschpoort Rare
Dwarf elder (Sambucus ebulus) Fortifications outside the Boschpoort Rare
Downy oat­grass (Helictotrichon pubescens) Fortifications and fields outside the Boschpoort Relatively common
Good king Henry (Blitum bonus-henricus) Fortifications and fields outside the Boschpoort Very rare Archaeophyte. Also outside the Wijckerpoort (see below)
Red goosefoot (Oxybasis rubra) Fortifications and fields outside the Boschpoort Relatively common
Red hemp­nettle (Galeopsis ladanum) Fortifications and fields outside the Boschpoort Very rare Also outside the Wijckerpoort (see below)
Round­leaved cranesbill (Geranium rotundifolium) Dry places outside the Boschpoort Rare
Sharp­leaved fluellen (Kickxia elatine) Fields outside the Boschpoort Rare Archaeophyte
White wood rush (Luzula luzuloides) Covered way of Fort Willem (Caberg) Rare Also near the Boschpoort (see above)
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Wild carrot (Daucus carota) Fortifications between the Tongerse Poort and  Brusselse Poort (on the west side of the city) Relatively common
Pink water­speedwell (Veronica catenata) Fortifications between the Tongerse Poort  and Brusselse Poort Very rare
Yellow anemone (Anemone ranunculoides)
Fortifications between the O.L. Vrouwepoort  
(near the Meuse) and Sint­Pieterspoort  
(near the Jeker) on the south side of the city
Rare
Brown sedge (Carex disticha) Ditches of the Sint­Pieterspoort  and O.L. Vrouwepoort Relatively common
Narrow small­reed (Calamagrostis stricta) Ditches of the Sint­Pieterspoort  and O.L. Vrouwepoort Extinct
Fringed water­lily (Nymphoides peltata) Canal between the O.L. Vrouwepoort  and Sint­Pieterspoort Rare
Sulphur cinquefoil (Potentilla recta) Outside the O.L. Vrouwepoort and Sint­Pieterspoort  next to a road leading to the glacis Rare Neophyte
Meadow cranesbill (Geranium pratense) Fortifications outside the O.L. Vrouwepoort Rare
Nottingham catchfly (Silene nutans) Fortifications outside the Sint­Pieterspoort Very rare
Jagged chickweed (Holosteum umbellatum) Walls and fortifications outside the Sint­Pieterspoort Very rare
Thale cress (Arabidopsis thaliana) Talus of a ditch near the Meuse at Sint­Pieter Relatively common
Golden dock (Rumex maritimus) Ditches in the fortifications at Sint­Pieter Rare
Meadow barley (Hordeum secalinum) Glacis fortifications near the Meuse at Sint­Pieter Very rare Also outside the Wijckerpoort (see below)
Grey mouse­ear (Cerastium brachypetalum) Dry places outside fort Sint­Pieter on ramparts Very rare Neophyte
Wood avens (Geum urbanum) Sunken lane near fort Sint­Pieter Relatively common
Wild thyme (Thymus serpyllum) Fortifications Sint­Pietersberg Very rare
Lesser trefoil (Trifolium dubium) Fortifications Sint­Pietersberg Relatively common
Common cottongrass (Eriophorum angustifolium) Old trench in the direction of Kanne Very rare This trench might be a relic of one of the sieges of Maastricht
Black horehound (Ballota nigra subsp. meridionalis) Ditches alongside a road outside the old  Wijckerpoort (on the east side of the Meuse) Rare Archaeophyte
Weasel’s snout (Misopates orontium) Outside the Wijckerpoort Rare Archaeophyte. Also near the Boschpoort (see above)
Good king Henry (Blitum bonus-henricus) Fields and fortifications outside the Wijckerpoort Very rare Archaeophyte. Also near the Boschpoort (see above)
Red hemp­nettle (Galeopsis ladanum) Fields and fortifications outside the Wijckerpoort Very rare Also near the Boschpoort (see above)
Meadow barley (Hordeum secalinum) In the fields outside the Wijckerpoort Very rare Also at Sint­Pieter (see above)
Whorl­grass (Catabrosa aquatic) Ditches in the fortifications at Amby Rare
Reflexed stonecrop (Sedum rupestre) Walls of the fortifications near a dock  on the way to Borgharen Rare
Common water­plantain (Alisma plantago aquatica) Ditches in the fortifications Relatively common
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Marsh­marigold (Caltha palustris subsp. palustris) Ditches in the fortifications  Relatively common
Blue water­speedwell (Veronica anagallis-aquatica) Ditches in the fortifications Rare
Marsh­bedstraw (Galium palustre) Ditches in the fortifications  Relatively common
Fennel pondweed (Potamogeton pectinatus) Ditches in the fortifications Rare
Cuckoo flower (Cardamine pratensis) Humid areas within the fortifications  Relatively common
Dark mullein (Verbascum nigrum) Humid areas within the fortifications  Relatively common
Hedge bedstraw (Galium mollugo) Fields of the fortifications  Relatively common
Germander speedwell (Veronica chamaedrys) Meadows and fields of the fortifications  Relatively common
Fairy flax (Linum catharticum) Dry places in the fortifications  Relatively common
Little yellow rattle (Rhinanthus minor) Dry places in the fortifications  Relatively common
Rough hawk’s­beard (Crepis biennis) Everywhere in the fortifications  Relatively common
Chives (Allium schoenopraum) Fortifications  Relatively common
Cow parsley (Anthriscus sylvestris) Fortifications  Relatively common
Narrow leaved hawk’s­beard (Crepis tectorum) Fortifications Rare Neophyte
Lopsided oat (Avena strigosa) Fortifications  Relatively common Mediterranean grass introduced as fodder
Reed sweet­grass (Glyceria maxima) Fortifications  Relatively common
Hogweed (Heracleum sphondylium) Fortifications  Relatively common
Salad burnet (Sanguisorba minor subsp. minor) Fortifications Rare
Meadow buttercup (Ranunculus acris) Fortifications  Relatively common
Bulbous buttercup (Ranunculus bulbosus) Fortifications  Relatively common
Creeping buttercup (Ranunculus repens) Fortifications  Relatively common
Greater yellow­rattle (Rhinanthus alectorolophus) Fortifications Rare
Curly dock (Rumex crispus) Fortifications  Relatively common
Broad­leaved dock (Rumex obtusifolius) Fortifications  Relatively common
Hybrid dock (Rumex x pratensis) Fortifications  Relatively common
Meadow saxifrage (Saxifraga granulata) Fortifications  Relatively common
Meadow goat’s­beard (Tragopogon pratensis  
subsp. pratensis) Fortifications  Relatively common
Common cornsalad (Valerianella locusta) Fortifications  Relatively common
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